CUR-H05603-99-P7347

Balkan Studies

A BIANNUAL PUBLICATION
OF THE
INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES
(ΙΔΡΥΜΑ ΜΕΛΕΤΩΝ ΧΕΡΣΟΝΗΣΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΑΙΜΟΥ)
THESSALONIKI, GREECE

22

23/12/96
P. 157

Volume 35, Number One Thessaloniki 1994

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P. O. BOX 10611, GR 54110 THESSALONIKI, GREECE

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949.6
B189

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Copy editor: Kostas Christidis
Printed by: S. & J. Sfakianakis Bros Co, Thessaloniki

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Printed in Greece

GR ISSN 0005-4313

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CONSTANTIN PAPOULIDIS

À PROPOS DE L'ŒUVRE DES EMPLOYÉS GRECS DU MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES DE LA RUSSIE IMPÉRIALE AUX XVIIIème, XIXème et XXème SIÈCLES*

En 1809, Alexandre Stourtza, dans son œuvre inédite *Ma vie; Histoire de mon enfance et de ma première jeunesse, écrite pour ma sœur*[1], écrivait ces propos caractéristiques sur lui-même: "Fils de parents émigrés, je ne connais point ma patrie, et je ne tiens à elle que par les souvenirs de mes parents. La Russie est mon pays: tout m'attache à elle, la religion, de devoir, l'habitude et mon cœur"[2]. Je pense que cette phrase conviendrait parfaitement comme introduction à ma communication. C'est ce que pensaient certains Grecs sans patrie, lorsqu'au XIXème siècle ils désirèrent en trouver une et essayèrent par de nombreux moyens d'atteindre leur but. Une des solutions envisageables était d'entrer dans les services diplomatiques de la Russie impériale, car les Grecs gardaient en mémoire la prophétie du "peuple blond" qui devait un jour ressusciter la Grèce. N'oublions pas que Jean Philémon écrivait de façon caractéristique en 1834: "le Grec non seulement n'a joui d'aucun honneur politique face au reste du monde, mais il a été haï, méprisé et même pas jugé digne d'avoir une sépulture à sa mort. Les peuples du Nord au contraire l'ont traité en frère. Auprès d'eux il a trouvé un refuge dans son embarras, un baume dans son malheur, des facilités commerciales, les honneurs militaires et civils, et de sérieux espoirs sur son destin..."[3].

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* Cette communication a été prononcée en russe lors du IVème Congrès d'Histoire (Moscou 6-11 juin 1994) dont le thème était: "La culture grecque dans la Russie du XVIIème au XXème siècles". Ce congrès a été organisé par l'Institut d'Études Balkaniques (Thessalonique) et l'Institut de Slavologie et de Balkanologie de l'Académie des Sciences Russe (Moscou).

[1] Il se trouve actuellement au département des manuscrits de l'Institut Russe de Philologie et de Littérature de Saint-Pétersbourg: IRLI, Fond: 288, Opis' 1, ed. hran 2.

[2] *Op. cit.*, f. 3. Par ailleurs, dans une de ses lettres, A. Stourza présente à Capodistria les traits suivants de sa propre personnalité: "Chrétien orthodoxe, Grec de naissance (Greek po roždeniju), fidèle sujet et, j'ose le dire, dévoué serviteur de l'Empereur" (Archives de la Politique Extérieure de la Russie), AVPR, Fond: Kanceljarija, d. 10233, f. 11, du 10/22 mai 1821. Voir également G. L. Arš, *I. Kapodistrija i grečeskoe nacional'no-osvoboditel'noe dviženie 1809-1822 gg.*, Moscou (Nauka), 1976, p. 222, note 1.

Grâce aux recherches que j'ai effectuées aux archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de Russie pendant les deux dernières décennies, j'ai pu réunir un assez grand nombre de documents qui concernaient les Grecs qui travaillaient dans les services diplomatique de la Russie impériale. On y parle d'environ 100 personnes[4], mais je pense qu'ils étaient beaucoup plus nombreux. Un assez grand nombre d'entre eux y ont demandé asile et ont cherché à y faire carrière. La plupart sont allés vivre dans la société de l'Empire ottoman et les territoires sous domination vénitienne[5]. Avec le passeport russe et leur nomination, c'est au service de la Russie impériale qu'ils ont servi la politique de la Russie, mais aussi leurs compatriotes, qu'ils ont particulièrement aidés politiquement (il est connu qu'ils ont permis à des Grecs d'émigrer de l'Empire ottoman vers la Russie impériale), économiquement (ils ont contribué à l'essor du commerce en Mer Noire et en Méditerranée) et culturellement (ils ont favorisé les arts et les lettres).

Les autorités russes préfèrent envoyer les Grecs, orthodoxes, comme représentants dans les Balkans et généralement en Méditerranée orientale, alors que les autres puissances européennes (bien que cela ne constitue pas une règle) recourent chez les autochtones aux Levantins catholiques romains et aux Juifs séfarades[6].

Mais voyons à présent quelques exemples caractéristiques:

1. Je commencerai par le plus célèbre, Jean Capodistria (1776-1831). Avant de s'installer en Russie, il est *Secrétaire du Territoire* au Sénat des Îles Ioniennes, et ils fonde la Société de Médecine de sa patrie et l'Académie Ionienne. Grâce au poste qu'il occupe en Russie, il aide économiquement des jeunes à étudier. Il les appelle "ses fils adoptifs". Son amour pour les arts

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[3] I. Philémon, *Δοκίμιον Ιστορικόν περί της Φιλικής Εταιρείας* (=.Essai historique sur la Société des Amis), Nauplie 1834, p. 77-78.

[4] AVPR, Fond: Dela Ličnogo Sostava i Hozjaestrennyh Del, Opis' 464 (= Formuljarnye spiski cinovnikov MID Rossii).

[5] V. Uljanskij, "Istoričeskij očerk russkih kosnul'stv za granicej", *Sbornik Moskovskogo Glavnogo Arhiva MID* 6 (1899) 51-546, LXXI-CDLXXIV.

[6] Voir N. C. Pappas, *Greeks in Russian military service in the late 18th and early 19th century*, Thessalonique, 1991, p. 88 (Inst. d'Études Balkaniques, no 219). D'autre part, K. Paléologos écrit au sujet de quelques diplomates grecs de la Russie du XVème et XVIème s. «Έλληνες διπλωμάται εν Ρωσία κατά την ΙΕ' και ΙΖ' εκατονταετηρίδα» (= Les diplomates grecs en Russie au XVème et XVIème siècles), in *Παρνασσός* 10 (1886) 32-39.

et les lettres le conduit (avec Anthimos Gazis, Ignace, l'évêque de Hongrie-Valachie et les Stourtza) à fonder la *Société des Amis des Muses*[7], et, plus tard, *l'École Commerciale Grecque d'Odessa*[8]. Son opposition à la "*Philiki Hétairia*", la Société des Amis, est connue ainsi que sa prise de position négative envers la Révolution des Grecs, mais on sait que lorsque celle-ci éclate commence aussi le dilemme de Capodistria, en raison du poste qu'il occupe en Russie. On connaît bien les raisons de son éloignement du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de la Russie impériale en 1822. Au sujet de sa carrière d'après 1822, tous ses biographes soulignent son œuvre positive dans l'administration centrale de la Suisse et son œuvre importante en tant que Gouverneur de la Grèce (de 1828 à 1831), surtout dans les domaines de l'administration, de l'éducation et de l'Église. Il est assassiné en 1831 à Nauplie[9].

2. Nicolas Vouldis, d'Arta, marchant à Jannina, est interprète à l'Ambassade de Russie à Constantinople jusqu'en 1752. Il est connu tant pour sa contribution dans les contacts entre le Patriarcat Oecuménique et les ambassadeurs de Russie à Constantinople A. A. Vesnjakov (1735, 1740-45) et A. Nepljuev (1746-50) que pour son mémoire (en 1748) qui apporte de nombreux renseignements sur les chrétiens de Dobrudja. C'est ainsi qu'il aide à la diplomatie russe à la veille de la Question d'Orient[10].

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[7] E. Koukkou, *Ο Καποδίστριας και η παιδεία, 1803-1822, Α' Η φιλόμουσος Εταιρεία της Βιέννης* (= Capodistria et l'Education, 1803-1822, 1: La Société des Amis des Muses de Vienne), Athènes 1958.

[8] C'est à cause de son activité que l'Académie des Sciences de Saint-Pétersbourg le choisit comme membre en 1818.

[9] *Αυτοβιογραφία Ιωάννου Καποδίστρια* (= Autobiographie de Jean Capodistria), introduction, traduction et commentaires par Michel Lascaris, Athènes (éd. Galaxias), 1962. E. Koukkou, *Ο Καποδίστριας και η παιδεία, 1803-1822, Α' Η φιλόμουσος Εταιρεία της Βιέννης* (= Capodistria et l'Education, 1803-1822, 1: La Société des Amis des Muses de Vienne). A. Despotopoulos, *Ο Κυβερνήτης Καποδίστριας και η απελευθέρωσις της Ελλάδος* (= Le Gouverneur Capodistria et la libération de la Grèce), Athènes 1954. P. Pétridis, *Η διπλωματική δράσις του Ιωάννη Καποδίστρια υπέρ των Ελλήνων* (= L'activité diplomatique de Jean Capodistria en faveur des Grecs), Thessalonique 1974. G. L. Arš, *I. Kapodistrija i grečeskoe nacional'no-osvoboditel'noe dviženie 1809-1822 gg.*, Moscou (Nauka), 1976.

[10] "Sans exagérer le rôle et la place qui reviennent à N. Bouidi, nous pourrons sereinement affirmer que la Mission russe (à Constantinople) possédait en sa personne un fonctionnaire doté de hautes qualités indiscutables de connaisseur de réalités balkaniques et des problèmes les plus éprouvants pour l'Empire qui s'engageait dans une période nouvelle et orageuse de son existence". R. Mihneva, "L'Empire Ottoman au milieu du XVIIIème s. à travers les rapports d'un natif d'Arta: N. Bouidi - Traits de sa vie et de son activité", *Études Balkaniques* 1992, tome 2-4, p. 32.

3. Panos Bitsilis[11] à Chimarra, Guikas Bitsilis à Céphalonie, et Zachos Bitsilis à Avlona jouent un rôle important dans le recrutement de marins volontaires à la fin du XVIIIème siècle. D'autres offrent des services similaires, comme Lymbérakis Bénakis à Corfou, Damien Zagoréos à Zanthe, Dimitri Nicolaou à Ithaque, Spiridon Varoukas à Trieste et Antoine Palladoclis en Dalmatie. Zachos Bitsilis, plus tard, lorsqu'il s'installe en Russie comme commerçant, fait construire une école dans son village de Drymades dans la province de Jannina[12].

4. L'homme de lettres céphalonien Spyridon Destounis (1782-1848), père du professeur Gabriel Destounis (1818-1895), est consul de la Russie impériale à Smyrne. Lorsqu'est proclamée la Révolution grecque et malgré les déclarations officielles de G. A. Stoganov qui soutiennent que la Russie n'a pas incité à l'insurrection[13], Spyridon Destounis, au péril de sa vie, sauve, à Smyrne, nombre de ses compatriotes du massacre turc. D'ailleurs, lui-même se réfugie en Russie à la suite des événements de Smyrne en 1821. Le soutien de la famille Destounis envers les arts et les lettres est célèbre. Leurs œuvres inédites, qui se trouvent au département des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Saltykov-Ščedrin[14], rappelleront aux jeunes chercheurs la présence culturelle de ces intellectuels de Céphalonie dans l'ancienne capitale de la Russie.

5. Constantin Rodofinikis (Rodofinikin) (1760-1838) commence sa carrière dans la marine de guerre de la Russie impériale pour la poursuivre dans les services diplomatiques russes. On sait qu'il offre de grands services à la politique russe de 1806 à 1807 grâce à sa présence et sa participation aux

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[11] Voir: "Ordres donnés par Catherine II au Général Jean Zaborovski en l'an 1878", K.A. Paléologos, «Ρωσικά περί Ελλάδος έγγραφα νυν το πρώτον εις την ελληνικήν μεθερμηνευόμενα» (= Documents russes sur la Grèce traduits pour la première fois en grec), *Παρνασσός* 1 (1877) 918 (où l'on parle de Panos Bitsilis en tant que "lieutenant consul Panos Bitsilis").

[12] N. C. Pappas, *Greeks in Russian military service in the late 18th and early 19th century*, p. 87.

[13] On sait que G. A. Stroganov, par une de ses circulaires du 17/29 mai 1821 aux consulats de la Russie impériale de la Mer Noire et de la Méditerranée Orientale et *qui a été transmise par les autorités ottomanes*, demande que soit empêché le transport des machines de guerre par bateau sous pavillon russe et qu'on arrête la piraterie. On peut voir encore a ce sujet: *Vnešjaja Politika Rossii XIX i načala XX veka; Dokumenty rossijskogo ministerstva inostrannyh del; Serija vtoraja; 1815-1830;* t. 4 (12), Mart 1821 g.-Dekabr' 1822 g., Moscou, 1980, document no 61 (p. 158-159) et note no 52 (p. 637).

[14] Pour davantage de précisions, v. Th. Proussis, "The Destunis Collection in the manuscripts section of the Saltikov-Ščedrin State public Library in Leningrad", *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 5 (1989) 395-452.

événements de Valachie et de Serbie. Plus tard, entre 1819 et 1837, il est nommé directeur à la Direction des Affaires Asiatiques du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de la Russie imperiales, Direction dont dépendent aussi les affaires balkaniques[15].

6. Alexandre Stourtza (1791-1854), dont nous avons déjà parlé, travaille pour les intérêts russes en veillant toujours à aider ses compatriotes. En 1809, il est nommé comme stagiaire au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et, en 1811, interprète. En 1812, il accompagne l'amiral P. V. Cicagov, chef des forces armées russes, au Danube et, en 1815, il accompagne Capodistria à Paris. En 1816, il publie son mémoire sur le comportement des Jésuites en Russie (*Considérations sur la doctrine et l'esprit de l'Église orthodoxe,* Stuttgart, 1816) et c'est la même année que les Jésuites sont chassés de Russie par un *oukase* impérial du 23 décembre. Avant 1821, il fait partie, comme Capodistria, des Grecs conservateurs et modérés qui croient qu'avant de secouer le joug étranger il faut avoir réalisé la renaissance intellectuelle. Après 1821, tout comme Capodistria, il contribue au combat avec sa plume et ses activités diplomatiques, mais aussi avec ses propres deniers. En 1822, il s'installe dans sa propriété des environs d'Odessa où, avec sa sœur, la comtesse R. Edling, in dirige la "Fondation Stourtza". Soutenant que l'insurrection de la Grèce a un caractère non pas social mais de libération et national, il écrit le livre: *La Grèce en 1821 et 1822; correspondance politique publiée par un Grec* (Paris, P. Dufard, 1823)[16]. Parmi ses œuvres inédites, son manuscrit *Duhovnaja žizn'i duhovnaja slovesnost na Vostoke* présente un certain intérêt. Il y examine d'abord la situation à Constantinople puis à Athènes. Il termine avec la phrase Θεὸς καὶ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιεῖ (= Dieu ni la nature n'agissent en vain) (Odessa, 12 mars 1853)[17].

7. De 1833 à 1836, trois Grecs, Gabriel Catacazy et Jean Paparrigopoulos de la Société des Amis, et Théodore Lélis, qui font partie de la délégation diplomatique russe à Athènes, travaillent pour les intérêts de la Russie, aident le parti des *Napistes* ou des *Moujiks* (qui sont les noms caractéristiques des membres du parti russe en Grèce), et aident de leurs deniers le mouvement

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[15] Pour davantage de précisions, v. Sot. Sotiriou, "Κ. Κ. Ροδοφοινίκιν..." (= K. K. Rodofinikin...), *Ενδοχώρα* 1991, tome 18, p. 16-22.

[16] Il écrit sur le même sujet à J. Capodistria le 2/14 avril 1821: "Cependant il importe de parler hautement à la conscience des monarques de l'Europe. Il importe de leur dire que la cause des chrétiens d'Orient ne doit jamais être confondue avec celle des révolutionnaires de France, d'Italie et d'Espagne...", *Vnešnjaja Politika Rossii XIX i načala XX veka...*, document no 36, p. 95.

[17] IRLI, Fond 231/III, 11.10, f. 11^{v}.

pour l'abolition du caractère autocéphale de l'Église de Grèce; ils suivent les mouvements des missionnaires américains (en particulier de King et de Hill), et, en même temps, fournissent des renseignements sur tout cela au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de Saint-Pétersbourg. Là-bas, au Ministère, de 1819 à 1837, le Directeur est un autre Grec, Constantin Rodofinikis (1760-1838), dont nous avons parlé plus haut[18].

8. Anghélos Moustoxydis (1780-1861), parent de l'homme de lettres André Moustoxydis, entré dans les services de la diplomatie russe en 1805. Il est nommé à Patras, dans les Dardanelles et à Thessalonique (1830-61). Il aide beaucoup les habitants chrétiens de Thessalonique qui souffrent de l'arbitraire des Turcs. Il vient en aide et protège son homologue grec dans la même ville, Théodore Vallianos. Il libère les grecs prisonniers des Turcs. En 1845, il écrit une lettre de recommandation qu'il adresse au Protaton pour le slavologue russe V. Grigorovič lorsque celui-ci désire se rendre au Mont Athos[19]. Enfin, en 1860, il détourne le célèbre chef de rébellion Tsamis Caratasso de l'organisation d'une révolution à Thessalonique: en raison de la puissante force armée basée dans la région, la révolution est condamnée d'avance et la population risque un bain de sang[20].

9. On sait que la famille Kapnissis est originaire de Constantinople et qu'une branche a émigré à Venise au XIVème siècle. Une autre branche s'installe dans les Îles Ioniennes. Antoine Kapnissis (1742-1812) est membre du Gouvernement Central des Îles Ioniennes lorsque les Russes s'en emparent en 1798. Une branche de la famille quitte les Îles pour s'installer en Russie. On connaît en Russie, sous le nom de "Kapnist", Antoine, fils de César et dont nous venons de parler, Dionyssios, fils de Marc, l'écrivain Basile, fils de

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[18] Pour plus de précisions v. AVPR, Fond: DLS I HD; Opis' 464, d. 2565 (= Paparigopulo). C. Papoulidis, «Ρωσικό ενδιαφέρον για την Εκκλησία της Ελλάδος την εποχή του Όθωνα με βάση έγγραφα του Αρχείου Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής της Ρωσίας» (= L'intérêt russe pour l'Église de Grèce à l'époque d'Othon, à partir des documents des Archives de la Politique Extérieure de la Russie), *Θεολογία* 57 (1986) 765-776.

[19] V. Grigorovič, *Očerk putešestvija po Evropejskoj Turcij*, Moscou, 1877, p. 11.

[20] Pour plus de précisions v. G. Toussimis, "Angélos Moustoxydis, Consul de Russie à Thessalonique (1830-1861), protecteur de la population chrétienne et du consulat de Grèce", *Les relations entre les peuples de l'URSS et les Grecs, fin du XVIIIème-début du XXème*, Thessaloniki, 1992, p. 167-173 (Institute for Balkan Studies, no 229). C. Papoulidis, "Quelques éléments nouveaux concernant les plans insurrectionnels de Tsami Caratasso sur la délivrance des peuples balkaniques en 1860", *Greek-Serbian Cooperation 1830-1908*, Belgrade, 1982, p. 107-110 (Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Institute for Balkan Studies).

Basile[21] et la poétesse Eugénie, fille de Pierre, qui épouse en 1909 Jean Dragassis-Paléologue[22]. De la famille Kapnist, Dimitri et Pierre, fils d'Alexis, Pierre, fils de Nicolas, et Michel, fils de Pierre, entrent dans les services de la diplomatie de la Russie impériale[23].

10. L'homme de lettres André Papadopoulo-Vrétos (1800-1876)[24] entre, après l'assassinat de Capodistria, dans la diplomatie de la Russie impériale comme traducteur. Il semble qu'il ne peut y rester car il publie plus tard à Paris: *Un Grec très-dévoué à la Russie, victime du chancelier de cet empire, le prince Gortchacoff*, Paris, Marseille, 1873. Quelques années plus tôt, il écrit une brochure en français: *les douze années du règne d'Alexandre II, empereur de Russie, par André Papadopoulo-Vrétos, auteur des "mémoires biographiques-historiques sur le président de la Grèce, le Comte Jean Capodistrias"*, Paris, 1867, qu'il envoie en 1869 à N. D. Kiselev, "ambassadeur de S. M. l'empereur Alexandre II", qui est nommé en France entre 1841 et 1854 et en Italie entre 1864 et 1869[25]. Malgré tous ses efforts, André Papadopoulo-Vrétos ne parvient pas à réintégrer les services de la diplomatie russe.

[21] P. N. Berkov, *Russkie dramaturgi; Vassilij Vassil'evič Kapnist (1757-1823)*, Moscou-Léningrad, 1950.

[22] Emm. G. Kapsambélis, *Τι οφείλει η Ρωσία εις την Ελλάδα* (= Ce que doit la Russie à la Grèce), Athènes 1947, p. 94-102. El. Pavlidis (édition): *Ο Ελληνισμός της Ρωσίας και τα 33 χρόνια του εν Αθήναις σωματείου των εκ Ρωσίας Ελλήνων* (= L'Hellénisme de Russie et les 33 ans de la corporation des Grecs de Russie à Athènes), Athènes 1953, p. 155-157.

[23] AVPR, Fond: DLS I HD, Opis' 464, no 1609, 1610, 1611 et 1611a.

[24] Il est connu surtout pour les œuvres suivantes: a) *Κατάλογος των από της πτώσεως της Κωνσταντινουπόλεως μέχρι το 1821 τυπωθέντων βιβλίων παρ' Ελλήνων εις την ομιλουμένην ή εις την αρχαίαν ελληνικήν γλώσσαν...* (= Catalogue des livres publiés depuis la Chute de Constantinople jusqu'en 1821 par des Grecs en langue grecque parlée ou en langue grecque ancienne...), Athènes, 1845. Cet ouvrage a eu une seconde édition: *Νεοελληνική φιλολογία ήτοι κατάλογος των από της πτώσεως της βυζαντινής αυτοκρατορίας μέχρι εγκαθιδρύσεως της εν Ελλάδι βασιλείας τυπωθέντων βιβλίων παρ' Ελλήνων εις την ομιλουμένην ή εις την αρχαίαν ελληνικήν γλώσσαν...* (= Lettres néo-helléniques, à savoir le catalogue des livres publiés par des Grecs en langue grecque parlée ou en langue grecque ancienne depuis la Chute de l'Empire byzantin jusqu'au rétablissement de la royauté en Grèce), 1ère partie, Athènes, 1854, 2ème partie, Athènes, 1857. b) *Mémoires biographiques-historiques sur le Président de la Grèce, le Comte Jean Capodistrias...*, tome 1er, Paris, 1837, tome 2ème, Paris, 1838. c) *Notizie Biographiche-storiche su Federico conte du Guilford... - Βιογραφικά - Ιστορικά υπομνήματα περί του κόμητος Φρειδερίκου Γυίλφορδ...*, Athènes, 1876.

[25] Pour davantage de précisions, v. C. Papoulidis, «Έγγραφα Ελλήνων διπλωματικών υπαλλήλων του 19ου αι. από τη βιβλιοθήκη Lenin της Μόσχας» (= Documents des employés diplomatiques grecs du XIXème s. de la Bibliothèque Lénien de Moscou), *Ελληνικά* 31 (1979), p. 156-158.

11. Il existe aussi les pages noires de l'histoire des services des Grecs dans la diplomatie russe: en 1867 se trouve en poste à Mytilène "le sieur Georges Amiras, vice-consul de Russie", qui "faisait du commerce pas toujours par des moyens les plus honnêtes et les plus justes et qui fut cause de nombreuses injustices". Pour cette raison, "les habitants de Mytilène", dans le mémoire qu'ils adressent à l'ambassadeur de la Russie Impériale Ignatief, avec 90 signatures, demandent son remplacement[26]. Bien entendu, l'exception confirme la règle et le cadre général du sujet.

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[26] AVPR, Fond: Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole, Opis' 517/2, delo 1812, ff 83-84r.



ῥήματος ἡμῶν διὰ τὸ ἔχῃ εὑρεῖν ὑπο-
δοχῆς παρὰ τῇ μεγαλοδόξῳ προνοίᾳ τῆς
Ὑμ. Ἐξοχότητος.
Ἐν βαθυτάτῳ σεβασμῷ ὑποσημειούμεθα
Τῆς Ὑμ. Ἐξοχότητος
δοῦλοι ταπεινότατοι
Οἱ κάτοικοι Μυτιλήνης



Les 90 signatures des habitants de Mytilène au mémoire adressé, en 18 mars 1867, à l'ambassadeur de la Russie Impériale Ignatief.
Arhiv Vnešnej Politiki Rossii (= Archives de la Politique Extérieure de la Russie), Moscou, Fond: Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole, Opis' 517/2, delo 1812, ff. 84-84ᵛ.

ELISABETH KONTOGIORGI

FORCED MIGRATION, REPATRIATION, EXODUS. THE CASE OF GANOS-CHORA AND MYRIOPHYTO-PERISTASIS ORTHODOX COMMUNITIES IN EASTERN THRACE*

The phenomenon of forced migration of populations and the refugee problem in the Balkans are directly connected with the rise of nationalism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Conflicting nationalisms in the region effected decisively the lives and fortunes of the national "minorities" which, after the wars, found themselves enclosed within the various newly-formed national states.

The object of this paper is a survey of the factors leading to the population changes in the Greek communities of the rural dioceses (ecclesiastical provinces) of Ganos-Chora and Myriophyto-Peristasis in Eastern Thrace, largely resulting from the forced migration and the repatriation of their inhabitants between 1913-1923. This period was the harbinger of their compulsory migration in accordance with terms of the Convention for the exchange of populations signed at Lausanne (30.1.1923) and which, for the first time, brought to the fore the concept of the exchange of populations as a means of solving the differences between states with common borders which lay claim to ethnologically mixed regions[1].

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* The following essay is based on a paper presented at the Symposium "Aspects of the Asia Minor Question. Historical Approach and Implications", held at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Department of Modern and Contemporary History and Folklore, on the 16th-17th October 1992. It draws upon unpublished archival material from both the General State Archives and the A. A. Pallis Archive. The Greek text is to be included in the Proceedings of the Symposium.

[1] For the negotiations between Greece and Turkey in 1914, regarding a likely exchange of populations, see Yannis G. Mourelos, "The 1914 Percecutions and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey", *Balkan Studies*, vol. 26, Thessaloniki 1985, 389-413. The exchange of populations between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, in accordance with the Convention signed by the two governments in Adrianople (2/15 November 1913), in effect confirmed a de facto situation which resulted from the wars and affected the minority populations settled within a twenty kilometre-wide zone along the borders between the two states. Dimitris K. Svolopoulos, *Η Θράκη υπό την Ελληνικήν*

The communities under examination here were established in the region of the Holy Mount (Tekfur Dağ) of the Gallipoli peninsular, along the Propontis coast. Administratively they belonged to the two sub-governorships (*kaza*): "Myriophyto" and "Peristasis" and ecclesiastically, to the two church provinces: "Ganos-Chora" and "Myriophyto-Peristasis", which up till 1919, came under the jurisdiction of the Gallipoli *sancak*[2] of the *vilâyεt* of Adrianople[3]. The two divisions, the governmental and the clerical, did not coincide. In the archives of the Sees, however, their boundaries are quite distinct—a fact which allow us to define them with precision, thus avoiding the confusion which often accompanies this issue. The villages and the towns under the sub-governoships can be found in the tables in the Appendix. The church provinces were made up as follows: 1) Ganos-Chora: Chora, Ganos, Avdimion, Milio, Leptochorion (İnceköy), Kastampolis, Kerassia, Neochorion, Sendoukion, Palamoution, Eirenochorion. 2) Myriophyto-Peristasis: Myriophyto, Platanos, Kalamitsion, Peristasis, Herakleitsa, Sterna, Loupida, Yeniköy, Limniski (Gölcük), Kalodendro (Yağac). Ethnically, the majority group within these two sub-governorships was Greek[4]. In 1912, according to the Greek Bureau of Foreign Information, the composition of the population in the two kazas was as follows[5]:

Διοίκησιν (Thrace under Greek Administration), Constantinople 1922, 111-113. St. P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities. Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, New York 1932, 18-20; Dimitris Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its impact upon Greece*, Paris-The Hague 1962, 54-55.

[2] The sub-governorship of Myriophyto came under the sancak of Rhaidestos after 1919. The sub-governorship of Peristasis remained under the sancak of Gallipoli. See Γενικά Αρχεία του Κράτους (ΓΑΚ), Αρχείον Μητροπολίτου Ελευθερουπόλεως Σωφρονίου: K85, Φ. K85γ, «Στατιστικαί Μυριοφύτου» (General State Archives, henceforward ΓΑΚ, Archive of the Metropolite of Eleftheroupolis Sophronios K85, F. K85γ, «Statistics of Myriophyto»); and Παράρτημα ΦΕΚ, τεύχ. 2, αρ. φύλ. 4 (Appendix of the Government Gazette, issue, 2, 4), Adrianople 18.9.1921.

[3] ΓΑΚ, K85γ, "Statistics of Myriophyto: academic year 1919/20. Administrative division".

[4] Figures concerning the Greek population within the two dioseses at the end of the 19th century in Stathis Psaltis, *Η Θράκη και η δύναμις του εν αυτή Ελληνικού στοιχείου* (Thrace and the Power therein of the Greek component), Athens 1919, 150-165. The author draws upon statistics from different sources and, therefore, the numbers are not very consistent. Furthermore, the rounded figures clearly indicate that this source is not wholly reliable.

[5] *Statistics of the Population of Thrace and Asia Minor, prepared by the Greek Bureau of Foreign Information*, London 1912.

	Myriophyto		*Peristasis*	
Turks	2.935	(19,60%)	1.569	(7,55%)
Greeks	12.046	(80,40%)	19.206	(92,45%)
Total	14.981		20.775	

The Greek population, both urban and rural, was the most dynamic and productive element of the local population and made its presence felt in all sectors of the social and economic life of the area[6]. Its blooming economic status at the beginning of the twentieth century is reflected in the substantial number of educational, cultural and religious institutions which the communities maintained[7]. The diocese of Myriophyto-Peristasis in 1911 had 22 churches, 19 priests and 11 primary schools at which 988 pupils were enrolled[8]. In 1912 there were, between the two dioceses, 39 Greek schools which employed 58 teachers and had a pupil population of 4.206 school-boys and girls[9].

The Problem with Statistics

The credibility of sources making reference to statistical data pertaining to the populations of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century has continually perturbed historians because the interested states frequently used quantitative information to support their political propaganda.

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[6] For the economic status and activities of the Greek population in these two dioceses see Aggelos Germides, «Τα Γανόχωρα της Ανατολικής Θράκης. Πόνημα Ιστορικό, Γεωγραφικό και Λαογραφικό», *Θρακικά* (Ganochora of Eastern Thrace. Historical, Geographic and Folklore Essay. Thrakika), vol. 46, 1972-73, 188 - 239. Also M. Maravelakis - A. Vacalopoulos, *Οι Προσφυγικές εγκαταστάσεις στην περιοχή Θεσσαλονίκης* (Refugee Settlements in Thessaloniki district), Thessaloniki 1993 (reprint): 138-141 (İnceköy), 200-203 (Gölcük), 203-206 (Palamoution), 206-207 (Yağac), 449-454 (Avthimion), 463-468 (Kerassia) and 471-477 (Peristasis).

[7] The rise in the number of educational institutions is related to the policy of the Greek state. Greek nationalism, from the Independence of Greece onwards, focused on the liberation of the unredeemed brethen and the annexation of areas which were left outside the borders of the national state. Education became the channel for communication between the national centre and the Orthodox Christian communities within the Ottoman Empire. The commission of teachers and books to the Orthodox Christian communities through a centralised educational system from the mid-19th century aimed at establishing links between the national centre and the "imagined communities of Hellenism". See Paschalis Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities" and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans, in *Modern Greece, Nationalism and Nationality*, edited by M. Blinkhorn and Th. Veremis, Athens 1990, 23-66; Eleni D. Belia, «Έκθεση Στυλιανού Γονατά περί Θράκης, 1907», *Δελτίον Ιστορικής και Εθνολογικής Εταιρείας* (The Stylianos Gonatas' report on Thrace, 1907, Bulletin of the Historical and Ethnological Society), 4, 1981, 244-250.

[8] ΓΑΚ, Κ 85γ, *op. cit.*

[9] "Statistics of the Greek Population, Schools and Teachers of the vilâyet of Adrianople in 1912, Table XVI", in *Statistics of the Population of Thrace...*, London 1912.

The objectivity of Greek statistical figures referring to the population of the Christian communities within the Ottoman Empire has often been doubted by historian-demographers who use figures from Ottoman sources. Because the statistics of Ottoman censuses present a different picture of the Greek population within the Ottoman provinces, reservations have been expressed about the way the Greek statistics have been compiled and their credibility has been considered questionable from a scientific point of view. It has been claimed that they have been put together by politicians, that they present a magnified Greek population and that they were used for the promotion of Greek national pursuits in the region[10]. Cross-referencing of sources and statistics, however, allows us to draw certain conclusions and to approach the matter in a completely new light[11].

According to the published Ottoman sources, the population of the two sub-governorships in question was in 1914 as follows[12]:

	Myriophyto		*Peristasis*	
Muslims	2.730	(16,18%)	5.604	(33,73%)
Greeks	14.146	(83,82%)	11.009	(66,27%)
Total	16.876		16.613	

As mentioned in the introduction to these statistics which were published by the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior, figures were drawn from the 1905/6 census to which was added the number of births and from which was subtracted the number of deaths occuring during the intervening period[13]. These statistics are, as a consequence, the result of reckonings which were, of course, based on official registers but not by taking a census of the population, the composition of which had changed in Eastern Thrace as well as in Asia Minor, due to migrations which had taken place after the Balkan Wars and as regards both the Muslim and the Greek elements.

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[10] Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities, The Population of Ottoman Anatolia at the end of the Empire*, New York University Press 1983, 89-99 (in particular p. 90).

[11] For a more comprehensive exposition of the problems ensuing from the available statistics see P. M. Kitromilides - A. Alexandris, "Ethnic Survival, Nationalism and Forced Migration", *Δελτίον Κέντρου Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών* (Bulletin of Asia Minor Studies), vol. V, Athens 1985, 23-24. The authors relying upon the material of the Historical Archive of the Greek Minority for Foreign Affairs establish that the Greek State in co-operation with the Greek consuls in the Ottoman Empire and the Ecumenical Patriarchate carried out a systematic census of the populations of the Orthodox communities between 1910-1912. The questionnaire circulated by the Patriarchate to the Archbishops of the dioceses asked for a detailed account of the inhabitants, the schools, the churches e.t.c. The structure of this questionnaire complies with that of the tables of statistics presented in the Archive of Metropolite Sophronios.

[12] Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914, Demographic and Social Characteristics*, University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, 170, Table I.17.A: "Ottoman Population, 1914 (R 1330)". Source: Ministry of the Interior, Directorate General of the Administration of Population Registers, *Memalik-i Osmaniyyenin 1330 Senesi Nüfus Istatistiki* (Population Statistics of the Ottoman State in the Year 1914), Istanbul 1919.

We endeavour, further on, to present certain factors regarding the population of the two sub-governorships of Myriophyto and Peristasis, and to estimate the effects of the wars and persecutions which befell the inhabitants, drawing upon information from the statistical accounts of the Archive of the Metropolite of Eleftheroupolis, Sophronios. We trust that some light will be thrown on an aspect of the problem concerning the population of the Greek communities in this part of Eastern Thrace.

The results of the census taken by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as regards the sub-governorships of Myriophyto and Peristasis, can be seen in Table 1. Their credibility is further reinforced by the fact that the Christian communities were obliged to make contributions to the Patriarchate in proportion to their population and it is, therefore, natural to conclude that there were no attempts made to inflate the number of inhabitants for the sake of economic policy[14]. For the year 1912, we only have figures for the sub-governorship of Myriophyto from an account of the Metropolite who toured the district, after a devastating earth-quake in that same year, in order to record casualties and material damage[15] (see Table 3).

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[13] *Op. cit.*, Notes to Table I.1.7.A. McCarthy Justin, in *The Arab World, Turkey and the Balkans (1878-1914). A Handbook of Historical Statistics*, Boston, Mass. 1982, draws upon the same source. He does not, however, mention anything about the way in which these statistics were compiled by the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior. He limits himself to noting that these are the most analytical and reliable published statistics referring to the Ottoman populations before the I World War, and condemns the stand of Western politicians who purposely ignored them, though they were available from 1918, but relied on other statistics more aligned with their own political pursuits; see p. 54-55.

[14] Nikolaos I. Pantazopoulos, «Εκκλησία και δίκαιον εις την Χερσόνησον του Αίμου επί Τουρκοκρατίας», *Επιστημονική Επετηρίς Σχολής Νομικών και Οικονομικών Επιστημών, ΑΠΘ* (The Church and the Law in the Aimos Peninsula during the Tourkokratia, Yearbook of the Department of Legal and Economic Studies, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki), vol. 8, 1960-63, 685-775.

[15] Metropolite Serafeim reports 704 deaths and 118 heavily injured persons as a result of the earthquake, ΓΑΚ, Κ85ε, «Καταγραφή Γανοχώρων» (Account of Ganos-Chora), 27th July, 1912.

Persecution-Forced Migration

The population distribution of these two dioceses of Eastern Thrace changes after 1913. Ideological, political and strategical reasons, in the main, but also practical reasons, caused the violent displacement of the Greek communities and brought the concept of population exchange into the diplomatic arena.

On the idealogical level, the concept of exchanging populations in order to achieve ethnic purity within the Ottoman Empire was part of the Young Turks' modernization programme. Typical of this attitude is the statement of Nazım Bey (one of the representatives and theoriticians of the Young Turks Movement) to a Greek journalist in Smyrna, 1908: "We intend, and we intend at any cost whatsoever, to assimilate, under the Ottoman ideal, the ethnic components within our domain, so that one may no longer talk of majorities and minorities, of Greeks and Turks, of Armenians and Israelites, one may no longer say "we" and "you". So that Christianity, Islam or Judaism may not prevail and disunite the people, but that the ideal of one Ottoman fatherland may prevail and unite them, a fatherland whose devoted children we shall all be without exception ... and we shall elevate our (Islamic) schools to this perfection on the basis of European programmes and with the assistance of European co-ordinators, so that not only Moslems but the Greeks themselves will close up the ranks of our schools..."[16].

Under this new order of things, which was further developed after the Balkan Wars, the bid for cultural uniformity became the most significant characteristic of Turkish nationalism. The notion of a multi-national, multicultural Empire was abandoned altogether by the Turkish nationalists. The new bid called for the immediate and thorough assimilation of the empire's Christian subjects or, if that were not feasible, for their forced migration or, if needs be, for their extermination[17]. At the same time, the unredeeming policy of the Greek state further encouraged the Young Turks' policy.

The fall of European Turkey after the Balkan Wars fuelled the adoption of a more aggressive policy towards the Christian communities of the Ottoman Empire. The Great Powers' decision to cede the Eastern Aegean islands to Greece, in February 1914, aggravated the situation. The danger of even more territorial losses, particularly in view of the islands proximity to the Western coast of Asia Minor which was inhabited by hundreds of thousands of Greeks, rendered the danger even more immediate. The deterioration of diplomatic relations between Greece and Turkey, following the Ottoman government's refusal to recognise the annexation of the islands, was quelled with the intervention of the Great Powers. Nevertheless. the repercussions of this decision were not confined to the diplomatic sphere. In the spring of 1913, the Turks began the systematic persecution of their Greek subjects in a large number of towns and villages of Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor[18].

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[16] *Οι διωγμοί των Ελλήνων εν Θράκη και Μικρά Ασία, Αυθεντικαί εκθέσεις και επίσημα κείμενα* (The Percecutions of the Greeks in Thrace and Asia Minor. Authentic Expositions and Official Documents), Athens 1915, 2.

[17] Ahmad Feroz, *The Young Turks*, Oxford, 1969 and Ergil Doğu, "A Reassessment: the Young Turks, their politics and anti-Colonial Struggle", *Balkan Studies*, vol. 16, 2, Thessaloniki 1975.

The aim of the policy was to alter the ethnological composition of the above regions and to reinforce the Ottoman component through the settlement of Muslims who could also offer defence in the eventuality of an invasion[19]. Immediately after the Balkan Wars, a wave of migration of Muslims, from virtually all regions of the formerly Ottoman Macedonia, took place: from the Greek (Central and Eastern), the Serbian (the *vilâyets* of Monastir and Kossovo) and the Bulgarian (the *kazas* of Strumnitsa, Razlog and Neurokopion). This migration of Muslims, was to a point, the natural consequence of the political changes brought about by the wars, but rapidly increased due to Young Turks propaganda. A considerable number of Muslims emigrated from Macedonia in order to avoid retaliatory acts on the part of the Christians. Some, fearing that a new cycle of hostilities was imminent and others, to exclude the possibility of becoming themselves subordinate to those whom they had, until then, under their power[20]. The Moslems of the above regions were, however, also incited to emigrate by Turkish government agents with promises of taking over the properties of Christian subjects. According to the statistics of the Turkish Migration Office, the number of Muslims who migrated to Turkey up till 1914 totalled 413.912, of whom 132.500 were settled in Eastern Thrace, in the *vilâyet* of Adrianople[21]. Under physical and

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[18] Margaritis Evaggelidis, *Υπόμνημα περί των δικαιωμάτων και παθημάτων των εστιών του πολιτισμού Μικράς Ασίας και Θράκης* (Memorandum on the Rights and Sufferings of the Asia Minor and Thracian Cultural Centres), Athens 1918, 77-103.

[19] Yannis G. Mourelos, *op. cit.*, 389-392.

[20] Historical Archives of Macedonia, General Governorship of Macedonia, F 70 (1913) and F 76 (1914), Reports by the General Governor of Macedonia.

[21] Archive A. A. Pallis, FA, 42: «Σημείωμα εμφαίνον τας αυξομειώσεις ας υπέστη ο πληθυσμός της Ανατολικής Θράκης» (Note Indicating the Fluctuations to the Populations of Eastern Thrace), A. A. Pallis, Athens, 15 February 1921. From Greek lands-regions of Epirus and Macedonia - 143.189 Muslims emigrated between 1915-1920: See Yannis Mourelos, *op. cit.*, 392, n. 15.

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mental pressure from the Young Turks' policy, the Greek subjects were coerced into fleeing to Greece thus making room for the Muslim refugees[22].

The persecution of the Greeks in the two provinces (sub-governorships) beeing studied here, began in 1913 and continued until February 1915. From July 1913, as soon as Eastern Thrace had once more come under Turkish control, pillaging and acts of intimidation and violence against the Greeks began, initially in reprisal for their conduct towards the Turkish population during the Bulgarian occupation when—with the tolerance and encouragement of the Bulgarian forces whose purposes in the region it served—Greeks from the villages of İnceköy, Kastampolis, Palamouti, Sendoukion and Simitli had looted their neighbouring Turkish villages, forcing the inhabitants to take refuge with their fellows further West. The afore-mentioned villages became, as would be expected, the prime target of the nationalist policy of the Turks[23].

The pillaging, persecution and all other imaginable methods of intimidation against the Greeks continued throughout 1913 and were rendered systematic by March 1914, under the direction of the German military mission to Constantinople, led by General Liman von Sanders. Members of the Turkish committee and Turkish refugees, with the tolerance, the encouragement and often with the co-operation of official Turkish authorities committed all kinds of acts of violence in order to coerce the inhabitants of Ganos-Chora and Myriophyto-Peristasis into abandoning their villages: incarceration, degradation, murder, hindrance of agrarian work, coercive tax levies, requisitions and seizures, statute labour, blockading, compulsory recruitment into the Turkish army[24].

Contrary to the protestations of the High Porte to the Greek Government that the local Turkish administration had no part whatsoever in the persecution of the Greek population, as ensues from the reports made by the Metropolites of the two dioceses to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the authorities were in fact directly involved in the events. The harbour-master of Chora, İsmail Bey, the vice-governor of Myriophyto, Cevdet Bey, the mayor of

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[22] According to A. A. Pallis who was General Secretary of the Refugee Committee for the Settlement of Refugees in Macedonia (1914) and later Representative of the "High Commission of Greece to the Central Committee for the Displaced Greek Populations in Constantinople" the number of Greeks expatriated from Eastern Thrace exceeded 100.000 persons, *op. cit.*

[23] Aggelos Germidis, *op. cit.*, 263.

[24] ΓΑΚ, Κ85ε, 3, wherein an analytical exposition by the Metropolite of the "Sufferings [arising from] the [attempted] Extermination on the part of the Turkish Government since 1913" of the eleven towns and villages in the diocese of Ganos-Chora, undated.

.Chora, Behçet and many more junior officials, applying the Young-Turks programme, contributed through their stance, to the displacement of the Greeks and the depopulation of the countryside[25].

The religious authorities did not remain idle against the phenomenon of this forceful expulsion of the Greek population. Knowing full-well the intentions of the Turkish committee, they endeavoured to take measures against the departure of the persecuted and to restrain as many as possible within the area. Thus, the Patriarchate's delegate, Archimandrite Sofronios, proposes, in a letter to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, to cancel a consignment of ships which were to transport the refugees to Greece. The pertinent part of the text reads as follows: "As grave as the suffering of the Greeks of Thrace and Asia Minor may be—for it is indeed grave—it is our duty to remain, by all means, firm in our ancentral lands and not to abandon them. Unfortunately, most of us have been seized by fear thus facilitating, through cowardly flight, the self-same fiendish schemes of the enemies of the nation. The assistance provided to these fugitives by means of a consignment of steamships, as through other means, is, therefore, not commendable. I beseech all who desire the good of the nation not to proceed to actions which facilitate this flight and thus accelerate the evacuation of the Fatherland. May the Lord be with them"[26].

The attempts, on the part of the Patriarchal delegate, to curb the flow of emigration and to help the Christians to resist the designs to eradicate them from their ancestral homes, proved too feeble to avert the plans of the Turkish committee. In fear of revived attacks, the inhabitants refused to return to their villages. Moreover, in most cases it was impossible to do so as their homes and properties had already been occupied by Turkish refugees. Panic-stricken and terrorised as they were, as many as could sold their properties at humiliating prices in order to pay their fares and flee as refugees to Greece. In way of example it is worth mentioning the case of Eirenochorion (Arap-

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25. ΓΑΚ, K85ε: "The government officials active in the desolation of the diocese of Ganos-Chora", undated, and copies of correspondence between the Metropolite Timotheos and the Patriarchate (May 1914) in which the situation is described most drammatically as are the psychological and physical pressures which the authorities used to coerce the Christians into emigrating, Also K85β, where, in a letter dated 12.12.1918, the Metropolite Sofronios, in view of thwarting the likely re-appointment of Cevdet Bey, former *kaymakam* (higher local official) in Myriophyto, makes mention of his activities: "this man is the protagonist of the persecution of the villagers in Milio, Kastampolis e.t.c., the robber of the inhabitants of Myriophyto on whom he imposed all kinds of forced labour and burdens".

26. ΓΑΚ, K85δ, Γ: Letter of the Patriarchal delegate Archbishop Sophronios to Ecumenical Patriarchate, Mikron Frear, 27th May 1914.

Hacı) in the province of Ganos-Chora, which consisted of forty households. On the 8th of Apri 1914, armed Turks from the neighbouring villages descended upon the Greek village and forced the inhabitants to abandon their houses, taking only whatever they could carry, and to seek refuge in the nearest Christian village Simitli, in the province of Herakleia. The latter village suffered a similar fate on the very next day. Many refugees from these two villages then made for the port of Kumbaou and others for Ganos where they sought refuge on board the ships anchored there. The Metropolite of Ganos-Chora, Timotheos, tried to encourage the population and convince them to remain. The administration of Myriophyto, however, aimed at deterring the return of the refugees to their homes. Such inhabitants of Eirenochorion as did venture to return, were driven away by the Turkish refugees who had, in the meantime, occupied their houses. In spite of their promises to intervene and expel the Turkish refugees, the administration of Rhaidestos dallied and in effect encouranged the occupiers. The result was that, the remaining inhabitants of Eirenochorion who were famished after their ordeals, boarded ships in Kumbaou and fled as refugees to Thessaloniki[27].

The plight of the maltitudes collected in the ports, the famine and the generally deplorable living conditions, eventually caused the Metropolite to support the locals' plea to fly. "As a result of their vicissitudes, the inhabitants of Kastampolis and İnceköy can by no means be convinced to return to; I can only support their plea to depart from Ganos, in view of unbearable hunger which scourges all, without exclusion, both themselves and us; situation hopeless; panic has seized all; fate of Sendoukion unknown; Milio has been uprooted; Avthimion is preparing to flee; We are starving"[28].

It is essential to make a distinction between the inhabitants of this region who were forced to emmigrate to Greece and another category of Thracians, in the main from the *sancak* of Adrianople, who, though fewer in number, had emigrated to Greece in 1913, immediately after the Balkan wars. They had, in effect, little other choice because their commercial activities after the Balkan Wars had been abruptly curbed by the ensuing territorial changes. Furthermore, the material and moral destruction brought about by the wars had rendered their stay precarious[29]. In contrast, the displacement of the

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[27] ΓΑΚ, Κ85ε, 3, copy of "Report on the evacuated villages of the diocese of Ganos-Chora to the venerable Patriarchate on the 21st of June 1914" by the Metropolite of Ganos-Chora Timotheos.

[28] ΓΑΚ, Κ85ε, γ, copy of a telegraph sent by the Metropolite of Ganos-Chora Timotheos to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, no. of Protocol 04522, 20th May 1914.

[29] Historical Archives of Macedonia, General Governorship of Macedonia, copy of

Christian populations of Ganos-Chora and Myriophyto-Peristasis was immediate and permanent, an end-result of sociopolitical pressures due to the nationalist crisis and concerned, in most cases, the total populations of the villages displaced[30].

The villages evacuated during the persecution of 1914 were the following: Eirenochorion or Arap-Hacı (280 inhabitants), Neochorion (1.400 inhab.), Leptochorion or İnceköy (1.800 inhab.), Kastampolis (1.200 inhab.), Milio (1.500 inhab.), and Sendoukion (600 inhab.). In total 6.780 people. A significant number of people were also expelled from Palamoution[31]. According to another source the displaced from the diocese of Ganos-Chora in 1914 numbered 7.018 people[32].

The expulsion of the Greek population of Eastern Thrace, with the exception of the towns Adrianople, Rhaidestos and a few more areas, was completed during the course of the European War. At the outbreak of the war, the Ganos-Chora region found itself within the war zone and became a supply dump for the Turkish forces. Every economic activity came to a halt and faminé became widespread. Some people from the villages Loupida and Sterna, as well as from Peristasis, encouranged by the presence of the allied naval forces, made a bid for autonomy[33]. This eventuality offered the occasion for a second wave of expulsion. This time in the way of forced migration within the Ottoman Empire, to the hinterland of Asia Minor. According to the reports of the Metropolite of Gallipoli, who in August of 1915 called on the refugees in Asia Minor in order to propose measures to be taken for their rescue, those exiled from Myriophyto were: 485 people from Neochorion (Yeniköy), 1.250 from Loupida (Araplı), and 475 from Limniski (Gölcük)[34].

"Report by the General Consul in Adrianople, Mavroudis", no. of Protocol 88, 20th April 1914.

[30] Similar and even more tragic conditions arising from the persecutions forced the inhabitants of other parts of Thrace, mainly Bizye and Saranta Ecclessies, into fleeing to Greece during the period 1914-15, ibid.

[31] ΓΑΚ, Κ85ε, 3.

[32] Archive A. A. Pallis, F A, 42: "Note" by A. A. Pallis "presenting the fluctuations in the numbers of inhabitants of Eastern Thrace as a consequence of the persecutions and migrations during the period 1912-1920, Table B, Statistics on those expatriated during the Balkan and I World Wars".

[33] Aggelos Germidis, *op. cit.*

[34] Historical Archive of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs, AYE, 1915/A/21, 1: "Analytical Table of Population, Churches, Chapels, Monasteries and Schools of evacuated areas". This table is included in copies of two reports by the Metropolite of Gallipoli, (Proussa, 8th August 1915), which were forwarded by the Greek Embassy in Constantinople (sign. Tsamados, protocol no. 4816), to the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

A total of 4.102 people had been displaced from the province of Myriophyto[35]. 1.400 people from Loupida, 1.302 from Neochorion and 1.400 from Herakleitsa were sent, during the months of June and July of 1915, to İzmid, Bilecik and Ahzar in Asia Minor[36]. The population changes in the sub-governorship of Myriophyto can be seen in Table 3.

Repatriation

With the signing of the Armistice, such as had been expelled into Asia Minor were allowed to be repatriated. After 1919, when Eastern Trace came under Greek control, refugees who had fled to Macedonia began to return to their homes. The repatriation process was not, however, an easy matter. Political and economic factors determined the number and rate of return.

From the beggining of 1919, in view of the annexation of Thrace and Western Asia Minor, the Greek government tried to define their policy in terms of the repatriation of refugees settled in Greece since 1914. The most significant issues which had to be considered were, firstly, whether it would be advantageous, either politically or economically, to organize a general repatriation of refugees, and secondly, as to what policy should be adopted as regards the Muslims—refugees who, for the greater part, were from Macedonia, as has already been mentioned, who had been settled in the villages of the Greek refugees.

A significant number of refugees from Eastern Thrace had settled as farmers in the hinterland of Macedonia[37]. With their settlement the government covered the demographic void which had been created by the desolation of the countryside during the Balkan Wars and by the emigration of Muslims from Macedonia. This refugee population, mainly in frontier regions with a significant proportion of Slavophone inhabitants, and which continued to be the target of Bulgarian *commitadji* activities and propaganda, constituted the kernel of the Greek element and their removal would have been of national and strategic consequence. Equally significant were the economic factors which demanded a programmed repatriation scheme.

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[35] AYE/1917/8/59: "Persecutions of Greeks in Asia Minor and Thrace". Archive A. A. Pallis, F A 9, "General Statistics on the Displaced Greek Population during World Way by Dioceses", Central Committee for the Displaced Greek Populations in Constantinople, p. 1 and 14. These statistics were compiled by the Patriarchate on the basis of information included in reports from the various dioceses submitted to the Patriarchate. Examilion, from which 750 people were expatriated, is included in these statistics under the diocese of Herakleia. However, in other tables it comes under the sub-governorship of Peristasis.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] According to figures of the General Governorship of Macedonia, the refugees from Eastern Thrace settled in Macedonia up till the year 1919 came to 77.833 individuals (19.395 families). See Archive A. A. Pallis, F A, "Repatriation Schedule of Refugees from Eastern Thrace settled in Greece", A. A. Pallis, General Financial Inspector in the Greek High Commission, Constantinople 21 May 1920. For the settlement of refugees from the two sub-governorships see ibid, F A: "Table of Refugees from Eastern Thrace settled in Macedonia", 20.5.1920: 80 persons from Loupida, 964 from Milio, 1.180 from Kastampolis, 556 from

The Greek government had spent great sums on settling the peasant refugees as part of an overall plan to replenish the rural population in order to increase agrarian productivity. Their departure would, therefore, mean a decrease in productivity in the northern provinces, both in terms of farm products and of taxes. Furthermore, finding new homes for the thousands of Muslim refugees from Macedonia, who had settled the lands and villages of the ousted Greeks, called for, not only time, but also negotiations with the Turkish government so that their resettlement in Asia Minor would not be carried out at the expense of the Greeks already established there. Finally, the time and order of repatriation depended on whether or not the refugees could be resettled in their original homes, as there were whole villages either completely destroyed or occupied by Muslim refugees. It was, consequently, deemed preferable, firstly, to allow for the repatriation of urban refugees, who could be housed in requisitioned buildings, and only part of the peasant refugees: initially those not settled in rural areas, on the provision that the Muslims settled in their villages would, beforehand, have been removed[38].

In order to safeguard this repatriation plan, the region of Eastern Thrace was divided into nine sectors. The third, fourth and fifth sectors were selected for the resettlement of the populations from the two provinces of Ganos-Chora and Myriophyto-Peristasis[39]. Name lists were drawn up, with place of

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İnceköy, 76 from Sendoukion, 556 from Ganos and Chora, 236 from Myriophyto and 656 from Peristasis. Total 4.303 persons. Another source, M. Ailianos, *Το έργον της ελληνικής περιθάλψεως* (The Work of Greek Relief), Press Bureau of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1921, mentions that those refugees settled in the region of Thessaloniki and the rest of Macedonia came to 62.481 individuals and were settled as follows: 32.481 in rural areas and 30.000 in urban centres, from which 20.000 in Thessaloniki.

[38] Historical Archive of Macedonia, General Governorship of Macedonia, F 65. High Commission of Greece. A. A. Pallis to Adosidis, "Memorandum on the Question of Repatriation of Refugees in Greece" and Archive A. A. Pallis, F A, 15a "Repatriation Schedule for refugees from Eastern Thrace settled in Greece", *op. cit.*

[39] M. Ailianos, *op. cit.*, 349-355. D. K. Svolopoulos, *op. cit.*, 53-54.

departure and destinations of those to be repatriated. A Central Refugee Committee was established in each See and undertook the orderly settlement of refugees, the collection of monies for the needy, as well as keeping statistics. These statistics included information on the following: the communities uprooted from the time of Balkan Wars onwards; their populations before expulsion; numbers of individuals expelled; numbers of survivors and place of their resettlement; number of men recruited into the Turkish army after the expulsions and the number of these who survived. They also included the extent to which the administrative authorities were involved in the forced migration of the Christians and in the commercial blockade; the amount of monies needed by each community for the resettlement of its expelled rural population; value of private and communal properties abandoned; damages; place of origin, time of resettlement and number of Muslims who were settled on lands belonging to Christian villagers; the number of refugees who returned, the number of survivors and of those desiring repatriation; the form of aid which they had received and the attitude of the Muslims towards them[40]. These statistics, however, were collected on various occasions and the information now available to us presents some discrepancies and difficulties, particularly as some lists were drawn up according to dioceses whilst others according to sub-governorships. They are, nonetheless, quite accurate as can be established by comparing the numbers of an analytical list bearing the names of all the families repatriated in Neochorion, against those of a more concise list of the Central Committee[41]. The numbers of those uprooted who were repatriated in the two sub-governorships up till February 18th, 1920 are shown in the following table[42].

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[40] ΓΑΚ, Κ85β, "Plan of action in each diocese concerning co-national refugees". A number of these reports with the above information regarding the two sub-governorships under examination are to be found in K85.

[41] In regards to Neochorion see ΓΑΚ, Κ85ε, F 3. "List of persons repatriated to date" 6th May 1919. For the concise list see Archive A. A. Pallis, F A, Central Committee for the displaced Greek populations in Constantinople, "Statistical Information, Resume", p. 11.

[42] Archive A. A. Pallis, F A, *op. cit.*

Peristasis

Villages	*Greek population before 1914*	*Displaced 1914-1917*	*Repatriated 1918-1920*
Loupida (Arapli)	736	736	500
Herakleitsa	1.442	773	395
Neochorion	689	567	275
Yeniköy	2.000	2.000	—
Examilion	1.407	1.407	900
Total	6.274	5.483	2.070

Myriophyto

Villages	*Greek population before 1914*	*Displaced 1914-1917*	*Repatriated 1918-1920*
Milio	1.500	1.500	—
Kastampolis	2.000	2.000	—
Leptochorion (İnceköy)	3.000	3.000	—
Total	6.500	6.500	—

Exodus

The political developments of 1922 determined conclusively the fate of the Greek communities of Eastern Thrace. After the Asia Minor Catastrophe the allied forces decided to cede Eastern Thrace to Turkey with the Moudania Agreement on 11th October 1922. Despite its initial reaction, the Greek government was forced to accept the terms of the Moudania Agreement on 13th October 1922. The evacuation of Eastern Thrace was put into effect two days later[43]. The Christian inhabitants of the communities being examined here, managed to flee as refugees to Greece before the departure of the Greek army[44]. The Convention for the compulsory exchange of populations between

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[43] G. Daphnis, *Η Ελλάς μεταξύ δύο πολέμων, 1923-1940* (Greece between the Wars, 1923-1940), vol. 1, Athens 1955, 31.

[44] The inhabitants of Ganos-Chora convened on the 2nd of October 1922 and decided on fleeing before the departure of the Greek armed forces. They also appointed a committee which, in cooperation with the Metropolite of Myriophyto as well as the Greek govern-

Greece and Turkey changed drastically the demographic and ethnological map of the area and redetermined the socio-economic status of the people settled as refugees, mainly in the northern regions of the Greek state. The number of families who survived the vicissitudes and managed to settle in Greece is shown in table 4, though it must be born in mind that these figures include only those families who made applications for indemnification to the Directorship of Exchange [of Populations].

The persecution of the Greek Christian populations of Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace cannot be understood simply as a consequence of the Greek invasion of Asia Minor and the retaliation of Turkish nationalism. It was the climax of a procedure which, as we have seen, had begun much earlier and which aimed at the attainment of ethnic purity within the newly formed Turkish national state. Fluctuations in the demographic composition of the dioceses of Ganos-Chora and Myriophyto-Peristasis indicate not so much discrepancies in the available statistics but more importantly, the regulated uprooting of the Greek population from the region between 1913 and 1923.

ment deputy Achilleas Papadatos, would oversee their decisive emmigration. ΓΑΚ, *«Κώδιξ Πρακτικών της κοινότητος Γάνου-Χώρας, 1913-1922»* (Minute-book of the Community of Ganos-Chora, 1913-1922), vol. iv, 216. See also M. Maravelakis - A. Vacalopoulos, *op. cit.*

APPENDIX

In the tables which follow the information is presented according to administrative subdivision (kazas or sub-governorships) and not according to ecclesiastical subdivision (dioceses), the latter being different and including only the Christian communities. This preference offers the further advantage of making identification of each administrative region relatively simpler. Furthermore, in this way it is possible to compare these figures with those included in other tables which provide information on the whole population, both Christian and Muslim.

The names of towns and villages are used as they occur in the statistics and reports found in the Archive of the Metropolite Sophronios, transliterated into latin characters. Where two or more names occur in the various sources for a particular village or town the following usage has been adhered to: first is the commonly used name—Greek in most cases, within ( ) is the Turkish name and, within [ ] is the new place name given by the Greek authorities in 1921, as presented in the Appendix of the Government Gazette, vol. 2, issue 4, "Name changes of settlements within the prefectures of Adrianople, Saranta Ekklessies, Rhaidestos, Gallipoli, Evros and Rothopi".

Sources

Tables 1 and 2: ΓΑΚ, Κ85ε: Metropolite of Ganos-Chora Serafeim to Ecumenical Patriarchate, protocol no. 5610, "Statistical List of the Male and Female Population of the Church Province of Ganos-Chora", 20 June 1911; and the Metropolite of Myriophyto-Peristasis Philotheos to Ecumenical Patriarchate, protocol no. 2815, "Statistical List of the Male and Female Population of the Church Province of Myriophyto-Peristasis", 19 March 1911.

TABLE 1

Greek Population of the "kazas" of Myriophyto and Peristasis (1911)

I. Kazas of Myriophyto

Towns and Villages	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*
Myriophyto (Mürefte)	2.408	2.217	4.625
Platanos	716	680	1.396
Kalamitsion	368	390	758
Kerassia	484	478	962
Ganos	1.233	1.214	2.447
Chora	1.774	1.740	3.514
Sterna* (Tepeköy)	1.270	1.210	2.480
Avthimion or Evthimion (Outsman Dereköy)	826	861	1.687
Milio or Milaia	675	655	1.330
Kastampolis	604	513	1.117
Leptochorion (İnceköy or Yeniceköy)	776	721	1.497
Neochorion	546	575	1.121
Museli (Mursalı)	—	—	—
Filiari (Yayaköy)	—	—	—
Georgitsi (Georgits)	—	—	—
Tatarochori (Tatarlı) [Pagkalı]	—	—	—
Beyoğlu	—	—	—
Total	11.680	11.254	22.934

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* Sterna is included in the kaza of Peristasis only in the statistics of 1911. From 1913 onwards is included in the kaza of Myriophyto. Villages for which information has not been included in this table were those inhabited only by Muslims.

II. Kazas of Peristasis

Towns and Villages	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*
Peristasis (Şarköy)	2.400	2.240	4.640
Loupida (Araplı)	620	630	1.250
Herakleitsa	620	630	1.250
Neochorion (Yeniköy)	255	230	485
Limniski (Gölcük)	237	237	474
Kalodendron (Yağaç)	125	110	235
Sendoukion-(Ova-Mousetzep)	308	259	567
Eirinochorion (Arap-Hacı)	112	105	217
Palamoution-Dryinochorion	193	211	404
Pligouri (Bulgur) [Polydori]	—	—	—
Tsaggarochorion (Çengerli) [Chalkanthi]	—	—	—
Saklı (Isaaklı) [Agios Ioannis]	—	—	—
Sofuköy [Sofikon]	—	—	—
Kızılcadere [Traussoi]	—	—	—
Elpis (Kocalı)	—	—	—
Avlamani	—	—	—
Emirli	—	—	—
Ak-Sakal [Sikalis]	—	—	—
Deliler	—	—	—
Eidemir	—	—	—
Palousoula	—	—	—
Beyköy	—	—	—
Yovaköy	—	—	—
Total	4.870	4.652	9.522

TABLE 2

Ethnological Composition of the Kazas of Myriophyto and Peristasis, 1911

I. Kazas of Myriophyto

Towns and villages	*Greeks*	*Turks*
Myriophyto (Mürefte)	4.625	611
Platanos	758	—
Kalamitsion	1.396	—
Sterna	2.480	—
Ganos	2.447	—
Chora	3.514	—
Kerassia	962	—
Avthimion or Evthimion (Outsman Dereköy)	1.687	—
Milio or Milaia	1.330	134
Kastampolis	1.117	—
Leptochorion (İnceköy or Yeniceköy)	1.497	—
Neochorion	1.121	—
Museli (Mursalı)	—	294
Filiari (Yayaköy)]	—	164
Georgitsi (Georgits)	—	144
Tatarochori (Tatarlı) [Pagkalı]	—	116
Beyoğlu		216
Total	22.934	1.679
	93,0%	7,0%

II. Kazas of Peristasis

Villages and towns	*Greeks*	*Turks*
Peristasis (Şarköy)	4.640	730
Loupida (Araplı)	1.250	—
Herakleitsa	1.250	—
Neochorion (Yeniköy)	485	—
Limniski (Gölcük)	474	—
Kalodendron (Yağac)	235	—
Sendoukion (Ova-Mousetzep)	567	—
Eirinochorion (Arap-Hacı)	217	—
Palamoution-Dryinochorion	404	—
Pligouri (Bulgur) [Polydori]	—	112
Tsaggarochorion (Çengerli) [Chalkanthi]	—	140
Saklı (Isaaklı) [Agios Ioannis]	—	246
Sofuköy [Sofikon]	—	36
Kızılcadere [Traussoi]	—	238
Elpis (Kocalı)	—	68
Avlamani	—	138
Emirli*		
Ak-Sakal [Sikalis]*		
Deliler*		
Eidemir*		
Palousoula*		
Beyköy		
Yovaköy		
Total	9.522	1.708
	84,8%	15,2%

* Figures for these villages have not been included because available sources are undated and refer only to the male population. (see Table 2a).

TABLE 2a

Male population of the kazas of Myriophyto and Peristasis

I. Kazas of Myriophyto

Towns and Villages	*Greeks*	*Turks*
Myriophyto (Mürefte)	2.296	315
Plátanos	720	—
Kálamitsion	337	—
Kerassia	500	—
Ganos	1.690	—
Chora	2.079	—
Avthimion or Evthimion (Outsman Dereköy)	900	—
Mílio or Milaia	699	62
Kastampolis	590	108
Leptochorion (İnceköy or Yeniceköy)	774	—
Museli (Mursalı)	—	147
Filiari (Yayaköy)	—	82
Georgitsi (Georgits)	—	72
Tatarochori (Tatarlı) [Pagkalı]	—	58
Total	10.585	844

II. Kazas of Peristasis

Towns and Villages	*Greeks*	*Turks*
Peristasis (Şarköy)	2.218	297
Loupida (Araplı)	615	—
Sterna	1.173	—
Herakleitsa	741	—
Neochorion (Yeniköy)	352	—
Limniski (Gölcük)	226	—
Kalodendron (Yağac)	94	—
Sendoukion (Ova-Mousetzep)	263	—
Eirinochorion (Arap-Hacı)	107	—
Palamoution-Dryinochorion	217	—
Pligouri (Bulgur) [Polydori]	—	56
Tsaggarochorion (Çengerli) [Chalkanthı]	—	70
Isaaklı (Saklı) [Agios Ioannis]	—	123
Sofuköy [Sofikon]	—	18
Kızılcadere [Traussoi]	—	119
Elpis (Kocalı)	—	34
Avlamani	—	69
Nachies		153
Emirli		96
Ak-Sakal [Sikalis]	—	151
Deliler	—	56
Eidemir	—	109
Palousoula	—	75
Beyköy	—	99
Yovaköy	—	36
Total	6.006	1.561

Source: ΓΑΚ, K85ε, sub-file 3. This table, which is undated, was included in the archive of the Metropolite of Myriophyto and Peristasis Filotheos (1908-1917).

TABLE 3

Population changes in the kazas of Myriophyto

	1911		*1912*		*1913*		*1920*	
Towns and Villages	*Greeks*	*Turks*	*Greeks*	*Turks*	*Greeks*	*Turks*	*Greeks*	*Turks*
Myriophyto (Mürefte)	4.625	611	5.500	650	3.178	265	3.918	730
Platanos	1.396	—	1.400	—	1.062	—	1.277	—
Kalamitsion	758	—	750	—	457	—	620	—
Sterna	2.480	—		—	1.871	—	2.083	—
Ganos	2.447	—	3.480	—	2.518	—	3.043	—
Chora	3.514	—	4.098	—	2.606	—	3.133	—
Kerassia	962	—	982	—	563	—	702	—
Avthimion or Evthimion (Outsman Dereköy)	1.687	—	1.840	—	1.069	—	1.400	—
Milio or Milaia	1.330	134	1.470	—	193	152	235	200
Kastampolis	1.117	—	1.070	—	—	492	—	520
Leptochorio (İnceköy or Yeniceköy)	1.497	—	1.450	—	—	840	—	821
Neochorion	1.121	—						
Mouseli (Mursalı)	—	294	—	255	—	230	—	271
Filiari (Yayaköy)	—	164	—	120	—	84	—	96
Georgitsi (Georgits)	—	144	—	180	—	101	—	119
Tatarochori (Tatarlı) [Pagkalı]	—	116	—	125	—	62	—	79
Beyoğlu			—	200	—	155	—	182
Total	22.934	1.463	22.040	1.530	13.517	2.381	16.411	3.018
	94,0%	6,0%	93,5%	6,5%	85,0%	15,0%	84,5%	15,5%

Source: 1911, see Table 1.

1912, K85ε, «Καταγραφή Γανοχώρων» (Account of Ganochora), 27 July 1912.

1913 and 1920, K85γ, «Τουρκική Καταστατική του πληθυσμού του καζά Μυριοφύτου» (Turkish Account of the population of the kaza of Myriophyto), 20 May 1920. No reference is made to what particular month in 1913 the census was taken, but we can safely conclude that it was in the later part of the year and after the expulsion of a considerable number of Greeks from the region as the figures clearly indicate.

TABLE 4

Settlement in Greece (1926)

I. Diocese of Ganos-Chora

Place of Origin	*Place of Settlement*	*Families*
Ganos	Kavala	688
Chora	Kavala	—
Avthimion	Thessaloniki	361
Milio	Thessaloniki	321
Leptochorio (İnceköy)	Langadas (Sochos)	286
Kastampolis	Thessaloniki	—
Kerassia	Chalkidiki (Polygyros)	212
Neochorion	Thessaloniki	282
Sendoukion	Drama (Aggista)	115
Palamoution	Nigrita (Saltikli-Kalokastro)	81
Eirenochorion	Ekaterini (Bromeri-Kallithea	47
Total		2.393

II. Diocese of Myriophyto-Peristasis

Place of Origin	*Place of Settlement*	*Families*
Myriophyto	Kavala	834
Peristasis	Thessaloniki	852
Platanos	Kavala	297
Kalamitsion	Kavala	168
Herakleitsa	Kavala	520
Sterna	Kavala	510
Loupida	Nestos (Foussiani)	286
Neochorion	Nestos (Karatzilar-Zarkadia)	159
Limniski	Kailaria (Tsartzilar-Filotas)	99
Examilion	Enotia (Dragoumanitsa-Apsalos)	303
Kalodendron	Nea Malgara	—
Total		4.028

Source: ΓΑΚ, Archives of the Ministry of Agriculture, Directorship of Exchange of Populations. (without file number).


ADRIANOPLE
Saranta Ecclesiai
Bounar-chisar
Vizyi
Seram
Chafsai
Baba Eski
Loule Bourgas
Ouzoun Kioprou
Chariopolis
Tsorlou
Raithestos
Koumbaou
Genikioi
Leptochorion
Kastampolis
Malgara
Eirinochorion
Devedji-kioi
Kessani
Senroukio
Almatli
Milio
Ganos
Bairamits
Limpitki
Chora
Ainos
Loupida
Miriophito
Genikoi
Heraklitsa
Peristasis
Gallipoli
Madytos
Krithia
ASIA MINOR



MAP OF EASTERN THRACE

LEGEND

———	Border line
– – – – –	Railway line
═══	Main roads
= = = = =	Secondary roads
●	Capital of district (Vilayet)
•	Centre of Sancak
•	Centre of Kaza
∘	Villages

Source Archive A.A. Pallis, F.A.: "Map of Eastern Thrace indicating the villages the inhabitants of which were expelled to Greece during 1914 and World War I " by S. Serafeimides. (Attached to document no 3577, 19 May 1920, of the High Commission of Greece in Constantinople)

Map design and drawing by Haris Kakarouhas



1. Myriophyton (Mürefte). Church of Agioi Theodoroi, built in 1913 with funds provided by the "Patriarchal Committee for the earthquake victims". Photographer: Christos Constantinidis (29 May 1920). Source: ΓΑΚ, K85ε, F. 1.



2. Myriophyton (Mürefte). The mosque. September 1921. (Carte Postale). Source: ΓΑΚ, Κ85ε, F. 1.

3. Kerassia. September 1921. (Carte Postale). Source: ΓΑΚ, Κ85ε, F. 1,

4. *Kalamitsion. September 1921. (Carte Postale). Source: ΓΑΚ, Κ85ε, F. 1.*

5. *Leptochorion (İnceköy). September 1921. (Carte Postale). Source: ΓΑΚ, Κ85ε F. 1.*

6 and 7. Aspects of Ganos. September 1921. (Carte Postale). Source: ΓΑΚ, Κ85ε, F. 1.

LENA DIVANI

THE RUSSIAN REFUGEES IN GREECE
A FIRST ATTEMPT TO REGISTER

> "How does it feel
> to be on your own
> like a complete unknown
> with no direction home
> like a rolling stone..."
>
> *Bob Dylan*

The breathtaking story of the Russians who abandoned their country in vast quantities after the Revolution, from 1917 till 1921, and seeked shelter at the four corners of the earth has not been totally examined yet. Some of them succeeded in carrying their wealth abroad and seasoned their homesickness in black caviar. The luckiest had already invested their money abroad. Most of them, though, discovered labor for the first time in their life[1]. Those who had questioned the proletariats' revolution, unexpectedly found themselves to be proletariats, facing poverty and sickness, dispersed from Brazil to China. Strange stories about their luck "fed" popular imagination. Many were those who tasted the six-franc meals cooked by the famous cook of Duke Nikolai Nikoliefski in Strasbourg and even more recognized officials of the White Army driving taxis in the European capital cities...

The Russian refugees are connected with the anti-Bolshevik struggle, a stillborn campaign that was also reinforced by the countries abroad: Japanese, Polish, Americans, English and French, each for their own reasons, helped the opposition to the communists[2]. It is well-known that the soviet government, a year after her establishment, was controlling only the central part of the Empire, with Moscow and ex-St. Petroupolis as centers. The anti-revolutionary elements were gathered in the periphery, being followed by a non-political mass which could not find food in the center. The periphery of this vast country became the theater of the civil war, which destroyed cities, villages and crops. All those who tried to save their life and their families created the first wave of refugees. In the spring of 1918 Ukraine declared its independence, the Kozaks did the same in the Southeastern counties, Admiral Koltchak became the dictator of the "White" Siberia while General A. Denikin was fighting the Soviets in Southeastern Russia and so was Yudenitch in Estonia. Poland joined the party as well[3].

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[1] Despite the public belief, most of the refugees were not aristocrats. The majority belonged to the middle class. Among them there were many intellectuals. Very few farmers passed the russian border, except, for the Kozaks.

[2] The strongest motive was the ideological terror against the predominance of communism. There were also more definite motives; for instance France wanted back the money she had loaned Tsarist Russia (Stephen Lee, *The European Dictatorships 1918-1945*, Methuen

It was not long that the countdown began. In the autumn of 1919 the White Army showed signs of disintegration. Admiral Koltchak's army was defeated, while he himself was killed in Siberia in February 1920. A wave of Russian refugees towards China and Japan followed[4]. Most of them were soldiers of the defeated army and along with some civilians they crossed the border in the fatal winter of 1919-1920.

In March 1920 Denikin's army[5] retreated and gathered mainly in Crimea. That spring was marked by the collapse of the European anti-Bolshevik front. Soon Denikin resigned from his army's leadership. General Peter Wrangel succeeded him, but even he didn't manage to hold resistance in Crimea for long and in a while he prepared for the final retreat. Despite all this, he obstinately denied the british mediation that could have insured amnesty for his army[6]. Like thousand of Russians who were found in exile, the General believed for a while that the Bolsheviks' days would soon be over...

While these troops were retreating, refugees began to flow into Russia's

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Co., London, 1987, p. 30-31). A classic work on the subject is J. Bradley, *Allied Intervention in Russia 1917-1920*, N. York, 1968.

[3] C. A. Macartney, *Refugees: the Work of the League*, League of Nations' Union, London, without date, p. 10-11.

[4] W. Chapin Huntington, *The Homesick Million, Russia-out-of-Russia*, The Stratford Company, Boston Mass., p. 12.

[5] Regarding White Army's action see the work of the white Russian forces' chief in S. Russia A. Denikine, *The White Army*, London, 1930, passim.

[6] Sir John Hope Simpson, *Refugees: Preliminary report of a survey*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1938, p. 38-39. It should be noted that Simpson and his associates from the Royal Institute of International Affairs surveyed, gathered and evaluated all the available documents about the Russian refugees and published statistic reports that are —even today— considered as the most accurate of all.

bordering countries. During November 1920, 126 ships overloaded with 136,700 passengers rushed out of the ports of Sevastoupolis, Vatoum and Odessa. Seventy thousands of them were the remnants of Wrangel's army that reached Constantinople, constituting the largest wave of refugees since the beginning of the war. Civilians were arriving in groups both before and along with them[7].

Hunger, which plagued Southern Russia in the summer of 1921 created another wave of refugees. The last one was caused by the final defeat of the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Far East.

The actual total number of the expatriated Russians has not been verified yet. There are testimonies that talk about 2 or 3 millions but they actually exaggerate. The most reliable sources estimate them at 1 or 1.5 millions. Their dispersion followed three main directions: a) West, towards Poland and Germany, b) East, towards China and c) Southwest, with Constantinople as a gathering point.

According to Simpson's sources a total of about 190,000 people passed through Constantinople. For five years, from 1919 to 1924, Constantinople became the main concentration and redistribution center of the Russian refugees. What this exactly means is too difficult for someone to conceive today. Wounded soldiers, women and orphans, all dressed in rags, were pilled in old barracks, in hospitals, caves or warehouses. The weakest of them either starved to death or died from diseases. It is obvious why Lord Cecil pointed that the problem of the refugees is a challenge to civilization.

The Turks and especially the Kemalists did not welcome them. The allied military and diplomatic authorities undertook the task of providing for the Russian refugees. The reasons that forced them to undertake this difficult and complicated task were, apart from the obvious humanistic and political ones, reasons of security and hygiene. With such wretched rabble to gather in the area, the allied army was in danger. Diseases and anarchy are contagious[8].

The Balkan countries shared the burden willingly. Despite its own problems, Bulgaria accepted about 30,000 Russians till 1922. Wrangel's soldiers, after they had just recovered in the concentration camps at Vosporos, passed to Bulgaria in order to work at the mines and the road constructions. Bulgaria also welcomed a significant number of intellectuals, among which were well-known people, who contributed in its academic development[9].

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[7] Marc Raeff, *Russia Abroad, a Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919-39*, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 19-20. This study is the most complete on the subject and offers us valuable information about the Russian emigrants' effort to preserve at all cost their cultural identity in the Diaspora.

[8] Marc Raeff, *op. cit.*, p. 19-20.

The country that warmly embraced them was most of all Yugoslavia. King Alexander had been brought up in the Russian Court and he kept close sentimental ties with the Romanoffs. The people loved Russia, which stood by them in 1914, the state needed trained civil servants and the army needed soldiers. The common religion of the two countries and the akin languages facilitated the assimilation. In that way whole parts of the White Army were embodied in the new state's armed forces and Belgrade became a significant center of the Russian Diaspora[10].

No systematic attempt for the refugees' settlement has been made until 1921. Whatever was done aimed at their survival and their temporal relief[11]. Apart from the French and the English government, humanitarian organizations from all over the world and mainly the International Red Cross[12], the institution "Save the Children", the Russian organization Zemstvos and Towns[13] and the Russian Diplomatic Corps abroad, contributed to this cause. It was more than obvious though that in order to solve this problem an international hyper-governmental organization was necessary to coordinate the whole attempt. On February 20, 1921, Gustave Ador, the President of the International Red Cross, asked with his famous letter the League of Nations to appoint a Commissioner, who, as an international political authority, would be able to solve this problem, which was beyond the abilities of the humanitarian organizations. His aim would be the coordination and the supervision of the whole project, and the definition of the refugees' legal status.

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[9] C. A. Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 18-19.

[10] There was one more important reason for which Serbians, as leading nationality, welcomed the Russians in the army and the bureaucracy. They trusted them more than the Croats and the Slovenians! (Marc Raeff, *op. cit.*, p. 21-22).

[11] Louise Holborn, *Refugees: A Problem of our Time, The Work of the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951-1972*, N. Jersey, 1975, preface.

[12] The Russian Red Cross did a great job collecting the wounded soldiers from the battlefield. Moreover, it used the Russian embassies' banking accounts abroad and the money that the White Army brought out of Russia to relieve the refugees. This could go on as long as the countries did not recognize the soviet government and the Soviets did not appoint new diplomatic representatives.

[13] It was a very important Russian humanitarian organization that helped civilians evacuate the war fields during the first World War and the Civil War. After 1918 the Zemstvos settled in Paris and established offices in Prague and in every concentration center of the Russian refugees. It mainly undertook their education and their health. It established

He was also supposed to find them jobs and, above all, he was supposed to do his best for the repatriation of the refugees[14].

At this point Dr. Fridtjof Nansen appeared. This man, who obtained the title of the "international spirit at his highest form", had already impressed the international public opinion by giving a prosperous end to the difficult task of repatriating the war prisoners, a task entrusted to him by the League of Nations. With his help a total of 450,000 prisoners was brought back to their country at a cost of only 8.6 dollars each[15]. During this complicated mission Nansen had, among others, to deal with the Soviet's mistrust of that new international organization, which was thought to be an instrument of the English and the French. Nansen impressed everybody because in a short while he managed to persuade the Soviets about his good intentions and gain their trust. In August 1921 he made an agreement with Chicherin, The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, that facilitated the huge effort to help the Russian people.

As soon as he assumed responsibility, in September 1921, he called a meeting in Geneva. He then tried to enlist the refugees according to their working abilities. At the same time he also conducted a research throughout the world about the special working needs and the career prospects for the refugees in each country. He established departments of his office in the largest refugees' centers[16], and, the most important, he gave solution to the problem of the refugees' legal status with the famous "Nansen passports".

At the time of his appointment 40,000 russian refugees were in Constantinople, plus those who had crossed from there to Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and other parts of the Near East. Sir Samuel Hoare was appointed Nansen's assistant and took over the critical office in Constantinople. He formed a

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hospitals and sanatoria for the sick and Russian schools of all levels for the children. It often insured the financial aid of the various countries for the operation of these schools. The Balkan countries in particular offered help until the end. This attempt blossomed until the end of 1928 but followed a descending route afterwards. That means that young refugees spent just one day per week studying their mother language (More details about the organization's action are included in Raeff's and Simpson's work).

[14] See the article of Atle Graham-Madsen, "The league of Nations and the Refugees" at *The League of Nations in Retrospect, Proceedings of the Symposium organized by the United Nations Library and the Graduate Institute of International Studies*, Geneva, 6-9.11.80, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, N. York, 1983, p. 358-367.

[15] For the amazing work of this great humanitarian see the thesis of Clarence Arthur Clausen, *Dr. Eridtjof Nansen's Work as High Commissioner of the League of Nations*, Ph. D., Illinois, 1932.

[16] Constantinople, Athens, Sofia, Vienna, Berlin.

committee, with Colonel Procter as president, which tried to insure money for food, medicine, and refugees' travelling expenses towards the countries of their final destination[17]. 20,000 Russians had been transferred and settled in 45 different countries until September 1923[18].

Nansen was convinced that the best solution would be the repatriation of the russian refugees. Despite his great efforts he didn't succeed in having impressive results. In 1922, after an agreement with the Soviets, a small number of russian refugees returned to their homeland. The agreement concerned mainly the Kozaks[19] from the districts of Don, Kuban and Terek, who were then situated in Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia. In the autumn of 1923, after 6,000 people had been repatriated, the russian refugees were forced to accept exile as inevitable. At that time Nansen's office focused its attempts at the employment and the integration of the refugees in their new countries.

THE RUSSIAN REFUGEES IN GREECE

Like all the countries neighbouring to Russia or Constantinople, the major concentration point of refugees, Greece also had to welcome and relieve a number of russian refugees. Geographic vicinity was not the only reason. Greece found herself morally bound to help the civil war's defeated because she had been actively involved in the anti-Bolshevik struggle. It is well known that after Clemanceau's proposal, the First Army Corps with three army divisions (1st, 2nd and 13th)[20], which means 42,000 men, were disembarked in Odessa and fought in a remarkable way at the side of the White Army, under K. Nider's command[21]. Venizelos accepted the french leader's proposal since he wanted to insure the french support to his plans in East Thrace and Asia Minor. Moreover there existed traditional ties between Greece and Orthodox Russia, which dated back to the turkish occupation[22].

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[17] It should be noted here that the English and French government as well as the Ameril can Red Cross, who had helped refugees to survive in the first crucial years, had now grown tired of paying and had declared that they would soon stop their granting. Nansen had insured only an amount of money for the functional expenses of his offices worldwide from the League of Nations. He therefore had to stimulate the sensitivity of the internationapublic opinion in order to find sponsors for his work.

[18] Sir J. Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 79-80.

[19] The Kozaks had been living free since the 14th century, discharged from taxes by accomplishing military services in distant areas of the country. Wars against neighbours led to the gathering of all this population. Land was granted to their military communities. During the 15th and 16th century the communities of Don, Volga, etc., are formed with administrative autonomy. In the beginning of the 20th century there were 11 corps of Kozaks in Russia. Their soldiers had to serve for 20 years. In order to keep them at his side, the Tsar fought to preserve their financial and social status. When the Revolution broke out most of them fought against the Bolsheviks.

[20] P. Zannas, ed., *Αρχείο Π. Δέλτα, Νικόλαος Πλαστήρας* (P. Delta Archives, Nikolaos

The Greek involvement in the Entente's anti-Bolshevik struggle not only endangered the numerous Greek communities in Russia[23] but also created a further moral obligation to extend hospitality to a number of Russian refugees.

The first Russian refugees on the Greek soil were probably the over 25,000 passengers of the French steamers who sailed into Gallipolis and the 10,000 who reached Limnos in the beginning of November 1920, taking the local authorities by surprise.

In Limnos the refugees were accompanied by a French general who resumed responsibility to prepare the place for another 20,000. The Greek prime minister cabled on 9.11.1920 to the annoyed and uninformed deputy governor of Limnos, Kazantzoglou, giving him directions to help the disembarkation and settlement of the Russians in tents and to inform their leader that he would be responsible for their feeding. Within a few days the Russians had settled at the east part of the island in British camps that had been granted to the French. General Bousseau took all necessary measures for the local people's and the refugees' security and health. Finally, he prohibited Russians to circulate in the near villages since very quickly rumors went around about food thefts under gun threats[24].

Plastiras), Hermes publ., Athens, 1989. A narration of Plastiras' about the expedition in Ukraine is contained in the book.

[21] For more details see K. Nider, «Η εκστρατεία της Ουκρανίας» ("The expedition in Ukraine"), in the *Big Military and Marine Encyclopedia*, Athens, 1927-1928, vol. 1, p. 111, 119, 347. According to existing testimonies the Greek army was welcomed with enthusiasm from the Greek population there, who felt threatened by the Soviets. The greek soldiers were considered very effective and disciplined compared to the French.

[22] For further details see the interesting article by P. Kitromilidis, «Από την ορθόδοξη κοινοπολιτεία στις εθνικές κοινότητες: Ελληνο-Ρωσσικές πνευματικές σχέσεις» ("From the Orthodox Commonwealth to National Communities: Greek-Russian spiritual relationships"), *Ta Historika*, issue 10, vol. 6, June 1989, p. 29-46.

[23] See A. Zapadis, *Ελληνο-Σοβιετικές Σχέσεις 1917-1941* (Greek-Soviet relationships 1917-1941), Estia, Athens, 1989, p. 53-59. The Soviets strongly protested and threatened that they would take hard measures against the 200,000 Greeks who were mostly anti-Bolsheviks.

[24] Hist. Archives MForAff/1920/A/5/VII/5, n. 14795, Kazantzoglou's report of 14.11.

The Prefect of Gallipolis, Markopoulos, was also found unprepared; on 11.11.1920 he cabled to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a French destroyer had arrived the previous day and that he was ready to protest if it started disembarking the refugees without the Greek government's authorization. Without paying attention to the prefect's reactions, the French started disembarking the refugees, while French steamers continued sailing in the port. On 13.11 the doctor who examined the passengers, found many cases of typhoid fever and worried about it uncontrollable spreading. The French assured him that there was no danger. On 19.11 25,000 people had settled down and a steamer with women and children was being expected. According to the local authorities' reports, the disembarkation of Russian refugees, which continued until early December, occurred in complete disorder. The measures that had been taken by the French and Russian headquarters proved to be inadequate. The police had banned liquor selling and had restrained the refugees' circulation but the soldiers kept escaping and wandering around Thrace. Robberies took place in the middle of the streets. Rumors began to spread about villagers being murdered by hungry Russians. The annoyed inhabitants could not stay calm, not even after the announcements by the police that the order would not be disturbed. It is obvious that from a certain point in the Prefect's reports reality and imagination were mixed up. This was also pointed out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which discreetly advised him not to rush into reporting every rumor that reached his ears! The Greek authorities though, trying to safeguard public order, offered to reinforce the guarding of the camps —a basically French responsibility— by the police, and they examine the possibility of dispersing the refugees in certain parts of Greece[25].

At the same time more than 1,000 Russian refugees of "excellent social status" sail into the port of Thessaloniki in order to settle at the old French hospitals situated in an isolated area in the outskirts. The local authorities tried to stall their disembarkation for a while, since they had already put

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.1920. We note that after the Russians' settlement in Limnos the Prefect of Chios panicked and sent an S.O.S. signal to the government not to allow the sending of Wrangel's soldiers to the island. "We have no residences, no food", he stresses, "and we have a cruel winter ahead of us". The Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed and calmed him down. (Hist Arch. MForAff 1920/A/VII/5, n. 15045).

[25] See the Prefect's reports of 7.11, 9.11, 11.11, 13.11, 2.12 and 12.12, Hist. Arch. MFor Aff 1920/A/5/VII/5. The French were also scared. They believe that among the Russian soldiers there were many propagandist kemalist agents.

2,000 Greeks from Caucasus in quarantine and they expected 4,000 more, possibly contaminated with small-pox and typhoid fever. The Russians, after their disinfection, settled in the old French hospital. At first, the French Consul took care of their feeding and the Greek authorities took care of their hygiene. In the beginning of December though, the French Consul announced that he had received instructions from Paris to pass over responsibility for the feeding of the refugees to Greece, bringing in this way the General Governor of Thessaloniki into a difficult and unpleasant position[26].

Both the threats of pestilential diseases[27] and the influx of the Greek refugees from Asia Minor, forced the Minister of Internal Affairs, Tsaldaris, to warn the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Stop the numerous descent of Russian refugees to Greece or we shall suffer irreparable disasters"[28].

The first informations about the number of Russian refugees in Greece are met in the memorandum written by Dendramis, head of the permanent Greek secretariat in the League of Nations, on 20.8.1921. These informations were necessary in order to facilitate the international organization's services, which were investigating the size of the problem due to the Commissioner's appointment[29]. According to Dendramis there were 31,500 Russians in the Greek territory at that time, distributed as follows: 24,000 were gathered in Gallipolis by the French, 3,500 were temporarily working in Limnos and were about to return to Thessaloniki, 1,500 were in Athens and Piraeus, 1,200 in Thessaloniki and 500 in various hospitals.

In the same text Dendramis stressed that the burden of the Russian refugees was devastating for the suffering Greece and therefore a way to convey them in a more suitable place had to be found.

Greece's difficult position was also verified by princess Sofia Demidoff, the russian ambassador's wife and representative of the Russian Red Cross in Athens, to whose tireless efforts the Russians who took refuge in Greece owe a great deal. While asking for help from the International Red Cross in order to insure special nutrition for 165 tuberculars, Demidoff emphasized that Greece did everything she could, despite her enormous needs because of the expedition in Asia Minor[30]. The country was devastated receiving too many wounded and sick people each day. This situation was described by A. Wintergerst, the International Red Cross' representative in Athens, to his organization and Nansen, who had just been appointed as the Commissioner of the League of Nations for the Russian refugees[31].

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[26] The Consul even wanted back the 100,000 that he had spent until then! (Hist. Arch. MForAff 1920/A/VII/5, n. 16704 and 15817).

[27] The sanitary services admit that it is impossible to examine them one by one because of the fact that the Russians arrive in crowds; therefore the danger of epidemics was increasing. (Hist. Arch. MForAff 1920/A/5/VII, 5, n. 15022).

[28] Hist. Arch. MForAff 1920/A/VII/5, n. 16099,

[29] LoN: 45/17352/16065 (19-27).

On 17.9.1921 Nansen received even more alarming news from Thessaloniki. The source was General Tomiloff[32], chief of the camp that had been established in the autumn of 1920 for the Russians who had come from Crimea to Constantinople and then to Thessaloniki, helped by the French, on the steamers Oscar, Harrax and Arragonie. As it has already been mentioned their feeding was the responsibility of the French Consul and then of the American Red Cross. The initial number of refugees in this camp was 957. In time, some of them managed to obtain visas and left for other countries. New refugees from Bakou, Constantinople, Limnos and Gallipolis took their place. In September 1921 the camp hosted 1149 people (218 women, 840 men and 91 children) and was expecting refugees from all over Greece by the end of the agricultural season.

In the beginning their nutrition was almost satisfactory. The proportion was 6 drachmas per person per day. The situation though was slowly getting worse. In May 1921 the proportion became 2 drachmas per person. So all those who were in no position to work were doomed to starvation. Some of them found a temporary occupation in the farms[33]. The younger men adjusted in a better way and undertook heavier jobs. Most of them still could not find a job in the area because they were unqualified. It should be reminded that they were soldiers with no professional training, often wounded, of a certain age and with a poor health condition that was deteriorating by the bad climate of Thessaloniki. Malaria was threatening to eliminate the already weak and starved Russians.

The situation was even more critical for the 91 children of the camp. With the American Archbishop's help, a school had been established in the camp where the children were given breakfast daily; but because of the cut down of the funding, the school was about to close and the children to starve.

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[30] Greece had very few dairy products to offer to those who suffered from typhoid fever and malaria. Demidoff was asking for milk in powder, rice, meat in cans and warm clothes. Apart from the sick in Athens, there were 2,555 in Thessaloniki, in Larissa and in Volos who also needed special nutrition (LoN: 45/16364/16065 (1919-1927) R1732).

[31] LoN: 45/16217/16065 (1919-1927) R1732.

[32] LoN: 45/16065/16065 (1919-1927) R1732.

[33] Those were approximately 80. The American Red Cross forced them to offer the 20% of their wages for the feeding of the rest.

Tomiloff pointed that everybody wishes to leave Thessaloniki. "There are no jobs, the climate is awful and malaria is eliminating us. The problem is that we can not get visas easily. Only few lucky ones managed to get a visa. The rest of us shall remain here in God's mercy, since even the American Red Cross, which is for now granting us with 50-60,000 drachmas per month, announced us that the financing will be stopped. The Russian organizations in Athens are sending us very few money, just enough to pay the rent for our lodgings. The Russian General Consul in Thessaloniki has no money to help us. The only thing he could do is to establish three workrooms in the camp for the handicraftsmen and women".

In the end of his desperate letter the Russian general becomes rather unfair to the Greek authorities, which according to the general opinion did their best. "The Greeks never cared about us", he emphasized[34]. "In all the countries of the world where the Russians seek refuge there are organizations to help them. Only in Thessaloniki there is no one. If the American Red Cross abandons us in 1922, as it has been announced, then we shall all die".

Two months later, on 9.11.1921, Tomiloff wrote to Nansen again, because the new years' day was approaching and so was the threat of famine[35]. He was begging for his help since the Russians could not get visas and tickets to more prosperous countries.

Apart from Tomiloff, Nansen's attention was at the same time also drawn by the Swiss president of the Council of the League of Nations[36]. He was referring to the 3,000 poor Kozaks who were dispersed throughout Greece going after temporary jobs. They were asking for their transportation to Bulgaria where other Kozaks had already been settled and where agricultural jobs were available[37].

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[34] The accusations are definitely unfair considering that Greece by accepting the Russian refugees jeopardized its relations with the Soviets who were approaching Kemal's Turkey even more.

[35] LoN: 45/16065/16065 (1919-1927) R1732.

[36] LoN: 45/17165/16065 (1919-1927) R1732.

[37] The strange thing is that at the same time Nansen received informations from an unknown source that Greece can absorb about 10,000 refugees in agricultural jobs and that she intends to transfer 30,000 Armenians from Cilicia in order to settle them in Peloponnesus. Philip Baker, who worked for the secretary general of the League of Nations and was about to come to Greece, was given orders to investigate whether the country had the

The denunciations "touched" the newly appointed Commissioner and in April 1922 he asked the Australian president of the mixed committee, which supervised the voluntary exchange of population between Greece and Bulgaria on behalf of the League of Nations, A. C. Corfe, to investigate as Nansen's representative the problem of the Russian refugees in Greece and to file him a report. The second member of the mixed committee, Belgian De Roover, was asked to help Corfe. It was a clever and cheap solution, since they had both already been working in Greece and had gained the Greek authorities' trust.

In order to help the two inexperienced men understand the very essence of this complicated problem, he asked Schlemmer of the International Red Cross, an expert on the Russian refugees' problem who would visit Athens in April 1922, to inform them. Schlemmer gave them their first instructions: a) To persuade the Greek government to offer the certification that Nansen had proposed, b) To find sponsors for the transfer of the Kozaks from Thessaloniki to Bulgaria, or to transfer them to a healthier place in Greece (this of course after the exaggerating appeals made by Tomiloff), c) To examine the children's condition in the camp of Thessaloniki urgently. According to Mrs. Tomiloff's informations, as she was supervising everything that had to do with the school of the camp, the conditions were devastating for the children. Luckily, a French organization had recently offered to find families that would adopt them, resuming all the expenses except for the ticket for the part of the route between Thessaloniki and Marseilles. The money for the tickets could be easily raised by the local charity organizations and the Greek government, which provided for the children until then[38].

The first thing Corfe did was to insure quinine for the spring, when the new season of malaria would begin. On 22.4.1922 he sent Nansen a report[39] about the condition of the approximately 6,000 Russians who were enlisted in the beginning of 1922. He had already lived in Greece for twelve months, he knew the right people, he had been informed both by the ambassador and princess Demidoff. He had also discussed with Roilos of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with Streit of the Greek Red Cross on the same sub-

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ability to absorb Russian refugees from Egypt, Cyprus and Constantinople. It is more than obvious that in order to accomplish his mission he leaves no chance to be lost. (LoN: 45/17683x/16065 (1919-1927) R1732).

[38] LoN: 45/20192/16065 (1919-1927) R 1732.

[39] LoN: 45/17636/16065 (1919-1927) R1732 and 45/19105/16065 (1919-1927) R1732.

ject. The conclusions that he reached, after having visited all the Russian camps and hospitals, were the following:

— The Russians in Greece live much better than their fellow countrymen in other countries do. They are better organized and from all aspects in a better condition than the Greek refugees from Russia[40]. Princess Demidoff is responsible for this exceptional coordination. It is also clear that the present Greek government is assisting them in every way -obviously because of Queen Olga's and Prince Nikolaos' influence[41].

— The refugees' hospitals in Athens are very well organized with the Greek government's assistance. The sick eat one egg daily and drink fresh milk. The conclusion is that the League of Nations does not have to worry particularly about the refugees in Athens.

— The Russians in Thessaloniki undoubtedly had a very hard time during the summer of 1921. Many lost their lives because of the seasonal exaltation of malaria since they had just arrived and were not organized yet. After that terrible experience they are scared that the following summer will eliminate them; that's why they sent so desperate warnings to the Commissioner's office. Things are different this year because they are better prepared and they have at their disposal an organized hospital, ready to take care of 150 sick people. This hospital belongs to the Russian Red Cross and operates with Russian staff. It is going to be disinfected and prepared for the season of the fever for those who suffer from malaria. The Greek government offered to transfer the tuberculars to a sanatorium in Macedonia, so that there would be more available beds. The paralytics shall be sent to a hospital in Athens. So, with the help of a big quinine stock, the danger of the summer will diminish[42]. Conclusion: It isn't necessary for the camp to be transferred to a healthier spot. What is necessary is a sum of 30$ per month to be disposed to the hospital in Thessaloniki for a 4 months' period, so that more staff and better nutrition will be insured.

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[40] About the important Greek communities in Russia see K. Papoulidis, «Οι 'Έλληνες της Ρωσσίας τον 19ο και τις αρχές του 20ού αιώνα» ("The Greeks of Russia in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century"), *Balkanika Simmikta*, 4, Institute for Balkan Studies, p. 109-140. From 1919 and on, approximately 55,000 Greeks came in Greece mainly from Caucasus and Crimea. The Greek government directed them towards colonizing in Macedonia and Thrace. Most of them got the Greek nationality by law, in October 1922 (The Russian refugees, especially the ones who lived in N. Greece, accused the Greek government that neglected them by giving first priority to the Greek refugees. It is a particularly selfish complaint since everybody recognized that Greece had shown great sensitivity in the problem of the refugees). Details about the problems they faced until they safely reached the Greek territory and settled see at the Historical Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1921, A/5/VII (2).

[41] Princess Helen, Nikolaos' wife, who came from Russia, had shown great interest in the more than 100 children who lived in the area of Athens in 1922. She established a school and a nursery and she granted them a meal daily. She also asked for the international organizations' help in order to establish a high school and an orphanage. Her mediation made the Commissioner's office hasten the survey about the Russian children in Greece. Two months later Corfe took over the refugees' problem in Greece (LoN:45/191 95/19195 (1919-1927) R1740).

— The camp's school is also in a good condition although many children are absent because of fever. Still a nutritional lunch is offered to them daily.

— There is satisfactory employment of the Russian refugees in Macedonia. The ones who have relatives or career opportunities in another country shall be helped in every possible way to be transferred there.

— The Russian refugees in Volos are in a similar situation with those in Thessaloniki. Many of them suffered from malaria but unfortunately the hospital of Volos is small, it lacks quinine and it is already full. The local farmers offer temporary jobs to the Russians but there have been many denunciations that the refugees are often being exploited[43]. This issue has been discussed with the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

General Conclusion: The most practical solution for the Russian refugees is to employ them. Neither the humanitarian organizations, nor the League of Nations, nor —even more— Greece can continue their maintenance. The establishment of an office of the League of Nations for the Russian refugees in Greece is necessary. An appropriate Russian should be put in charge, someone to keep in touch with the Greek government and the relevant organizations of the other countries. The office shall be under the supervision of the representatives of the League of Nations in Greece. The Greek Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Welfare are eager to help[44]. Is the League of Nations willing to pay its functional expenses for six months?

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[42] The allied army that had camped in Macedonia had also been stricken by malaria. They numbered a 60% of victims. Then there was a thought of forbidding the soldiers to stay in Macedonian front for more than 18 months. They noticed though that the second year the malaria victims were much less. This was an additional reason for Corfe's optimism. It should be mentioned that his optimism proved realistic. In the summer of 1922 the victims were much less (For the adventures of those who lived at that front see the classic book of Alan Palmer, grandchild of a British army's officer who fought in Macedonia for a long time, *The gardeners of Salonica*, London, 1965).

[43] The denunciations came from Schatzmann's report about refugees in Thessalia, which reached the League of Nations in January/February 1922. According to that the Russians' daily wage is 10 instead of the regular 15 drachmas. The children earn a few by selling candies at the shops and cafeterias. Those who settled in Pilio live in great poverty. Among them are university professors and intellectuals from Moscow who are working in the farms of Argalasti and Horto!

The money that Corfe needed to complete his mission was in total the following: 200 pounds for the hospital, 300 for the transportation of those who are unable to work to appropriate places, 1,000 annually for the support of those who don't have a permanent job and 100 annually for the maintenance of the 15 Russian students who were accepted by the University of Athens without fees[45]. "If we can raise this money we shall be in peace with our conscience because we 'll have done our duty here", Corfe concludes.

The Commissioner's office answered Corfe's letter on 24.5, assuring him that they were trying to raise the money he needed[46]. Meanwhile Nansen was pushing the repatriation of the Kozaks of Greece. In July 1922 there were 500 in Thessaloniki, 200 in Athens, 200 in Piraeus, 300 in Halkidiki and 1,000 dispersed all over Greece. In the autumn of the same year Nansen's attempts were crowned with success with the return of the Kozaks of Don, Kuban, and Terek, who had been in Bulgaria and Greece[47]..

Corfe himself was so active that he received many praises from the League of Nations and the Commissioner. He found jobs to many unemployed and he even pulled a few strings to settle the rest. He asked his compatriot Sir J. Allen, Commissioner for New Zealand, to accept a number of Russian refugees into his country. In order to make him more sensitive about it, he stressed how much Greeks love New Zealand and how much they were concerned about the Russians, although they had thousands of their own refugees to take care off[48]. With his persistence he finally managed to be sponsored with 3,000 pounds through the Australian Red Cross. He also provided a fund for the 15 Russian students who had been accepted by the Greek university, from the same source. Finally, he asked for the help of an old friend, P. Reeves, president of the Anglo-Hellenic Society in London. In order to help the poor Russian refugees to survive he proposed the opening of a cheap market for the essential goods.

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[44] The Greek government was eager to offer the offices and help with bureaucracy. Hist. Arch. MForAff, 1923/LoN/F/2 (52).

[45] The Commissioner's representatives took many steps before Greece accepted the Russian students without paying fees. Free registration in Greek universities was then against the law. Finally they exceptionally accepted these 15 students for free as a gesture of good will (Hist. Arch. MForAff 1923, LoN: F/2 (52)).

[46] LoN: 45/17636/16065 (1919-1927) R1732.

[47] LoN: 45/17683x/16065 (1919-1927) R1732.

[48] LoN: 45/21291/16065 (1919-1927).

In the meantime the expedition in Asia Minor had taken a dramatical turn for Greece. In March 1922 a conference was held in Paris for the revision of the Treaty of Sevres. Our ex allies evidently changed their minds and suggested that the Greek troops should retract from Asia Minor. The Greek population in this area run away under the shadow of death. In August 1922 Kemal's army launched a general attack. Despite its efforts the Greek army was defeated and scattered. In the beginning of September Smyrna was surrendered to flames. Hundreds of thousands of Greeks were uprooted from their homes and they seeked shelter in their homeland. Until 1923, when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, approximately 1,000,000 Greeks had escaped from Turkey. The rest of them arrived officially with the obligatory population exchange between Greece and Turkey that was agreed in Lausanne[49].

On 19.9.1922 the Assembly of the League of Nations ordered the Commissioner's office for the Russian refugees to undertake the safe transportation of the new refugees from Asia Minor[50]. Nansen asked Greece to support financially the enterprise. Streit considered the League of Nations' involvement as extremely beneficial for the protection of the minorities in Turkey and offered 1,000,000 drachmas. The poor financial condition of Greece did not allow him to grant more for the protection of the endangered Greek population.

It is therefore clear that Greece cannot dispose anything for the Russians anymore[51]. In August 1922 Corfe was informed that the Greek government intended to discontinue the 2 drachmas allowance and pushed Nansen to intervene. Indeed, the Commissioner's office, although it could understand Greece's difficult position, made a step to the Minister of Welfare Doxiadis. On 20.8.1922 Doxiadis addressed a slightly indignant letter to Nansen. He stressed the interest that our country showed in the Russian refugees and the warm welcome they had received from Greece. "After the tragedy in Asia Minor we cannot offer you anything anymore", he concludes. "Please evacuate the camp of Thessaloniki as soon as possible"[52]. In the end the Greek government did not discontinue the allowance of the 400 people of Thessaloniki's camp, who were incapable of working. She preferred instead to appoint a very strict committee in Athens and Piraeus, which would evaluate who was really incapable of working. Those who were would continue receiving the 2 drachmas allowance per day[53]. The Commissioner's staff, pleased with this solution, was desperately seeking for a way to transport the Russians of Greece to more suitable countries.

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[49] Em. Roukounas, *Εξωτερική Πολιτική 1914-1923* (Foreign Policy 1914-1923), Sakkoulas ed., 1978, p. 366-369. For Greece's critical position after the refugees' influx see D. Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan exchange of minorities and its impact upon Greece*, Paris, 1962, passim.

[50] The well-known Colonel Procter undertook this difficult task once more. Later on, a special body, the Greek Settlement Commission under the aigis of LoN, took over.

[51] Hist. Arch. MForAff 1923/LoN/F/2 (52).

[52] LoN: 45/17636×/16065 (1919-1927) R1732.

The following winter the situation was even more difficult. Turkey, showing off her good will to the soviet government, announced Nansen that Constantinople had to be evacuated from the Russian refugees (15,000 self-supported and 5,000 supported by American humanitarian organizations). The announcement caused panic to the refugees, although the Commissioner managed to insure a promise from USSR that another uprooting of the refugees would not be demanded[54]. Those who could get a visa run away. In that way a new wave of refugees reached Greece. They managed to obtain a transit permission by demonstrating Latin-American visas. This transit though was due to last too long, since they had no money to buy tickets to their final destination. So, Greece's Consul General in Constantinople received severe warnings to give transit permissions only to the ones who already had a ticket[55].

According to the estimations of Nansen's office in Greece, approximately 4,000 refugees were here in 1923. Corfe was trying to transfer them to a more appropriate country until the summer. He was in close touch with I. W. Collins, his colleague in Bulgaria. At the same time he warned Nansen, who was still trying to repatriate the refugees, that his intentions were about to be misunderstood by the Russian emigrants. "They suspect that we want to surrender them to the Soviets by force", he underlined on 22.6.1923. "Let's not insist on bringing them home and let's try to find them a place to live. They can no longer stay in Greece. They didn't even choose her. They came in this place without perspectives, just because it was close to Crimea and Gallipolis. We shall strengthen the League of Nations' prestige in Greece if we free her from the burden of the Russians"[56].

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[53] We shouldn't forget that Greece had to make a good impression to the League of Nations at that time (LoN: 45/17636/16065 (1919-1927)).

[54] Nansen's report to the members of the League of Nations' Council, 29.1.1923 (Hist. Arch MForAff 1923/LoN/F/2 (52)).

[55] LoN: 45/17636x/16065 (1919-1927) R1732.

[56] LoN: 45/29501x/16065 (1919-1927) R1732.

A year after, in the spring of 1924, the condition of the Russian refugees in Greece was stable. They enumerated approximately 3,000 people. Those who had a satisfactory job had been adjusted[57]. With the help of the Russian humanitarian organization Zemstvos and Towns ten different handicrafts were established in the camp of Thessaloniki, which proved quite profitable business and occupied a sufficient number of refugees[58]. Most of them though were just surviving, relying on charity and hoping to find money for the desirable ticket to Europe.

The Russian organizations, which mainly supported them, were in danger after the recognition of the Soviet Union by Greece and the re-establishment of their diplomatic relations on 8.3.1924[59]. The Greek royal family did not live in Greece anymore and according to the legislation for the ex-king's property the Russian hospital was to pass under the Greek state's control.

In order to examine the effects of the soviet diplomatic representatives' arrival in Greece, a committee was formed under the presidency of Tzakoutzeff, the embassy's ex-first secretary. The committee relied on the prestige and the social position of its president, who had no formal status anymore[60]. One of the most important problems that this committee tried to solve was the future of the Russian church. It should be noted here that, although before the revolution the Russian orthodox church was an authoritative and rather weak institution, it played a very important role in the exile. It represented then the vital "umbilical cord" of the refugees with the Russian tradition and their culture. Many intellectuals, indifferent until then, found there a mental shelter and a kind of relief from nostalgia. The local churches often became the center of the refugees social life. It was therefore natural that the Russians of Greece considered their church's survival as a problem of high priority.

The Russian orthodox church's financial survival[61] was finally taken care by the Serbian embassy in Athens, which was ready to cover all the expenses[62]. The greatest problem of course was to manage to keep the church away from the soviet embassy's control by choosing the appropriate legal status. Three options were discussed: a) To be considered as the Serbian church's property, b) To put it under the control of the Greek ecclesiastical authorities, or c) To be controlled by the legal Union of the Russian Orthodox Christians. The third option was approved as more effective.

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[57] From 1924 until 1929 the International Labor Organization took over the Russian refugees' employment and settlement. The Commissioner's office was responsible for their legal and political protection (Jacques Vernant, *The Refugees of the Post-War World*, London, 1959, p. 24).

[58] Corfe was actually trying to improve these handicrafts and incorporate them into, Thessaloniki's economical life. See his proposals in LoN: 45/37459/16065 (1919-1927).

[59] B. Kondis, "The re-establishment of Greek-Soviet relations in 1924", *Balkan Studies* 26 (1985), p. 151-157.

[60] LoN: 45/35776x/33944 (1919-1927) R1750.

[61] A special Byzantine monument in Athens, the Russian church of Panagia Lykodimou, was established in the first half of the 10th century. In 1835 the Russian diplomatic

Since 1924 two groups of Russian refugees arrived in Greece. On 23.6.1924 a group of 126 Jews and two Russians came from Odessa to Piraeus[63]. In 1936 the second, and last, group arrived from Constantinople. They were 80 people (according to another version 130 took transit visas but in the end only 80 managed to come) who were forced to leave Turkey[64]. Greece permitted them to stay at Syros until they could travel towards the countries of their final destination. She even gave permission to 18 of them to settle at this island under the condition that the rest would leave at once. In September 1936 the Ministry of Defense reminded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that apart from the country's financial difficulties, these refugees would prove to be harmful to the public security and the social regime. The kind attempts of the island's elite to persuade the authorities to allow the Russian refugees of "excellent education and high social status" to stay, were not successful. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs answered that such initiatives simply put the government in a difficult position, because she "affectionately

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mission, which wanted a temple to cover the embassy's needs, undertook the reparation of this, almost ruined, church. It became the center of the Russian religious life in Athens ever since. Archimandritis Sergios Dabits (1911-1919) was the last supervisor of the Russian temple, who was appointed by the Russian royal mission. After the Revolution his position was taken over by Russian refugees. In 1954 Duchess Helen, wife of Prince Nikolaos, who came from Russia, made a general restoration of the temple (about the temple see in detail the vicar Ilias Apostolidis' book, *Η Ρωσσική Εκκλησία Η Παναγία Λυκοδήμου* (The Russian Church Panagia Lykodimou), Athens 1959). In the sixties the Greek-Russian priest Timotheos introduced the Greek language to the ceremony in order to attract the second generation's children, which often do not speak Russian fluently or at all.

[62] In this way the close relation between Russians and Serbians is confirmed. According to my sources the community's registry office was located in Yugoslavia and they had to register weddings, deaths and births there.

[63] LoN: 45/31354/16065 (1919-1927).

[64] Turkey expelled them by offering in return Turkish citizenship to 1,500 Russians. This dismissal was actually a chance to get rid of 3 could-be soviet agents: Victor Bakeria, possibly the head of soviet propaganda in Near East, Barbara Tanitrova and Victor Kavtaratzie (see the report of the general consul in Constantinople of 1.2.1936 at Hist. Arch. MForAff 1936/22).

considers about those victims, but, since she has to refuse to Greek refugees from Russia, she is completely unable to allow the settlement of non-Greek citizens in Greece"[65].

Finally 10 ended up in Belgium, 14 in Norway, 10 in Sweden and 3 in Yugoslavia. The rest of them stayed temporarily at Syros. Many of them secretly left the island looking for jobs. Nansen's office, which had undertaken their maintenance, made huge efforts to find a state willing to offer them shelters and jobs[66].

Things have changed at the international arena since 1936. In the '20s it was much easier for the League of Nations to settle the Russian refugees. The cities that had been destroyed during the war had to be rebuilt and industry was developing. Therefore a need for labor hands existed. The young and capable of working did not find difficulties in adjusting and helped that way the writing of a splendid chapter in the history of the League of Nations. Everybody believed that the problem of the Russian refugees was almost solved a little while before the international financial crisis. The amounts of money that were in the Commissioner's disposal began to decrease gradually. The program was to cut the funds in 1938[67]. The only regular source of revenue left were the 15 golden francs paid by the refugees for the Nansen's stamps on their identity certifications.

The financial crisis that followed dissolved this temporary triumph. The countries that welcomed the emigrants were now hit by unemployment. Social racism sprung. Naturally, the first victims of the crisis were the refugees. Everybody now wanted to get rid of this useless burden. In 1934 Nansen's office tried to use the League of Nations' mechanism to block the Russian refugees' dismissal. Unfortunately their attempts did not succeed. Unwanted strangers started to go in and out of the borders, to be arrested, to be imprisoned, to be expelled again and so on.

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[65] Appeals were made by the Doctors' Association, the Lawyers' Association, the Lyklo Ellinidon, the local industrialists and by Archbishop Filaretos. Their argument was the hospitality that Russia had offered to Greeks in the past and the fact that they had very useful and original skills. At Syros for instance there was no other German teacher but Vladimir Rastorgugieff (Hist. Arch. MForAff 1936/22).

[66] Simpson's data, *op. cit.*, p. 136-137.

[67] So when the problem appeared again they had no money to deal with it. Except for the lack of administrative budget they had no legal status anymore, since Nansen's office would definitely close down in 1938. Thus, since 1935, discussions began on how to continue the protection of refugees. USSR was the only country who could not understand this necessity! Besides, when USSR adhered to the League of Nations she had set forth the condition that the office for the Russian refugees would definitely close. USSR was also the only country that voted against the recommendation of the Assembly that the Russian refugees' protection should continue after 1938 (*Refugees and the League*, League of Nations' Union, Sep. 1935, p. 52).

Due to the international economical deterioration and despite Nansen's office's attempts, from a certain point and on it didn't manage to transfer the Russians of Greece to other countries. The number of those who ended up in Greece is undefined. The census of 1928 showed 3,329 people. The president of the Russian Refugees' Union in Athens estimated them to be about 4,000. Finally, according to Nansen's office, their number was 2,205[68]. Their small society in Athens[69] was structured in 17 humanitarian, social or political organizations.

The Greek government, according to her liberal policy, offered them working permission quite easily but did not grant them the Greek citizenship. Those who remained in Greece after the second World War, though, became easily Greek citizens. A 75% of the Russian refugees was occupied in handicrafts —they were usually well trained handicraftsmen. Despite the hard times that Greece was going through, those who were capable did not face a prolonged unemployment problem. The ones who had a more "technical" education —like engineers and doctors— managed to integrate pretty well. The rest of them adjusted in the hard conditions and managed to earn their living with the famous russian courage as drivers, foreign language teachers, waitresses, salesmen on the streets. Their flair for fine arts and music helped them a lot. The painter N. Orloff, graduate of Kiev's art school, was one of the most eminent russians in Greece. Many more distinguished either by making miniatures at the Benaki Museum or by working at Keramikos industry of pottery as painters. Others run restaurants in Faliro and others pastry shops at Stadiou street (the "Petrogrand" and the "Rossikon"). The elderly and the incapable of work were those who lived under critical conditions.

Various corporations and organizations helped them preserve an illusion of warmth and security in a generous but foreign country. The most active organizations were: The Mutual Aid Fund, a kind of social security institution under Sofia Demidoff's[70] chairmanship that helped the sick, the Russian

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[68] Simpson's data, *op. cit.*, p. 136-137.

[69] It proved very difficult to gather informations about the social and political life of the small Russian communities in the other big cities in Greece for the period 1945-1994. My sources are all Russian refugees settled in Athens and Piraeus.

[70] Sofia Demidoff was obviously the guardian angel of the community. After her death this role was apparently taken over by Alfred Gatzen, an attorney who became a merchant and helped every suffering Russian until his death in 1987.

Hospital in Piraeus, which occupied the Russian doctors and nurses, the Russian Club in Plaka[71], where the community's social events took place, the Kozaks' Association and, above all, the Russian Church at Filellinon street, where a lending library was located as well.

The Russian Refugees' Union in Greece had a semi-official status and issued identity certifications for its members. Nansen's office's representatives in Athens were trying to help individually the refugees who were in need or to support their organizations with money from Geneva and Nansen's stamps[72].

They were easily assimilated. This was due to the fact that the men, who were certainly more than the women, had to marry Greek girls and they were, therefore, incorporated in Greek families. A positive factor was the common religion between the guests and those who offered hospitality, as well as the high social status of the Russians, who were very proud of the zero criminality of their community.

The Russian School in Athens operated regularly during the interwar period. For a prolonged period of time Father Sergios Sniegiroff was its soul. According to the testimonies of Russian refugees living in Athens today[73], great efforts were made in order to preserve that school with money raised by balls and other charities. The American organizations helped a lot. In 1936 the school closed down because there were not enough children. Besides the Russians had finally lost their hopes of returning to their country and wanted their children to adjust into Greek reality.

Many children of the Russian refugees which settled in Thessaloniki used to go to the Russian schools of Serbia in order to continue their studies. Those schools were funded by international Russian organizations and the Serbian government.

After the second World War many of the Russian refugees, who had survived the hunger and the cruelty, left Greece in order to avoid the civil war's consequences. At that time their motto was "go away from the Balkans". In the USA, Canada, Australia, Argentina and France, which became their new countries, they prospered and educated their children. The few families living in Greece today dream to travel back to their homeland along with their children after almost 80 years. As visitors...

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[71] The russian club established in 1928 in order "to facilitate the social life and the mutual aid of the russian emigrants". Every ex citizen of the Russian Empire who didn't recognize the soviet government could be member of this club.

[72] In May 1930 Nansen died. After that the legal and political part of the refugees' protection was kept as the object of the International Nansen Office for the Refugees. The charity work was divided in independent offices.

[73] I would like to thank Father Timotheos of the Russian Church, who is the soul of the Russian Senile House in Argiroupolis, the engineer Dimitri Lebedeff and Nina Zaparozets, wife of the Demidoff's driver, for their kindness and their willingness to share their memories from that hard era with me. I also thank all the others who wished to remain anonymous.

Athens' Law Scool

DOMNA VISVIZI-DONTAS

LE DODÉCANÈSE À LA CONFÉRENCE DE LAUSANNE (1922-1923)*

Des éditorialistes occidentaux ont souvent signalé que si le Proche-Orient avait pu couler au fond de la mer, la paix aurait été assurée en Europe occidentale. Il est vrai qu'après la Première Guerre mondiale, les tentatives de rédaction de la nouvelle carte de la région ont suscité de tels problèmes que par moments une nouvelle guerre mondiale menaçait l'Europe. Pendant les négociations de paix de Paris en 1919, la dissolution de l'Empire ottoman fait resurgir au premier plan l'antagonisme des Grandes Puissances, la Grande Bretagne, la France et l'Italie, pour la domination en Méditerranée orientale. Mais, l'Italie occupe déjà le Dodécanèse depuis 1912. De plus, par le traité secret de Londres du 24 avril 1915, elle a assuré la promesse de la Grande Bretagne et de la France d'une "pleine domination" en Dalmatie et en Epire pour s'approprier de la Mer Adriatique italienne (ce qui demeure le but de la politique italienne actuelle), le Dodécanèse et une base en Asie Mineure, afin de s'approcher du pétrole de la Russie et du Moyen-Orient. Les deux Alliés n'ont alors pas pensé que les visées impérialistes de l'Italie viendront se heurter aux revendications de la Serbie et de la Grèce qui viennent siéger à la Conférence de la paix de 1919 en tant que vainqueurs et qui ne sont pas disposées à abandonner des territoires qui leur appartiennent pour les céder à l'Italie. D'ailleurs, elles ont l'appui du gouvernement britannique, et en particulier du Premier Ministre Lloyd George qui est d'avis que les exigences italiennes ne sont pas relatives par rapport à la contribution de l'Italie à la guerre. C'est avec cette sérieuse justification qu'il s'efforce de faire attribuer le Dodécanèse et l'Epire à la Grèce et la Dalmatie à la Serbie. Il désire le plus ne pas voir les Italiens dans le Dodécanèse: avec un Dodécanèse sous domination grecque en liaison avec l'occupation de Chypre, la Grande Bretagne consolide sa domination en Méditerranée orientale.

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* La présente étude était communiquée pendant le congrès international "Rhodes 2400", qui a eu lieu à l'île de Rhodes en novembre 1993.

Abréviations

A.Y.E. : Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères de Grèce, Athènes.
D.B.F.P. : *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939,* First Series, vol. XVIII, London 1972.
D.D.I. : *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani,* Settima Serie: 1922-1935, vol. I, Roma 1955.
M.M.A.B.: Musée Benaki, Archives de Vénizélos, Athènes.

Il apparaît donc à ce moment-là que le traité secret de 1915 rencontre dans son application non seulement les réactions de la Grèce et de la Serbie mais celle de la Grande Bretagne. Celle de la Grèce est même plus forte, car les Italiens ont déjà clairement montré leurs visées expansionnistes après l'effondrement du front serbe en novembre 1915. Leur but est de s'emparer de l'Épire du Nord, de Corfou et de la domination commerciale de Thessaloniki par son important élément juif, et de s'assurer l'annexion du Dodécanèse. Il est donc normal que l'antagonisme gréco-italien sur le partage du butin de guerre devienne si fort qu'il laisse présager le naufrage du traité de paix avec le Sultan. Et qu'il crée également des obstacles à la signature de l'accord tripartite qui doit définir les zones d'influence des trois Alliés en Asie Mineure où les Britanniques ne veulent surtout pas la présence des Italiens à Smyrne (qu'ils ont d'ailleurs promise aux Grecs). Cette rivalité gréco-italienne n'est pas pour déplaire ni à la Grande Bretagne ni à la France qui ne désirent pas conclure un accord tripartite tant que ne seront pas réglées les questions en suspens en Europe de l'ouest. Les deux alliés posent donc comme condition à la signature de l'accord tripartite la satisfaction de la Grèce, principalement sur la question du Dodécanèse et de l'Épire du Nord. Cette pression multiple sur les Italiens les oblige à céder. Le 29 juillet 1919, Tittoni, le ministre italien des Affaires étrangères, et Vénizélos qui veillent à améliorer les relations gréco-italiennes, aboutissent à un accord. Les clauses prévoient que la Grèce abandonnera ses visées sur l'Épire du Nord, alors que l'Italie sera engagée d'accepter de céder le Dodécanèse à la Grèce. Cet accord constitue finalement une partie du Traité de Sèvres du 10 août 1920 — traité qui a été considéré par les Italiens et les Français comme un triomphe anglo-grec.

Ce triomphe ne dure cependant pas longtemps. La Turquie ne ratifie pas le Traité de Sèvres et l'échec de la campagne grecque d'Asie Mineure, en août 1922, en fait une lettre morte. Mais avant qu'il ne s'effondre le front d'Asie Mineure, à partir du début de l'année, les Italiens procèdent pour son abrogation. Il font savoir que le gouvernement italien ne reconnaîtra pas le régime du Dodécanèse sur la base du traité de 1920. Mais la Grande Bretagne a décidé à en donner suite. Lord Curzon, le ministre britannique des Affaires étrangères, dans un mémorandum qu'il adresse au gouvernement italien, souligne que la Grande Bretagne ne considère pas l'accord italo-grec de 1920 comme nul. Et il rappelle à l'Italie que la Grande Bretagne a des intérêts importants et directs dans la région et qu'elle ne restera pas indifférente si le traité n'est pas appliqué. Mais le mémorandum britannique demeure sans réponse de la part de l'Italie car la défaite grecque imminente en Asie Mineure lui donne de nouvelles bases de négociations sur le Dodécanèse. Effectivement, l'isolement diplomatique dans lequel se retrouve la Grèce après la "catastrophe de l'Asie Mineure" offre l'opportunité à l'Italie à mettre en œuvre l'application de ses visées expansionnistes. En octobre 1922 quoique les Alliés préparent la conférence de paix avec la Turquie, le gouvernement italien annonce à l'ambassadeur grec à Rome que l'accord de 1920 sur le Dodécanèse n'est plus valable. Mais il semble que l'Italie n'a pas prévu la réaction de la Grande Bretagne même après la défaite de la Grèce. Surpris, Curzon fait savoir aux Italiens que pour le gouvernement britannique la question du Dodécanèse ne peut pas être séparée du règlement général ni être résolue par une dénonciation unilatérale d'un acte international par l'Italie. L'interprétation des traités par la Grande Bretagne borne cette action de l'Italie qui prend conscience que la question sera discutée durant la Conférence de Paix de Lausanne le 20 novembre 1922 qui marquera la fin du grand problème de la dissolution de l'Empire ottoman. Un problème qui occupe l'Europe depuis des siècles.

L'Italie n'attend pas cependant jusque là. Depuis le 31 octobre, la scène politique de Rome a changé et c'est Mussolini qui tient désormais le premier rôle. Mussolini, étant un homme politique à forte personnalité, un calculateur sagace, un temporisateur perspicace, est arrivé au pouvoir avec l'ambition de faire de l'Italie une puissance dominante en Méditerranée orientale. C'est d'ailleurs une des principales visées de la politique extérieure de l'Italie depuis son unification. L'un des premiers actes politiques de Mussolini est donc d'adjuger le Dodécanèse à l'Italie. Sous prétexte de devoir répondre au mémorandum britannique sur la question du Dodécanèse, il adresse une lettre personnelle à Curzon. C'est aussi un moyen spécieux de montrer qu'il tient désormais solidement les rênes du pouvoir. Dans sa lettre il admet que, puisque le traité de 1920 constituait une décision collective des Alliés, eux seuls étaient compétents pour réexaminer la cause du Dodécanèse dans le but de conclure un nouvel accord. Cette réponse est d'une importance particulière pour Curzon, non pas tant sur le sort du Dodécanèse que sur la constitution d'un front uni des Alliés pendant la Conférence de Lausanne, alors qu'il n'a pas encore réussi à s'entendre avec le premier ministre français Poincaré[1]. Mais dès que Mussolini s'aperçoit que les positions de Poincaré ne sont pas alignées à celles de Curzon sur différentes questions du Proche-Orient, il en profite pour inaugurer sa politique de la *mare nostrum*. Il est aidé par le fait que les Kémalistes doivent se montrer à Lausanne arrogants et intransigeants et réclamer même les territoires qu'ils ont perdus pendant les guerres des années 1911-1913. Mussolini propose donc au gouvernement britannique que les pourparlers commencent d'emblée par la question du régime du Dodécanèse[2], ayant compris qu'un accord anglo-italien a plus de valeur qu'un accord franco-italien. D'ailleurs, la France a jeté tout son dévolu dans le partage du Moyen-Orient et est d'avis que la question du Dodécanèse ne concerne que la Grèce et l'Italie[3]. Curzon n'a pas d'objection à ce qu'on discute du régime des îles avant même l'ouverture de la Conférence, mais il exige la participation de la France[4]. C'est alors qu'il apparaît que Mussolini va perdre le jeu de l'accord anglo-italien sur le Dodécanèse. Cependant le dictateur "temporaire" s'est décidé à atteindre à son but, en attendant une nouvelle occasion.

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[1] D.B.F.P., vol. XVIII, First Series, n° 583 et D.D.I. (II), n° 61.

Cette occasion se présente lorsque la presse française annonce que Curzon et Poincaré se sont mis d'accord à Paris sur toutes les questions qui seront abordées à Lausanne. Mussolini leur téléphone alors pour leur dire qu'il désirerait les rencontrer à Territet le 19 novembre et qu'ils pourraient faire ensemble le voyage de Lausanne. Les deux autres sont surpris mais, en même temps, redoutant que l'invitation ait un rapport avec le nouveau mouvement fasciste, l'acceptent. En effet Mussolini a l'intention de rivaliser avec les deux autres dans l'art de la diplomatie. Il leur déclare d'emblée qu'il est d'accord pour qu'ils se présentent unis face aux Turcs à Lausanne[5]. Néanmoins, il demande aux autres d'appuyer la politique italienne au sujet du Dodécanèse. L'Italie n'accepte en aucun cas que la question soit discuté dans le cadre de la Conférence. Elle soutient que le sort des îles a été prescrit par le traité secret de Londres de 1915 et, donc, que leur régime doit faire l'objet de négociations séparées par les trois Alliés et surtout après la conclusion de la paix avec les Turcs, afin de ne pas leur offrir la possibilité de donner leur avis sur la question. Il veut aussi contraindre ses interlocuteurs en exigeant qu'il soit ajouté au traité de paix de Lausanne un article où il apparaisse que le Dodécanèse est adjugé à l'Italie. De son côté, Curzon considère toutes ces revendications comme inacceptables et insiste sur le fait que le sort des îles sera réglé dans le cadre général de la Conférence de Paix[6]. C'est un premier échec diplomatique pour Mussolini, mais il ne se décourage pas. Comme Curzon le signale au Foreign Office, Mussolini a peur que l'Italie, avec la révision du Traité de Sèvres, perde ses intérêts territoriaux en Asie Mineure. De surcroît, il n'est pas certain qu'elle conserve l'ensemble des îles du Dodécanèse. L'Italie ne gagnerait donc rien de sa participation à la Grande Guerre contre l'Empire ottoman. C'est avec cette crainte que Mussolini demande et obtient une entrevue particulière avec Curzon, qui vient d'être élu président de la Commission des Affaires Militaires et Territoriales et est devenu, par conséquent, une personnalité importante de la Conférence. Il ne peut cependant pas imposer les termes de la paix, s'il n'obtient pas le franc soutien de ses alliés, puisque dès la première séance les Turcs se présentent intransigeants étant fidèles à la tradition de la diplomatie ottomane, qui consiste à la temporisation, l'insistance et la patience. Conduit par cette pensée, le 22 novembre, Mussolini assure à Curzon qu'il est partenaire de l'Entente sur la base de l'égalité. Il l'assure aussi que son amitié avec la Grande Bretagne constitue l'un des piliers fondamentaux de sa politique extérieure car il croit que les dispositions de la Grande Bretagne envers l'Italie sont sincères. Pendant toute la durée de l'entretien, il laisse clairement paraître qu'il a une forte position dans son pays, en sorte qu'il peut tenir toutes ses promesses. Pour ce qui est des sujets de négociation de la Conférence, il assure une fois de plus qu'il appuyera les positions britanniques. Bien sûr, toute cette introduction est destinée à laisser entendre que, si la Grande Bretagne est d'accord avec la position italienne sur le Dodécanèse, la coopération de la France est acquise[7]. A cette première phase des négociations, l'appui de l'Italie, mais aussi, bien entendu, celui de la France est, pour Curzon, indispensable[8], — même si ultérieurement ni Mussolini ni Poincaré ne tiendront leurs promesses. Quoi qu'il en soit, c'est ainsi que Mussolini arrache à Curzon la promesse que la cause du Dodécanèse sera discutée hors du cadre de la Conférence. En rentrant à Rome, le lendemain, il annonce à la presse: "Nous avons conclu qu'il n'existe pas de question du Dodécanèse à régler avec la Turquie et que ces îles ne pourront pas devenir un sujet de conflit. Le Dodécanèse n'est plus un problème international"[9].

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[2] D.B.F.P., n° 148 et D.D.I. (I), n° 70.
[3] D.D.I. (I), n° 76.
[4] D.D.I. (I), n° 92 et 100.
[5] Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The last Phase 1919-1925. A study in Post-War Diplomacy*, Londres, 1934, p. 287-289.

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[6] D.B.F.P., n° 207.

[7] D.D.I. (I), n° 141.

[8] Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 290 et D.B.F.P., n° 213.

[9] A.Y.E., 1922-23/A/22/4, n° 2133/13009, Kallergis à Politis, Rome, 10/23 novembre 1922.

Le 29 novembre, Curzon appelle Barrère et Garroni, les représentants français et italien, pour des entretiens privés et confidentiels au sujet des îles. Comme l'intérêt de la Grande Bretagne est de voir l'Italie s'éloigner de la Méditerranée, Curzon propose qu'on lui ménage en Afrique des concessions pour qu'elle ne conserve que Rhodes et Astypaléa. Les autres îles seraient attribuées à la Grèce[10]. Cette proposition soutient les plaintes des habitants de Calymnos contre l'occupation italienne qui est devenue particulièrement oppressive[11]. Le représentant italien ne montre aucun intérêt. D'ailleurs, il a l'appui de son collège français car Poincaré avait promis à Mussolini son soutien dans l'affaire du Dodécanèse, pour que les deux alliés puissent collaborer pour d'autres questions, en particulier financières, avec la Turquie[12]. Mais l'Italie n'a pas pris en compte la Turquie, qui a décidé de donner son avis sur la question. Ismet Pacha, le Président de la délégation turque à la Conférence, réclame de participer aux débats. Son but est, d'une part, d'éviter la cession des îles à la Grèce et, d'autre part, si elles restent à l'Italie, de faire en sorte que la Turquie voie au préalable ses principales exigences satisfaites. Garroni propose comme solution à Ismet de conclure un accord bilatéral, mais ses efforts se révèlent inefficaces[13]. Les Turcs pensent que leur intransigeance et leur insistance conduira les Alliés à faire des concessions et des transactions qui leur seront favorables.

Les événements tournent tout autrement, lorsque, le 4 décembre, la question des Détroits est à l'ordre du jour des débats. C'est un sujet de la plus haute importance pour la Grande Bretagne et qui, pour être réglé, nécessite le front commun des Alliés contre la forte réaction non seulement de la Turquie mais aussi de son alliée, la Russie, qui a été invitée aux négociations uniquement pour cette question. La Grande Bretagne ne peut pas se permettre de laisser en suspens le problème du Dodécanèse où des Italiens, en tout cas, se montrent intransigeants. Curzon donne alors sa parole de faire en sorte que les îles soient attribuées à l'Italie[14], mais cette promesse n'est pas ratifiée par un accord particulier. Cette évolution des choses mobilise le gouvernement grec. Mais, à Lausanne, Vénizélos a tellement de questions sérieuses à régler (en particulier celle du Patriarcat et celle de la Thrace occidentale) qu'il ne juge pas dans l'intérêt de la Grèce d'entrer en conflit avec l'Italie[15]. C'est ainsi que dans la première partie de la Conférence, avec l'aide de Curzon et sous la menace de l'armée grecque de Thrace, il a résolu le problème du Patriarcat et de la Thrace occidentale et il a conservé une position d'attente pour le Dodécanèse. Mais, alors qu'il existait encore de nombreux sujets de négociation, les Alliés sont obligés sous la pression de la politique d'intransigeance que poursuivaient les Turcs, d'interrompre brusquement les négociations, imposant ainsi leurs propres solutions: le 29 janvier 1923 ils présentent à la délégation turque le projet d'accord de paix et réclament qu'il soit signé immédiatement. Les Turcs, bien entendu, remettent cette signature à plus tard. C'est cependant la seule solution pour leur faire admettre qu'ils sont les vaincus de la Grande Guerre et que leur succès vis à vis des Grecs ne constitue qu'un incident de son histoire.

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[10] A.Y.E., 1922-23/A/22/4, n⁰ 93/13137, télégramme secret, Kaklamanos à Rendis Lausanne, 14/27 novembre 1922.

[11] A.Y.E., 1922-23/A/22/3, n⁰ 11/13186, Pétychakis au Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Chio, 14/27 novembre 1922; M.M.A.B. /173/33, Appel de la population de Kalymnos à Vénizélos contre la domination italienne, 1er décembre 1922.

[12] A.Y.E., 1923/A/22/1, n⁰ 12750, télégramme, Vénizélos à Rendis, Paris, 19 novembre/ 2 décembre 1922; A.Y.E., 1922-23/A/22/4, n⁰ 4391/15175, Romanos à Alexandris, Paris, 3 janvier 1923.

[13] D.D.I. (I), n⁰ 171 et 189.

[14] D.D.I (I), n⁰ 204 et 211.

Dans le projet du traité de paix des Alliés, à l'article 15, le Dodécanèse est attribué à l'Italie. C'est alors que Vénizélos se hâte d'annoncer que "la délégation (grecque) se réserve le droit du gouvernement grec de reprendre ultérieurement des discussions pour un meilleur sort des îles du Dodécanèse, selon le principe de la nationalité et les accords antérieurs"[16]. Mussolini réagit sur le champ à cette déclaration de Vénizélos en demandant également l'appui de la Grande Bretagne. Mais Curzon, qui a véritablement triomphé contre la Turquie et la Russie sur la question des Détroits, propose que le régime du Dodécanèse soit discuté entre Rome et Londres[17]. Or, la Turquie revient dans cette nouvelle phase pour réclamer Castellorizo sous prétexte que l'île est située tout près des côtes turques[18] et d'après la note collective des Grandes Puissances du 13 février 1914 — décision qui n'a pas été appliquée à cause de la déclaration de la Première Guerre mondiale[19]. C'est dans le cadre de cette politique que les Turcs proposent aux Alliés, le 8 mars 1923, leur contre-projet de traité de paix qui prévoit la cession de Castellorizo à la Turquie. Surpris, le gouvernement italien réagit vivement, déclarant qu'elle sera intraitable sur le sort de cette île frontalière[20]. La question prend une nouvelle dimension: Elle devrait être discutée à la Conférence, à laquelle la Grèce prend également part, qui réclame l'application de l'accord gréco-italien de 1920. C'est aussi une excellente occasion pour la Grande Bretagne de limiter quelque peu l'Italie en Méditerranée orientale. Curzon a véritablement une claire vision de l'avenir, comme cela se vérifiera en 1935. Puisqu'il n'a pas fait d'accord écrit avec Mussolini, il n'est pas tenu de déclarer que la Grande Bretagne est obligée de respecter l'accord de 1920, ni même de se référer à sa déclaration d'octobre de l'année précédente par laquelle il n'a pas reconnu ni accepté son annulation unilatérale de la part de l'Italie[21]. C'est sous ces conditions que Mussolini était obligé encore une fois d'arracher au chef de la diplomatie britannique la promesse que l'article 15 du projet de traité de paix allié demeurera inchangé. A présent la promesse britannique ne suffit plus et la situation de Castellorizo deviendra un objet de négociations dans la seconde phase de la Conférence qui s'ouvre le 24 avril 1923[22].

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[15] A.Y.E., 1922-23/A/22/4, n⁰ 2443/14984, télégramme, Kallergis à Alexandris, Rome, 23 décembre 1922/5 janvier 1923.

[16] D.D.I. (I), n⁰ 482; A.Y.E., 1922-23/A/22/6, n⁰ 1042/614, Vénizélos à Bompard, Lausanne, 29 janvier 1923.

[17] D.D.I. (I), n⁰ 495 et 523.

[18] D.D.I. (I), n⁰ 594.

[19] Pour les détails voir Domna Dontas, *Greece and Turkey: The regime of the Straits, Lemnos and Samothrace*, Athènes, 1987, p. 26-28.

Pendant cette seconde phase, les Turcs se présentent intransigeants et exigeants au sujet de Castellorizo. Ils réclament l'île puisqu'elle leur a été attribuée par un accord antérieur. La politique des Turcs est de gagner Castellorizo avec la note collective des Grandes Puissances du 13 février 1914. Leur demande n'est pas infondée. Cette note ne concerne pas uniquement Castellorizo mais aussi Imvros et Ténédos. Ces deux îles ont été gagnées par les Turcs selon la même note pendant les négociations sur la question des Détroits. Inquiet pour l'évolution de cette affaire, Montagna, de la délégation italienne, essaie, dans des entretiens particuliers, de convaincre Ismet de reculer. Le représentant turc insiste pour que Castellorizo se trouve dans les eaux territoriales turques. Montagna rétorque que si le bout de l'île se trouve très près de leurs frontières, l'île est assurément hors des eaux territoriales turques. Les négociations, qui durent un mois entier s'avèrent laborieuses. Le recul des Turcs semble impossible. Ce n'est qu'avec l'entremise de la délégation britannique que les Italiens obtiennent Castellorizo[23]. Les détails de l'argumentation des Turcs au sujet de Castellorizo se prolongent jusqu'aujourd'hui dans les îles grecques de la Mer Egée orientale et méridionale et au sujet du plateau continental. Et cette expérience du passé est un guide précieux pour la diplomatie du futur.

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[20] D.B.F.P., n° 443.
[21] D.B.F.P., n° 583.
[22] D.B.F.P., n° 458.
[23] D.D.I. (I), n° 70 et D.D.I. (II), n° 69; D.B.F.P., n° 478 et 479.

La mobilité diplomatique autour du Dodécanèse ne laisse évidemment pas non plus indifférent Vénizélos Il tente avec quelque espoir de succès de faire participer la Grèce à la décision finale sur le régime de ces îles. Tenu à l'écart des discussions italo-turques du 28 mai 1923, il s'adresse à Londres à Curzon qui, pour la seconde phase des négociations, a retrouvé sa place au Foreign Office. Il lui propose la solution suivante: si la Grande Bretagne n'entamait pas de discussions générales avec les Italiens sur le sort du Dodécanèse, Athènes pourrait mener ces négociations avec Rome, de la part de la Grande Bretagne. Curzon désirerait que le problème des îles soit résolu entre la Grèce et l'Italie; l'accord qui serait alors conclu serait accepté par les Alliés comme la solution juste de toute l'affaire. Mais il n'est plus désormais possible de faire admettre à l'Italie d'abandonner ses droits sur le Dodécanèse[24]. Vénizélos, bien qu'il ait su depuis la première phase des négociations de Lausanne que la Grèce rencontrerait les pires difficultés au sujet du Dodécanèse, fait tout de même cette proposition pour ne pas être accusé de ne pas être à la hauteur des circonstances. A Athènes on est déjà quelque peu mécontent de la tactique diplomatique qu'il a suivie à Lausanne. Le général Théodore Pangalos et l'amiral Alexandre Hatzikyriakos, moins réalistes que Vénizélos, pensent que la Grèce aurait pu gagner bien davantage en s'appuyant sur son armée de la Thrace et sa flotte. Sous cette pression, le Gouvernement Révolutionnaire n'hésite pas à tenter une dernière action pour le Dodécanèse: il envoie à Rome le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Apostolos Alexandris, qui, le 24 juin, rencontre Mussolini. Mais comme c'est après de si nombreuses et si difficiles négociations que le dictateur s'est assuré la cession des îles, il est raisonable que, gêné, il refuse avec froideur toute discussion sur ce sujet[25]. C'est une dure expérience pour le Gouvernement Révolutionnaire, mais aussi la confirmation que Vénizélos a réussi davantage à Lausanne que la grande défaite de l'Asie Mineure ne laissait présager. Finalement, l'article 15 du projet de traité de paix allié du 29 janvier 1923 qui donnait le Dodécanèse à l'Italie reste inchangé et il est inclus tel quel dans le texte final du Traité qui est signé aussi par Vénizélos, le 24 juillet 1923, au nom de la Grèce.

En conclusion, il suffit de rappeler ce que Vénizélos à déclaré aux journalistes à la sortie de la salle de la Conférence: "Vous me demandez mes impressions sur la signature de la paix. Comment vous cacher la profonde mélancolie avec laquelle j'ai signé le Traité de Lausanne qui abolit définitivement le Traité de Sèvres? J'ai cependant apposé ma signature avec le sentiment de rendre un service à mon pays. Nous avons été vaincus et, à la suite du total isolement diplomatique auquel nous sommes parvenus par la politique qui nous a conduits à la défaite, une reprise de la guerre conduirait la Grèce à une véritable catastrophe. Alors que grâce à la remarquable réorganisation de l'armée qu'a réussie la Révolution, nous avons gagné la paix qui permet à la nation de mettre un terme à la période de la guerre et de se consacrer à l'œuvre de réorganisation intérieure. Si, en faisant cesser les déchirements antérieures et en revenant au fonctionnement normal des institutions, nous réussissons, par des élections libres, à rassembler une représentation nationale capable de donner au pays un gouvernement qui affronte la crise, je pense que nous pouvons envisager l'avenir avec confiance"[26].

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[24] D.B.F.P., n° 583.

[25] M.M.A.B./173/40, n° 988, télégramme, Alexandris à Vénizélos, Rome, 24 juin 1923.

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26. M.M.A.B./173/40.

XANTHIPPI KOTZAGEORGI-
GEORGIOS A. KAZAMIAS

THE BULGARIAN OCCUPATION OF THE PREFECTURE OF DRAMA (1941-1944) AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON THE GREEK POPULATION

The Bulgarian occupation of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace during World War II is a subject as complex and sensitive as it is tragic, and yet it was dealt with by Greek writers only during the decades of the 1940's and 1950's. A study of the bibliography of this time leads us to the following unavoidable observations: a) The people that dealt with and wrote about the issue of the Bulgarian occupation were directly involved—by position or by nature—in the situation when and where it occurred. b) In many of the works which deal with the issue there is no desire to approach it scientifically. c) A strong nationalistic, disorienting tone is inherent in most of these works. d) Many of the relevant works draw so heavily upon previous authors that it is often difficult to speak of new self-contained work. e) Finally, there is a marked absence of information coming from archive material; even when such information does exist, it is more often than not, fragmentary*.

The aim of this article is to provide an initial scientific record by a Greek author of the World War II Bulgarian occupation and of its consequences on the city and the area of the prefecture of Drama. Its principle aim is not, however, to give a full catalogue of victims or an assessment of the extent of destruction etc., but rather to provide a brief, collective (and not necessarily exhaustive) picture of the Bulgarian occupation and its consequences on the Greek population. The prefecture of Drama was chosen because, in a way, it played a 'leading role' during the period of occupation, a role which we believe will be demonstrated in the discussion of the subject.

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* It should be borne in mind that very few Bulgarian archives are accesible to foreign, especially Greek researchers. The authors of this paper have, therefore, had to rely on works by Bulgarian authors (notably G. Daskalov, D. Jontsev, I. Koev, S. Krumovski) who have consulted the relevant archives (notably the Archives of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, the Central State Archive of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Military-Historical War Archives).

THE BULGARIAN OCCUPATION OF EASTERN MACEDONIA AND THRACE

The Bulgarian decision for the invasion of the Greek provinces of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace was taken on 18 April 1941[1]. The invasion began on 20 April 1941 and by the following day (21.4.1941) the 2nd Border Brigade had reached and occupied Drama (where it installed its headquarters)[2]. The occupied Greek territory covered an area of 16,682 square kilometres and comprised of the prefectures of Serres, Drama, Kavala and Rodopi and part of the prefecture of Evros. It was subdivided into 11 local administrative units, one of which was that of Drama[3].

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[1] With order no. 4.4545/4 of 18 April 1941 issued by the German military authorities (Oberkommando Der Wehrmacht - OKW) to the corresponding Bulgarian authorities, see *Memoire sur les Reparations dues par la Bulgarie à la Grèce*, Documents Helleniques Serie C (Questions Economiques), Paris 1946, (hence to be referred to as Memoire), p. 4. In applying the German order, an order numbered 6101/18 April 1941 was issued by lieutenant-general Hatzipetkov of the 2nd Bulgarian Army, for the Bulgarian army to invade Eastern Macedonia and Thrace "to protect the Bulgarian population from the irregular Greek forces and detachments still roaming the area". The German general who signed the former order was named Greifenberg. See Daskalov, Georgi - Koev, Ivan, "Ustanovjavane i izgrazdane na balgarskata voena vlast v Belomorieto (April - Juli 1941 g.)" (Settlement and organisation of the Bulgarian military authorities in the Greek Eastern Macedonia and Thrace (April-July 1941)), *Voennoistorticeski Sbornik* 5/1990, (hence referred to as Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*), p. 108-9. (On 2 May 1941 the name of the 2nd Bulgarian Army was changed to the 1st. See Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 115).

[2] See also, Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 110 and 113. Also Διεύθυνσις Ιστορίας Στρατού (Army History Section, Athens) (hence referred to as ΔΙΣ), Arch. 8, F. 918/D/8, records by Zois Zografos, Drama Police Commander, 26.3.1946, record no. 4/2/16d. According to this record the Bulgarians left the town on 15 October 1944.

[3] The process of occupation proceeded at a very slow pace. For example, by 27 April the Bulgarian Armed Forces had occupied Macedonia only as far as the Serres-Drama line. The departure of the Germans started from the area of Serres and Sidirokastro. The German general Ot of the 30th German Army Corps wrote a letter to the Bulgarian general Loukas, Commander of the 1st Army, announcing that the executive power of the areas would be passing to the latter, who would replace the Greek bodies in their hitherto executive powers. See Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 115-118. See also A. Chrysochoou, *Η Κατοχή εν Μακεδονία, Βιβλίον 4, Οι Βούλγαροι εν Ανατολική Μακεδονία και Θράκη* (The Occupation of Macedonia, Book Four, The Bulgarians in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace), issue D1, Thessaloniki (ΕΜΣ) 1951, (hence referred to as: Chrysochoou, *Η Κατοχή*, issue D1), p. 13; Krumovski, Slavko, "Vazstanovjavane na balgarskija belomorki izlaz i vansnopoliticeskite uslovija za otstojavaneto mu (Maj 1941 - Septemvri 1944 g.)" (The return of the outlet to the Aegean sea to Bulgaria and the foreign policy conditions for its defence, May 1941-September 1944), *Voennoistorticeski Sbornik* 4/1990 (hence referred to as *Vazstanovjavane*), p. 133.

The legal position of the occupation was never clear: the German military forces (following orders issued by their political superiors) allowed the Bulgarian army to occupy the above-mentioned areas, which, however, were never conceded definitively to Bulgaria. The definitive settlement remained to be arranged after the end of the war[4]. On 14 May 1941 Bulgaria announced the official annexation of the occupied areas. The announcement was treated with forbearance by Berlin, which, despite the Bulgarian announcements, continued to regard the annexation as provisional. The Germans held a wide range of rights throughout this territory, a fact that showed that they saw the settlement as provisional in nature. The economic interests of the Reich had been arranged on 24 April 1941 with the Clodius-Popov Agreement and the Complementary Protocol of 27 April 1941, in which it was determined that the Bulgarian Administration did not have the exclusive sovereignty in the area[5].

Kozuharov—first general administrator of the Aegean area—was appointed with Resolution no. 39 of the Cabinet Council on 3 May 1941, having been chosen by Czar Boris himself. The same resolution maintained the existing administrative division of the area. Kozuharov was replaced on 20 October 1941 (on account of the events of October 1941) by Hristo Gerchikov, who remained in the position until 7 July 1942 and then by Stefan Klechkov, who remained until 7 September 1944. The latter was handed over to the Greek authorities by the Bulgarians upon liberation, was tried, condemned to death and executed. See Daskalov, Georgi, "Izgrazdane na Balgarskata administracija i politiceskata sistema v novoosvobozdenite zemi na Zapadna Trakija i Iztocna Makedonija (1941-44 g.)" (The organisation of the Bulgarian administration and the political system in the newly acquired lands of Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia, 1941-1944), *Voennoistoriceski Sbornik* 6/1992 (hence referred to as *Izgrazdane*), p. 105, 106, note 19. For an account of the exact extent of the occupied territory, see Stephen C. Xydis, *The economy and finances of Greece under axis occupation*, Pittsburg 1943, p. 10. For an account of the administrative division, see Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 105 and note 16 and Gennadeion Library (Athens), "Tsouderos' Archive, F. 11/60, 21.8.1941, record no. 2757, cipher from the Greek Embassy to Ankara (Raphael) to Tsouderos.

[4] See Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 126; Hoppe, Hans-Joachim, "Bulgarian nationalities policy in Occupied Thrace and Aegean Macedonia", *Nationalities Papers* 14 (1986) (hence referred to as *Bulgarian nationalities policy*), p. 89.

[5] For an account of the German reservations, see Hoppe, *Bulgarian nationalities policy*, p. 89. Also Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 118, note 60, which also refers to a German version of the political map of early 1942, which defines the Bulgarian-occupied area as 'under Bulgarian administration' and maintains the border demarcations between Bulgaria and Greece as they stood before the war. Also, see Miller, Marshall Lee, *Bulgaria during the Second World War*, Stanford (University Press), 1975, p. 128: "the fate of the various regions belonging to Yugoslavia will not be settled definitely until later, at the conclusion of peace. At present, therefore, no statements can be made regarding the future boundaries of Macedonia". For an account of the preservation of Germany's economic

From the very beginning, however, Bulgaria regarded the acquisition of the area as definitive; indeed, the establishment of civil and military authorities, civil servants, army personnel and settlers lent a definitive air to the occupation. Thus, despite German reservations, the Bulgarians proceeded gradually to take over the area's civil services, to dismiss Greek civil servants and to confiscate the services' funds and files[6].

To reinforce and defend Bulgaria's legitimazing titles in the area, the Bulgarian authorities, in addition to the regular army (the 2nd Bulgarian Army Corps), used armed groups which had been recruited from among the Bulgarian population. For the same purpose, the official organisation of paramilitary groups ('Associations of Reservist Officers' and 'Reservist Non-commissioned Officers'), had been active from November 1941 (in Drama: since early 1942) whereas, in 1942, a branch of the (illegal) para-military organisation "Bulgarian Legion"[7] was founded at the Drama high school. Moreover, a plethora of political associations and organisations (illegal or not) which had been active in the occupied area took steps towards the same goal. One of the most peculiar legal organisations was the Iliden Organisation, with —interestingly—purely autonomistic aims[8].

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rights, see Miller, *ibid.*, p. 128; also, Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 111-112, in which it refers to a letter sent by the 30th Army Corps of the Wehrmacht (based in Kavala) to the commander of the 1st Bulgarian Army, entitled "General Guide-line Principles for the occupation of Greece by the German and Bulgarian Forces" (18-19 April); in this letter amongst others they request guarantees for the economic interests of the 3rd Reich (confining the tobacco harvested in 1940 and the unutilized remains of that harvested in 1939, also taking cotton into their care and maintaining the currency equivalence which had been set by the Germans).

[6] The abolition of the Greek authorities took place despite article 3 of the truce agreement between, on the one hand, Germany-Italy and Greece on the other, in which it was determined that the Greek authorities would remain in Macedonia and Thrace. See Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 116, 118 note 60, 122. Krumovski, *Vazstanovjavane*, p. 134. It is interesting to note that the Bulgarians hold the Germans responsible for the abolition of at least the Greek communal authorities. See Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 125. They also ascribe the administrative incorporation of the area into Bulgaria to "the particular conditions prevailing in the area, as well as in the remaining territory which was returned". Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 104.

[7] The 2nd Bulgarian Army Corps was founded with a ministerial decree (no. IV-M1, 5.11.1943), in accordance with the instructions of German military command. See Jontsev, D., "Osigurjavane na Otbranata na Belomorskija Brjag ot 2-ri korpus (Dekemvri 1943-Mai 1944 g.)" (Consolidation of the defence of the Aegean coast by the 2nd corps (December 1943-May 1944), *Voennoistoriceski Sbornik* 1/1992, p. 49, 51. Krumovski, *Vazstanovjavane*, p. 133. Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 119, 123.

[8] Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 122.

BULGARIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE OCCUPIED AREAS

The principal and also immediate aim of Bulgarian policy in the occupied area was the latter's full incorporation into the Bulgarian state, which would happen on an administrative, ecclesiastical, educational, ethnological and economic level.

Administration: New political, military and police authorities

The bulgarization of the area's administration was achieved with the installation of new political, military and police authorities which were brought in to replace their abolished Greek equivalents. Some sources indicate that this replacement was carried out on a scale greater than that in any other occupied area of Europe, and that civil servants "from the highest ranks down to porters"[9] were replaced. A further aim of this replacement was to increase the Bulgarian population in the area: civil servants posted there were invited and encouraged to move to the area with their families[10].

As capital of an administrative district, Drama was: seat of the Bulgarian prefect (duties assumed on 8 May); seat of the provincial administrator (the first administrator appointed was Basil Georgiev); seat of the provincial police administration and of one of the five police garrison commander's offices; seat of the provincial courts of law (there were five in all occupied Greek areas) and of one of the two district courts of law of the occupied areas; and capital of an educational province. Drama was also the seat of one of the provincial "State Property" services, the purpose of which was to create an inventory and administer the state's movable and immovable property; headquarters of the district railways of Thrace and those of the 18th sector (for Eastern Macedonia); branch headquarters of the Bulgarian Agricultural Cooperative Bank; and finally it had also been chosen as the location for a state prison. That Drama was a town of such significance to the occupying forces is also indicated by the fact that as early as 5 May 1941 a telephone exchange had been installed there[11].

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[9] Lemkin, Raphael, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (hence referred to as *Axis Rule*), Washington D.C. 1944, p. 188.

[10] On the basis of the Cabinet Council Resolution of 9 October 1944. 'If they moved with their families, they were entitled to provisional free gifts of land and accommodation, a measure which was not extended to unmarried civil servants or workers, or to those whose families did not reside in their place of work. The gift of land and accommodation would become definitive upon the completion of three years of service in the area'. See Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, p. 416-417 for excerpts from the Council Resolution.

The Church: Administrative matters - Expulsions

The Bulgarian authorities were particularly concerned about the influence of the church on the Greek population in the occupied territories and about the likelihood that the church would develop into a pole of resistance against them. For this reason right from the very first days of the occupation they took care to bring the churches under their control so as to prevent their becoming centres of anti-Bulgarian propaganda (Decree of 19 May by General Loukas, commander of the 1st Army). On 22 May General Loukas ordered (amongst other things) that the sermons of the Greek clergy be followed by the military police[12].

At almost the same time as the Bulgarians assumed the governing power of the area, measures were taken to de-hellenize the church in Eastern Macedonia and in Western Thrace by removing its leaders and expelling the Greek bishops to the German-occupied area[13]. With the Resolution of 29 April

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[11] Chrysostomou, *Η Κατοχή*, issue D1, p. 14. Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 112, 114. See also, Dimitar Jontsev, *Balgarija i Belomorieto (Oktomvri 1940-9 Septemvri 1944 g.) Voenno-istoriceski aspekti* (Bulgaria and the Belomorieto, October 1940-9 September 1944. Military-historical aspects) (hence referred to as *Balgarija i Belomorieto*), p. 48. Daskalov, *Dramskoto Vastanie 1941* (The revolt in Drama 1941) (hence referred to as *Dramskoto*), Sofia 1992, p. 80. Ivan Bobatinov was appointed mayor of Drama and Dimitar Bakirchiev was appointed provincial administrator of Nevrokopi (See Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 109). Drama was also the seat of the decentralized health service, as well as that of the agriculture-livestock farming service, etc. The other four police garrison commander's offices were in Serres, Kavala, Xanthi and Komitini (Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 107-8). The other district court of law of the occupied areas was in Komotini. The district of Philippoupoli had judicial competence over the area of Drama (Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 114). On 22 June 1941 the 3rd Cavalry Regiment was installed in Drama, while the 2nd Infantry Battalion, whose headquarters was also in Drama, was reinforced by an artillery battery. The army forces of Drama came under the administrative authority of the Kavala Regiment, while from June 1941 they were brought under the administrative jurisdiction of the 2nd Division. See Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 123 and 124, note 95.

[12] Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 121-122. The Muslim mosques were subjected to the same treatment.

[13] Where some people took notable action in the relief of refugees. See A. Svolos, *Για τη Μακεδονία και τη Θράκη* (For Macedonia and Thrace), Athens (Papazisis), 1945, note on p. 5 and on p. 49, where the author mentions actions taken by the archbishop of Serres. See also *Η Μαύρη Βίβλος των βουλγαρικών εγκλημάτων εις την Αν. Μακεδονίαν και Δυτ.*

1941 of the Bulgarian Church Synod, the occupied areas were brought ecclesiastically under the Bulgarian Sees of Nevrokopi and Philippoupoli, and were managed by church commissioners[14]. A new ecclesiastical district of Stromnitsa-Drama was created, which included amongst others the Greek Sees of Drama and Zichnae, Sidirokastro, Serres, and Kavala[15]. Archimandrite Ieronimos Yamalakis, who was substituting for the Bishop, was expelled from Drama and the area was brought under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Bishop of Nevrokopi[16].

A number of Greek priests were also expelled at the same time and the remaining priests were forbidden from holding services in the Greek language. The authorities also made it compulsory that choristers learn to chant in Bulgarian[17]. Few priests were exempted from expulsion, mainly those wor-

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Θράκην 1941-1944 (The Black Book of Bulgarian Crimes in Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, 1941-1944) (hence referred to as *Μαύρη Βίβλος*), Athens 1945, p. 17-18. Chrysochoou, *Η Κατοχή*, issue D1, p. 26.

[14] See *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 18 and Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 16. The Bishop of Nevrokopi was Boris, who, in early 1944, made a one-week tour of Drama and the surrounding area. He held a service in the cathedral church of Drama (3.3.1944), in Doxato (9.3.1944) and in the church of St. Nicholas in Drama (Sunday 5.3.1944), *Zora*, newspaper 9.3.1944 ref. U.S. NARA 874.9111/771, 23 March 1944.

[15] The same ecclesiastical district also included another four Sees in the Yugoslavian sector which had been occupied by Bulgaria, see Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 116, note 111. On 1 January 1943 the district was divided into two parts and an autonomous ecclesiastical district was formed, the seat of which was in Drama, see Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 117, note 116.

[16] Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 116, note 111. Also see. A. Fostirides, *Εθνική Αντίστασις κατά της βουλγαρικής κατοχής, 1941-1945* (National Resistance to the Bulgarian Occupation, 1941-45), Thessaloniki 1959, p. 219.

[17] See Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, p. 188. Also, Διεύθυνσις Ειδικών Υπηρεσιών Πολέμου, Τμήμα IIα [Γραφείον IIIον], *Δελτίον Πληροφοριών Β'*, Υπ. αριθ. 37 (Special War Services Administration, Dept. IIa [Office III], Information Bulletin no. 2, Service no. 37), 31 August 1943, p. 19. Also, *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 11-12, 17-18, 98. Also, *ibid.*, p. 47, where one can also find a testimony that the parish priest of the village Ftelia, Drama, "was maltreated in the presence of his parishioners and paid a fine of 10,000 drachmas because he told the Bulgarian bishop's representative that on account of his old-age he was unable to learn the Bulgarian language". Also, *ibid.*, p. 61 about Doxato. Also, see Ελληνικό Λογοτεχνικό και Ιστορικό Αρχείο (Greek Literary and Historical Archive, Athens; hence referred to as ΕΛΙΑ), Αρχείο Βουλγαρικής Κατοχής και Προπαγάνδας (Archive of Bulgarian Occupation and Propaganda, hence referred to as ABK), no. 206, as reported by K. Papageorgiou, Drama 23.7.1942, and no. 215, as reported by the archbishop of Serres, 27.7.1942. With the Resolution of 20 June 1941, the Bulgarian Synod took the decision that the Greek language could co-exist with the Bulgarian language on an occasional basis (Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 116). See ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 199, statement made by E. Mantzaris (Doxato), 3.7.1942.

king in remote and, for the most part, mountainous villages. The places of the priests expelled were filled by Bulgarian clerics (some of whom were brought back from retirement), who held services in the villages on an alternating basis. Three churches remained open in Drama, while the others were either closed or handed over to Bulgarians[18].

The lower clergy of the area also suffered extensively. In two Sees (Drama and Nevrokopi), eleven Greek priests were murdered by the Bulgarian regular and irregular forces out of a total of 58 that were executed during the occupation throughout the Bulgarian-occupied area (see Table 1 of the Appendix). Many other priests were maltreated, robbed and ultimately expelled by the Bulgarian authorities[19]: sources refer by name to 63 priests who were expelled, a significant part of the area's total number of priests[20]. The expulsions took place on any pretext: an example is the case of the priest of the village of Amisos (Drama) who, at the end of March 1942, having been betrayed by a 'Bulgarized' Greek, was arrested, maltreated and ousted because he performed a memorial service for those who had been executed during the events of September-October 1941[21].

All the religious foundations of the area were plundered. Churches, monasteries and cathedral buildings were pillaged, for the most part, by Bulgarian priests, and icons, vestments, gold and silver vessels, carpets, books, etc., were removed. In particular, old icons were plundered from Doxato, whereas liturgical equipment was plundered from the churches of Drama. The monastery of Eicosifinissa was also plundered and all its monks were expelled[22].

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[18] ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 206, as reported by K. Papageorgiou, Drama 23.7.1942. According to another testimony, the Greek churches of Drama were not holding services. See ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 188, 2nd statement made by N. Philippides (Drama), 16.6.1942.

[19] See Chrysochoou, *Η Κατοχή*, issue D1, p. 27, in which the following description appears of the treatment sustained by the 70-year-old archimandrite D. Nikolaides, (Greek) bishop's representative at Mikropoli, Drama: 'Having obliged me to strip off completely, they began to examine my clothing and baggage. Having taken all the money that was to be found in my baggage, they ordered me to put on my vest and underwear. They immediately set about beating me thoroughly with rifle-butts and kicking me, calling me a partisan and asking: 'How much Bulgarian blood have you sucked, priest of the devil?'. This tragedy was carried out five times over a period of three hours and immediately after each beating they pulled at my hair and my beard with all their might so much so that many of the hairs remained in their hands (see also *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 106)'. The above priest was expelled after this occurrence and he died in Thessaloniki. 75-year-old Vissarion Dimitriades, archdeacon of Drama, was also subjected to similar treatment and he was also ultimately expelled. See Chrysochoou, *Η Κατοχή*, issue D1, p. 28.

[20] See A. Papaevgeniou, *Μάρτυρες κληρικοί Μακεδονίας-Θράκης. 1941-1945* (Cleric Martyrs of Macedonia-Thrace 1941-1945), Athens 1949, p. 68-72, in which descriptions of the maltreatment of priests by the authorities are also included, and *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 47, for the statement testifying to the maltreatment of the parish priest of the village of Poursovo. See also E. Gorgias, *Γύμνιες* (Devastation), Athens 1945, p. 28-29, which includes the statement from August 1942 that 'there were hardly any Greek priests [left] in the Bulgarian-occupied territories...'.

[21] See *ibid.*, p. 28.

Education - Language

One of the most significant manifestations of the Bulgarian policy of dehellenization concerned education and language. The application of such a policy started off with the expulsion of Greek primary and high school teachers. The Greek schools were closed and were replaced with Bulgarian ones, at both primary and secondary level (the latter in towns). A Bulgarian high school was founded and operated in Drama. During the first months of the occupation there was an attempt to entice Greek children into attending Bulgarian schools by distributing food, a tactic that was soon abandoned. Later, it was forbidden to Greek children to attend Bulgarian schools: only Bulgarian citizens and persons embracing Bulgarian ideals were allowed to attend Bulgarian schools[23]. Reading rooms were also established in large towns (including Drama) to offer additional support to the Bulgarian education, and in some villages branches of the Bulgarian youth organisation were founded for the benefit of children and young people; night schools for illiterate Bulgarian adults were also established[24]. Seminars concerning the Bulgarian language, geography and history were organised at the same time[25].

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[22] *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 43-44.

[23] *Memoire*, p. 10; Hoppe, *Bulgarian nationalities policy*, p. 91; *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 19, 55; Dimitris Magriotis, *Θυσίαι της Ελλάδος και εγκλήματα κατοχής κατά τα έτη 1941-1944* (Greece's sacrifices and occupation crimes during the years 1941-44), Athens 1949, p. 229. Also, ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 188, 2nd statement of N. Philippides (Drama) 16.6.1942. See also, U.S. NARA, 874.00/683, 3 February 1943, Burton Y. Berry (Sofia Embassy) to the Secretary of State. This record concludes that some Greek schools were operating in Thrace, although the basis of this conclusion was simply the fact that "it does not seem possible that the Greek children in Kavala, for example, should be obliged to attend Bulgarian schools". A memorandum by the same author, however, a few months later announces that all the Greek schools had been closed. See U.S. NARA, 874.00/49, 2 May 1943, Burton Y. Berry to the Secretary of State. Bulgarian historians maintain that it was forbidden for Greek children to attend school "due to it being impossible to find the necessary teaching staff"; see Daskalov, *Dramskoto*, p. 82, note 114 and Jontsev, *Balgarija i Belomorieto*, p. 99.

[24] Jontsev, *Balgarija i Belomorieto*, p. 74-76; Daskalov, *Dramskoto*, p. 82, note 114. Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 119.

The compulsory use of the Bulgarian language, in both written and spoken forms of speech, was established throughout the Bulgarian-occupied area on 12 May 1941. The decree consisted of the following: a) that it was obligatory for working people to learn the Bulgarian language well; b) that it was obligatory for shop-keepers to address their customers in the Bulgarian language — a matter for which they had to sign a declaration; c) that the use of the Greek language was forbidden and it was an act punishable with a fine. The Bulgarians proceeded to take a series of measures aimed at reducing to a minimum the presence of the Greek language and civilisation. Thus, by means of decrees issued during the first days of the occupation, libraries, book-shops and museums were brought under military control; the possession and use of Greek historical books and printed material was forbidden, even in private libraries; Greek printing-houses were forbidden from operating, as were type-setting machines, Greek typewriters and duplicators; radio sets were confiscated and listening to stations other that German, Bulgarian and Italian was forbidden[26].

The names of towns, villages and streetes, etc., were also changed. It was ordered by decree that Greek street-name signs and names of businesses be replaced by Bulgarian ones[27]. Greek inscriptions in churches and shrines, etc., were also whitewashed and even tombstone inscriptions were re-written in Bulgarian[28].

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[25] Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 119. Also, ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 188, statement by E. Ferhatides of Drama and 2nd statement of N. Philippides (Drama) 16.6.1942; Also ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 206, as reported by K. Papageorgiou, Drama 23.7.1942; also, ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 175, statement of A. Pougaras, 25.5.1942 and ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 227, statement of E. Chatzipetrou (St. Athanassios, Drama), 29.8.1942. Also, *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 55 and 70. For details of the seminars see Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 118. This is also backed up by the Bulgarian organisation 'Father Paisios', the aim of which was 'to strengthen Bulgarization beyond its borders' (see Daskalov, *Izgrazdane*, p. 120). In his statement of 29.8.1942, ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 227, E. Chatzipetrou of St. Athanassios probably refers to these seminars.

[26] Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 121-122, Daskalov, *Dramskoto*, p. 76, for the decrees of 19 and 22 May 1941 by General Loukas. See also ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 255, 2nd statement of A. Ladopoulos, 20.11.1942.

[27] See Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 121. Also, K. Snok, *Η τραγωδία της Δράμας* (The tragedy of Drama), Drama 1945, p. 25; *Memoire*, p. 10; Hoppe, H.-J., "Γερμανία, Βουλγαρία, Ελλάδα: Οι σχέσεις των τριών χωρών και η πολιτική της Βουλγαρίας στην Κατεχόμενη Μακεδονία", στο *Η Ελλάδα 1936-1944. Δικτατορία, Κατοχή, Αντίσταση* ('Germany, Bulgaria, Greece: relations between the three countries and the policy of Bulgaria in occupied Macedonia' in Greece 1936-44, Dictatorship, Occupation, Resistance), Athens 1989, p. 406. *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 18, 20; Vestis, *Atrocités Bulgares en Grèce*, Paris 1946, p. 6. ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 176, statement of H. Syroglou, 9.6.1942 (Choristi, Drama).

The Bulgarian obsession with removing any traces of Greek names as elements-symbols of identity extended even to people. The Bulgarian Church Synod, in its meeting at the end of December 1942, decreed that residents of the occupied areas with Greek names should have their names changed to its Bulgarian equivalent. Attempts to change surnames are also reported whereby a Bulgarian suffix would be added to existing names[29].

Economy

Significance of the area for Bulgaria

The occupied area did not only satisfy the strong tendencies towards revisionism, irredentism and territorial expansion that had been cultivated for years in Bulgaria. It was also of tremendous economic significance[30]. It was for this reason that one of the aims of the Bulgarian policy was the full economic integration of the area with Bulgaria.

The area of Drama, in particular, was of great value for Bulgaria's economy: an article in a Bulgarian newspaper of 1943 described it as 'the Bulgarian Eldorado', referring to it as the major tobacco-producing centre in terms of both quality and quantity in the occupied area; according to the article, the area produced 1/10 of the total amount of tobacco produced in Bulgaria: the tobacco crops of the area of Prosotsani alone, the article continued, were greater than those in the whole area (of the prefecture) of Harmanli in Bulga-

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See also, Antonovski, Hristo, "The Drama Uprising of 1941 and Bulgaria's fascist crimes" (translation), *Glasnik* 5 (1961), p. 59.

[28] See ΑΙΣ, Arch. 8, F. 909/E/2d, Memorandum of Dimitrios Andreades, Prefect of Drama to the Ministry of General Administration for Macedonia, 'concerning the situation in Bulgarian-occupied Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace', Thessaloniki 6.8.1942, p. 2. Also, see p. 5 where it makes reference to the fact that in Kavala the only Greek inscription is the dedication of the Greek communities of Egypt on the statue of Mehmet Ali.

[29] In accordance with this procedure the law courts of each area would issue certificates with the new name, on the basis of which the church authorities would issue new birth certificates. See U.S. NARA, 874.00/671 from the American Consulate General in Istanbul to the Secretary of State, 4 January 1943, reference in article of the *Zora*, newspaper of Sofia, 24 December 1942; also, ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 278; ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 41; ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 176, statement of H. Syroglou, 9.6.1942 (Choristi, Drama).

[30] See newspaper 'Der Wirtschafts-Ring' US NARA, 874.014/33, 22 September 1942, Daniel J. Reagan, Commercial Attache to the American Legation in Bern to the Secretary of State. The same is valid, though to a lesser degree, for other agricultural produce (flax, silk), and for minerals and ores.

ria. According to the author of the article, apart from tobacco, the area of Drama was also suitable for the cultivation of every type of fruit — the climate would even permit two harvests a year — as well as for raising cattle[31].

First measures

The economic destruction of the Greek population was essential within the framework of the economic policy of bulgarization of the area. Initially the Bulgarians confiscated the property of those Greeks absent from Drama during when it was occupied; their movable property was shipped to Bulgaria, while their immovable property was given to Bulgarians[32]. The inhabitants of the occupied areas were later obliged to exchange the Greek currency notes they had with Bulgarian ones. However, the amount they were given was only 60% of its exchange value while for the rest state bonds were given[33].

Thereafter, they attempted to systematically destroy the economy of the area using two types of measures: heavy taxation, whereby it was attempted to destroy economically the Greek inhabitants, and measures aimed at limiting the economic activity of the Greeks.

Taxation - Measures for draining the economy of the area

Most sources agree that the taxes imposed on the Greek population of the area were both particularly severe and of an arbitrary nature.

In July 1941 the Bulgarian Ministry for the Interior issued a decree according to which, apart from those taxes provided for in Greek legislation, the new municipal authorities in the occupied areas would also levy taxes in accordance to Bulgarian legislation. The same practice seems also to have been applied to outstanding debts to Greek banks. Thus, for example, in 1941, the value (or part of it) of the tobacco bought by the Bulgarian state was not paid to those entitled to it, but instead was retained in payment to outstanding debts to the Greek Agricultural Bank[34].

[31] See *Zora*, newspaper, 21.7.1943 in US NARA, 874.9111/282, 16 July 1943, Burton Berry, American Consul General in Istanbul to the Secretary of State.

[32] ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 206, as reported by K. Papageorgiou, Drama 23.7.1942. According to other sources, they confiscated the property of those absent at the census of 25-30 June 1942, see ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 8, 11.8.1941, Aliens' Center of Thessaloniki to the president's office, unsigned. and K. Doxiades, *Destruction of Settlements*, Athens 1946, p. 42.

[33] D. Magriotis, *op. cit.*, p. 243. ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 8, 11.8.1941, Aliens' Center of Thessaloniki to the president's office, unsigned. *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 34.

[34] 'Law for the Budget, revenue, expenses and accounts of the municipalities of the

A series of taxes (regular and special) were imposed which covered all manifestations of economic activity. Thus, the following taxes were established:

- real estate taxation (of up to perhaps 20% of the value of the real estate).
- taxes on houses, gross income, signs, fares, employed personnel; also on coffeeshop chairs (10 leva per hour), on card games, etc.
- taxes on agricultural produce: on tobacco (7 leva per kilo), on animals (20-40 leva per head, 70 leva on pigs), on poultry (10-20 leva)[35].

Beside this, a compulsory domestic loan of 4% on land value was also legislated, effective from 20 June 1943, and the land owners were required to pay this amount[36].

There are also testimonies to the fact that the Greeks were obliged to pay certain amounts to support Bulgarian settlers or at least to feed them. They were also obliged to deposit the acre tax corresponding to land that belonged to them but had been expropriated and handed over to Bulgarian settlers[37].

The tax was fixed at a rate decided upon by the Bulgarian financial authorities as they wished; the person taxed was not invited previously to fill a tax return form: he was simply expected to pay the amount assessed, without any right to appeal. Often the tax-collector would not give the proper

recently liberated countries', (Bulgarian) Government Gazette, no. 164, 29 July 1941; US NARA, 874.512/47, Enclosure from George Earle III, Legation of the United States of America, Sofia to the Secretary of State.The same seems to have been applied for municipal taxes and outstanding debts to banks. See ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 141 and 205, 3rd statement of A. Rassas, 16.7.1942; ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 200, "Summary Report...". Altinamazis, mayor of Alexandroupoli, 6.6.1942. The occupation government of Tsolakoglou also submitted a declaration to the German authorities on this subject: see G. A. Pharmakides, *Πεπραγμένα της παρά τω πρωθυπουργώ υπηρεσίας ανταποκρίσεων μετά των Γερμανικών Αρχών κατά την κατοχήν* (Actions taken by the correspondence service to the prime minister along with the German authorities during the occupation), Athens 1957, p. 29. *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 60, testimony by the village of Kyrgia (Drama).

[35] ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 206, report by K. Papageorgiou, Drama 23.7.1942; also, ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 227, statement of E. Chatzipetrou (St. Athanassios, Drama), 29.8.1942 and *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 34, 62.

[36] ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 311, Aliens' Center of Thessaloniki to the Administration of the Service for Aliens, Athens, 'Information about the Bulgarian-occupied Greek territories', 20.5.1943. *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, note p. 34, 62.

[37] ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 231 (3), 'Report by A. Chrysochoou, Gen. Inspectorate of the Prefectures of Macedonia', 2.9.1942 and ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 227, statement of E. Chatzipetrou (St. Athanassios, Drama), 29.8.1942. *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 62.

collection receipt which, in some cases, resulted in Greeks having to pay the same amount all over. If the tax was not paid in full within a month it was doubled, interest was added, and if not paid within the next month the movable property of the debtor was auctioned[38].

The following are typical examples of the arbitrary and severe nature of the taxation contributions which were imposed: a) the case of the village of St. Athanassios (Drama), the residents of which paid 200 leva per family to the Bulgarian communal authorities for the supply of water for irrigation; however, only once during the occupation period was water supplied, and even then this lasted for three hours; b) the case of the village of Doxato, the residents of which, according to some testimonies, had to pay 500 leva per family as compensation for the ammunition used to execute the residents of the village in October, 1941[39].

Measures for the limitation of the economic activity of the Greeks

Attempts were also made to cripple the Greek population using measures to limit its economic activity.

The law "for the compulsory expropriation of the various organisations of public benefit in the newly-liberated countries" of 29 July 1941 gave civil services and the local administration the right to expropriate private businesses (such as electricity) producing plants, flour mills, mines, quarries, banks, hospitals, pharmacies and others) which were regarded as being of general public benefit, committees set up by the local mayors were empowered to decide on the characterization of such facilities[40].

Administrative measures were also taken to limit the scope of activity of Greek skilled workers and self-employed businessmen. An 'occupation tax' was imposed with particular severity upon them, and a special work permit system was established. Contemporary sources deemed the refusal to grant such a permit to be granted as equal "to a sentence to death by starvation"[41]. The following extract shows the results typical of the application of this measure:

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[38] *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 35.

[39] ΔΙΣ, Arch. 8, F. 909/E/2d, Andreades. Also, ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 206, as reported by K. Papageorgiou, Drama, 23.7.1942 and ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 227, statement of E. Chatzipetrou (St. Athanassios, Drama), 29.8.1942. *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 33-4, which refers to taxation amounting up to 30% on profits and inheritances, and additional municipal taxes. See also, Gorgias, *op. cit.*, p. 12, which refers to the case of the compulsory distribution of 1,400 copies of a book ('Houbava Bulgaria') to the thousand families of the village of Nikisiani at 500 leva per copy (= 350,000 leva), 1,5 mill. leva for wheat seed (which was not delivered), 100,000 leva for 'lost uniforms' of the Bulgarian police, etc. Again, *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 34.

[40] Daskalov, *Dramskoto*, p. 89.

> Considerations of a political nature have also augmented the number of those without jobs; ... the institution of a system of special permits of work has been introduced since December, 1941 with the result that out of the 6,800 storekeepers, small merchants, small businessmen, etc., who applied for such licences, only 4,300 received them; and out of 5,530 artisans, only 4,300 were successful in their petitions. (Xydis, Stephen C., *The economy and finances of Greece under axis occupation,* Pittsburg 1943, p. 19).

Greek doctors, lawyers and pharmacists were forbidden from practicing their professions[42]. The limiting measures taken by the Bulgarians resulted (according to the statement of A. Zacharopoulos, a pharmacist from Drama), in the population of Drama being left with neither doctors nor pharmacists from spring 1942[43].

According to some information, Greek self-employed businessmen were only permitted to practice their profession if they engaged in partnership with Bulgarians, who contributed neither capital nor labour to the business: they merely took a share of the profits; according to the complaints lodged by many Greeks these partners promptly forced the Greeks to quit and took possession of the business[44].

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[41] Decree no. 2206 of 30.5.1941 and 2290 of 6.6.1941, of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labour, see Daskalov, *Dramskoto,* p. 88. See also Lemkin, *Axis Rule,* p. 189 and ΔΙΣ, Arch. 8, F. 909/E/2d, Andreades. In December 1941 the Bulgarian authorities ordered businessmen to sell their merchandise before a particular deadline — once this had expired, practicing any profession by a Greek was forbidden. EAIA, ABK, no. 49b. Probably the same law as referred to in EAIA, ABK, no. 225, statement of I. Lambropoulos, 20.8. 1942, in accordance with which the practicing of any profession by Greeks was forbidden after July 1942, though this deadline was ultimately extended to the end of the year.

[42] Greeks doctors had been forbidden from practicing from March 1942, and in August of the same year they were obliged to hand in their diplomas to the authorities. EAIA, ABK, no. 227, statement of A. Zacharopoulos, Drama, 3.9.1942. Also, *Μαύρη Βίβλος,* p. 31 and p. 123, to which is attached the text banning a Greek doctor from Komotini (with the date 27.4.1942) from practicing his profession, in accordance with which the relevant resolution of the Cabinet Council (no. 4404) had been issued from the 31.10.1941; probably, however Greek doctors were allowed to practice their profession on some occasions for some time after the publication of the law. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labour banned Greeks from practicing the profession of lawyer and pharmacist with another Resolution no. 2288 of 6.6.1941. Daskalov, *Dramskoto,* p. 88-89.

[43] EAIA, ABK, no 227, statement of A. Zacharopoulos, Drama, 3.9.1942. Also, *Μαύρη Βίβλος,* p. 99.

Even farmers did not escape the economic limitations. Wheat producers were obliged to hand over their produce to the authorities, keeping only a very small part of it[45]. The 1942 tobacco harvest was bought from the producers at artificially low prices[46]. Similar measures were applied in the case of animals: they were requisitioned for use or consumption by the Bulgarian army and settlers, against receipts which were only rarely acquitted. In this manner, the village of Pyrgi (Drama) during the Bulgarian occupation lost 100 head of cattle, 25 beasts of burden, 2,000 sheep and goats and others[47].

Colonization of the area by Bulgarian settlers

> The Bulgarians, the entire Aegean region, the refugees are rejoicing, they are anxious to return to their homeland, all the Bulgarians wishing to move to the fertile land are rejoicing. (article entitled "The Aegean is rejoicing", *Novo Vetser*, newspaper, Sofia, 7 November 1941, see, *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 120).

One of the primary aims of the Bulgarian government was to alter the ethnological composition of the area. The Bulgarian historian, D. Jontsev, makes a characteristic reference to the fact that in summer 1942, the Bulgarian government was seeking ways "to expel at least half the Greeks..."[48].

The settlement programme was officially announced by decree on 24 October 1941[49]. The stated purpose of the programme was to "give the area back its Bulgarian character". The settlers were given, amongst other things, land, houses, animals, and seeds[50]. The local Bulgarian authorities had submitted proposals the aim of which, according to Gerchikov (General Administrator of the occupied territories) was for the Aegean area "to...heal and become bulgarized".

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[44] Snok, *op. cit.*, p. 25. *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 31. ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 61 and no. 208, 5th statement of D. Theodoropoulos, Drama, 24.7.1942.

[45] See ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 197, 1st statement of C. Bitsas, 29.6.1942. In 1942 the residents of Doxato harvested their fields under the supervision of the Bulgarians (soldiers and rural police), were obliged to thresh using mechanical threshers (handing over 10%) and they were not allowed to grind the wheat. See also, *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 31-2.

[46] ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 254, 1st statement of J. Tsapanides, 17.11.1942; 2nd statement of N. Daskalos, Mikropoli, Drama, 18.11.1942.

[47] *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 32.

[48] Jontsev, *Balgarija i Belomorieto*, p. 78, 93.

[49] See Jontsev, *Balgarija i Belomorieto*, p. 79. Also. US NARA, 768.7415/51, 4 November 1941, Royal Greek Legation in Washington (C. Diamantopoulos) to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State.

The legal details concerning the colonization were arranged with a plethora of laws; decrees and circulars. One of the decrees facilitated the confiscation of privately-owned Greek land. Another decreed that any pieces of occupied land which had not been distributed to settlers by March 1943 would be rented "firstly to Bulgarians and, as a last resort, to the indigenous population"[51]. The land distributed among the settlers was of significant area: according to information, 620 acres of land were distributed among 35 settler families in the village of Kyrgia, as well as part of the animals and tools belonging to the Greeks[52].

Because problems had been encountered in finding land and homes for the settlers even as early as September 1942, a decree was issued in accordance with which "any privately-owned real estate which is essential for the construction of housing for settlers in the Aegean area will be confiscated"; following this, settlers began to move into the houses of Greeks still living in the area[53].

Extensive "illegal" immigration, chiefly by persons seeking to profit by the situation, also occurred during the occupation. According to the complaints expressed on 16.11.1942 by the regional administrator of Drama, Hristo Enev, unsuitable categories of people had been chosen as settlers. The representative of the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior, on his visit to the area in 1943, also verified the unsuitability of a large number of the settlers[54]. The acts of banditry of many of these people had catastrophic consequences on the area.

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[50] See US NARA, 874.52/9, 24 October 1941, From Gray (Sofia) to the Secretary of State. Also, 874.9111/218, 24 June 1943, Burton Berry, Consul General, Istanbul to the Secretary of State and 874.9111/467. Also, *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 28-29. The possession and paying off terms were extraordinary favourable, see indicatively, Jontsev, *Balgarija i Belomorieto*, p. 79. *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 122.

[51] ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 290, *Zora*, newspaper, 10.2.1943.

[52] *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 30.

[53] Georgi Daskalov, "Demografski procesi v Iztocna Makedonija i Zapadna Trakija (1 Januari 1942-25 Oktomvri 1944 g.)" (Demographic processes in Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace (1 January 1942-25 October 1944)) (hence referred to as *Demografski*), *Voennoistoriceski Sbornik* 1/1992, p. 26, 29. Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, p. 189. ΔΙΣ, Arch. 8, F. 909/E/2d, Andreades. See US NARA, 874.9111/218, 24 June 1943 and 874.9111/467, 15 October 1943, Burton Berry, American Consul General to the Secretary of State.

[54] Daskalov, *Demografski*, p. 28, 29, 37 and 38; *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 29.

Colonization in the prefecture of Drama

The information we possess does not allow us to provide details of the exact number of Bulgarian settlers in the prefecture of Drama. The local authorities in the area anticipated that 780 families would settle in 8 villages. According to some information 1,750 Bulgarian families had settled in 12 villages in the Drama area by the end of 1942[55]. It is almost certain that colonization in the prefecture of Drama took place on both rural and urban levels. Thus, the Bulgarian urban population in Drama in the census of 1943 stood at 5,056 persons —one of the largest in the occupied area— and the vast majority of these were Bulgarian settlers[56].

The draining of the Greek population in the prefecture of Drama

The aim of the Bulgarian policy in the occupied territory to alter the ethnological composition of the population by any means was furthered by the flight of Greek citizens. This flight was in the form of either individual or mass deportations, displacements of population and "voluntary" departures; all this took place despite the fact that the German authorities wished otherwise[57].

Deportations

The Bulgarian authorities proceeded with the deportation of educated Greek citizens shortly after the occupation was completed. The persons deported were mainly school teachers, doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, notary publics, etc. —generally those who the Bulgarian authorities felt could be regarded as a point of reference and pole of resistance to the bulgarization programme of the area. To cite an example, immediately after he assumed his duties, the district administrator of the area of Drama, Basil Georgiev, proceeded with the deportation of approximately 60 Greek scientists who 'could influence the population'. The wave of mass deportations (on any pretext) intensified in July and August 1941 when the results of the census which had been carried out turned out negative for the Bulgarians. Yet again, 96 people were deported from the area of Drama from 9 to 25 August 1941[58]. The attitude of the Bulgarian district administrator of Drama towards the Greeks was demonstrated clearly in his letter of 15 September 1941 to the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior. In it he requests that the wave of expulsions of the Greek population, which had been checked on the 1st September be resumed, explaining that the expulsion of the Greeks was the only way "to begin the economic and political bulgarization" of the area which would be hindered by the fact that "a Greek always remains 100% Greek"[59].

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[55] The former piece of information was taken from Daskalov, *Demografski*, p. 22. The latter appears in Monastiriotis, *Οι Πρώσσοι των Βαλκανίων* (The Balkan Prussians), Cairo 1944, p. 59.

[56] Xanthi: 7,289 Bulgarians, Serres: 6,344, Kavala: 4,624. See Daskalov, *Demografski*, p. 40.

[57] The opposition of the German authorities to the departure of the Greek population of the area was stated quite clearly by the German authorities in a letter sent by the commander of the 30th Army Corps of the Wehrmacht (Kavala) to the commander of the 1st Bulgarian Army, entitled "General guide-line principles for the occupation of Greece by the German and Bulgarian Forces" (18-19 April 1941) (see Daskalov-Koev, *Ustanovjavane*, p. 111-112).

"Law concerning the citizenship of the areas liberated in 1941"

Another measure which led to the mass exodus of the Greeks from the area was the Bulgarian "Law concerning the citizenship of the areas liberated in 1941" of 5 June 1942. In accordance with article 4 of this law, anyone who did not take up Bulgarian citizenship by 1 April 1943 would be deported. A Bulgarian representative stated typically that the purpose of the law was "to facilitate the emigration of Greeks, Serbs and others from [within] the kingdom's boundaries"[60].

The same representative issued an order to the local authorities on 23 March 1943 to facilitate the emigration of the Greeks from the area using any possible means. On the basis of the above, a large number of permits to leave (1,627) were granted to Greeks of the Drama area wanting to emigrate[61]. The prerequisite in every case before the permit to emigrate to German-occupied Greece was granted was a signed declaration stating that all those who were leaving would not return and that they were handing their property over to the Bulgarian state[62].

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[58] Specifically, 31 people were deported on 9 August (from the villages of Doxato, St. Athanassios, Platania, Kalabaki, etc.); 16 people on 12 August from the villages of Xiropotamos and Photolivos, 36 people the following day and another 13 on 25 August (see Daskalov, *Dramskoto*, p. 90). See also, *Μαύϱη Βίβλος*, p. 20-21; Magriotis, *op. cit.*, p. 231. ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 36, '4th Report of the General Administration of Prefectures of Macedonia', 30 November 1941, p. 8; see E. Grigoriou, *'Ελληνες ϰαι Βούλγαϱοι* (Greeks and Bulgarians), Thessaloniki 1954, p. 535, which also refers to the mass deportation of 72 lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc. from Drama in June 1941.

[59] Daskalov, *Dramskoto*, p. 91.

[60] Daskalov, *Demografski*, p. 31. The law was published on 10 June 1942 in the Bulgarian Government Gazette, see also *Μαύϱη Βίβλος*, p. 118-120 to which the text is also appended. In Greece this law is more commonly known as the 'Law concerning Naturalization'.

[61] Whereas only 240 were granted in the town of Xanthi, 358 in Serres, 2,754 in the prefecture of Xanthi. See Daskalov, *Demografski*, p. 34.

The rate of exodus of the Greek inhabitants of the area was accelerated by pressures to submit a statement by which one agreed to take up Bulgarian citizenship were exerted long before the relevant deadline expired (it was rumored that the deadline would expire on 15 August 1942 or December 1942, while the date given by the law was 1 April 1943)[63].

Other reasons for the exodus of the Greek population from the area

Finally, it should be noted that found various ways of forcing the Greek population to leave were devised. For example, there is information that some Greeks were arrested as undesirables and transported to Bulgaria. There are testimonies to mass diplacements to Bulgaria[64], while many of the —mainly young— Greeks sought ways to emmigrate as industrial workers to Germany, quite a few of them doing so to avoid being called up to the labour battalions. From the area of Drama alone 480 Greek workers left for Germany in April 1943[65].

Measures of oppression and physical extermination of the Greek population: Labour battalions — forced labour

Those Greeks who remained in the area had to suffer not only the consequences of the economic and other measures, but also the humiliation of working for the occupying forces. The best-known and most usual method was being called up for municipal, civil and military work. In April 1942 many Greeks of the 1942 class (1,700 from the area of Drama alone)[66] were called up by the Bulgarian army[67] and sent out of Greece (mainly into Bulgarian-occupied Yougoslavia) for the construction of roads and other works[68]. Around 1,200 people from the Drama area were also called up and taken to the Greek forts of the Metaxa line in Komotini in order to demolish them. Those called up worked long hours in the open, under exhausting conditions. They were given little food and were maltreated. This maltreatment in many cases constituted a type of punishment to break the spirit of opposition of the Greeks and make them yield to the intense pressures exerted upon them by the authorities to declare that they were Bulgarians. Many Greeks lost their lives either due to maltreatment or to accidents during their compulsory service in the labour battalions[69].

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[62] *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 107-109. Antonovski, *The uprising*, p. 61.

[63] See ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 227, statement of E. Chatzipetrou (St. Athanassios, Drama), 29.8.1942; also, ΔΙΣ, Arch. 8, F. 909/E/2d, Andreades.

[64] ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 41 and 43, which refers to the arrest of Petros Andrikopoulos from Kyrgia, who was arrested along with others on 1.11.1941 and transported to Drama to be deported, but subsequently escaped. *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 41-42.

[65] The number is large when compared to the 183 from Xanthi and 246 from Kavala in the same month. See Daskalov, *Demografski*, p. 36. It is estimated that a total of 10,000 Greeks left the Bulgarian-occupied area to work in Germany (see Daskalov, *Demografski*, p. 42).

[66] ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 201, 3rd statement of Ilias Theocharides, 8.7.1942. According to

Apart from the labour battalions, to which mainly young and exclusively male Greeks were called up, it is apparent that various types of forced labour were imposed on those residing in the countryside. For example, in the countryside around Drama, the residents of Doxato were obliged to construct new houses for the Bulgarian settlers; the residents of the village of St. Athanassios (Drama) were used on an alternating basis twice a week, together with their animals and carts, to build houses for the settlers; finally, the residents of the village of Pyrgi were obliged throughout the occupation to cut fire-wood (a total of some 20,000 cubic metres of timber) for the authorities and settlers[70].

General Comments

a) Damages

To conclude we would like to add some general information as to the

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other information it was 850 (see ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 184, 2nd statement of N. Chatzopoulos, 9.6.1942, Choristi, Drama).

[67] According to another source the classes 1941-2 were called up from May to November 1942 and the class of 1943 in August. See Gorgias, *op. cit.*, note p. 30-34.

[68] See Gorgias, *ibid.*, p. 20-21.

[69] See *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 40. Svolos, *op. cit.*, p. 27-30. Gorgias, *ibid.*, p. 20-21, who mentions that their daily rations were pulses and 500g. bread. See also ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 147, 188, 205, 1st and 2nd statement of 14-16.7.1942, of P. Serkitzis, A. Chatzifotiades. ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 167, statement of 29.5.1942, of I. Sismanis and in particular ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 158, as reported by Gen. Inspectorate of the Prefectures of Macedonia 'Concerning the maltreatment of those Greeks from Eastern Macedonia and Thrace called up for service by the Bulgarians', 29.5.1942; the report estimates the number of men called up at approx. 7,000.

[70] Magriotis, *op cit.*, p. 244. ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 254, 2nd statement of N. Daskalos, Mikropoli, Drama, 8.11.1942. *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 36, 62.

consequences of the Bulgarian occupation on the prefecture of Drama with regard to material damage and loss of human life.

It is certain that the destruction suffered in the prefecture of Drama was much greater than that suffered by any of the other Bulgarian-occupied areas. The exact extent of the damage is not easy to estimate. One source[71] gives a total of 67 destroyed villages in the prefecture and of 2,163 homes as well as the further destruction of 961 homes in other villages (which were not entirely destroyed). Another source gives a figure of 31 villages destroyed in their entirety and some 18,025 homeless[72]. More specifically, in the rural settlements of the prefecture of Drama, 3,357 buildings in all were totally destroyed, 2,952 were partially destroyed (a total of 6,309 houses out of a total of 14,925), and 179 settlements were suffered damage as a consequence of the above[73]. Municipal buildings suffered damage as well as private houses, and many were either wholly or partially destroyed. Among the municipal buildings which met the same fate was the Drama High School which had its doors, windows and even the floor-boards removed; the same also happened to the school at Doxato[74].

According to post war estimates of the Greek Ministry of Reconstruction 36.5% of the total buildings throughout the prefecture of Drama were destroyed during the occupation, while the prefecture comes 7th in terms of loss of building capital in the whole of Greece[75].

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[71] *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 14, 45, which mentions 1,500 plundered homes in the town of, Drama.

[72] See *Cities and Villages of Greece Destroyed by Germans, Italians and Bulgars 1941-44*, n. p., n.d., p. 37-38. Of those 15 were destroyed at the end of September (1, Doxato) and in October 1941 (14, Mikropoli, Kokkinogeia, Prosotsani, Mikrokambos, Kallithea, Sitagri, Kalos Agros, Photolivos, Mesorema, Choristi, Kallifytos, Christos, Adriani, Nikiforos), 2 (Platanovrysi and Prinolofos) in September 1942, 9 in October 1943 (Potami, Prinotopos, Nerofraktis, Ano Ftelia, Kato Ftelia, Pigadia, Mikrolofos, Chamokerasia, Kranochori) 5 in November 1943 (Granitis, Pyxarion, Mavrokordaton, Paliambela, Mikrolivado).

[73] K. Doxiades, *Καταστροφαί οικισμών* (Settlement Destruction), Athens 1946, p. 47. Various sources also refer to the destruction of particular small settlements at different times. See eg. A. Phostirides, *Εθνική Αντίστασις κατά της βουλγαρικής κατοχής 1941-45* (National Resistance to the Bulgarian occupation 1941-45), p. 227-228 and 234 for the partial destruction of the communities of Kastanoto and Paschalia on 12-13 May 1944. Also in the community of Ano Pyxarion a total of 38 houses were destroyed, as well as the school and the community building, see Ιστορικό Αρχείο Μακεδονίας (IAM) (The Historical Archive of Macedonia), the Prefecture of Drama 1940-50, AEE=D/2 ABE=44, ESPA Report, community of Pyxarion, 23.11.1946.

[74] *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 45, 61.

[75] K. Doxiades, *Θυσίες της Ελλάδος, αιτήματα και επανορθώσεις στον Β' Παγκόσμιο*

b) Loss of human life

The exact number of human lives lost is exceptionally difficult to estimate. The wanton violence of the Bulgarian occupying forces and the many different ways in which the Greeks were pursued and exterminated make such estimates impossible. The figures given vary[76]. Thus the victims of the events of September-October 1941 are estimated at 2,000-3,000 (mostly men) in the town of Drama and at 5,000-6,000 throughout the prefecture[77].

The difficulty in determining the exact number of Greeks who lost their lives becomes more evident when one tries to estimate out the losses on a local level. Thus in the area of Drama, on the basis of the register of names (drawn up by the Mayor of Drama, A. Nikiforides) of those Greek citizens murdered by the Bulgarians, the losses total 468 persons during the occupation; another 28 died during the same period as a result of beatings, maltreatment, torturings, etc.[78]. Another source reports 56 executions in Drama and twelve in the rest of the prefecture during the period of the Bulgarian occupation[79]. In addition to the catalogues of victims which have been drawn up by

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Πόλεμο (Sacrifices of Greece; claims and reparations in the Second World War), Athens 1947, p. 41, 45.

[76] ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 36, '4th Report of the Gen. Inspectorate of the Prefectures of Macedonia', 30 November 1942, p. 10, 19; Grigoriou, *op. cit.*, p. 553, 569; A. Svolos, *op. cit.*, p. 212, reports 5,000-6,000 victims. Snok, *op. cit.*, p. 31, mentions approx. 2,500 dead in Drama, 15,000 in the district (on p. 42 he mentions 16,000 "people slaughtered in Drama and its district"). Finally, Antonovski, Hristo, in *The Uprising*, p. 67, raises the number of victims to 2,500-3,000.

[77] Other sources estimate the victims throughout Eastern Macedonia and Thrace at 23,000, see *Ruins of Modern Greece*, p. 38; 40,000 ref. Greek Royal Legation, Press Bureau, Bulletin no. 14, Greece and Bulgaria, June 1946, p. 10, with 30,000 displaced to Bulgaria; 50,000 victims (P. Monastiriotis, *op. cit.*, p. 61) and 100,000 hostages in forced labour. See also Doxiades K., *Devastation in Greece*, n.p., n.d. (= England), p. 15, which reports 45,000 dead, victims of the Bulgarian occupation and Christopoulos, George, *Bulgaria's Record*, Chicago 1944, p. 112, which gives 54,974 as the official estimate of victims until 28 October 1944 (on the basis of 'official estimates of the Greek Government'). Finally, Υπουργείο Ανοικοδομήσεως, *Η επιβίωσις του Ελληνικού Λαού* (The Ministry of Reconstruction, The survival of the Greeks), Athens 1947, p. 80, table 49 reports 10,000 hostages in Bulgaria and 30,000 victims of Bulgarian artocities, with a total reduction of the population on the Bulgarian-occupied territory of 30%.

[78] ΔΙΣ, Arch. 8, F. 909/G/5, 'Register of names of those murdered by the Bulgarians', Drama, 26.10.1954, Mayor of Drama, A. Nikiforides, to ΔΙΣ. Typically, most of these were refugees from or had origins in Asia Minor or in the Black Sea area, and a small number of them were Jews or Armenians.

[79] IAM, General Administration of N. Greece, B/19, 2/1, index manuscripts (24 pages).

various services, there are occasional testimonies to more murders (individual or mass), the accuracy of which cannot be assessed[80].

Finally, we should not forget to include the 780 (out of a total of some 1,200) Greek Jews of Drama who were deported to Germany. During the occupation, Greek Jews suffered together with the rest of the Greek population; on 3 March 1943, they were rounded up by the Bulgarian authorities (together with the other Jews of the Bulgarian-occupied areas) transported (in inhuman conditions) to Bulgaria and later handed over to the Germans and put to death in the German concentration camps. Of the 780 deportees, only 4 had returned to Drama in April 1945, a figure which had reached 39 in 1948[81].

It should also be noted here that to those physically exterminated must be added the unknown number of people who succumbed to the consequences of the systematic undernourishment imposed on the Greeks by the Bulgarian authorities[82].

In conclusion, the authors believe that it may be stated with certainty that the population in the prefecture of Drama decreased by 25,161 persons during the 1940-1951 period (from 145,653 in 1940 to 120,492 in 1951). We cannot, with any certainty, give details of the total decrease in the population during the Bulgarian occupation alone and attributable to its direct and indirect consequences. It is not even possible to provide an exact estimate, for reasons we believe are clear, even of the victims of executions and slaughter. It is, however, indicative that, while the average rate of population increase during the decade 1940-51 for the whole of Greece was +0.21‰, for Northern Greece -0.32‰, for all of Macedonia -0.27‰ and for Thrace -0.60‰, during the same period the population of the prefecture of Drama dropped by -1.60‰ (see also Table 2, Appendix)[83].

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[80] The testimony of the Bulgarian head-gardener of the Municipality of Drama is typical: he boasts of having killed 88 Greeks and of having only another 12 to go to make it 100. See ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 197, statement of Androklis Mavrides, 29.6.1942.

[81] See indicatively, *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 142-44; M. Molho, *In Memoriam, homage aux victimes juives de Nazis en Grèce*, Salonique 1948, vol. I, p. 103-4 and vol. II (par J. Nehama), p. 164, and Hoppe, *Bulgarian nationalities policy*, p. 95-99.

[82] Whereas the Bulgarian settlers and employees were given (with a red ration-book) 300g. of wheat bread per day per head, the Greeks (with a white ration-book and the label 'Inorodni' [Foreigners]) were only given 200g. of corn bread. The same discrimination was also applied for other foods. ΑΙΣ, Arch. 8, F. 909/E/2d, Andreades; ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 206, as reported by K. Papageorgiou, Drama 23.7.1942 and ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 176, statement of C. Syroglou, 9.6.1942 (Choristi, Drama); ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 167, statement of I. Sismanis, 29.5.1942. According to other information the bread ration for the Greeks was 45 drams, ΕΛΙΑ, ABK, no. 141; or 62 per day for the town of Drama and 62 per week for the villages,

During the same period the semi-urban and rural population of the prefecture seems to have particularly suffered. The statistical data attached (see Table 3, Appendix) are indicative of the development of the population (rural, semi-urban and urban) in two neighbouring prefectures, both under Bulgarian occupation. A comparison of the data of the three prefectures, apart from showing the marked drop in the rural and semi-urban population of the prefecture of Drama, also demonstrates vividly the difference in the scale of reduction of the population of this prefecture in relation to the other two prefectures mentioned above.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, we believe that this first attempt for an integrated presentation of the Bulgarian occupation reveals and proves, in a way which is not impeded by emotion, that the Bulgarian measures:

- were part of an integrated and well-planned policy
- covered almost every sector of public and private life
- were uniquely severe, and the authorities called upon to apply them, carried out the orders given to them with excessive zeal
- finally, the measures were aimed at the marginalization, physical extermination and eventual removal of the Greek population from the area and its complete incorporation to Bulgaria.

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see ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 184, 2nd statement of N. Chatzopoulos, 9.6.1942 (Choristi, Drama); *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 37. For details of the food supply, see extensively A. Svolos, *op. cit.*, p. 30-33, with references to the situation in Drama and its area. The distribution of other foodstuffs (mainly sugar and small amounts of vegetable oil) did not occur frequently (every 2-3 months). Keeping food reserves of over 1 kilo per type in the towns and of certain amounts in the countryside was also forbidden. It was even forbidden for Greeks to buy many types of foods: shop-managers were obliged to hang labels in the shop-windows which reminded that the goods displayed were "samo za balgarite (only for Bulgarians)". ΕΛΙΑ, ΑΒΚ, no. 223, Aliens' Center of Thessaloniki, 12.8.1942, anonymous memorandum Also, *Μαύρη Βίβλος*, p. 37-38, and A. Svolos, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

83. Υπουργείο Συντονισμού, Υπηρεσία Περιφερειακής Αναπτύξεως Βορείου Ελλάδος, Γραφείο Επενδύσεων-Στατιστικής, Τμήμα Στατιστικής, *Εξελίξεις και προβολαί του πληθυσμού Μακεδονίας-Θράκης, 1940-1972* (Ministry of Co-ordination, Service for the District Development of N. Greece, Office of Investments-Statistics, Dept. of Statistics, Developments and Projections of the Population of Macedonia and Thrace, 1940-1972), s.l., December 1968, p. 8, table 1.1: Population of Macedonia-Thrace during the years 1940-1951-1961 per prefecture.

The application of this policy was carried out with methods unique to all parts of Europe occupied by the Axis forces, methods which are more in keeping with the rationale of the 19th century (when the Balkan states were still coming into being) than to that of the 20th century.

APPENDIX

TABLE I

Clerics of the Sees of Drama and Nevrokopi that lost their lives during the Bulgarian occupation

Name	*See of Drama* *Village*	
Anastasios Karypides		executed
Georgios Alexiades	Agios Georgios at Kokkinogeia	executed
Stylianos Gripas	Nikiforos	tortured and executed
Ioannis Iliades	Platania	beaten to death
Savvas Karagiannides	Ypsili Rachi	executed
Anthimos Papadopoulos	Sitagri	executed
Iakovos Koryfides	Agios Georgios at Kyrgeia	executed
Monk Sofronios	Monastery of Eikosifinissa	hostage in Bulgaria, died of hardships
Monk Daniil	Monastery of Eikosifinissa	executed
Archimandrite D. Nikolaides	Mikropoli	died of hardships and maltreatment
	See of Nevrokopi	
Eleftherios Iosifides	Katachloro	executed

Source: Ath. Papaevgeniou, *Μάρτυρες Κληρικοί Μακεδονίας-Θράκης, 1941-1945*, Athens 1949, p. 14-15, 28, 33.

TABLE II

Average annual growth rate of the population during the period 1940-1951: Total of Greece, N. Greece, Macedonia, Thrace, Drama Prefecture, comparative data

	1940	*1951*	*Average annual growth rate 1940-51*
Greece	7,460,203	7,652,801	+0.21
N. Greece (Macedonia and Thrace)	2,116,587	2,042,388	-0.32
Macedonia	1,756,664	1,705,434	-0.27
Thrace	359,923	336,954	-0.60
Drama Prefecture	145,653	120,942	-1.70

Source: Υπουργείο Συντονισμού, Υπηρεσία Περιφερειακής Αναπτύξεως Βορείου Ελλάδος, Γραφείο Επενδύσεων-Στατιστικής, Τμήμα Στατιστικής, *Εξελίξεις και προβολαί του πληθυσμού Μακεδονίας-Θράκης, 1940-1972*, December 1968, p. 8, Table 1.1.

TABLE III

Development of the urban, semi-urban and rural population in the Prefectures of Drama, Kavala and Xanthi, 1940-1951

Prefecture	*Total*		*Urban Population*		*Rural Population*		*Semi-urban Population*	
Year	*1940*	*1951*	*1940*	*1951*	*1940*	*1951*	*1940*	*1951*
Drama	145,653	120,492	33,816	33,166	67,912	51,904	43,925	51,904
Kavala	138,133	136,337	49,667	42,261	74,529	72,325	13,937	72,325
Xanthi	98,575	89,891	31,015	27,283	63,555	59,420	4,005	59,420

Source: Υπουργείο Συντονισμού, Υπηρεσία Περιφερειακής Αναπτύξεως Βορείου Ελλάδος, Γραφείο Επενδύσεων-Στατιστικής, Τμήμα Στατιστικής, *Εξελίξεις και προβολαί του πληθυσμού Μακεδονίας-Θράκης, 1940-1972*, December 1968, p. 8, Table 1.6a.

TABLE IV

Population in the towns and villages in the prefecture of Drama before and after the Bulgarian occupation

Names of towns and villages	*Census of 1940*[1]	*Census of 1951*[2]
Drama	33,816	32,651
Doxato	4,760	4,959
Prosotsani	7,011	6,227
Achladea	443	505
Adriani	2,065	2,088
Ag. Athanasios	4,301	3,770
Agora	525	467
Ano Pyxario	978	801
Charitomeni	1,181	1,149
Choristi	3,184	2,969
Chrysokephalo	979	802
Dasoto		618
Dipotamoi	1,456	831
Exochi	873	647
Grammeni	701	700
Granitis	577	215
Kalabaki	2,873	3,228
Kalamonas		785
Kali Vrysi	1,678	1,399
Kalliphyto	3,186	2,838
Kallithea	1,764	1,552
Kalos Agros	1,367	1,594
Kataphyto	1,064	473
Kato Nevrokopi	3,290	1,775
Kato Vrodou	1,980	944
Kokkinogeia	2,240	1,956
Koudounia	1,635	1,786
Kyrgeia	5,532	5,154
Leukogeia	1,859	1,382
Makryplagio	896	649

[1] *Πληθυσμός της Ελλάδος κατά την απογραφήν της 16ης Οκτωβρίου 1940. Πραγματικός, νόμιμος και μόνιμος πληθυσμός*. Athens: Εθνική Στατιστική Υπηρεσία, 1946

[2] *Πληθυσμός της Ελλάδος κατά την απογραφήν της 7ης Απριλίου 1951.* Athens: Εθνική Στατιστική Υπηρεσία, 1961.

Mavroleuki	701	861
Mavrotopos	1,117	1,104
Megalokampos	756	786
Mikrochori	769	775
Mikrokleisoura		339
Mikromilia	986	335
Mikropoli	3,169	2,436
Mikrotopos		546
Mokros	1,203	558
Monastiraki	707	783
Mylopotamos	777	807
Nerophraktis	837	935
Nikiphoros	2,484	1,640
Ochyro	2,162	1,464
Pagoneri	1,256	545
Paleo Katapoti	597	347
Paranesti	3,488	2,909
Perachora		595
Perithori	3,422	1,486
Petrousa	3,636	2,383
Photoleivos	2,278	2,358
Pigadia (Pigai?)		844
Platania	1,993	1,942
Platanovrysi	1,293	1,045
Potamoi	1,551	1,233
Poursovo	439	423
Ptelea of Doxato (Ftelia)	827	767
Ptelea of Platania	1,107	1,174
Pyrgi	396	438
Sidironero	1,542	1,171
Silloi (or Sylli)	937	541
Sitagroi	1,823	1,348
Skaloti	624	372
Tholos	1,025	918
Valtochori	624	687
Vathytopos	973	807
Volakas	2,445	1,188
Ypsili Rachi	1,182	1,049
Xiropotamos	2,983	3,074
Total in the prefecture of Drama	145,089	127,567[1]

[1] Reduction of the population between 1940-1951: 17,522 persons


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Πετρούσα
Ξηροπόταμος
Προσοτσάνη
Χωριστή
Δοξάτον
Άδριανή
Κηρια
Νικηφόρος
Μαυρολεύκη
Καστανόχωμα
Τιάσατα
Θόλος
Καρυόφυτον
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Τοξόται
Παράδεισος
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A map of the prefecture of Drama before the Second World War

Review Essays *

ANASTASIA N. KARAKASIDOU

NATIONAL IDEOLOGIES, HISTORIES, AND POPULAR CONSCIOUSNESS: A RESPONSE TO THREE CRITICS

The commentaries of Zahariadis, Gounaris, and Hatzidimitriou on my recent article, "Politicizing Culture: Negating Ethnic Identity in Greek Macedonia" (*Journal of Modern Greek Studies* [*JMGS*], 1993, vol. 11, pp. 1-28), raise important issues and concerns that merit further attention. The argument I advanced in that article, reduced to its most basic expression, was that national ideologies concerning the essence of "the Greek nation", evidenced in Greek popular culture as well as in many public statements emanating from Greek academic, media, and political circles, have ascribed a political meaning and significance to Slavo-Macedonian culture in Northwestern Greece. I argued that, under the influence of a Greek national ideology, popular perceptions regarding Slavic-speakers in the Florina area of Greece have come to redefine what could have been regarded as a latently benign sense of *ethnic* identity among such Slavic-speakers as a potentially hostile *national* identity, one that is both alien and antithetical to widely-held popular notions concerning the homogeneity of the Greek nation. Pejoratively labelled as "Bulgarians" until at least 1944, many Slavic-speakers in Greece who today continue to express views about their cultural distinctiveness are now denounced as "Skopian agents"[1]. The result, however unintentionally, has been the effective denial of a Slavo-Macedonian cultural and ethnic identity as a legitimate component of the contemporary Greek nation-state.

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* *Editor's note:* The editor considers that the debate which arose from Dr. A. Karakasidou's article "Politicizing Culture: Negating Ethnic Identity in Greek Macedonia", is closed in this issue.

[1] Skopje is the capital and largest urban center of the FYROM. It is also the name that many Greeks adopt when referring to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), objecting to the inclusion of the word "Macedonia" in the title of that newly independent state.

My article explored various complaints voiced by Slavic-speakers in Northwestern Greece, including charges that their ethnic identity has been wrongfully interpreted as a foreign national consciousness (or a political allegiance with a foreign nation-state), and that they have suffered political oppression and cultural suppression. I framed discussion of these complaints through the analogy of a court proceeding (e.g. plaintiffs and defendants). The purpose of this approach was *not* to act as an advocate for Slavo-Macedonians or any political "cause"; nor was it to render a final, sweeping judgement on the issues raised. Rather, my purpose was to facilitate discussion of a number of theoretical issues of immediate concern to Modern Greek Studies. The idiom of a court hearing was deliberately adopted for three principal reasons: 1) to offer a forum in which the "plaintiffs" could express their views, unadulterated by the views of those in the Greek media, government, or academia who would otherwise disparage them; 2) to open a discussion about the criteria for assessing the validity of "evidence"; and 3) to leave "judgement", if it must be made, to the minds of individual readers.

Nevertheless, I did offer my own interpretations of evidence and drew my own analytical conclusions. I argued that the politicization of Slavo-Macedonian ethnic culture has been a by-product of the resurgence of national ideologies in recent years, the transnational situation of Slavo-Macedonians (living in Greece and the former Yugoslavia, as well as in Albania and Bulgaria), the ill-defined boundaries of cultural exchange and ideational discourse in the region, and the contemporary climate of tension and suspicion that characterizes relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). I concluded by suggesting that rather than adopting attitudes and policies more tolerant of multi-cultural diversity within a modern nation-state, the predominant response of many Greeks (including government administrators, media commentators, academic scholars, and the lay public) to local claims to a Slavo-Macedonian ethnic identity has been characterized by inflammatory rhetoric, hostile perceptions, and discriminatory practices. This has fuelled, rather than abated, tensions and unrest in the area today.

The response to my article in Greece, as well as among Greek diaspora abroad, has varied from congratulatory approval, to constructive criticism, to hostile refutation. I have been praised for my "integrity", criticized for my "naivety", accused of being an "agent of Skopje", and subjected to death threats. The three commentaries on my article by Zahariadis, Gounaris, and Hatzidimitriou offer more scholarly critiques, raising objections to or voicing concerns over my sources, evidence, theory, logic, style, and conclusions.

Before turning to specific concerns raised in each respective commentary, I first offer some general comments.

All three commentaries show little appreciation or familiarity with anthropological methods and theories. This is unfortunate, for no productive interdisciplinary exchange can take place on empirical issues without a prior mutual understanding of how cognate disciplines address interests of common concern. Sociocultural anthropology is "holistic" in that it addresses the nexus of various dimensions of culture and society, from language and ideation to socialization and enculturation, from politics and economy to family, kinship, and social groups. It is a discipline that is concerned with how society is thought about and organized, and how it changes over time. Field methods commonly employed by anthropologists include extended local-level fieldwork: living with and among the subjects of one's inquiry for protracted periods of time. This is critical to developing a rapport with respondents, and provides an opportunity to cross-check information obtained from one source with that derived from others. My own work is both historical and contemporary: it entails the solicitation of oral testimony as well as the scrutiny of available written documents and archival evidence. Through both participation in and observation of interaction in a local setting, ethnographers hope to discover information not always readily discernable in written documents, information not always available to short-term interviewers practicing so-called "hit-and-run" methodologies.

One of the most important issues raised in this regard concerns the methodological and epistemological problems involved in using oral histories. While each commentator voices healthy skepticism over the validity of oral sources, each also assumes an unhealthy *unskepticism* over the inherent validity of written sources. There is a well established scholarly tradition (both in anthropology as well as its cognate disciplines) that recognizes the value of oral sources if they are collected methodically, used critically, and tested, cross-checked (against other oral as well as written sources), and corroborated. Moreover, there are many potential pitfalls involved in the (exclusive or uncritical) use of written sources[2].

The issue is not merely an academic one, for Anderson (1983) has linked the rise of nation-states and national ideologies to print capitalism. Written, as well as oral, accounts should all be subject to the same critical scrutiny. To accept, *a priori*, published materials and scholarly bibliographies as 'established truths' (an issue to which I will return in my discussion of Hatzidimitriou below) is, in my opinion, rather naive. In the context of competing national paradigms (such as we see today in the present Macedonian Controversy between Greece and the FYROM), such naivety can breed ignorance, an ominous trend in any context.

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[2] Space precludes a full treatment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of oral and written historiography or the respective methodological and theoretical approaches of history and anthropology. There is a plethora of scholarly publications on this matter, and I can only draw attention to a few productive starting points (e.g. Cohn [1987], Keesing [1986], Vansina [1985]).

Finally, all three commentaries also voice concerns with "mega-trends": communist conspiracies, Slavic aggression, and the like. I, too, am concerned with global processes, but my particular training has led me to examine such issues in localized (as well as regional, national, and international) contexts. History has many faces, each of us one of them. The more faces we can see of History, the better we may hope to comprehend it. That understanding, I believe, will inevitably lead to the realization that there is not simply one "correct" or "objective" History, but rather a multitude of histor*ies*. Our respective analytical perspectives may lead us to emphasize certain histories more than others, or to accord greater significance (and different interpretations) to particular historical events. But without a concern for and attention to the muted or "subaltern" voices of history, our knowledge and understanding will be only partial and we risk continuing to labor indefinitely in a mystifying veil of ignorance. This is not a "sentimentalism", as Gounaris would have it. Rather, it is a concern with the multiple voices and the multifaceted character of history.

I turn now to address each commentary in turn, for each revolves around its own particular underlying theme. I address that of Zahariadis first, for he has already published a much edited-down version of his critique in the *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* (May 1994, vol. 12, pp. 167-168). I have responded to him there, also in a much abbreviated form, and simply suggest that interested readers examine the core points of our exchange in that forum. The central theme or underlying subtext of Zahariadis' commentary is explicitly expressed in his concluding assertion: "The points is not that there is no case to be made, but rather that Dr. Karakasidou has failed to make it".

This is an important (and a disarming) statement, for it assumes general agreement that Slavo-Macedonian ethnic culture in Greece has become politicized. Zahariadis, however, takes issue with my interpretation of the causes of this politicization, preferring to see it as rooted in the actions of communist forces and the responses of successive Greek governments to this perceived threat. I am disappointed that Zahariadis did not place his critique of my argument in the context of his own extended analysis of the politicization of ethnic culture in Northwestern Greece. Such an approach might prove more productive than the surgical-like critique he offers of my method, logic (and style), theory, and evidence.

Zahariadis characterizes my research method as little more than gathering information by "striking 'amicable' conversations with whomever was willing to talk". As nearly any anthropologist will agree, fieldwork is hardly mere amicable conversations[3]. Some interviews and informal discussions may be amicable, but others are not. Moreover, quite often the challenge (or obstacle) to field research is to facilitate response: to have people *become* willing to talk. This is not always a simple or easy task, particularly so for a Greek conducting interviews with Slavo-Macedonians on these issues. Effective ethnographic and oral history research requires the cultivation of a sustained rapport with respondents, which in turn is predicated on the ability or predisposition to listen, to hear, and to withhold judgement for the moment. Preconceived dogmas (or patriotic sentiments towards Hellenism and the Greek nation) do little to facilitate research on the type of questions I raised in my article. One will reap what one sows, so to speak. Slavo-Macedonians in the Florina region have learned through decades of experience to be guarded in their responses to Greek journalists and researchers, and many keep silent on issues of identity, consciousness, or even language.

I myself have visited villages where men insisted that the entire village has been always and forever nothing but Greek speakers, only to have an elderly grandmother come wandering over and begin speaking to one or more of the men in Slavic a short time later. The woman spoke *no* Greek at all, and the men were extremely evasive about their knowledge of Slavic. Protracted fieldwork in a localized context offers an opportunity to cultivate a rapport, trust, or level of comfort or understanding with those initially less willing to talk. In this manner, a researcher does not need to rely on the sometimes biased views of "activists" working with their own agendas. Should one doubt accounts obtained through oral interviews? Healthy skepticism would be a better point of departure. Should one reject such stories outright or accept them at face value? Certainly not, and despite the accusations to the contrary levelled in these commentaries, I have done neither.

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[3] While Zahariadis complains that I offer no discussion of my research methods, scholarly journals (and the *JMGS* in particular) have little space to permit extended discussion of complex anthropological fieldwork techniques. Interested or critically minded readers ought to correspond with the author in question (or should examine her or his research proposals and grant applications, if permissible) in order to evaluate and to scrutinize methodology.

Zahariadis does make a good point when he questions why I used oral accounts (which he derides as mere "anecdotal evidence") to document "the Slav" case, but no interviews for "the Greek" case. First, I must take issue with the way in which he aggregates the plethora of opinions and viewpoints into two highly reified categories: "the Slavs" and "the Greeks". Most of the ethnic Slavo-Macedonians I spoke with also consider themselves Greek (in terms of their *national* identity), and would strenuously object to Zahariadis' compartmentalization of them in a non-Greek category. His juxtaposition of "Slav" and "Greek" confuses contemporary *ethnic* and *national* labels. Furthermore, my research indicates that there is not one but many voices on either of these two supposed sides (see Karakasidou 1993b).

Concerning the substance of Zahariadis' criticism, let me point out that written documentation concerning Slavo-Macedonian viewpoints and opinions is difficult to find or to obtain, if one excludes (as I did) the biased, nationalistic-oriented material emanating from the FYROM. I have conducted numerous interviews with what Zahariadis would consider "Greek" respondents, and I could have easily provided many of their oral accounts as counter-points to those of Slavo-Macedonians[4]. But such information would have had relatively little bearing on how *national* (not local) ideology in Greece has politicized popular perceptions of ethnic culture in the Florina region, distorting it as somehow alien to the Greek nation-state and antithetical to the concept of the Greek nation, and either demanding its assimilation or denying its existence.

I also find it disappointing that in critiquing the logic of my argument, Zahariadis paints a "straw man" caricature of my positions and reasoning. He asserts, for example, that I "readily accept" ethnic identity as a non-politicized constant. Balderdash. I have *never*, neither in that article nor in any of my work, made such a claim. In fact, my argument is exactly the opposite[5], and I do not understand why Zahariadis has inverted my position. Nothing is constant except change. Certainly ethnic identity is conditioned by political forces —not only those "outside of Greek national boundaries" (as Zahariadis would have it), but also by forces within those borders[6].

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[4] I cannot help but wonder whether such testimonies, in supporting a Greek national position, would also have been dismissed by these commentators as "sentimental" fieldnotes of "limited value".

[5] I agree with Zahariadis that individuals do not acquire their ethnic identity *solely* through the family (although the family is one of the most critical contexts for socialization and enculturation). But I disagree with his reasoning. Ethnicity *may* transcend kinship, but does not always do so. Such conclusions cannot be drawn *a priori*, but should provide the basis for empirical research. I also agree that ethnicity may be transmitted through

Furthermore, Zahariadis' confusion over what he labels as my "dependent" and "independent" variables is also a product of his own misunderstanding. First and foremost, I do not employ such terminology and I have serious epistemological doubts over whether any social "variable" can ever be considered truly "independent" of others. Social scientists deal with human culture, not an 'objective' physical environment governed by 'natural laws'. The problem may be one of a simple disjuncture in our respective conceptual approaches: while Zahariadis may be more comfortable working with static, even functionalist, models, I am a dialectician. To assert, as Zahariadis does, that I maintain Slavo-Macedonian ethnic identity to be independent of other forces, is to misrepresent my position in the most profound manner.

In the same vein, I must protest that *nowhere* do I attempt "to demonstrate the distinctiveness of ethnicity and the historical validity of Slav claims", as Zahariadis asserts. While this is a legitimate topic for research, it was *not* the purpose nor the point of my article. Again, my concern was to show that what could have been regarded as a latently benign sense of ethnic or cultural difference has been, rathei unfairly, through, the often zealous rhetorical force of national ideology, recast as a dangerous, sectarian, manifestation of potentially secessionist *national* identity. I do *not* argue nor suggest, as Zahariadis claims, that political repression leads to the emergence of ethnic "distinctiveness" or "Otherness". While repression may lead to a heightening of consciousness regarding differences between groups (as has been the case in the Florina region), Slavo-Macedonians have suffered political repression and cultural suppression because they have been *perceived* by Greek authorities as being different—and different in a dangerous way.

I also take issue with the manner in which these commentators consistently

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"common language, rituals, religion, traditions", and other media. But I pointedly take exception to Zahariadis's inclusion of the term "racial characteristics". For a detailed account of my perspective on the formation and transformation of ethnic and national identity, see Karakasidou 1992.

[6] The macro-minded need not be beholden to the theoretical works of Anderson (1983), Barth (1969), Chatterjee (1993), Gellner (1983), and others to understand such processes. In his discussion of political states and "the notion of tribe", the late anthropologist Morton Fried (1975) offered path-breaking insight on such themes long before most of these later, oft-cited major theoretical works appeared.

refer to the "alleged" repression of Slavo-Macedonians. I could understand their skepticism if my sources had been confined to pro-FYROM political activists. In fact, they were not. There is nothing "alleged" about the discrimination and the suffering inflicted upon many Slavic speakers (even non-communists) in Northwestern Greece (see Souliotis 1992). Official Greek government archives such as those of the Historical Archives of Macedonia/ General Directorate of Macedonia (as well as the Metaxas Archives[7]) provide ample documentation to support those claims. While I can respect the political convictions of those who argue that such repression is only "alleged" to have taken place, such views are untenable as scholarly positions. "National truths" are not necessarily "ultimate truths", and whether a scholar chooses to come forward to present one's findings is an issue left to the ethics of each individual scholar.

Zahariadis goes on to accuse me of a "very myopic view of politics", claiming that I "erroneously" equate "politics" with "the state". His criticism strikes me as a non-sequitur. If my view of politics is overly "myopic" (i.e. local), how could I possibly equate politics with the state? Anthropology is one of the few social sciences that draws its theoretical strength from cross-cultural studies of state and non-state societies, and anthropologists have regarded "all politics as local" long before the late U.S. Congressman Tip O'Neil was credited with coining the phrase.

In addition to the way in which he conflates ethnicity and nationality, Zahariadis also confuses a basic distinction between *nation* (a population) and *state* (an administrative unit). The two may coincide (as they do in Greece), but do not always do so. History has seen both multi-national states as well as stateless nations. The processes of modern nation-building do, however, occur in the context of —or are launched against— existing state-level administrative apparati. I also question whether the process of forging ethnic identity (or Zahariadis' "*ethnos*" "*ethni*") is dependent upon "the ability to forge sovereign authority" among a group of people. Sovereign authority is a political issue in the formal sense of the word, and its relationship to the formation of ethnic identity is tenuous at best. On the other hand, it is the construction of *national* identity that is predicated upon "the willingness of other similar groups to accept [sovereign] authority". Such is the hegemonic character of national ideology and this, in a nutshell, was what my *JMGS* article was all about.

There is a significant misrepresentation of fact in Zahariadis' commentary when he implies that I claim "only Greek history...is constructed". *Nowhere* do I make such a claim, and his citation (Karakasidou 1993:18) is a outright fabrication[8]. He questions why I consider Greek "historical memories" of descent from Alexander the Great to 'be far-fetched, but not "the Slav claim" that Greeks arrived in the Florina area after 1913. First of all, it is misleading to characterize Greek claims to descent from Alexander as "historical memories", while depicting and (delegitimizing) assertions made by Slavo-Macedonian respondents as mere "claims". I hardly 'glorify' the claims made by Slavo-Macedonian villagers as "absolute truths", as Zahariadis maintains. The polemical character of his assertion is evident in his question of whether "there is something to Slav memory that is inherently superior to Greek memory".

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[7] See, for example, Lithoksoou 1993.

Furthermore, the evidence Zahariadis offers to support his argument is also misleading. It is hardly surprising that no mention was made of "Slavo-Macedonians" in Ottoman censuses, for the categories employed in those documents ("Greek", "Bulgarian", "Serbian", etc.) referred to national or ecclesiastical aggregates rather than ethnic cohorts whose boundaries were not territorially defined. Censuses and survey-type questionnaires only provide answers to the questions that are asked. In this light, we ought to pause and consider why after 1951 the national Greek census stopped asking respondents about the languages they spoke. As for the issue of Greek settlement in the Florina area, one need only refer to the post-1913 Greek government documents relating to Florina, documents that hardly may be considered to have a pro-Slavic bias but which nevertheless support the verbal "claims" of my respondents.

Consider, for example, information contained in the Historical Archives of Macedonia/General Directorate of Macedonia, File No. 53 ("Population Statistics of the Educational Districts of Voden, Karatzova, and Gevgeli, 1911, 1913, 1915), Table A: "Florina District: Ethnological Census of the Population's Inhabitants". After factoring out the Turkish population, this document describes 38.6 percent of the Christian population as "Greek", but notes that *none* were monolingual in Greek. Of those multi-linguals who were described as Greek and could speak Greek, 52.8 percent also spoke "Bulgarian", 32.5 percent also spoke "Koutsovlach", and 14.7 percent also spoke

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[8] The passage to which Zahariadis evidently refers is this: "Yet most Greek scholars do not regard ethnicity (or even nationality, for that matter) as a historical construct, and many fail to recognize the fundamental truth that reality —just like our cultural representations of "self" and "other"— is *constructed*" (emphasis in original).

"Albanian". On the other hand, 59.4 percent of the Christian population was described as "Bulgarians", as much as 70 percent of whom were mono-lingual in "Bulgarian" only. These, according to official Greek government archives, were the political and linguistic realities that the Greek state faced after the incorporation of the Florina region in 1913.

Finally, I turn to several of concerns raised by Zahariadis in connection with what he calls my "substantive points". First, he returns to an issue raised at the outset of his commentary, one that many concerned scholars have also raised: namely, how large is the Slavo-Macedonian population of Florina and how does one define its parameters. Rather than inventing my own "*etic*" criteria to define membership in that ethnic cohort, I opted to employ the "*emic*" categories used by respondents to define themselves: namely, "Slavic speakers or descendants of Slavic-speaking families". I do not consider my decision to provide a rough estimate of this population cohort in proportion to the rest of the area's population to be a "grave error", as Zahariadis charges. Considering the lack of precise, concrete numbers that we can all agree accurately reflect the specific size of this group (or "non-group", see Boissevain [1968]), I believe that I have acted in a responsible manner.

Nevertheless the 'numbers game' should not be used as a pretext for dismissing or downplaying the past repression visited upon Slavic speakers in the area. As one historian remarked to me, "If we are only talking about a small number of people, what does it matter?". First of all, my field research suggests that we are *not* talking about a "small number of people", although certainly they represent but a tiny fraction of the entire population of Greece. Secondly, if we were to adopt such a line of reasoning, it is only fair to ask at what numerical threshold should we become concerned about political repression and cultural suppression: ten people? one hundred? one thousand? ten thousand? At what point may we determine that it is one too many?

Zahariadis concludes by asserting that I "inadequately" address the reasons behind Greek authorities' past repression against Slavo-Macedonians. While, as he notes, I do recognize that Greek authorities have had legitimate concerns about the situation in the Florina region, as well as anxieties about the expansionist designs of neighboring states against Greek territorial integrity, I have no desire to serve as an apologist for any discriminatory practices. Zahariadis attributes Greek government actions to an "anti-communist fervor". While I have no doubt that such sentiments played a significant role in shaping post-Civil War government policies, it would be simplistic in the extreme to explain cultural suppression in such terms.

The popularity of such commonplace arguments (like those that attribute

Slavo-Macedonian ethnic identity to a 'communist conspiracy'[9]) is linked, I believe, to the manner in which they allow us to compartmentalize the issue into the soothing, readily digestible categories in national history: namely the Civil War and the communist threat. They allow one to explain away the problem without ever seriously addressing more fundamental underlying issues. In blaming the ubiquitous 'Other' (in this context, Slavic communists), such arguments lead one away from a potentially more painful soul-searching reflection on how Greek policies and practices have contributed to and even exacerbated the problem.

While I certainly agree that Bulgarian communists took up the banner of the "Macedonian" cause to further their own ends or those of the Comintern, Zahariadis must recognize that terrorism was practiced by both communist and nationalist partisans during that period of civil conflict. Slavic speakers of the region were often caught between these two opposing political and military forces, and were certainly split into different ideological camps. Equally significant is the element of teleology embedded in Zahariadis' argument, i.e. how it rephrases the issue of ethnic identity in terms of national and international political contest. If Slavo-Macedonian identity *only* found its conceptualization and expression in the context of nation-building campaigns within a foreign, Slav dominated, international communist movement, then one may justifiably ascribe a threatening national character to such expressions of identity. If, on the other hand, the premise of such arguments can be shown to be false, then the whole house of cards tumbles.

I turn now to the remarks of Gounaris, for the two commentaries offer interesting comparisons. While Zahariadis claims that there is a point to be made but that I have failed —largely through faulty theory— to make it, Gounaris praises my theoretical reasoning as "solid". Nevertheless, Gounaris asserts that my arguments and conclusions are tainted by a "sentimental" attachment to respondents. This is a deceptively powerful accusation, for it provokes a crisis of credibility concerning my intellectual integrity. He maintains that this "sentimentalism" has naively misled me to an unintentional misperception and misrepresentation of the evidence, thus devaluing my argument and disqualifying my conclusions.

Let me begin with a few comments on Gounaris' theoretical orientation. He agrees with me that nation-building processes are often painful and destructive, and he accepts my assertion that Slavic ethnic culture in Greek Macedonia has been politicized, noting that such phenomena are common where "ethnic nationalism" (his term) prevails. I would like to suggest a word of caution in employing terms such as 'ethno-nationalism' or "ethnic nationalism". Such labels conveniently lump together (and thus gloss over) important distinctions between ethnic and national identity. I do not deny that the two *may* become conflated; in fact, the point of my article was to show how national ideology has affected just such a transformation in Greek popular culture. When used carelessly in an *a priori* manner, such perspectives equate ethnicity with nationalism, effectively politicizing culture by linking it to national ideological movements. Ethnic groups may potentially become national groups. The issue is *whether* or not they do, and if so *how* and *why*.

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[9] There may be good reasons for viewing "Macedonian" *national* identity in such a light, but not for so regarding Slavo-Macedonian *ethnic* identity.

Gounaris' main concern lies in criticizing what he calls my "biased negation theory". Just as I believe it is inaccurate to ascribe to me a "negation theory" (nowhere in my article do I presume to outline a coherent theory of 'negation'), I also feel that it is unfair to label my work as "biased", except for the fact that it is openly critical of distortions created by national ideologies of all varieties (including both Greek *and* "Macedonian"). His opinions apparently arise from the "additional political meaning" Gounaris attaches to my article in his opening paragraph, claiming that I examine the politicization of Slavo-Macedonian ethnic culture and identity in the context of present-day disputes between Greece and the FYROM[10]. In point of fact, I do *not* focus my analysis on this limited context, but rather orient my discussion around the nineteenth and twentieth century process of nation-building in Greece. Moreover, texts do not themselves "assume additional political meaning", but rather have such significance ascribed to them by readers, such as Gounaris, who in this instance is concerned with the timing and context of my article's publication. In retrospect, the timing of its publication was important, but it was a factor over which I had little control[11].

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[10] In a similar vein, Gounaris questions why my assertion that most Slavic-speakers in Greek Macedonia feel "nothing less than Greek in national consciousness and political loyalty" is placed in a note rather than in the main text. It was placed there because it should be a common assumption underlying these discussions and not a major point of contention to be highlighted in the text. The vast majority of Slavo-Macedonians in the Florina region *are* ardent Greek patriots who consider themselves to be, and wish to be regarded as, legitimate citizens in the Greek national collectivity. It has been largely national zealots from other parts of Greece who have questioned —and continue to cast doubts upon— the national political loyalties of Slavo-Macedonians in Greece.

[11] As I noted, my paper was first presented at the 1991 MGSA Symposium in Gainesville, Florida.

Gounaris takes issue with my use of the works of Martis and Kyriakidis as examples of how Greek national ideology has influenced public perceptions on the Macedonian Controversy. He protests that Martis, for example, was a qualified politician and administrator but not an academic scholar, and thus should not be cited as representative of Greek academic positions. This misses the point entirely[12]. Authors such as Martis bring with them into the arena of public commentary on the Macedonian Issue powerful forms of political capital. By virtue of prominent public and/or political positions of their authors, the works of Martis and others have received prominent attention from the media and the general public. In fact, I have suggested that it is their very preeminence in non-academic circles that enables them to influence public opinion to an extent rarely achieved by most scholars (Karakasidou 1994). Moreover, Martis' influential treatise received both critical acclaim and an award of recognition from the Academy of Athens.

Throughout his critique, Gounaris repeatedly makes reference to my "historical" evidence, consistently placing the word "historical" within inverted commas. This subtle rhetorical (if not polemical) device is employed by an historian to question the anthropologist's command of history. Leaving aside the issue of oral histories and the debate over the criteria for determining what constitutes evidence, I am surprised that Gounaris, as an historian employed by the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, is so unaware of written documentation (supposedly more acceptable to him as "historical evidence") on local resistance to Hellenization and Bulgarization during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Greek government archives themselves contain documents describing in explicit detail the hostility and resistance with which many Slavic-speaking communities in the Florina region confronted the political activities of both Greek and Bulgarian national agents in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (see Karakasidou 1994a). While I myself would not label such resistance as "ethnic 'Macedonian'" (Gounaris' term), the fact that it occurred suggests that some among the local population had ambivalent feelings towards enculturation into the national collectivities that were competing for sovereignty over them.

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[12] Similarly, Gounaris derides my use of Kyriakidis as an influential example of how national ideology has shaped public perceptions on the Macedonian Issue, claiming that the latter's "views on *ethnos* were perhaps [only] representative of his post-war generation". Again, Gounaris, although an historian, is missing the largely historical point I was making: that for his time the works of Kyriakidis carried a great deal of influence in molding popular consciousness and scholarly thinking on these issues. Certainly, the bibliographical database on Greek nationalism has grown immensely since World War II. But I nevertheless stand by my assertion that certain elements which informed the thinking of Kyrialidis (and others) continue to find expression in many contemporary writings (cf. Karakasidou 1994b).

Similarly, I am surprised that Gounaris refers to a period of "state tolerance" [toward local or regional ethnic culture] during the years 1912-1936. Such a characterization seems oblivious to official Greek government documents describing a concerted and justified policy in the 1920s to deport, exile, resettle, or imprison inhabitants of the Florina area who actively displayed a non-Greek consciousness and/or actively resisted the imposition of Greek rule following incorporation into the expanding Greek nation-state in 1913[13]. While I agree that political oppression was not restricted to Slavic-speakers during the Metaxas era (1936-1940), it is important to recognize that different motivations may have been behind Metaxas repression against particular segments of the country's population[14]. Certainly some, but equally certainly not all, Slavo-Macedonians held leftist sympathies. To reiterate, "anti-communist fervor" cannot alone adequately explain the political repression *and* cultural suppression visited upon Slavo-Macedonians in general.

Gounaris subscribes to widely-held popular beliefs that there was a "transition from Bulgarian to Macedonian [sic] identity" among the Slavic-speakers of the area. Empirically speaking, some *—but not all—* Slavic-speakers of the Macedonia region did adopt a Bulgarian national identity (and consciousness) as a result of successful Bulgarian national propaganda efforts in the area. This is amply documented in official Greek government archives[15]. But there is *no evidence* that all Slavic-speakers of the region had Bulgarian leanings. In fact, data suggest just the opposite. Some Slavic-speakers sided unequivocally with Greek nation-building efforts: others resisted both Greek and Bulgarian national enculturation campaigns.

Gounaris' ill-founded assumption is based, at least in part, on his own theoretical perspective on the issue: that there were no ethnic groups in the area, but rather only population cohorts that were potential national groups (Gounaris, personal communication). *Apropos* my earlier point concerning pitfalls in the application of the term "ethnic [or ethno-] nationalism", Gounaris questions whether any Slavo-Macedonian ethnicity existed "before nationalists in Skopje searched in their turn for the ethnic core of their brand new nation-state". Such a teleological perspective conflates ethnic identity with national identity, suggesting that the former is derivative of the latter. It implies that there were no cultural differences or local *emic* notions of 'distinctiveness' (whether highly articulated or vaguely expressed) before nationalism and national ideologies arrived on the scene. Gounaris fails to understand that national constructions are predicated on some existing form(s) or sense of distinctiveness (or "Otherness"). Such distinctions are then highlighted, emphasized, and endowed with an ideological character as one political aggregate of people is marked off from others. I find it highly untenable to suggest that cultural homogeneity prevailed in the region of Macedonia before national activists from "Skopje" (or Bulgaria or Greece for that matter) appeared on the scene.

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[13] For details, see Karakasidou (1994a).

[14] At the same time, I am not completely convinced by Gounaris's *a priori* assertion that communists surely were forced to consume "more castor oil than any Slav-speaker". Surely, any careful social historian would research that question or at least conduct a credible survey before making such a claim; I would like to see the numbers upon which Gounaris bases his assertion.

[15] Again, see Karakasidou (1994a).

While we may debate whether such cultural distinctiveness may be most appropriately characterized as "ethnic", "local", or "regional" (or any other of a plethora of labels), the fact remains that prior to its partition, the geographic region of Macedonia was characterized by cultural *heterogeneity*. To assert that all inhabitants were "Greek and only Greek" from time immemorial may fit contemporary national fancies or support "the nation" in a time of political crisis. It may even earn one glorification as a national patriot, or at least protect one's job security in government controlled employment. But such assertions fly in the face of both an enormous theoretical literature as well as an available body of empirical evidence. Moreover, they obfuscate —rather than clarify— material and symbolic processes of change. Rather than mystifying ourselves with racist-tinged notions of "purity" (assumptions that fuelled both Nazism and ideologies of "ethnic cleansing", among other things), would it not be more productive to recognize the inordinately succsssful character of modern Greek nation-building? If one is disinclined to believe oral accounts of cultural distinctiveness related by respondents (whether owing to a distrust of oral testimony or because of *a priori* assumptions that anyone who advances such claims must by definition be a 'Skopian agent'), then why not turn to other documentable differences, such as those of kinship terminology, marriage patterns, family organization, language, rituals and customs, and the like? Why is it that cultural pluralism is held in such ill-repute in contemporary Greece? Why does Gounaris conclude that it has never become a "realistic political option in Europe?" I hardly feel his assessment is accurate.

Gounaris goes on to take issue with the way in which my "historical" evidence (again, those peculiar inverted commas) is connected with recent activist demands for certain civil liberties and equal rights in employment, religion, language, and folk culture. Here his commentary shifts from a critique of my argument to an evaluation of the legitimacy of those demands. I am not particularly disposed towards arguing for or against such demands (hence the plaintiff v. defendant format of my article); I leave that task to politicians and polemicists. Nevertheless, since Gounaris frames these comments in terms of a general critique of my article, some response is necessary.

First, Gounaris is correct in asserting that it is common place in Greece for many people who have failed to secure work in the coveted public sector to complain about unfair access to jobs. Clientelism in Greece is well documented and openly acknowledged. Slavo-Macedonian complaints that they are disproportionately discriminated against in their search for public sector employment certainly should *not* be accepted at face value[16]. I included such claims of discrimination *not* to lend credence to them, but rather to show that Slavo-Macedonians now capitalize on what they perceive to be their ethnic distinctiveness in order to seek better access to such coveted jobs in a region marked by economic underdevelopment. In this manner, I sought to show that the politicization of culture may become a political tool used by parties on any side for a variety of reasons.

More significant, however, are the doubts and skepticism voiced by Gounaris concerning two other claims, namely language use and the enculturation of children with ethnic songs, dances, and folktales. Gounaris overly simplifies the language issue when he points out that villagers outside of Edessa did not feel uncomfortable speaking Slavic in front of an outsider such as myself. A great deal depends upon who is involved[17]. Considering what many Slavic-speakers in Greek Macedonia have been subject to over the course of this century for using their native language, it is hardly surprising for them to feel guarded when in the presence of a Greek-speaking outsider. Some will openly speak Slavic and express contempt for any opinions that they should speak only in Greek. Others, however, censor themselves, feeling that to speak Slavic in public will only lead to unwanted trouble. It is important to point out that use of the Slavic vernacular is no longer prohibited nor considered a punishable offense. Yet nevertheless it remains a highly politicized issue.

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[16] A non-partisan commission of inquiry would be one way of assessing the validity of such claims.

[17] In that particular instance, the two men to whom I referred had heard my husband and I conversing in English before they spoke to each other in Slavic in our presence. That case was somewhat peculiar (reflecting, as I implied in my article, a high degree of ethnic consciousness in that village). As noted above, I have visited many villages in the Florina area where local residents vehemently denied they spoke or understood any Slavic dialects, yet then later conversed with neighbors or relatives in Slavic.

Gounaris also doubts that "censorship has been imposed on grandmother fairy tales", a phrase I find rather demeaning. Yet in much the same manner as with language use, many Slavo-Macedonians exercise a conservative discretion in transgenerational transmission of folk-tales, songs, dances, and even family histories. Many parents and grandparents consider —some even argue about— what good it would do a child to learn songs in Slavic? Or family histories and genealogies that would muddle all sense of today's clearly demarcated international state boundaries? Or folk-tales conveying the values and traditions of a now past agrarian lifestyle and its old extended agnatic families? It is not a strict self-monitoring of the sort often employed when speaking in the mixed company of native Greek speakers. But many parents now ask themselves what is the point of having their children learn such things, or ponder the consequences a child might face if such knowledge were voiced or expressed at a poor moment or in an untactful manner. 'Ignorance is bliss'.

Gounaris points out that even the casual traveller to Florina can attend numerous festivals and dances, further evidence of which is available through the media (newspapers, magazines, television). The discerning observer may note that most of the music is devoid of words, song verses having been purged and the dances renamed in Greek. In some villages, Slavic songs and dances are performed openly, but this is a rather recent phenomenon[18]. More often, one finds that a band performing in a Slavo-Macedonian village will play Greek songs for most of the evening. Only late at night, after much of the crowd and most of the outsiders have departed, will they begin to play, sing, and dance Slavic tunes[19].

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[18] Until only a few years ago, it was not uncommon for police to step in and stop a band from playing Slavic songs and dances; such cases are easily documented.

[19] Sometimes, "censorship" or intimidation are still employed to discourage such expressions. As recently as 1992, I witnessed a Greek restaurant owner in Florina threatening to call the police when an amateur musician began playing and singing Slavic songs to the small crowd of patrons that still remained at 2:00 in the morning. In other instances, arguments and even fisticuffs have erupted at wedding festivities when some family members and guests called for the band to play Slavic songs, while others protested vehemently. At one festive gathering, an angry listener cut off power to the band's amplifiers when they

For these reasons, I have few doubts concerning assertions in the work of folklorists or even 'local historians' that culture in the Florina region is "Greek". A national culture *has* permeated the area. In many contexts, it is the dominant idiom through which people define their identity. But many local families and individuals also possess other idioms through which they conceptualize their identity. The standards one must maintain when conducting research in such a setting are the same standards against which all studies and all documents must be evaluated: one must ask who conducted the inquiry and who responded, in what setting, to what questions (equally important are the questions that are not asked), and with what purpose in mind.

Gounaris returns to the issue of language in his claim that I identify language with "cultural (i.e. ethnic) differentiation" and "cultural identity". This is a simple misunderstanding of my position: language *may* be linked to ethnic or cultural identity, but it alone is hardly determinative. More disturbing is Gounaris' patently false assertion that I claim the Slavic dialect spoken in Florina is "quite the same all around Greek, Bulgarian and Yugoslav Macedonia". *Nowhere* in my article do I make anything remotely similar to such a claim. Likewise, Gounaris claims that I maintain a "premordialistic" [sic] view of "Slavo-Macedonian nationalism and ethnic identity". Again, *nowhere* do I make nor imply such a position, which might explain why Gounaris provides no page references to my article. Such arguments are antithetical to my views on ethnic and national identity. In fact, what he calls my "constructivist" approach to modern nationalism is applied even handedly to both the Greek and "Macedonian" cases. Moreover, *nowhere* in the article do I refer to a "Slavo-Macedonian nationalism" nor to "ethnic Macedonians" (his term)[20]. Considering the highly charged political environment surrounding this issue, I would have expected Gounaris to be more careful in his use of words and labels.

Gounaris would also have one believe that Greek views of communist language construct refer not to the local vernacular but only to the official language of the FYROM. While some Greek scholars (e.g. Kofos 1986) have

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continued to play Slavic music. On the other hand, some individuals do sing "Macedonian" nationalist songs, imported from the FYROM, which justifiably outrages the police.

[20] As I have explained almost *ad nauseam* in many different forums (including my 1993 article [p. 21-22, note 2]), I reject the claims of nationalists in the FYROM to a "Macedonian" ethnicity or nationality. Instead, I opt to use the term "Slavo-Macedonian", with 'Slavo' referring to language dialect and culture, while 'Macedonian' refers to the geographic region in which those Slavic-speakers live.

been careful to make such distinctions, the ideologies of popular nationalism in Greece do *not*[21]. Moreover, even some scholars do not make such distinctions, as evidenced in Hatzidimitriou's commentary. In much the same light, while Papathemelis may not be a linguist, his views have had an inordinate influence over the formation of popular perceptions in Greece and have contributed strongly and directly to the politicization of culture in Western Greek Macedonia. As I noted above, in taking issue with the academic credentials of the influential sources I cite, Gounaris fails to grasp the basic point that national ideologies are not the exclusive domain of academic scholars. They are an empowering force that enables the lay public, however historically or ethnologically ill-informed, to speak with authority on such issues out of a 'national concern'. My article was an attempt to explore the ramifications of this tendency.

In discussing the issue of political refugees, Gounaris claims that I omit "historical details" concerning Slavic designs against Greek territory. He asserts that I simplify a complicated political question because such details "do not fit [my] model". I can only respond that I do, in fact, explicitly discuss such concerns in my text (1993a:19). While it may be politically expedient to maintain that visas are denied only to those suspected of plotting seditious acts against Greece, the fact remains that the visa denial policy is broad and inclusive. It places both known pro-FYROM activists and other non-politically active refugees in the same *persona non grata* category. One could legitimately argue that Greek authorities are maintaining a cautious policy in times of national crisis, but that does not detract from the discriminatory character of the exclusion order.

Gounaris also casts doubts upon the validity of my conclusions and the representativeness of my sample of respondents. He asserts that the same "handful of activists" that have lobbied for national and international attention were "probably [the] very same who supplied Dr. Karakasidou with her evidence". I consider it highly unprofessional for Gounaris to make such an assertion without substantive evidence, and I suggest that it reflects his own bias on the issue. Without compromising the identity of any respondents, let me state for the record that I spoke with activists and non-activists alike; men and women; youths, adults, and the elderly; townspeople and villagers; Greeks, Vlachs, Slavo-Macedonians, and Arvanites; laborers, farmers, technicians, entrepreneurs, media personnel, artists and musicians, doctors, school teachers, clergy, and local administrators. Moreover, my work has not been confined to the solicitation of oral accounts, but has included examination of media sources and documents in official government archives. Likewise, I utterly reject his allegations of a "deliberate omission of a solid historical background and the supposed ignorance of bibliography". Gounaris is a personal acquaintance of mine. He is fully aware of the diversity of my sample, my familiarity with the historical background, and my command of the extensive bibliography on the Macedonian Issue. Needless to say, I have a high degree of confidence in the diversity of my sample, the range of my sources, and my conclusions.

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[21] On the other hand, some Greeks will go so far as to vehemently deny that any Slavic-speakers exist in Greece.

Gounaris also dismisses categorically many of the examples I offer of Greek national ideology and rhetoric as "not really representing anyone". Such an assertion opens a Pandora's Box of questions concerning who has the authority to 'represent' whom. This is an important epistemological *and political* issue, but one that creates false dichotomies when dealing with popular nationalism. While my illustrations may not fit Gounaris' category of elite, official, or 'representative' positions, the wide range of discussions, interviews, and surveys of the media I have conducted in Greece suggest that many Greeks *do* subscribe to the positions or views outlined in my article. Certainly there is variation[22]. Conservatives, liberals, and leftists may debate or bicker with each other (or even amongst themselves) over particular points of contention. But these differences are minor, and are dwarfed by the overwhelming consensus of *popular* national ideology on the Macedonian Issue.

Gounaris also suggests that there are legitimate Greek concerns about an international conspiracy against Greece on the Macedonian Question. As evidence, he cites Turkey's offer of military assistance to the internationally recognized Muslim government in Bosnia and the dispatch of U.N. and U.S. peacekeeping forces to the FYROM. While I am not a "political analyst", I would hazard a guess that the decisions made by foreign governments, or by international political bodies such as the U.N. or the European Union, have been based on concerns considerably more complex than a collective conspiratorial plot to encircle and threaten Greece. Such views thrive in an atmosphere of increasing popular and government concern over Greece's growing international isolation on the Macedonian Controversy. There is increasing concern among the international community over the threat of violence or war in the Southern Balkans. The uncompromising position of the Greek government, while immensely popular in Greece[23], as well as Greece's unilateral economic blockade of the FYROM and the widespread popular support in Greece for Serb nationalist actions in Bosnia, all do little to abate such fears.

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[22] I find it rather facile to criticize me for not citing the recent book by Kyrkos (1993). Gounaris has the advantage of playing the "Monday Morning Quarterback"; my article was written in 1991 and was already in press when Kyrkos' work was published.

Gounaris closes by reiterating his agreement that culture has become politicized in Greece, justifying it with the perceived and passionate need for patriots and nationalists to "'protect' Greek 'historic rights'". Gounaris argues that "there is not even a single argument [in my article] which is not in complete alignment with Yugoslav ('ready-made') Macedonian nationalism". He concludes that "even without fieldwork, propagandists in Skopje sound more realistic than sentimental social anthropologists". Gounaris knows better than to accuse me openly of being a 'Skopjian agent', although the implications in his rhetoric are certainly suggestive. Rather, he opts to dismiss (and to delegitimize) my work as "sentimentalist". But such views are based on his own values and perceptions rather than on any substantive evidence. Does he find the positions of 'Skopjian' propagandists attractive because they deal in clear-cut ideals rather than the complicated tangle of tangible reality?

I would suggest that Gounaris' conclusion offers an example of the reified, bifurcated, and reductionist 'US:THEM' mentality so common in national ideologies. Scholarly studies that do not conform to perceived national truths or to accepted canons of national history are regarded as serving the interests of (or being "in complete alignment with") 'THEM' rather than 'US'. National ideologies 'cleanse' and sterilize world views, painting black-and-white pictures of simple, clear-cut dichotomies. Their absolution desensitizes or blinds us to the complicated reality that lies somewhere between two illusory extremes. They are a modern day opiate that feeds off ignorance, fear, and uncertainty to offer comfort through their simplicity. But national ideologies can be highly intolerant of dissent, and non-conformists risk condemnations of 'betrayal' for supposedly serving the purposes of opposing national 'Others'.

In this vein, I turn finally to Hatzidimitriou and his full article length commentary, "Distorting History'. As its title suggests, this is a rather polemical piece in which I am repeatedly accused of "assuming a political position in the guise of anthropological research"; of working from a "biased and political agenda"; of making "deliberate misrepresentation of the evidence"; and of engaging in "personal speculation", "imagined application" of theory, and "undocumented accusations" against Greek authorities. The principle theme of his commentary is the attempt to demonstrate that my article was politically motivated. As he portends: "[I]f it can be demonstrated that Dr. Karakasidou's assertions are based on a serious misrepresentation of the evidence, then one *must* conclude, based on this article, that she is assuming a political position" (emphasis added). In a unconscious manner, Hatzidimitriou continues the court metaphor he so detests in my article. He proposes to establish both my motive and my opportunity, thus 'proving' my guilt.

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[23] A recent article in *The New York Times* (Simons 1994) cited public opinions polls in Greece that show at least eighty (80) percent of the population supports the government's position on the Macedonian Controversy.

Texts, it has been said, may sometimes mirror their author. Such a reductionist, bifurcated world view that regards different opinions as inherently politically motivated is, I suggest, itself a product of national ideology. Consider the manner in which Hatzidimitriou takes issue with the map accompanying my article, denouncing it as "a political statement" that illustrates "irredentist aspirations" of nationalists in the FYROM. He will undoubtedly be surprised to learn that the map was a hybrid adaptation of maps contained in several leading Greek historical studies. Far from being 'Gligoroff's map', as one angry commentator put it, it indicates the boundaries of geographic Macedonia in a manner similar to that employed in those other Greek works. Moreover, the word "Macedonia" was deliberately placed along the tri-state international boundary using a typeface different from that employed in the names of various nation-states. In addition, the FYROM appears unlabelled, for at the time my article went to press there was no international agreement on the official name of that newly independent nation-state. Hatzidimitriou also claims that my map fails to show "present politico-geographic divisions", but they are shown clearly, in accordance with standard international cartographic conventions. Similarly, he asserts that the area of Western Greek Macedonia is "absent" from my map, but it too is plainly there and clearly marked, along with "Central" and "Eastern" Greek Macedonia. While Hatzidimitriou repeatedly accuses me (without presenting any evidence) of deliberate misrepresentation of fact, his description of my map is so distorted that I am afraid it is he who is guilty of misrepresentation[24].

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[24] As a footnote, I would like to point out for the record that several deliberately altered versions of my map have appeared in Greek-American newspapers. Lines of demarcation on those unauthorized re-publications have been retouched by others to show a shaded

Trained as an historian, Hatzidimitriou draws on an impressive array of bibliographic sources to offer citations that he claims disprove various positions I take in my article. I regret that Hatzidimitriou does *not* apply his knowledge in a constructive re-interpretation of the issues I addressed from the standpoint of an alternative theoretical perspective. Instead, he draws on established literary canon (or Tradition) in Greek academia (as well as some foreign works on Greece) in a piece-meal attempt to refute my observations, arguments, and conclusions. I have neither the space nor the inclination to respond to all of Hatzidimitriou's assertions, many of which are patently absurd. Rather, I will focus only on those points of contention that I believe can be salvaged into a constructive intellectual exchange which will put both his work and mine in proper perspective.

Both Zahariadis and Gounaris voiced concerns about the validity of verbally solicited field data, information which Hatzidimitriou disparages as "personal field notes of limited value". Yet his commentary raises a deeper epistemological issue. This concerns the extent to which an existing body of literature on a given subject should be read critically. Does one accept the arguments made in certain works on the basis of the social capital of the author's name, or the extent to which the conclusions meet with one's approval or satiate one's emotions? Or should all scholarly works alike be critically scrutinized for problems in conceptualization, logic of reasoning, and the ways in which definitions —and thus interpretations— of evidence are constructed?

When Hatzidimitriou accuses me of violating "basic principles of historirical method and analysis", he is alluding to a National History. I refer not to a general synthesis of 'the history of the Greek nation', but to an accepted, established canon of scholarly literature that shares certain fundamental assumptions about 'the Greek nation' and 'its history'. In short, I refer to what he calls "texts from the long historical tradition of Hellenism". The reified and reductionist categories in National History contain epistemological assumptions antithetical to the notion of multiple histories or multi-vocal histories. They also tend to set the ideological standards against which citizens are treated and the works (and motivations) of scholars are judged. Quite unconsciously, a national historical perspective tends to look backward from the point of view of the present. Generally speaking, National History in

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"Macedonia" outlined by a heavy, broken line. Obviously, such symbols convey very different implications. Yet they are the Orwellian handiwork of others, and do *not* reflect my positions.

Greece has not been concerned with how the *peoples* of the Southern Balkan Peninsula were transformed into the *people* of the Greek nation-state; it has been concerned with showing that those people have *always been* "Gteek", and with demonstrating the historical continuity of Ancient-Classical-Byzantine-Modern Greek culture and the Greek nation.

As noted above, my 1993 article was a study of how national ideology has influenced popular consciousness on the Macedonian Issue and has contributed to a politicization of ethnic culture in Northwestern Greece[25]. I was concerned with the impact of national ideology and popular national consciousnessss on the lives of self-ascribed members of an ethnic cohort living on what might be considered the margins of the Greek nation-state. Many Greeks have only a vague familiarity with these issues, and even less understanding of how they have affected the lives of citizens in Northwestern Greece with a Slavic-speaking ancestry. While the elitist assumptions in Hatzidimitriou's National History perspective lead him to categorically dismiss modern Greek popular culture as "not worthy of serious comment", it has been the forum of popular national culture, far more than the Greek academic arena, that has most directly influenced the politicization of Slavo-Macedonian culture. Many Greek scholars and intellectuals have played a role in this process, but so too have politicians, the media, and concerned private citizens. National ideology, as noted above, is an empowering ideology. The concerns and opinions of non-specialists are accorded a legitimate place in its discourse and rhetoric. The emotive component of national ideologies helps to elevate their assumptions to the status of moral dogmas. In this sense, popular culture is well worthy of study.

Hatzimitriou is concerned with what he calls the "ethnic/'national' nature of hellenic continuity". It was precisely this tendency to conflate *ethnicity* with *nationality* that I criticized in my paper[26]. Moreover, in describing the

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[25] In this sense, I believe the references I make to the popular magazine *Tachydromos* are quite relevant and pertinent, despite Hatzidimitriou's objections. Publications such as that have contributed directly and significantly to the politicization of ethnic culture in contemporary Greece through an inciteful and libelous campaign of distortion and misrepresentation. Similarly, I believe it is misleading to claim that "Greek journalism is often influenced by party politics" while official government positions are inherently "more balanced". Party politics have played a highly significant role in framing the policies of successive Greek governments in the twentieth century, including government positions on the Macedonian Controversy.

[26] He later conflates yet again the terms ethnicity and nationality in his subsequent discussion of William Miller (see below), as well as in his assertion that "ethnic" Vlachs,

"nature" of Hellenism, he metaphorically endows the national ideology with organic, natural qualities. So prepared, he then goes on to talk about the "continuity" or "survival" of Hellenism, and how "Hellenism reasserted itself". While national ideologies provide powerful motivating forces, it is wrong to ascribe to them an active role of agency. Hellenism didn't reassert itself, it was reasserted by human actors. Hatzidimitriou echoes this organic analogy in his discussion of the "Hellenic mutations" fostered through cultural interaction or through the incorporation of many groups into the Greek nation "naturally as part of a peaceful assimilation process". In fact, assimilation for Slavo-Macedonians in Greece has been neither an inherently "natural" process nor a particularly "peaceful" one. Yet it did take place.

Hatzidimitriou is, by his own admission, principally concerned with the comparative "study of Hellenism". He derides me for not having a familiarity with the necessary scholarship and accuses me of ignoring "essential documentation"[27]. He will no doubt be surprised to learn that I embarked on this research with some of the same assumptions that he voices, namely the hypothesis that the redefinition of ethnicity with nationality "may have been part of a historical process beyond the control of the Greek state, or that it may have occurred...as part of a peaceful assimilation process". What I found, however, was an overhelming degree of oral testimony to the contrary. For me, the critical question then became one of exploring whether any written documents existed to corroborate (directly or indirectly) those assertions. Such documentation does exist in official Greek government archives (see Karakasidou 1994a).

In addressing specific issues, Hatzidimitriou seems principally concerned with proving that the Greek state is not guilty of the charges levelled by Slavo-Macedonian respondents. He totally misunderstands the purpose of my opening vignette, and while I would like to explain its meaning to him, there are more serious issues requiring attention. To begin with, he holds *a priori* assumptions that invalidate any testimony provided by Slavo-Macedonian respondents. Since their "absurd claim concerning the identification of Slavo-Macedonians with Alexander the Great" must be rejected, he reasons, "why

Gypsies, and the like have been "Hellenized" and now identify themselves as Greeck (a national category).

[27] For example, he makes much out of the fact that my article does not refer to the numerous works of the historian Kofos. Again, my article dealt specifically with popular culture and national consciousness in Greece. I have engaged some of the arguments of Kofos elsewhere (e.g. Karakasidou 1992).

lend credence to their other assertions and reproduce them?"[28]. Such bias borders on bigotry. Obviously, the former claim may be based entirely on nationalistic sentiments, and was included only as a point of departure for my discussion of nationalism and popular culture. In contrast, many assertions made to me by Slavo-Macedonians *can* be substantiated through written documentation, including official Greek government sources (see Lithoksoou 1993, Karakasidou 1994a). Directive No. *122770, for example, sent by the General Directorate of Macedonia to all villages in Greek Macedonia (regardless of whether they were Slavic speaking or not), forbade the use of Slavic (and other non-Greek) languages[29].

Similarly, I find his assertion, made without citation or documentation, that "all Slavic languages in Florina are referred to as Bulgarian" to be an example of cultural (or national) bigotry. Referred to as such by whom? Certainly they are not so referred to by their speakers, who commonly use the term "*(en)dopya*" (local, native) to describe their Slavic vernacular[30]. Even native speakers of Greek in Florina refer to the local Slavic vernacular as *endopya,* rather than as "Bulgarian". Similarly, he maintains that I "cannot point to any historical references to Slavo-Macedonian as a separate language prior to the establishment of the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia". Here it is curious to note that while Gounaris insisted that Greek scholars carefully refer *only* to the official Slavic dialect formalized in Skopje after 1944 as a (communist) contruct, Hatzidimitriou clearly implies that the spoken Slavic vernacular of Florina is also part of such inventive constructions. The two languages are definitely *not* the same. Slavic speakers from Florina themselves maintain that they have difficulty understanding radio and television broadcasts from Skopje, where the standardized "Macedonian" language borrows from Serbo-Croatian. Such borrowing is often necessary to fill in vocabulary gaps when a vernacular is transformed into a standardized language[31].

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[28] Hatzidimitriou is extremely distrustful of the Slavo-Macedonians respondents whom I cite, although he does not know anything about them personally. His national political sentiments are evident in his discussion of Edessa as a separatist stronghold during the 1940s, where he cites some supporting evidence from what he calls "enemy" documents (note 6).

[29] Consider the following passage taken from the archives of a Greek Macedonian township: "[We] listened to the president articulate to the [township] council that in accordance with the decision [*122770] of Mr. Minister, General Governor of Macedonia, all municipal and township councils would forbid, through [administrative] decision, the speaking of other idioms of obsolete languages within the area of their jurisdiction for the reconstitution of a universal language and our national glory. [The president] suggested that [the] speaking of different idioms, foreign [languages] and our language in an impure or obsolete manner in the area of the township of [X] would be forbidden" ([X] Township Decision No. 134, 13 December 1936).

[30] Hatzidimitriou is apparently personally unfamiliar with language use in the Florina area. He questions how I, a non-speaker of Slavic, could understand my respondents, and raised doubts about the reliability of data derived through "Greek translators". Nearly all Slavic speakers in the region, with the most prominent exception of some elderly women, now also speak Greek. I did not have to rely on translators; respondents with whom I spoke directly voiced their own opinions and views in Greek. It was only in the case of the village outside of Edessa that respondents preferred to speak Slavic amongst themselves before agreeing on an opinion to present to me in Greek.

Hatzidimitriou's difficulties stem, in part, from his confusion over elite and popular culture. Ironically, he accuses me of failing to distinguish between "formal and popular culture". In point of fact, such a distinction was a central theme in my argument: that "formal" (or 'High' or national) culture can delegitimize notions of popular (or 'Low', 'folk'. or ethnic) culture, the latter in this case being that of the Slavo-Macedonians in Greece. While Hatzidimitriou ascribes to me a "theory of ethnic destruction" (placing in quotation marks a phrase that appears *nowhere* in my article[32]), he questions whether nation-building is always "destructive in every case" (his words). When he asserts that the transformation from ethnic to national orientation "varies within the social and institutional levels of the society", he has grasped a central theme in my argument, although he apparently does not realize it. He points out that "Hellenism" was not eradicated by the Ottoman occupation[33]. His confusion, I believe, is rooted in the erroneous conflation of ethnic and national categories. One would be hard pressed to show that "Hellenism" was a "popular" or 'Low' culture in the Ottoman Balkans. Certainly many people

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31. I owe this observation to Susan Gal.

32. Nor does this otherwise meticulous bibliographer provide page references to places where I allegedly use such terms.

33. Hatzidimitriou also attempts to support his assertion through reference to the "survival and increase in population of the Muslim minority in Thrace". First, I am not certain that the two contexts are entirely comparable: Second, my own research in Greek Thrace suggests a great deal of popular variety within the broad category of "Muslim", a religious label, to be sure, but one that is also employed as a national or "formal" label. Furthermore, it would be absurd to argue that Muslim culture (in its numerous varieties) is not hard pressed in Greek Thrace. Hatzidimitriou also raises the issue of the "destruction of Hellenism" in Asia Minor, perhaps to suggest my intellectual efforts would have served better purposes by focusing on that situation. Indeed, the comparison could prove interesting, for (as in Greece) Hellenism in Asia Minor was a "formal" or 'High' culture. One could certainly explore how hybrid elements in the "popular", local, or 'folk' culture of Asia Minor refugees have fared since their resettlement in Greece.

subscribed to notions of "Hellenism", and those ideas diffused through various parts of their lives. But "Hellenism" became a national ideology, and a highly formalized one as Hatzidimitriou himself shows in his assertion that there is a proper body of bibliographic references necessary to any discussion of Hellenism.

Objections are also raised to my rough estimate of the size of the native Slavic-speaking population in Florina in proportion to that of native speakers of Greek. When Hatzidimitriou compares the figure I offered with the census of 1928 (which put the "Greek population of Florina" at sixty-one percent), he concludes that either it has been "the Greeks of Florina that have suffered 'ethnic destruction'" over the years, or that I would have the reader believe "that a mass exodus of Greeks has taken place" from Florina since the late 1920s. This is a ridiculous assertion; what in fact happened was an in-migration of Greeks following the area's incorporation into the Greek nation-state in 1913. Official Greek government documents clearly indicate that, as of 1913, there were no mono-lingual Greek-speaking villages in the prefecture[34].

The question of language use is linked to the processes of socialization and enculturation, which I argued had formerly been within the domain of individual families but over which the Greek state gradually extended its influence. Responding to my argument, Hatzidimitriou demands to know why I seem "unaware" of similar Serbian, Bulgarian, and Romanian efforts in Ottoman Macedonia since the nineteenth century. This, again, strikes me as another knee-jerk reaction of national ideology. Certainly such efforts have taken place; the theoretical perspective I employed clearly anticipates as much. But why is this an issue in reviewing my article? I was not writing about Serbian, Bulgarian, or Romanian nation-building campaigns. I would welcome such a study, for it would place my own work (as well as that of others) in a broader comparative perspective. Yet, ironically, after first excusing Greek institutional repression of Slavo-Macedonian ethnic culture as conditioned by competition with these other national powers, Hatzidimitriou then goes on to deny such repression ever took place. It would seem he not only wants his cake, but to eat it too.

Hatzidimitriou also turns to the works of several authors in an attempt to 'prove' that I have misrepresented their arguments and positions. He quotes from Kyriakidis at great length, for example, in an attempt to show that the latter did not link "Hellenic [i.e. national] consciousness" to notions of race or superiority. But to argue that to possess a national consciousness is to be fundamentally different from the "herds and swarms of animals" (i.e. those without a nation or national consciousness) strikes me as ethnocentric rhetoric to say the least. Moreover, he goes on to admit that Kyriakidis wrote with a political agenda in mind: "to combat Bulgarian and Yugoslav territorial demands in the middle of the Greek civil war".

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[34] Again, refer to the statistics cited in the text above, data obtained from the Historical Archives of Macedonia/General Directorate of Macedonia, File No. 53, *op. cit.*

While Hatzidimitriou also attempts to use Miller's observations to refute mine, I read them as generally supportive of my contentions. He quotes him as describing a turn-of-the-century Macedonia divided by "a medley of conflicting nationalities". He interprets the passage from Miller as arguing that no solution to the region's political problems (i.e. the determination of national boundaries) can be made on the basis of "common cultural [i.e. ethnic] consciousness"· This is precisely the scenario I described in my article: the road to nation-building in early twentieth century Macedonia was a tricky business; it was accomplished only through the transformation of ethnic identity into a national identity and consciousness.

Hatzidimitriou also confuses apples with oranges when he draws on Abbott's observations in Greek-speaking parts of Macedonia. My analysis focused on Slavic-speaking Florina, and I explicitly note that circumstances in the area were markedly different from those in Greek-speaking areas of Macedonia (e.g. the Langadhas Basin in Central Greek Macedonia where I have also conducted fieldwork [see Karakasidou 1992]). Similarly, he attempts to establish the presence of a Greek population in Florina prior to 1912 through reference to documents relating to the area around Naoussa. Yet not only are Florina and Naoussa different locales, but Naoussa is located in a different area of Macedonia that other scholars (e.g. Kofos 1980; Vouri 1992) have referred to as an "undisputed zone" of Greek influence. Rather than referring to statistics from Naoussa to assess the Greek presence in Florina, one could turn to the 1911-1915 population statistics from Florina in the Historical Archive of Macedonia that I referred to above.

Hatzidimitriou again conflates ethnicity and nationality in his discussion of "Macedonian identity" and "consciousness". He maintains that "Greece refuses to formally recognize a foreign Macedonian *national* consciousness within Greece...because such an *ethnic* consciousness is an artificial construct created by a hostile neighbor with territorial aspirations" (emphasis added). This is precisely the type of thinking that my article criticized. As I have noted, I regard the so-called "Macedonian" national *consciousness* in Greece as a recent construct imported from the FYROM. While also a "construct" (i.e. a product of human agency), Slavo-Macedonian ethnic identity (i.e. a sense of cultural distinctiveness) is a phenomenon of a totally different order and cannot be categorically dismissed as propaganda from the FYROM. All forms of identity and consciousness (be they ethnic, national, or whatever) are human constructs[35].

The influence of Greek national ideology on Hatzidimitriou's thinking is also evident in his use of the term "Greek *millet*". In point of fact, it was known as the Christian Rom *millet*. It was predominantly associated with the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, for that national institution held broad administrative and ecclesiastical jurisdiction over it[36]. I should also add that while Hatzidimitriou also accuses me of presenting the policies of the Greek Patriarchate "as being identical" with those of the Greek state, I *never* made any such claims.

Despite his apparent command of vast bibliographic resources, Hatzidimitriou concludes with several significant claims advanced without any citations whatsoever. First is his broad and highly inflammatory assertion that "it can be demonstrated that it is not true that 'most Slavo-Macedonian activists have never sought to secede from Greece or to change the country's borders in any way'". If, as he claims, the "historical record" supports his contention[37], why does he not substantiate this accusation? Second, I would be particularly interested to learn of documentation that substantiates his claim that "technical recognition of minorities within Greece has allowed Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to claim authority over Greek territory in the past". I was not aware that Greece has recognized any "minorities" (other than a Muslim minority, which has little if anything to do with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia), nor was I aware that such recognition has enabled those two countries to claim territorial concessions from Greece. While Hatzidimitriou has offered an impressive bibliography on Greek National History on the Macedonian Controversy and on the study of Hellenism, is it unfortunate that he fails to provide any citations or documentation to support the more contentious assertions he makes in his commentary.

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[35] If Hatzidimitriou accepts this point, then he cannot argue that Greek national consciousness (or that mystical 'psychic' unity of Hellenism) has survived impervious to change through the millennia.

[36] Through a rather bizarre logic, Hatzidimitriou interprets my historical overview of the nineteenth century contest between the Greek and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches over Macedonia as an attempt to "lend historical legitimacy" to claims of present-day Slavo-Macedonians (or what he refers to as "informants, allegedly from Florina" — why "allegedly?") that they have suffered repression at the hands of the Greek government. It is not difficult to understand how twentieth century prohibitions against the use of Slavic vernacular may have been conditioned by the role of language in that nineteenth century national ecclesiastical struggle. Yet I fail to see the logic in reasoning that by discussing the latter one thereby lends "historical legitimacy" to contemporary complaints of past repression.

[37] Curiously, his own historical "overview" of twentieth century Northern Greece is a summary that is surprisingly consistent with, if not similar to, mine.

Finally, a word on minorities, violence, and nationalism. While he expresses sympathy with and support for Greek government positions on the issue of minority status, Hatzidimitriou himself refers to Slavo-Macedonians as "the Slavic minority of Northern Greece". He goes on to attribute "abuses of minority rights" to a general "Balkan phenomenon" of "local vengeance". He dismisses out of hand the validity of verbal reports from the victims of such abuses, asserting that they may be motivated by "protracted acrimony that expresses itself as irridentist [sic] nationalism". He calls for supporting documentation of such claims, such as for example the findings of "international and governmental organizations on minority rights within Greece". There is, in fact, ample evidence that can be cited from such sources (e.g. reports from the international Helsinki Watch, the Minority Rights Group in Greece, or the annual U.S. Department of State reports on human rights). I can, however, anticipate Hatzidimitriou's response, for there is a "Catch-22" inherent in his logic: if the complaints of "alleged" victims of repression are not to be trusted, then how can one trust written reports based on such testimonies? Once again we return to the issue of assessing evidence against the standard of perceived national truths. But how can one explain away similar evidence of repression found in official Greek government archives, such as the Historical Archive of Macedonia?[38].

Hatzidimitriou concludes that "either Greece has become less tolerant of Florina's Slavic population since 1962, or ...Karakasidou's article misrepresents the situation". It is unfortunate that rather than making any serious effort to re-evaluate the former hypothesis, his commentary is devoted exclusively to an attempt to 'prove' the latter premise. Yet by holding Hatzidimitriou accountable for his words, I think I have shown that it is not I but *he* who engages in misrepresentation. Such tactics do little to promote legitimate scholarly exchange on some of the most important national issues facing Greece today.

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[38] It is a small irony that, while I chose to let the assertions of respondents stand by themselves (rather than to provide written documentation to verify their claims) because I did not wish to appear as an advocate of "minority rights", this is precisely what Hatzidimitriou accuses me of doing.

In reviewing these three commentaries on my 1993 *JMGS* article, I have highlighted several epistemological issues worthy of further discussion. These include the potential advantages and potential pitfalls in the use of verbally solicited field data; the valuable insight that extended, local-level field research may offer; the need to evaluate all sources (oral and written) with a critical eye; and the subtle ways in which national ideologies may influence perceptions and interpretations of issues relating to the Macedonian Controversy in Greece. At the same time, I have pointed out the disturbing ways in which all three commentators have engaged in sometimes subtle, sometimes blatant misrepresentations, misquotations, and miscitations of my work. Such distortions may serve the purposes of their authors, but they do not and cannot contribute to a productive scholarly exchange. 'Strawmen' are easy to topple; a sustained theoretical and epistemological debate requires greater sensitivity and fairness. To falsely attribute arguments, to seriously misrepresent positions, to offer polemical attacks and unsubstantiatable accusations of political motivations not only falls pitifully short of established standards of ethics and professionalism, but also offers little intellectual challenge to the author upon whose work such commentaries are made.

The present international situation in the Southern Balkans is marked by a contest between competing Greek and "Macedonian" nationalisms. There is considerable evidence to support contentions that nationalist activists in the FYROM are attempting to export a "Macedonian" national ideology to Slavic speakers in Greece's northwestern frontier. It is a testimony to Greek nation-building efforts that such activities have met with only limited success. But we must also look at what that nation-building process has entailed. I have no doubt that neighboring nation-states such as Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia also engaged in political repression and cultural suppression as part of their own state-strengthening and nation-building campaigns. My own research has merely focused on how such processes unfolded in Greece. Until we can overcome the reductionist 'US: THEM' categories of national ideology, until we can liberate ourselves from a bifurcated world view that sees only "ruthless villains and innocent victims", a comprehensive understanding of the history —and the effects— of modern nation-building in Greece will remain elusive.

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Book Reviews

Laiou, Angeliki E. and Maguire, eds., *Byzantium, a world civilization* (Dumbarton oaks Research Library and Collection), Washington, D.C., 1992; VII-162 pp. ill. hardbound.

According to the editors' announcement "this book introduces the great civilization of Byzantium and shows the centrality of Byzantium's role in world history". Elsewhere it is stated that its objective is to examine Byzantium's "multifaceted contacts" with the other contemporary European and non-European civilizations, which were its neighbors. More exactly, it is a collection of seven dense essays, the first six of which were originally delivered in the course of a meeting in the American National Academy of Sciences, on November 3, 1990, in Washington, D.C., to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Byzantine Center at Dumbarton Oaks and, at the same time, to commemorate its founders Robert and Mildred Bliss. The last of the seven papers was delivered six months later, at the Center itself, during a symposium on "Byzantine Civilization in the Light of Contemporary Scholarship".

The authors, all well-known scholars of international standing, having a mere thirty minutes to expose their views on long-lasting historical phenomena involving world history, had to be brief and to the point. The general theme and at least four of the papers evoke some ideas which were presented some time ago by a group of well-known scholars of the time under the title *The Root of Europe,* or *Studies in the Diffusion of Greek Culture,* ed. by M. Huxley, (London, the Geographical Magazine, 1952). In this book, however, we have a new look with much wider perspectives by another group of scholars who examine a more extensive set of questions with different eyes in the light of the present state of research and, naturally, interpret it in their own particular ways.

Perhaps this is the proper place to express a non-specialist's deep appreciation for the pioneering work accomplished in this Byzantine Center for the advancement and diffusion of knowledge in a field which is fundamental to a better understanding of the circumstances surrounding the birth and growth of three major cultural entities which, along with the surviving Byzantine heritage, constitute the core of our civilization: the community of the Latin and Germanic peoples of the West, the community of the Slavic peoples of Central and Eastern Europe and the community of the peoples of the Muslim Near East. In this book it is shown clearly how their permanent contacts with the Byzantine State and society, whether in peace or in conflict, mark the high points of their own emergence in the fore-front of world history.

The first contribution, by Milton Anastos, the "last survivor of the original group" which conceived and founded of the Byzantine Center, is a first-hand account of the history of the institution itself which, for the last fifty years has so much contributed to the development of Byzantine studies, helping the most promising and most active specialists to explore and reveal to all of us what Byzantium really was. Here, in a fifteen page summary, the author gives us the most important highlights, or, as he writes, "a synopsis of what has been going on at Dumbarton Oaks in the last fifty years". Very judiciously, a complete list of the publications by the Center is annexed to this volume.

The second contribution is by Speros Vryonis, who needs no introduction here. In a thirteen page thought provoking text, followed by four pages of carefully selected bibliography, he presents Byzantine civilization as "hybrid", "Hellenic and Christian", authentic with its own personality, values, aspirations, cosmic outlook, a pivotal world civilization, contributor, and causally relevant to the three other civilizations just mentioned[1]. We have it from Toynbee that the word "civilization" in itself is hybrid and that there is something hybrid in the constitution of the civilizations in question[2]. As for the use of the word "Hellenic", we believe that, even though it includes the meaning of "Hellenistic", this last word would have been more appropriate in this case for the simple reason that the last phase of ancient Greek civilization was more universal and closer to the birth of its Byzantine offspring.

Historically, first comes the Islamic civilization. With the conquests of Omar and with their own, with the vast majority of their new subjects still Christian, with their fiscal and administrative system based on Byzantine prototypes, with their ambitions to replace the emperors in Constantinople, the Umayyads of Damascus looked up with admiration to a civilization whose prestige would outlive their own dynasty to surface again, in the ninth century, in Bagdad where Greek scholarship, science and philosophy received at least as much attention as in Byzantium.

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[1] M. Lheritier, relying upon the verdict of other well-known European scholars, has also underlined this point in his article "L'histoire byzantine dans l'histoire generale", *Melanges Charles Diehl*, Paris, 1930: I, 201-216.

[2] *A Study of History*, vol. XII: *Reconsiderations*, London, 1961, p. 273.

The next most important ethnic group to enter the stream of world history through contact and affiliation with Byzantine civilization is the community of the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe, the future members of the so-called "Byzantine commonwealth" of nations[3]. Their first encounters with Byzantine civilization occurred when their emerging societies found in Constantinople what they were looking for: spiritual and artistic values of universal application. Adopting the Greek Orthodox form of Christianity meant to them immediate access to a rich cultural heritage, new and better social standards, order, law and Christian ethics, and this meant a giant step in their march towards civilization. A case in point mentioned by Mr. Vryonis is that of tsar Symeon of Bulgaria (893-927). Born a prince and educated in the classics in Constantinople, he took the vows because as a cadet he was destined to head the Bulgarian church. The circumstances made him a King. Finding himself ruling countries and peoples in the Balkans, where the Byzantine heritage and Greek Orthodox religion were deeply rooted, just like the Umayyads of Damascus before him, he thought it natural to claim for himself and for his Bulgarian dynasty the Byzantine throne as well.

The last but most dynamic civilization to emerge in the geographical margins of the Byzantine matrix was that of the Latin and Germanic Western Europe whose contacts with Byzantium were as old as was the Empire itself. Of the three different periods in the long history of relations between the nations of the West and the Greek Orthodox East, the author chose to underscore the last when the West was expanding and Byzantium declined. As was the case with the Arabs and the Slavs, the West Europeans, too, had their claimants to the Byzantine throne and even succeeded in capturing it: indeed, for the last two centuries in the history of truncated Byzantium, the West produced claimant after claimant to that throne, whereas in certain parts of the Greek world some West Europeans maintained themselves well beyond the year of the disappearance of Byzantium (Frankokratia-Venetokratia).

As was the case in Antiquity, when the Roman conquerors of Greece were themselves conquered by its civilization, so it was once again after the Crusades, when the peoples of Western Europe came into contact with the Greek heritage in the Byzantine Empire, found it worthy, adopted it and thus set in motion this great cultural revolution which we call the Renaissance.

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[3] D. Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth. - Eastern Europe 500-1453*, London, 1971.

““Whereas”, writes S. Vryonis, “the Islamic world took only a portion of the Hellenic strand of Byzantine civilization and the Slavs only the religious strand, Western civilization became the most nearly complete heir and continuator of the double heritage within its own society”.

The first part of Dimitri Obolensky's “Byzantium and the Slavic world” outlines the main ideas of his well known monograph, *The Byzantine Commonwealth* to which anyone wishing to know more about the subject must turn. Here he casts a new look upon the high points of the millenial cause-and-effect historical relationship between the Slavic nations of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, on one hand, and the Greek Orthodox core of the Byzantine Empire, on the other. In agreement with the previous contributor, and with other scholars as well, he recalls the creative genius of a good number of 14th and 15th century Greek intellectuals, theologians, and artists, who created the so-called “last Byzantine Renaissance”. It is well-known that this extraordinary flourishing of letters and arts occurred at a time when for all practical purposes the Empire had ceased to exist, having succumbed to its internal and external enemies early in the thirteenth century.

The second part of Mr. Obolensky's report is a critical evaluation of what is undoubtedly the richest spiritual component of this permanent relationship between the Slavic nations of Eastern Europe and the Greek orthodox culture and spirituality. The first theme presented is the Cyrillo-Methodian cultural revolution of the ninth century which put the Southern and Eastern Slavs in the orbit of the Byzantine Christian Orthodox Oecumene. The second, which laid the foundations of both Greek and Slav Christian spirituality for centuries to come, was the Hesychast movement which occurred about five centuries after the Cyrillo-Methodian mission. These two important historical developments, which shaped the face and touched the depths of the soul of Orthodox Slavdom, could not have been told in a better way and in so few words.

Irfan Shahîd of Georgetown University, known for his work on the history of the relations between pre-Islamic Arabs and the Byzantine Empire, presents an interpretative synthesis of the diffusion of Byzantine culture in the Islamic World in its classical age. Before getting there, however, it must be kept in mind that, during the Umayyad period, the populations of the lands of the so-called Fertile Crescent retained strong memories of their Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine and Christian past. Their most recent cultural heritage was Byzantine and they were vastly superior in numbers to their Arab conquerors, better educated and more civilized. Heirs to this rich cultural tradition, once converted to Islam, they transformed themselves into its promoters and carriers, a well-known historical fact which did not escape Mr. Vryonis' attention.

Mr. Shahîd chose to turn his attention to the admittedly more spectacular and better-known golden age of Arab philosophy and science, when the Islamic peoples had produced a civilization with its own authentic personality. Less than a century after the Abbasid revolution, in al-Mamun's time (813-833), in the "House of Wisdom" in Bagdad and later on in several other places within the Muslim world, conditions were ripe and competent scholars were available for a systematic review, critical analysis and translation into Arabic of some of the best works of Greek learning. It is at that time that Arab artists, philosophers and scientists had demonstrated by their works that they had achieved both power of expression and depth in thinking. Even though coranic precepts put an obstacle to free philosophical inquiry, the contribution of Arab scholars as intermediaries between Greek East and Latin West, via Muslim Spain and Sicily, was undoubtedly a precious gift to humanity: their preservation and subsequent diffusion of Greek science and medicine can hardly be overestimated.

A. E. Laiou, who devoted a good part of her career to show us what can happen in international relations when the equilibrium, which ensures stability, is upset, brings out and underscores the high points in the relations between declining Byzantium and the rising West. Seeking to inform and to entertain at the same time, she presents her views of what might have been twelfth-century Byzantium, seen by two representative westerners of the time: a young French nobleman from Champagne and an adventurous Venetian businessman, both of whom had first hand knowledge of conditions prevailing in the Greek East.

Naturally, Mrs. Laiou's paper is not limited to some cases taken at random from the Byzantine political superstructure, or from the socio-economic infrastructure, in order to compare, or contrast, them with their Western counterparts which presented, it must be remembered, a great variety in many ways. This reader cannot but agree with the author's pointing out differences which lead to the conclusion that though the latin nations of the West absorbed a good deal of the same heritage, nevertheless the two worlds, the Greek Orthodox East and the Latin West, had lived apart for so long that, as they grew to maturity, they had developed two unquestionably different personalities, two unquestionably different sets of institutions, mentalities, psychologies and so on.

Gary Vikan of the Walters Art Gallery of Baltimore, known for his previous work on Byzantine religious art, turned his attention to iconography.

His substantial critical evaluation is made more eloquent by the thirty-four well-chosen illustrations which prove his point. He starts by stating that Byzantium was "the richest and most enduring of all medieval christian empires". Though the use of the plural of the last word in the phrase may not be acceptable by everybody, it remains a fact that, in the domain of the decorative arts we have the most evident and the most enduring component of the artistic legacy of the Greek Orthodox Oecumene of Byzantium.

A basic historical fact to bear in mind is that the origins of the decorative arts of Byzantium go back to the Hellenistic Near East. This can easily be seen in the surviving mosaics and frescoes of the so-called proto-byzantine period. It is well-known that the Arab onslaught and the ensuing iconoclastic revolution wrought havoc upon the arts and a new start had to be made in artistic creation a century later. This second phase, which lasted for just over four centuries, started on a good footing and was rich and productive in all fields of cultural endeavor until it received a quasi-mortal blow at the hands of the French crusaders in 1204. The third, which witnessed the so-called "last Byzantine Renaissance", unfolded under severe handicaps and merged into the post-byzantine period.

Continuity and change may be said to be the two basic ingredients in the long history of Byzantine iconography, for, though its basic themes and models remain unaltered, each particular period has its own distinct personality and style. Besides, the Byzantine icon required spiritual content and religious symbolism, which go beyond questions of esthetics. "Byzantine art", writes Mr. Vikan, "was inward-looking and traditional; originality and self-expression, as we understand and value them in modern art, have no place in Byzantine art". We all know, of course, that if there were no exceptions to the rule Byzantine art would have been much less interesting than it actually is. Moreover, this reader will not accept the expression "inward-looking" at face value, on the ground that all forms of art, Byzantine painting included, are by definition the opposite.

In fact, Byzantine art does have the ingredients of both originality and self expression as can be seen in the very illustrations offered by the author himself, the most striking being No. 23 which depicts an unusually frightened, or at least deeply worried, Virgin. If it can be established that this icon had been painted in 1185, or soon afterwards, an additional explanation may be added to that which is proposed: the Virgin may be actually beholding the awful destructions perpetrated by Sicilian Normans and Muslims along the Egnatia road in Macedonia and in Thessaloniki itself, a good part of the population of which was butchered in the most savage manner in that particular year.

The last contribution in this book is by the second of its two editors, Mr. Henry Maguire of the Byzantine Center itself. For years, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* kept us up to date with current research on Byzantine art and art history and, not long ago, even organized an entire symposium devoted to the byzantine icon, the papers of which were published (D.O.P., 45, 1991). This well-documented paper, which was read in another symposium, held at Dumbarton Oaks in 1991, was intended primarily to be a report on the state of research on Byzantine art and art history since the foundation of the Center. Mr. Maquires second more challenging objective was to demonstrate the pertinence of the accomplishments of Byzantine art to ongoing debates involving general questions such as the theory of art and its objects.

In reference to this last aim of the paper the author goes beyond his announced objectives by presenting representative works of art to prove his point and, with particular attention to style, esthetics and form by evaluating them, judging them, comparing or contrasting, them to more recent works, in short by playing the role of an art critic. In order to examine systematically the basic ingredients of Byzantine art he follows, more or less convincingly, John Ruskin's methodology in his classic *The Seven Lamps of Architecture.*

Considering the wealth and variety of Byzantine art, we are tempted to think that it may be misledading, and to a certain degree even contradictory or untrue, to generalize by using such words as "conservative", "static", "inward-looking", in describing it. A historian would be mindful to avoid committing the sin of anachronism and remember that Byzantine art was addressed to Byzantine society and to no one else: it reflected the spiritual needs, indeed the state of the soul, of the society which produced it. For that reason, the pronouncements of the modern art critic may be completely irrelevant for Byzantine iconography.

Ionian University B. SPIRIDONAKIS

Demetra Papanikola-Bakirtzis, Eunice Dauterman Maguire, and Henry Maguire, *Ceramic Art from Byzantine Serres*, University of Illinois Press, Illinois Byzantine Studies III, Urbana and Chicago 1992, pp. X+75, 4 plates, 52 figures.

In October and November 1992, on the initiative of the Ephoreia of Byzantine Antiquities of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace in association with the Krannert Art Museum, an exhibition of Byzantine pottery from Serres was held at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

The exhibition was accompanied by the volume under review here, which consists of the following separate parts: 1) 'Byzantine Pottery in the History of Art' by Eunice Dauterman Maguire and Henry Maguire, pp. 1-20; 2) 'Serres: A Glazed-Pottery Production Center during the Late Byzantine Period' by Demetra Papanikola-Bakirtzis, pp. 21-35; 3) 'A Note on the History and Culture of Serres during the Late Byzantine Period' by Charalambos Bakirtzis, pp. 36-9; there follows a detailed catalogue of the twenty-five objects in the exhibition, pp. 41-65; 4) 'The Materials Analysis of Byzantine Pottery' by Sarah Wisseman, pp. 66-9; a glossary of terms and technical vocabulary used in the book, pp. 70-1; and a selected bibliography, pp. 72-3.

Apart from the twenty-five photographs of the individual exhibits, the volume is also enriched by four full-page colour plates and twenty-seven illustrations distributed amongst the texts.

In the preface (pp. IX-X) Eunice Dauterman Maguire and Henry Maguire briefly discuss the exhibits, most of which were found in the course of archaeological excavations in Serres. They were all produced by a local workshop, operating in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. From this point of view. the finds are justifiably considered to be of exceptional interest, not only for the picture they present of local artistic production in the period in question, but also for the information they provide about how mediaeval pottery was made.

In their essay on 'Byzantine Pottery in the History of Art' (pp. 1-20), the Maguires conduct a brief, though comprehensive, analysis of the nature of Byzantine pottery. From the manufacturing technicques they move on to the thematic repertory of and the sources of inspiration for the decoration, and finish with the relations between and mutual influences of this type of Byzantine art and other, comparable art forms—such as metalwork and painting—as also pottery of other cultures, both eastern and western.

Given that most of the pottery was intended for domestic use, the selection of the decorative themes—in marked contrast to official religious art—

is remarkably free and imaginative. Motifs tend to be taken from the natural world and everyday life, and the sources of inspiration are frequently contemporary romances and the folksongs about Digenis Akritas. Apotropaic signs are also favoured, and there is no lack of purely imaginative decoration.

The writers point out that Byzantine pottery was influenced both by the Islamic world and by other forms of Oriental art. notably Persian and Chinese. Apart from decorative motifs based on Cufic designs, for instance, Byzantine pottery also presents striking chromatic effects (particularly the use of white slip as a background), which hark back to the three-colour ware of Tang China.

Known centres of Byzantine pottery production were Corinth, Thessaloniki, Serres, Didymoteichon, and Cyprus. As well as being objects of trade and commerce both within and outside the Byzantine Empire, ceramic ware was also an important means of transporting technology from the Eastern Mediterranean to Western Europe, particularly with respect to firing, glaze, and decoration. The writers adduce evidence to show that the influence of Byzantine pottery in the West, and particularly in the urban centres of Northern Italy, increased considerably during the period of the Crusades (12th-13th cc.), when Venice and Genoa controlled the trade in Byzantine pottery.

The next chapter, Demetra Papanikola-Bakirtzis' 'Serres: A Glazed-Pottery Production Center during the Late Byzantine Period' (pp. 21-35), is in two parts. The first part discusses the techniques of production of Byzantine glazed pottery in general, and the second describes and analyses the techniques, the aesthetic and the specific characteristics of Serres ware.

After a long period when Byzantine pottery was a much neglected art form, in recent years specialists have been showing more interest in it. The international conference on Byzantine pottery that was organised in Athens in 1987 by the French Archaeological School was the first opportunity for a more systematic review of Byzantine pottery and provided an impulse for further research into this particular genre of art.

Research now concentrates on locating workshops and recording the characteristics of their products. Papanikola-Bakirtzis points out that 'Byzantine glazed pottery is a low-fired earthenware' and information about its production comes from archaeological finds and from observation of modern traditional pottery workshops, which use techniques that have not changed much since the Byzantine period.

The quality of the pottery is determined by all the aspects and stages of its production: the type of earth selected, its processing into clay, the wheel and the potter's skill in shaping the clay, and, of course, the kiln and the success of otherwise of the firing. Half-finished pots found in various places (including Serres) testify to the existence of pottery workshops. The thin walls of the Byzantine pottery presuppose the use of a foot-operated wheel, though no potter's wheel of the Byzantine period has yet been found.

From a technological point of view, a major innovation in Byzantine pottery was the use of tripod stilts, small earthenware devices which separated the vessels during firing and kept them from sticking together. The technique was introduced into Byzantium from the Islamic world in the 12th c. and led to more efficient, mass production of Byzantine pottery.

The most common decorative technique used on Byzantine pottery was *sgraffito:* the fresh pot was covered with a fine layer of white slip, through which the design was cut into the dark (usually red) clay. It was the width of the engraved line that determined the various decorative techniques. The Fine Point Sgraffito technique is characterised by a very thin line with delicately rendered details and was employed between the 9th and the 12th c. In the middle of the 12th c. the line, or incision, became broader, first to emphasise details and later to render the whole subject. There are also cases of the sgraffito technique's being used to render figures in a way that makes them appear to be in low relief on the dark-coloured bare clay (a technique known as *champlevé*).

At the end of the 12th c. colour began to be used, first yellow-brown (made from iron oxides) and soon afterwards green (from copper oxides). Before long colour was a major factor in the decoration of Incised Sgraffito ware (the pigments being applied with a brush onto the incised design after the first firing and before the second). The final effect, however, was determined by glazing: the decorated surface of the pot was covered with a lead glaze, which gave it, after the third and final firing, an impermeable, lustrous film.

It is to precisely this category that most of the Serres ware belongs, produced by workshops operating mainly in the late Byzantine period (13th-14th cc.). The existence of workshops in Serres is attested by the discovery and identification of a large number of ceramics with common features in terms of clay, shape, and decoration. Further confirmation is supplied by the discovery of wasters (half-finished vases), and of clay rods and tripod stilts used in the firing process.

Serres pottery is made of red, frequently coarse clay, usually well fired. Most of the pots are open shapes, mainly bowls with a lesser number of plates. The decorative motifs are extremely varied and eclectic in their rendition: birds (of two types, tall and squat), animals, foliate themes (spiral sprigs, trefoils, and palmettes), and geometrical motifs (e.g. a star inscribed in a pentagon).

On the basis of these characteristics, which are the principal features of the Serres ware, Demetra Papanikola-Bakirtzis presents a reasonable case for arguing that a number of these pots have been located both in neighbouring and in more distant areas. This indicates that they spread from Serres in the late Byzantine period. Pots found at Philippi and Thessaloniki in Macedonia, Melnik in Bulgaria, Maroneia and Mosynopolis in Thrace, Corinth, and Byzantine Skoupi (Skopje) and Prilapos (Prilep) may be attributed to the Serres workshops, and a Serres plate has been found embedded in the wall of a church in Molyvdoskepasti in Epirus. A small fragment found during the cleaning of the Laguna at Venice also has the characteristics of the Serres pottery.

In the short chapter which follows, 'A Note on the History and Culture of Serres during the Late Byzantine Period' (pp. 36-9), the Ephor of the Ephoreia of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Antiquities of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Professor Charalambos Bakirtzis, gives a concise account of the historical and cultural circumstances in Serres from 1204 to the collapse of the Byzantine Empire. During this period the town participated in the most crucial events that followed Latin rule, for it was part of the state of Thessaloniki under Boniface de Montferrat (1204) and the object of Bulgarian claims, first under Johannica and later under John II Asen, until it was brought into the state of Nicaea by John Batatzes (1245). After Michael VIII Palaeologos had restored the Byzantine Empire in 1261, Serres once again became the capital of the theme of Serres and Strymon and flourished both economically and culturally for a while, despite finding itself, in the first half of the 14th c., at the centre of the dynastic conflict between John V Palaeologos and John VI Kantakouzenos. Before it finally fell to the Turks in 1383, Serres was in Serbian hands under Stephen Dushan and his successors (1345-71).

One of the most important artistic creations of this period was the founding of the Monastery of St John Prodromos on Mount Menoikion (1275) and four churches within the town of Serres itself: St George Kryonerites, St Demetrios, St Nicholas of the Kastro, and the funerary chapel in the old Cathedral of the two Saints Theodore. To these may be added the town's fortification with the citadel, the contemporary works of painting and sculpture, and, in the literary sphere, the outstanding *Ekphrasis tou ierou Pherron,* by the Serrean scholar Theodore Pediasimos.

The next section of the book, which is untitled, consists of catalogue entries (pp. 41-65), a presentation of twenty-five ceramics from Serres, two of which were found during excavations at Philippi and Maroneia. Each page, devoted to one item, comprises a photograph, a small drawing of the outline and section of the object, and an explanatory text giving details of the type of clay used and the shape of the article, followed by a much lengthier description of the decoration. This is followed by a brief description of the glaze (its colour and the surfaces it covers). There is no authorial ascription for this chapter, but it was in fact compiled by Demetra Papanikola-Bakirtzis in association with Eunice Dauterman Maguire.

The last chapter is contributed by Sarah Wisseman, 'The Materials Analysis of Byzantine Pottery' (pp. 66-9). She begins by discussing the technical methods of analysing the clay used in Byzantine pottery in order to determine where the products were made and how far they spread. The nature and chemical composition of clay can vary quite widely, making it very difficult to identify the provenance of the raw clay used at the time when any particular item was made. The writer points out that, apart from geological, climatological, and natural conditions, the composition of the clay also depends on and is affected by tempering and firing, which makes it even harder to identify its source.

Various techniques are employed to determine the provenance of pottery, including petrography (the microscopic analysis of the structure of the clay) and multi-elemental analysis in the form of optical emission spectroscopy, X-ray fluorescence, and neutron activation. Neutron activation analysis (NAA) is considered the most useful today, though it has the drawback of requiring a nuclear reactor. The Byzantine pottery from Serres has been chemically analysed by optical emission spectrography, the method favoured by A. H. Megaw and R. E. Jones. Twenty-two samples were examined, and the results suggest that the clay came from at least three different sources. However, Wisseman cautions, the variations could be due to firing different quantities of the same clay at different temperatures or to the differences that can exist between layers of the same clay bed.

This interesting chapter ends with the results of a special investigation of the chemical composition of the colouring agents and glaze from two samples of Serres ware. The testing was carried out by Dr Duane Moore, a clay mineralogist at the Illinois State Geological Survey, and revealed, amongst other things, the presence of elpasolite, which according to Moore, appears to be an alteration product of cryolite.

As already stated at the beginning of this report, the book ends with a glossary of technical terms and a selected bibliography. Brief biographical notes of the writers and contributors supplement this collective work, which is in every respect a useful addition to the literature on Byzantine art. In their easily comprehensible and extremely informative texts, the writers present a succint picture of Byzantine pottery, so that the value of this particular volume far exceeds the narrow confines of a mere exhibition catalogue of glazed ceramic art from Serres. It also provides a vivid picture of the productive and artistic activity of Serres' pottery workshops in the late Byzantine period, thus shedding more light on the economic, social, and cultural life of this major urban centre in Eastern Macedonia.

E. N. KYRIAKOYDIS

Bessarione e l'umanesimo. Catalogo della mostra, published by the Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici and the Biblioteca Nazionale Marchiana, Napoli (Vivarium) 1994, 28×24.5 cm., pp. 544+XVI.

Bessarion, the Greek from Trebizond on the Black Sea, is today considered one of the most important personalities in the history of the European spirit, a leading figure in the Byzantine world who contributed to the revival of the Classical tradition in Western Europe. This assessment belongs to Professor Giovanni Pugliese Carratelli, director of the Italian Institute of Philosophical Studies, and to the enterprising head of the Marciana Library of Venice, Marino Zorzi. Both supervised the above monumental work.

We are not dealing here with the usual catalogue of exhibits (manuscripts and mementoes of Bessarion). This is a book with impeccable academic specifications, printed with enviable artistic sensitivity. It includes 26 studies, written by European experts who have been involved with the life and activity of Bessarion. It is, moreover, embellished with rare, or hitherto unknown, colour and black-and-white tables, miniatures, facsimiles of documents and autographs of Bess., wood-cuts, engravings, views of cities, diagrams, sketches, maps and photographs of wonderful quality. In essence, the reader has before him a work of art, both as regards the typographical presentation as well as the contents.

I know of no other intellectual personality of medieval and modern Hellenism who has been so deservedly honoured in Europe. Bessarion's decision, in 1468, to donate his library, consisting of manuscript codices of texts by Greek and Latin authors, to the Venetian Republic has so far been amply justified.

The published works cover the greater part of the book - the first 378 pages. The subjects enable us to plot the activities of the Greek humanist and his environment more fully. The titles of these works are quite indicative:

— References to the Life and Personality of Bessarion, by Marino Zorzi. — The Byzantine Tradition, the Greek East, and Southern Italy, by Gianfranco Fiaccadori. — Works of the Young Bessarion with a Theological Content, by Antonio Rigo. — Bessarion as Poet and the Last Imperial Court of Byzantium, by Sylvia Ronchey. — Bessarion at the Council of Florence: Humanism and Ecumenism, by Luca d'Ascia. — Philosophical Thought of Bessarion: the Platonic Tradition, by Brunello Lotti. — Bessarion's Interests in Astronomy, by Antonio Rigo. — Rome and the Bessarionian Academy, by Concetta Bianca. — Bessarion and the Roman Basilica of the Twelve Apostles, by Lorenzo Finocchi Ghersi. — Cardinal Bessarion as Papal Legate in Bologna (1450-1455), by Franco Bacchelli. — Bessarion and the Fine Arts, by Fabrizio Lollini. — Miniatures in the Latin Manuscripts of Bessarion, by Susy Marcon. — Bessarion and Venice, by Marino Zorzi. — The Formation of Bessarion's Greek Library, by Elpidio Mioni (†). — Bessarion and Crete, by Henri Saffrey[1]. — Letter from Bessarion to the Pro-Union Priests in Crete, by Paolo Eleuteri. — Eastern Europe and the Union of the Churches, by Gaetano Platania. — Bessarion and the Turks, by Giacomo Carretto. — The Portraits of Bessarion, by Fabrizio Lollini. — Concerning the Portraying of Bessarion, by Lotte Labowsky (†). — Carpaccio and Bessarion, by Augusto

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[1] May I be allowed to note that the bull by Pope Pius II, dated 11 May 1463, to which the author refers (p. 244), as does P. Eleuteri (p. 248), had already been published by Georg Hofmann, Papst Pius II. und die Kircheneinheit des Ostens, *OCP* 12 (1946) 217-223, and a commentary on its contents was provided by Zacharias Tsirpanlis, *The Legacy of Cardinal Bessarion to the Supporters of Union in Crete under the Venetians (1439-17th century)*,Thessaloniki 1967, pp. 98-101. H. D. Saffrey re-published this bull from the same archive *(Arch. Segr. Vat.* - Reg. Vat. 490, f. 311^{r}-314^{v}) in *Thesaurismata* 16 (1979) 46-50, unaware that Hofmann had published it earlier and that Tsirpanlis had commented on it. Saffrey is familiar with the latter's book and refers to it, but for other matters, not the commentary on the above bull. I should also like to make it clear that the note in Bessarion's own hand (in *Monac. Gr.* 547, f. 359^{r}), first published by Saffrey (in *Byzantion* 35, 1965, 549), was published again more fully by Tsirpanlis, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-254, with comments which decipher the rather obscure contents. Besides, for the land-holdings of the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople in Crete (location, incomes - expenses, rents etc), see also my latest study: The Villages of the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople in Crete under the Venetians (New Evidence - 17th Century), *Onomata* 13 (1989-1990) 274-284.

Gentili. — Carpaccio's "Saint Augustine in his Study": a portrait within another?, by Patricia Fortini Brown. — Bessarion's Small Work "That Nature Acts Wittingly" (*Quod natura consulto agat*), by John Monfasani. — The Urban Outline and Architecture of Mistra (1249-1460), by Gianluigi Ciotta. — The Astrolabe Presented to Bessarion in 1462 by Regiomontanus, by David King and Gerard Turner. — The Cross-Holder of Bessarion, by Renato Polacco.

Then follows a detailed inventory of 129 exhibits, most of which are from the Marciana Library, the Vatican Library, St.-Nikolaus-Hospital Bernkastel-Kues, Grottaferrata etc., as well as icons from the Greek Institute in Venice, reliquaries, diptychs, chalices and patens and other items directly connected with Bessarion and his times.

The extensive bibliography (pp. 527-544), at the end, provides tangible proof of the international scientific community's interest in Bessarion[2].

The initiative of the Marciana Library[3], with the exhibition and the well-documented work which accompanies it, constitutes a new challenge to assess and reassess the cultural inheritance of the Greek cardinal.

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[2] To this most useful bibliographical record, it is worth adding the following small contributions: Carmelo Capizzi, Il Bessarione tra affari e carità: a proposito di tre atti notarili inediti, in: XVI. Internationaler Byzantinisten Kongress, Wien, 4.-9. Oktober 1981, Akten II/6 (= *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik*, 32/6), Wien 1982, pp. 27-42. - A. F. van Gemert, "Michael Apostolis as Teacher of Greek", *Ellinikà* 37 (1986) 141-145. - Igor P. Medvedev, "Bolonskaja gramota Vissariona Nikejskogo v Archive LOII SSSR AN SSSR" [= A Letter from Bessarion of Nicea from Bologna in the Leningrad Archive - Department of the Institute of History of the Soviet Union, the Academy of Sciences], *Vizantijskij Vremennik* 47 (1986) 134-144. - Nelson H. Minnich, "Alexios Celadenos: a disciple of Bessarion in renaissance Italy", in his book: *The Catholic Reformation*, Variorum, London 1993.

[3] In 1968, too, on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of Bessarion's donation, the Library, as an expression of its gratitude towards its benefactor, organized scientific meetings and an exhibition of codices, with the relevant publication: *Cento Codici Bessarionei, catalogo di mostra*, a cura di Tullia Gasparini Leporace ed Elpidio Mioni, Venezia 1968. Likewise, a special volume was published with 34 studies dedicated to Bessarion and the Marciana Library: *Miscellanea Marciana di Studi Bessarionei (a coronamento della donazione nicena)*, Padova 1976 (Medioevo e Umanesimo - 24).

D. E. Kakampouras, *La politique anglaise à l'égard de la Grèce de 1821 à la lumière de la critique grecque de l'époque,* Athènes 1994, pp. 260.

Ce livre, qui reprend la thèse de doctorat de son auteur, sur base à la fois de sources inédites et d'autres déjà éditées, étudie les conséquences de la politique anglaise à l'égard de la Grèce pendant la Révolution de 1821 et dans les années suivantes. Rappelons, à ce propos, l'incidence qu'eut, sur la politique anglaise de l'époque, la conclusion de deux emprunts qui liaient la Grèce à l'Angleterre.

L'œuvre du Dr. D. E. Kakampouras est divisée en deux parties, la première se composant de deux chapitres, la seconde de trois. Le premier chapitre décrit les réactions de personnalités grecques face à la politique anglaise qui, pendant les années 1821 et 1822, prit position contre la Révolution hellénique. Il faut du reste signaler que, peu après, les Grecs de toutes tendances adoptèrent à leur tour une attitude unanime à l'égard de la politique anglaise, qu'ils considérèrent comme hostile aux intérêts grecs.

Dans le deuxième chapitre, l'auteur examine les nouvelles données qu'introduisit la politique de Georges Canning sur le problème hellénique des années 1823-1825. Cette politique, en effet, fut de toute évidence influencée par le mouvement philhellénique qui toucha certains milieux anglais et par l'existence des deux emprunts accordés par l'Angleterre à la Grèce révolutionnaire.

Le troisième chapitre est consacré aux activités des trois Grecs envoyés à Londres pour suivre la procédure des deux emprunts: il s'agit d'I. Orlandos, I. Zaïmis, An. Louriotis qui, dans leurs rapports, portent des accusations précises contre les Anglais impliqués dans l'affaire des deux emprunts. Cependant, le délégué, G. Spaniolakis, mandaté à leur suite à Londres, n'hésite pas à dénoncer dans ses rapports les exactions commises par les deux envoyés précedents, I. Orlandos et An. Louriotis, les accusant d'avoir géré ces emprunts à des fins personnelles et donc au détriment de leur patrie, ce qui ne manqua pas d'avoir des répercussions néfastes pour la Grèce.

Dans son quatrième chapitre, l'auteur évoque les passions politiques que souleva l'arrivée des livres anglaises des deux emprunts dans une Grèce en situation jusque-là précaire, financièrement et politiquement.

En effet, cet argent anglais ne fut versé que partiellement à des mouvements d'opposition et n'eut donc, en fait, pour destinataires que le gouvernement Kountouriotis et la "partie" anglaise de la Grèce, ce qui explique, dans le contexte d'une telle politique de l'Angleterre, l'exacerbation des passions grecques et l'explosion de la deuxième guerre civile en Grèce. La rupture de l'unanimite nationale, provoquée par la distribution des livres anglaises, constitue l'objet des recherches du Dr. D. E. Kakampouras dans son cinquième chapitre.

Il s'agissait des nouvelles revendications économiques des banquiers anglais, juste après la signature du premier emprunt, qui constituaient réellement une pression sur le gouvernement provisoire grec. Celui-ci, finalement, céda à cette pression. Cette attitude régla presque la répartition des fonds, étant donné que les livres anglaises dont le gouvernement disposait, servirent davantage aux besoins de la guerre civile qu'aux affaires nationales. Plus tard, D. E. Kakampouras reconnut les fautes de la "partie anglaise" et de son gouvernement dans les années 1823-1825, une politique qui eut des conséquences catastrophiques pour l'avenir et l'indépendance de la Grèce. Les prétentions des banquiers anglais donnèrent souvent au gouvernement anglais l'occasion d'intervenir dans les affairs politiques grecques après la Libération, c'est-à-dire sous le gouvernement de Kapodistrias et aussi de la vice-Royauté.

Le livre du Dr. D. E. Kakampouras souligne les relations de la politique anglaise avec le Comité Philhellénique de Londres, qui orienta les actions des philhellènes anglais, y compris lord Byron. Ce livre met aussi l'accent sur la similitude d'opinion des hommes politiques grecs qui redoutaient la situation défavorable que créeraient en Grèce les deux emprunts et dans lesquels ils voyaient, finalement, de grands obstacles pour la libération de leur pays. Ce point de vue est confirmé par les archives grecques, les mémoires d'hommes politiques et les journaux de l'époque, ainsi que par des sources anglaises.

En dernière analyse, le livre du Dr. D. E. Kakampouras confirme l'opinion des Grecs de 1821 et des générations suivantes sur le caractère de la politique anglaise envers la Grèce. Les emprunts anglais avaient surtout déchaîné les passions politiques et favorisé, contre la Grèce, des chantages anglais, qui se poursuivirent tout au long de la période du ministère Kapodistrias et de la Régence sous la forme d'une politique d'intervention dans les affaires grecques. Finalement, ce livre du Dr. D. E. Kakampouras est important, car son auteur puise ses renseignements dans les archives grecques et britanniques et dans la presse périodique de l'époque pour illustrer l'ensemble d'une réalité douloureuse pour la Grèce encore en révolution durant le gouvernement de Kountouriotis et l'influence exercée par le parti anglais.

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Κωνσταντίνος Κ. Παπουλίδης, *Ο ελληνικός κόσμος του Αντωνίνου Kapustin (1817-1894). Συμβολή στην πολιτική της Ρωσίας στη Χριστιανική Ανατολή το 19ο αιώνα* [= Constantin Papoulidis, Le monde grec d'Antonin Kapustin (1817-1894); Contribution à la politique de la Russie envers l'Orient chrétien au XIXème siècle], Thessaloniki, 1993, pp. 199 (Institute for Balkan Studies, no 248).

Cet ouvrage, comme le dit son auteur en introduction (p. 13-15), a été écrit pour accomplir une promesse faite à feu son maître, l'archimandrite Cyprien Kern, professeur à l'Institut de Théologie Orthodoxe de Paris, où l'auteur a fait ses études de 1954 à 1959, année de l'obtention de son diplôme. Il avait demandé au jeune étudiant grec de faire des recherches, dès que les circonstances le permettraient en ex-Union Soviétique (à laquelle il n'avait pas lui-même accès), pour retrouver le *Journal* d'Antonin Kapustin et écrire, grâce aux éléments qu'il y découvrirait, une biographie de ce savant clerc russe qui complèterait la biographie pauvre par manque d'éléments qu'avait écrite son maître exilé à Paris depuis les années de la Révolution d'Octobre. C'est donc cette promesse envers son maître qu'accomplit ici l'auteur. Connaissant le russe, il se consacre avec le zèle scientifique qui le caractérise à la recherche, dans les archives russes de l'ex-Union Soviétique, du *Journal* du savant russe, et finalement le trouve. Cette étude appliquée a pour résultat la rédaction de cet ouvrage.

Il est important de noter que l'auteur n'a pas choisi pour son livre le titre de "Journal" ou celui d'"Itinéraire de la vie" d'Antonin Kapustin, mais celui de "Le monde grec d'Antonin Kapustin", en y ajoutant le sous-titre suivant: "Contribution à la politique de la Russie envers l'Orient chrétien au XIXème siècle". Ce choix n'est pas dû au hasard et on le comprend à la lecture de l'ouvrage. L'auteur distingue en effet dans le "Journal" en question la figure du savant "russe byzantin", qui adore l'esprit grec et plus généralement l'orthodoxie grecque. Et c'est ce monde grec qui est son principal sujet. Ce sont ses idées et ses conceptions sur ce qui a influencé la politique de la Russie envers l'Orient chrétien au XIXème siècle que l'auteur rapporte dans son livre avec des observations riches et particulièrement judicieuses, justifiant ainsi pleinement le titre qu'il donne. Pendant cette période critique du XIXème siècle s'affrontent et s'engagent des influences étrangères, russes et particulièrement françaises et anglaises qui jouent à certaines époques un rôle décisif pour l'évolution et la formation des "questions nationales" de la Grèce.

L'ouvrage est divisé en trois parties. Dans la première partie (p. 26 à 38), l'auteur parle de l'origine, des études et plus généralement de toutes les activités du prêtre russe. Il est né en 1817, dans la Province de Sibérie, d'un père prêtre, et sa famille remonte à Ivan le Terrible. Le Nord dur et glacial et l'entourage familial immédiat se révèlent décisifs dans la formation de son caractère. Il est encore très jeune quand il se consacre dans sa ville natale à ses études ecclésiastiques, qu'il poursuit à Katérinoslav où pour la première fois, grâce à l'étroite amitié qu'il lie bientôt avec un étudiant grec, Séraflm Serafimov, originaire de Marioupolis, il admet le rôle décisif de l'orthodoxie grecque et plus généralement de l'esprit grec. Il lit Homère et Hérodote dans le texte à peine 21 ans. Finalement il se consacre à des études de théologie à la Faculté de Théologie de Kiev dont il sort diplômé en 1843. Le 7 novembre 1845 il reçoit la tonsure du moine et prend le prénom d'Antonin (son premier prénom était André). On lui confie à la Faculté de Théologie la chaire de Théologie Morale puis le cours de Théologie Herméneutique. Parallèlement, il traduit du grec en russe les Homélies de Saint Jean Chrysostome. Vers le mois de juin 1850, il est nommé, en tant que clerc et connaissant le grec, membre de la délégation diplomatique de la Russie à Athènes. Ceci le comble de joie. Il écrit, en grec, à son ami intime Sérafim Sérafimov pour lui annoncer sa nomination: "Que dire, que faire? ... Mais me voici Grec, comme tu le voulais depuis longtemps" (p. 36).

Il arrive le 30 septembre 1850 à Athènes où il reste dix années entières (p. 39-57), visitant de temps à autre différents lieux de la Grèce dont le Mont Athos. Dans la capitale grecque, où il se sent comme chez lui (p. 63), il développe une importante activité surtout grâce aux étroites relations qu'il lie avec les cercles ecclésiastiques, politiques et plus généralement avec la société de son temps. Un de ses grands succès est la concession de l'Eglise de Saint-Nicodème au Gouvernement russe et sa transformation en centre culturel au service des relations gréco-russes (p. 53).

A l'issue de ce séjour de dix ans à Athènes, il est nommé à Constantinople, le berceau de l'orthodoxie (p. 58-60), où il demeurera cinq ans (de 1860 à 1865) et s'intéressera particulièrement à des sujets byzantins.

Il change finalement d'itinéraire et se rend à Jérusalem où il a la charge de Directeur de la Mission Russe, dont les visées ne sont pas étrangères à la politique russe au Proche-Orient mais pour lesquelles il ne semble pas montrer un intérêt particulier. Ce qui l'intéresse davantage, dit l'auteur, c'est l'universalité de l'Eglise orthodoxe qu'il voit indissolublement liée à l'esprit grec (p. 67-68).

La deuxième partie de l'ouvrage (p. 81-112) est consacrée à une référence exhaustive à l'œuvre particulièrement riche de Kapustin (p. 81-89), avec une mention particulière pour l'œuvre écrite en grec dont l'auteur a découvert des manuscrits à Kiev, Moscou et Saint-Pétersbourg. Ses notes sur sa visite au Mont Athos au Monastère de Saint-Pantéléimon (p. 94), de Vatopédion (p. 95-96), Philothéou (p. 100) et au Protaton (p. 96) sont particulièrement impressionnantes.

La troisième partie (p. 113-120) se réfère à Kapustin en tant qu'archiviste. On le voit se consacrer à l'archivage en catalogues spécifiques des manuscrits qu'il trouve et qu'il étudie dans différentes bibliothèques de monastères qu'il a visités de temps à autre durant ses 44 années de séjour en Grèce, à Constantinople et au Jerusalem. Ces manuscrits sont grecs, géorgiens, arméniens, syriaques, slaves, arabes etc... Mais son intérêt se porte surtout sur les manuscrits grecs des monastères du Mont Athos et de Sainte Catherine du Sinaï.

Enfin, un chapitre particulier de la troisième partie se réfère à la politique de la Russie en Orient chrétien, où est mis en valeur le rôle de l'ambassadeur russe à Constantinople, le général Ignatief.

L'ouvrage se clôt sur des annexes contenant différents textes officiels qui nous font découvrir les activités et plus généralement la personnalité du savant russe, dont les idées, les jugements et toute l'œuvre nous étonnent souvent. L'auteur réussit donc en 199 pages sa présentation de l'homme et de l'œuvre dans une langue autant truculente qu'abordable par tous les publics.

MICHA'I'L P. PYROVETSIS

Vlavianos Haris, *Greece, 1941-1949: From Resistance to Civil War. The Strategy of the Greek Communist Party*, St Antony's College, Oxford 1992, pp. 350+xvii.

Das Trauma des griechischen Bürgerkrieges, dessen Wunden vor wenigen Jahren in den politischen Auseinandersetzungen in Griechenland noch zu spüren waren, das Fehlen einer systematisch betriebenen zeitgeschichtlichen Forschung in Griechenland und ein, seit Kriegsende bis zum Sturz der Militädiktatur 1974, schwieriger Zugang zu den staatlichen griechischen Archiven hatten die griechischen Historiker in den ersten Nachkriegsjahrzehnten daran gehindert, die Kriegs-und-Bürgerkriegszeit befriedigend und unvoreingenommen auszuleuchten. Erst mit der Öffnung der britischen und der amerikani-

schen Archive in den siebziger Jahren und mit der Veröffentlichung kommunistischer Druckschriften aus der Kriegszeit und Memoiren wichtiger kommunistischer Führer nach der Wiederherstellung des demokratischen Regimes in Griechenland begann man, diese vorher als brisant geltenden Themen mit Ernüchterung zu behandeln[1].

Eine vom Komplex der politischen Voreingenommenheit freie Arbeit ist auch die Dissertation von Haris Vlavianos. Die Ergebnisse seiner Untersuchungen, zu denen früher schon andere Historiker gekommen sind, sind zum größten Teil unwiderlegbar. Nach einer kurzen Skizzierung der Politik der griechischen KP(KKE) im Zeitraum 1918-1940 (S. 7-22) führt der Verfasser einige Gründe als maßgebend für den raschen Aufstieg der von der KKE kontrollierten Widerstandsorganisationen EAM/ELAS an. 1) Die Unfähigkeit der bürgerlichen Parteien, der Exilregierung und des Königs, den Widerstand zu organisieren. 2) Die Diskreditierung des Königs in den Augen des griechischen Volkes "for giving his blessing to the diktatorship of Metaxas". 3) Die Erfahrungen der Kommunisten in der illegalen Arbeit. 4) Das radikale sozial-politische Programm der EAM, das, anknüpfend an die antifaschistischen Volksfrontkonzeptionen der dreißiger Jahre, unter Zurückstellung des Klassenkampfes alle Kräfte auf die Befreiung von den Besatzungsmächten und die Errichtung einer demokratischen Nachkriegsordnung konzentriert hat. 5) Die britische Politik, die mit der Aufrollung der Frage der Wiederherstellung der Monarchie (ohne Plebiszit) die Positionen der EAM/ELAS verstärkt hat (S. 25-35).

Die Konstituierung des Politischen Komitees der Nationalen Befreiung (ΠΕΕΑ) am 10.3.1944 wird als die dynamische Antwort der EAM auf das Scheitern der Verhandlungen um eine Regierung der Nationalen Einheit im Rahmen der "Kairoer Mission" (Sommer 1943) gewertet (S. 35), während die Meuterei der griechischen Streitkräfte im Nahen-Osten (April 1944) nicht als kommunistisch, sondern als "the latest phase of the steadly rise of republikanism, which had been in progress since the death of Metaxas" charakterisiert wird (S. 38). Der Eintritt der EAM unter den ungünstigen Bedingungen des Libanonvertrages in die Regierung der Nationalen Einheit unter Papandreou (Anfang September 1944) wie auch der Kaserta-Vertrag werden auf die Ratschläge der im Juli 1944 in Griechenland weilenden sowjetischen Militärmission zurückgeführt. Die sowjetische Haltung wird durch die Vereinbarung zwischen Moskau und London (Mai 1944) über die Abgrenzung ihrer Interessensphären in Rumänien und Griechenland erklärt. Dies sei auch in dem Anfang Oktober 1944 in Moskau geschlossenen "Prozentabkommen" bestätigt.

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[1] Als Standardwerke gelten: Matthias Esche, *Die Kommunistische Partei Griechenlands 1941-1949: Ein Beitrag zur Politik der KKE vom Beginn der Resistance bis zum Ende des Bürgerkrieges,* Munchen 1982 und Βασίλειος Κόντης, *Η αγγλοαμερικανική πολιτική και το ελληνικό πρόβλημα 1945-1949,* Θεσσαλονίκη 1984.

Für das Scheitern der Bemühungen der EAM und der Regierung Papandreou um die Demobilisierung der griechischen Streitkräfte und Partisanenverbände im November 1944 und für die darauffolgende Dezemberkrise wird Papandreou verantwortlich gemacht, der unter dem Druck der Engländer vom am 27.11.1944 erzielten Kompromiß (Zusammenfassung der Riminibrigande, der Heiligen Schar, der ELAS und EDES in eine Division unter einheitlicher Führung, in der die ELAS in der gleichen Stärke repräsentiert werden sollte, wie die anderen Verbände zusammen) abgerückt war und am 29.11.1944 vorgeschlagen hatte, "a unit of ELAS and an equally strong unit of EDES were to be retained, acting independently from one another and from the Third Brigade" (S. 48).

Die Niederlage dei ELAS in der Schlacht um Athen im Dezember 1944 wird auf die militärische Überlegenheit der Briten durch den Einsatz zusätzlicher Truppen aus Italien zurückgeführt (S. 51). Für die Post-Varkiza Krise werden die Engländer und die griechischen Regierungen verantwortlich gemacht, weil sie keine konstruktive und versöhnliche Politik betrieben und die rechtsextremistischen terroristischen Organisationen, die die Anhänger der EAM brutal verfolgten, toleriert hätten (S. 79-86). Die EAM habe im Prinzip am Vertrag von Varkiza festgehalten und der neue Führer der KKE N. Zachariadis sei im Jahre 1945 für die Linie der nationalen Versöhnung und des friedlichen Übergangs zum Sozialismus nach voller Entfaltung der bürgerlichen Demokratie eingetreten (S. 86-105). Wegen des Terrors der Rechtextremisten und ermutigt von der Internationalisierung der griechischen Frage durch die Sowjetunion Anfang des Jahres 1946 sah sich jedoch Zachariadis veranlaßt, auf dem Zweiten Plenum der KKE (Mitte Februar 1946) eine Doppelstrategie durchzusetzen, welche die Organisierung des bewaffneten Kampfes in den Bergen mit der Fortsetzung des politischen Massenkampfes in den Städten zu verbinden suchte (S. 171-188). Der Boykott der von der KKE und der EAM im allgemeinen für verfälscht gehaltenen Wahlen am 31.3.1946 wird als eine Nachwirkung der von Zachariadis durchgesetzten Orientierung auf den bewaffneten Kampf und als "decisive mistake" für das Schicksal der KKE gewertet. Daß die sowjetischen Ratschläge über eine Teilnahme an den Wahlen keine breite Diskussion innerhalb der Partei fanden und von Zachariadis vertuscht bz.w. mißdeutet wurden, wird durch das

Fehlen innerparteilicher Demokratie und die stalinistische Struktur der KKE, die sich mit der Person von Zachariadis identifizierte, erklärt (S. 189-224).

Der Autor vertritt die These, daß die KKE ursprüglich die Aktivitäten bewaffneter Guerillas zum Zweck der Selbstverteidigung und als politisches Druckmittel einsetzte, welche eine Umbildung der Regierung unter Einschluß der EAM sowie die Durchführung einwandfreier Wahlen erzwingen sollten. Erst die Verkündung der "Truman-Doktrin" im März 1947 und das Scheitern der Verhandlungen der KKE mit der Regierung Tsaldaris über eine günstige politische Lösung veranlaßte Zachariadis im September 1947, die erfolgslose Doppelstrategie aufzugeben und alle verfügbaren Kräfte in den bewaffneten Kampf zu werfen. Mit einer kurzen Erwähnung der für die KKE ungünstigen Entwicklungen nach dem Dritten Plenum (keine Anerkennung der Provisorischen Demokratischen Regierung seitens der Sowjetunion und der Volksdemokratien, Unfähigkeit der Demokratischen Armee, ihr Potential auf 60.000 Mann zu vergrößern und Städte zu besetzen, heftige Kontroverse zwischen Vafeiadis und Zachariadis um die weitere Taktik), die schließlich durch "Titos Verrat" im August 1949 zu einer militärischen Niederlage der Demokratischen Armee führten, schließt Vlavianos seine Arbeit ab (S. 225-247).

Die Thesen des Autors, die allerdings in der Forschung bereits bekannt sind, können im Prinzip nicht bestritten werden. Aber damit sind die Fragenkomplexe, die mit der politischen Entwicklung Griechenlands 1944-49 und den internationalen Aspekten des griechischen Bürgerkrieges zusammenhängen, nicht erörtert worden. Der Umstand, daß der Verfasser wenige ungedruckte Quellen heranzog (kein Zugang zum Archiv der KKE) und sich vor allem auf veröffentlichtes Material stützte, hat ihn wesentlich daran gehindert, bedeutende Aspekte des griechischen Problems zu beleuchten. Für das historische Verständnis z.B. der widersprüchlichen Taktik der EAM/KKE im Jahre 1944 ist für die Historiker die Antwort auf die Kernfrage, wie man den Faktor England einschätzte, sehr wichtig. Wir wissen, daß die EAM/KKE zwar immer Mißtrauen gegen die Engländer hegte, aber sich weder militärisch noch psychologisch auf eine bewaffnete Konfrontation mit den Briten vorbereitete. Als sich am 3.12.1944 die Krise zuspitzte, richtete man sich anfänglich gegen die "innergriechische Reaktion" und die besten Divisionen der ELAS operierten außerhalb Athens. Die konsternierte Partreiführung zögerte, gegen die Briten offen vorzugehen, und ging davon aus, die Sowjetunion werde eine militärische Intervention Großbritanniens verhindern. Als man sich Mitte Dezember 1944 für den Angriff auf die Engländer entschied, hatte sich die Situation durch den Einsatz zusätzlicher britischer Streitkräfte (20.000) und durch die inzwischen unmöglich gewordene Verlegung der ELAS-Divisionen aus den Provinzen erheblich verändert. Anderseits erwiesen sich die politisch unerfahrenen Führer der KKE als unfähig, in den politischen Verhandlungen Flexibilität zu zeigen, um günstige Kompromißlösungen zu erreichen. Sie konnten die Bedeutung Griechenlands für die strategischen Interessen Großbritanniens nicht richtig erkennen und die "rätselhaften" Botschaften aus Moskau nicht "entschlüsseln" (so z.B. die negative Stellungnahme des Stabes des Generals Tolbuchin im September 1944 zu den Bitten der Mitglieder der KKE Erithriadis und Kanakaridis um die Entsendung von Teil der in Bulgarien befindlichen Roten Armee nach Griechenland).

Die Verantwortung für den Ausbruch der Dezemberkrise kann nicht einseitig Papandreou angelastet werden. Es ist richtig, daß am 27.11.1944 eine Kompromißlösung über die Demobilisierung der Partisanenverbände bzw. die Reorganisierung der griechischen Streitkräfte erzielt wurde. Es waren aber die Sozialisten Svolos und Tsirimokos und nach anfänglicher Zögerung der kommunistische Minister Zevgos, die dafür eintraten. Das Politbüro der KKE lehnte den Kompromiß ab und verlangte die gleichzeitige Entwaffnung der ELAS, der EDES, der Heiligen Schar und der Riminibrigade, was die Briten nicht annehmen konnten.

Die Entwicklungen nach Varkiza sind im Kontext der Ost-West Polarisierung und des Kaltes Krieges zu sehen. In diesem Zusammenhang kommt dem sowjetischen und dem jugoslawischen Faktor besondere Bedeutung zu. Diese Aspekte werden leider in der Arbeit von Vlavianos nur am Rand bedandelt. Zwar schlug die sowjetische Führung der KKE vor, einen massiven politischen Kampf aufzunehmen und an den Wahlen teilzunehmen, aber nach dem Wahlboykott und angesichts des beginnenden Kalten Krieges im Zeichen der berühmten Rede Churcills über den Eisernen Vorhang (5.3.1946) favorisierte sie die bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen in Griechenland als Druckmittel gegen den Westen, obwohl sie den griechischen Kommunisten keine unmittelbare Hilfe in Aussicht stellte[2]. Die Tatsache, daß die sowjetische Regierung bis zum April 1949 keine Friedensinitiative für die Bereinigung der griechischen Frage ergriff und die griechischen Aufständischen ab Mitte 1948 über Bulgarien unterstützte (die Aufforderung Stalins an die jugoslawische Delegation am 10.2.1948 im Kreml, den griechischen Guerillas nicht mehr zu helfen, sind im Kontext des sich anbahnenden sowjetisch-jugoslawischen Konflikts zu sehen), erweckte bei den Britten und den Amerikanern den

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2. Vgl. den neuen Aufsatz von Jordan Bajev, "Bălgarija i graždanskata vojna v Gărcija (1944-1949) godina", in: *Voenno-istoričeski Sbornik* 2-3 (1992), S. 88-116.

Verdacht, daß die griechischen Kommunisten im Auftrag Moskaus die sowjetische Expansionspolitik unterstützen.

Es ist richtig, daß bis heute nicht nachgewiesen werden konnte, daß die Kommunistische Partei Jugoslawiens den griechischen Aufständischen umfangreiche Hilfe unter der Bedingung versprochen hätte, daß die KKE einwilligt, nach einer Machtübernahme die griechische Provinz Makedonien an Jugoslawien abzutreten. Aber allein durch den Umstand, daß die Demokratische Armee vom jugoslawischen Boden aus mit jugoslawischer Hilfe die Operationen startete, konnte die KKE leicht in den Verdacht geraten, einen nationalen Verrat verübt zu haben, wenn man die damalige Makedonienpolitik Titos berücksichtigt. Die seit 1924 von den breiten Schichten des griechischen Volkes als antinational empfundene Politik der KKE bezüglich Makedoniens mußte in den Jahren 1944-1949 (insbesondere nach dem Fünften Plenum des ZK der KKE im Januar 1949) verhängnisvoll für die Partei gewirkt haben[3]. Wenn man auch die bitteren Erfahrungen der Briten in der November-Dezember Krise 1944 in Betracht zieht, versteht man, warum sie und die griechischen Regierungen gegenüber den Versöhnungsvorschlägen der KKE sehr skeptisch waren. Zachariadis war nicht bereit, seine Friedensangebote an eine vorherige Entwaffnung der Aufständischen zu knüpfen, wie es die griechische Regierung verlangte. Insofern kann die Wahlenthaltung als ein schwerer Fehler bezeichnet werden, weil dadurch der politische Handlungsspielraum der KKE erheblich eingeengt und das Mißtrauen gegen die friedlichen Absichten des Generalsekretäs Zachariadis noch mehr verstärkt wurden.

Das griechische Drama 1944-1949 ist ein vielfältiges Problem und bedarf noch einer tiefgreifenden Analyse. Vlavianos hat zwar einen Beitrag dazu geleistet, nicht aber das letzte Wort gesprochen.

Institut for Balkan Studies SPYRIDON SFETAS

Harry J. Psomiades - Stavros B. Thomadakis (eds.), *Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order*, New York 1993, 439 pp.

Pursuing a tradition started in 1976, *Pella* Publishing House of New York has presented volume IV of its *Modern Greek Research Series*, which

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[3] Vgl. Risto Kirjazovski (Hrsg), *Dokumenti za odnosot na kommunističkata partija na Grcija kon makedonskoto nacionalno prašanje 1918-1974*, Skopje 1982.

contains some of the presentations delivered at the Conference entitled "Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order", which was held by the Center for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies of Queens College, the City University of New York, from May, 20, to June, 1st, 1991.

Focusing on the three key-elements of the conference as indicated by its title (which also applies to the volume), i.e. Greece, the new Europe and the new world order, experts of Greek origin from Greece and abroad examine various aspects of contemporary Greece within the context of the European Union and in view of the revolutionary changes which are reshaping Eastern Europe and the growing sense of United States world domination. Although most contributions have not been updated with respect to subsequent developments up until the time of publication, they none the less offer a solid basis for any further analysis of issues affecting Greece, the European Union and the shifts in the international setting. The papers primarily deal with various economic phenomena (eight out of the seventeen chapters), foreign policy and defense, issues of national identity, administration and culture.

The admission of Greece into the (then) European Economic Community is singled out as the most significant development in post-war Greek history. A whole decade before the latest cosmogonic changes in the eastern half of Europe, the choice of connecting Greece's fate even more closely to that of the Western democracies has proved a major turning point in the course of the Modern Greek State, on that came at the most propitious moment. The significance of this choice is widely acknowledged within Greece today, as Europe undergoes a period of nationalist fervour marked by outbreaks of violence in parts of the former Eastern bloc.

The section of this volume dealing with the economy (Part II) at first provides the student of Greek affairs with useful information, tables and statistics on the various indexes of the Greek economy with particular reference to its integration into the European Union. The papers on the economy cover the entire range of Greece's interwoven economic relations with the European Union, Eastern Europe and the Balkans; added to that is an elaborate picture of economic developments between 1980 and 1990/91.

Following the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in December 1991, whereby the ruling European élites intend to change the course of the European Union, the convergence of the economies of the member-states and even more so of those less well-to-do countries such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal has become a primary aim of the Union. This task has become all the more urgent following the changes in Eastern Europe and the pressing demands of more and more states to join the European Union.

If the point at issue is for the Greek economy to extricate itself from its stagnant growth rates and low productivity in order to embark upon a course of sustained growth, it may be interesting to follow the different approaches and strategies towards this vitally important end as suggested by the contributors. According to G. Alogoskoufis (chapter 7, pp. 163-178), it is vitally imperative for Greece's drachma to participate in the European Monetary System; such a move would entail a measure of monetary discipline which could in turn compel the country's public and private sectors to change attitudes in order to achieve some macro-economic balance by means of an inflation rate closer to the European average and, in the longer run, to improve the terms of trade between Greece and the Union (pp. 176-177). By way of contrast, L. Papademos (chapter 6, pp. 125-162) maintains that a country like Greece might better be advised not to join the EMS, since this could aggravate her debt accumulation process, and hence jeopardise the continuation of her monetary policy (p. 154); instead, a far-reaching taxation reform and a drastic reduction in the country's public debt are suggested.

As the first critical decade from Greece's admission to the European Union came to its close, a new framework for European and global relations began to take shape, rendering the entire structure of international relations rather vulnerable and unstable. Greece, still having to overcome the significant difficulties resulting from her entry into a common European economy, also had to turn her attention to her isolated —since World War II—Balkan neighbors. What is more, Balkan developments have become directly connected with the threat of the Yugoslav crisis spreading across the entire region. At this time, the Greek economy has acquired a vast hinterland which presents it with a unique opportunity to escape from its preexisting narrow limits and to evolve into a dynamic factor of Balkan developments. A necessary condition, however, as S. Valden points out, for Greece's economic *Ostpolitik* to go beyond border-level contacts and transactions is to abandon past practices and to go ahead with its "European" opening to the Balkans by means of multilateral regional co-operation while taking advantage of the prestige and prospects of the European Union itself (pp. 307-308).

In so sensitive a region as the Balkans, developments in external relations and security matters are bound to play an all important role. The point made by the only non-Greek author in this volume (chapter 17), R. Clogg, is quite indicative in this respect: throughout the post-war period, the foreign policy debate absolutely dominated the domestic political scene in Greece. During the 1950s and 1960s Greece was faced with the Cyprus question, in the 1970s Cyprus became part of the wider conflict with Turkey, during

PASOK's 1980s the stage was taken by Greece's entry into the EEC and the debate over benefits and losses arising thereof, while the early 1990s are marked by the Macedonian question (p. 422).

The section on foreign policy and security (Part III, pp. 379-435) deals with Greek-American relations, the US involvement in the perpetual Greek-Turkish antagonism, particularly after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, Greece's political relations with the European Union and, finally, the prospects for Greece and her Balkan neighbors in the 1990s.

After the Second World War, US support constituted the cornerstone of Greece's defence doctrine as well as the basis of her economic reconstruction following the devastation of the occupation and civil war years. At the same time, the prominent US military presence in Greece and the various agreements signed by the two countries gave rise to certain assumptions which have considerably influenced the course of Greek-American relations over the last fifty years. The question of the bases and other US military facilities in Greece, their use, particularly after the collapse of the rival socialist bloc, the role of NATO today and its identification with the US set the framework for Greek-American relations. According to T. Couloumbis (chapter 14, pp. 379-390), it is essential for Greek-American relations no longer to be viewed in the context of the Cold War and their civil war background. Greece is a member of the European Union and, therefore, her relations with the US ought to be gauged by this new reality (pp. 389-390).

Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the, by now, traditional Greek-Turkish conflict, as V. Coufoudakis notes (chapter 15, pp. 391-404), has entered a new phase. The new conditions in the Balkans and the entire region as far as the Caucasus add a new dimension to the options of Turkish foreign policy, which exceeds the familiar context of high-pitched exchanges with Greece over the Aegean and Cyprus (pp. 402-403). Indeed, following the virtual freezing of Turkey's admission to the European Union, Turkey seeks to expand her influence in the Balkans and the former Soviet republics, having virtually secured the consent of the guarantor of the "New World Order" the USA.

Greece's political relations with the European Union and the need for Greece to enhance and modernize her political and administrative structures constitute the main theme of the current decade, as P. Ioakimides suggests (chapter 16, pp. 405-420). If, during the early years after her admission, Greece was predominantly preoccupied with the convergence of her economy with those of the other member-states, today it is imperative for Greece to promote by all means available her integration within the political structures of the

European Union to the fullest extent possible. Moreover, given the fact that Greece can claim a recond of adaptation to the common institutional framework greater than any other member-state as well as the most committed "pro-European" public, it seems that the country is capable of remaining party to European developments (pp. 419-420).

The volume's last chapter, that is R. Clogg's paper on Greece and the Balkans (pp. 421-436), is of particular interest, mainly on account of the following reasons: (i) the author is not Greek and, for this reason, is well-poised to review in a dispassionate manner developments in this area; (ii) his record as an authority on contemporary Greece lends a special weight to his views; and, (iii) the distance between the time of the presentation and subsequent developments gives R. Clogg's text a certain amount of charm regarding the views of its, then, possibly unsuspecting author on things to come in the Balkans. Almost a month after the conclusion of the conference in New York, war broke out in Yugoslavia leading to the current, still unpredictable, deadlock and, a little later, the Macedonian question surfaced with all its "particular" aspects.

Those with a knowledge of the Balkan situation are well aware of the fact that the current nationalist and religious conflicts, which brutally ravage the formerly unified Yugoslavia, are nothing new but survived even after the end of the Second World War, only they were pushed to the edge of historical collective memory by the ensuing communist order, and then only superficially.

The extent of intra-Balkan difficulties is demonstrated by the realization that, whenever two Balkan states maintain or try to maintain a close relationship, then a third Balkan country automatically feels herself threatened by such a *rapprochement,* since her relations with at least one of the parties are usually troubled. Factors accounting for such friction may be a historical past of wars and uprisings, a minority question, a contested border, the exploitation of water resources *el al.* The triangle between Greece, Serbia and Albania provides a characteristic case in point: the traditional Greek-Serbian (or-Yugoslav) relationship poses a constant obstacle in the way of a Greek-Albanian *rapprochement* on account of the bitter dispute between Albania and Serbia (Yugoslavia) over Kosovo (p. 434).

It is worth-noting the final point which Clogg makes in his paper on Greece's post-war Balkan policy, which to a certain extent helps explain the confusion still prevalent in Greece regarding the maze of intra-Balkan relations. Balkan studies and, more specifically, the study of external relations in the Balkans had almost totally been neglected in Greece in the past (p. 435), as the country, particularly after the restoration of democracy, made an effort to transcend her narrow and wretched neighborhood, then under communist rule, and to reaffirm her European identity through her admission to the European Communities. In spite of all post-1974 Greek initiatives for closer co-operation with the northern Balkan states, which owed a great deal to the personal appeal of Constantine Karamanlis, the Balkans remained an "exotic" place for Greece, being overshadowed by the vision of Europe. Moreover, it should not be disregarded that all those moves in the Balkans after 1974 were rather aimed at countering Turkey with a view to maintaining a balance in the region than stemmed from a Greek desire to approach and to really get to know the other Balkan peoples.

A chief characteristic of the post-war trend of Greek policy in the Balkans is the construction of very stable relations with Bulgaria, a country with which Greece hardly ever found herself on the same side in time of war. There are many factors which contributed to the development of friendly relations between Greece and Bulgaria: (i) both countries considered that no national minorities lived on their territory; (ii) both countries considered that Turkey constituted a permanent threat to their sovereign rights; (iii) Orthodoxy constitutes the predominant religious confession in both countries. Moreover, Bulgaria has today become a real hinterland of great investment opportunities for the Greek entrepreneurial spirit (p. 434).

Minority questions are also an essential characteristic of the Balkan political landscape. R. Clogg makes a special reference to these issues. With regard to Greece, he refers to the difficulties which were likely to arise from the, then only possible, secession of the "Republic of Macedonia" from the Yugoslav federation in connection with the issue of a Slav-Macedonian minority in Greece. According to Clogg, the Greek government ought not to go on denying the existence of such a minority, nor should it continue its practice to refer to the Turks in Western Thrace as "Muslims", since the latter in their vast majority feel Turks (p. 433). He further expresses the view that Greece should ignore any provocations on the part of either the "Macedonians" or the Turks and should not give in to their nationalistic activities. Greece may fear nothing, Clogg continues, since it is one of the most homogeneous countries in the world and, therefore, may become a model state in what regards the protection of minorities by permitting those living on her soil to organize themselves in any way they wish. In following such a policy, Greece has got nothing to lose and a lot to gain in terms of prestige (pp. 433-434).

Already from the 1980s the international community displayed a keen interest in the legal protection of minorities of all kinds within the framework of international organizations. More specifically, the CSCE has provided a rather comprehensive framework for the protection of minority groups in Europe and beyond. One may safely predict that the coming century will be the century of minorities and of the protection of human rights. In this respect, however, the Balkans, which throughout the modern era have become synonymous to nationalism, bad faith and intolerance of all things foreign, could hardly serve as a model case for the application of international regulations on minorities; any illusion to the contrary would only help create erroneous assumptions, which do not correspond to the historic realities of the region.

What, for instance, could a European politician or analyst expect of Albania in the case of the Greek minority, which after fifty years of imposed insulation attempts to come to terms with contemporary developments and to organize itself on a national basis. What could be the attitude of the newly formed Republics of former Yugoslavia towards their minorities, when, for example, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has based its nation building process upon minority claims against neighboring countries, which it also took care to enshrine in its Constitution (Art. 49, para. 1). This reality is implied by R. Clogg (p. 433), who, however, suggests that Greece act wisely and not play into the hands of Skopje on the minority issue. What is then the general attitude of Turkey as the mother country towards the Turkish minorities in other Balkan countries, at a time when minorities inside that country experience an intolerable situation, to say the least (the analogy is also used by Clogg, who refers to the lamentable conditions facing the few remaining Greeks in Turkey, which are in no way comparable to those prevailing in Western Thrace; p. 433).

Apart from these examples of particular Greek interest, the same is true with regard to other minority groups in all Balkan countries, which at the same time act as the national focal point, the "mother-country" to their own kin abroad. One should also not overlook the important question of the Gypsies (Rom) throughout the Balkans, who lack a national center to protect them against the arbitrariness of their host countries. Besides, it is not an exclusively Balkan phenomenon for a state to follow an assertive policy and to try to protect its co-nationals abroad, while being full of distrust and on the defensive when it comes to minorities within its own boundaries.

The Balkans need time and peaceful conditions before they become able to overcome their past in order to respond to the demands and challenges of the new world order. Concepts which are common place and self-evident elsewhere, such as democracy, freedom of opinion, human rights, democratization of the state, market economy or fiscal conscience, need time to take roots here. What is more, the Balkan countries, especially those which have experienced a controlled economy for decades, must overcome their economic problems without delay in order to enable themselves to look upon a brighter future. Greece has the advantage over the rest of the Balkans of having been a member of the European Union for thirteen years and a democratic state for an uninterrupted period of twenty years. It remains to be seen what will be the course of both Greece and her Balkan neighbors in the post-Cold War era.

Institute for Balkan Studies KYRIAKOS D. KENTROTIS

John Loughlin (ed.), *Southern European Studies Guide,* London-Munich 1993, 233 pp.

In 1993, the British publisher Bowker (London) and the German publisher Saur (Munich) published the second book in the *Area Studies Guides* series, entitled *Southern European Studies Guide.* The publication was edited by Professor John Loughlin of the Dutch Erasmus University in Rotterdam and the Centre for Mediterranean Studies at the University of Bristol.

The book is made up of eleven chapters containing presentations by university professors and scholars. It is a bibliographic guide to Southern Europe, which to some extent includes or is identified geographically with the Mediterranean region. The guide relates first and foremost to the southern member-states of the European Union (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) as well as the Mediterranean's two island democracies, Cyprus and Malta, both of which intend to become EU members in the near future. The bibliography on these specific countries principally includes the titles of books and articles (with brief comments on each work), and cites the main specialist magazines and Institutes on the matters dealt with by the specific bibliographic guide. These are shown in relation to the general picture of each country through the course of its history, the internal political situation, the system of government, the community and the economy. Additionally, depending on the country, there are further, more detailed, references to matters of culture (Spain Cyprus and Greece), the women's movement and the position of women (Greece), Law (Italy) and the Church (Malta). The publication's eleven chapters are supplemented by citations of bibliographic details for five subject units related to the six selected countries. These are: economic development (Will Bartlett, pp. 132-151), migration (Russel King, pp. 152-172, which also includes the case of Turkey), Tourism (Allan Williams, pp. 173-192), relations between the European Community and Southern Europe (Fiona Butler & Juliet Lodge, pp. 193-1206, which also examines the case of Turkey) and international relations and security in Southern Europe (Thanos Veremis, pp. 207-221, which also examines the case of Turkey).

Of course, one would expect that, under current international conditions, a comparable guide would be available that would deal with the Balkan states, or all the countries of Eastern Europe that have endeavoured, since 1989, to walk the way of parliamentary democracy and a free market. This is not to detract from the value of the present publication, but nonetheless it would have been more timely, more in keeping with the times if it had been published in the 1980's (although such publications were not in any case published then), when three of the four countries covered by the bibliographic report (Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986) were admitted as full members of what was then the European Economic Community.

It is a fact that all bibliographic compilations of this type are always welcomed by the scientific community. This particular publication goes a long way towards filling the gap in the study of the southern region of the European Union. The researcher thus has at his disposal a compilation of almost the entire English-language bibliography on Southern European —and by extension, Mediterranean— matters. It would however be superfluous to emphasize that a researcher must know the local language of each country and be able use the domestic bibliography in order to make a truly thorough study of the region. (Although from the beginning the book's editor states that it aims to be a kind of introduction to all the issues involved and thus restricts itself to an English-language bibliography, it is only in the case of Portugal and Italy that there is satisfactory citation of bibliography in the local languages).

Researches began to deal with southern European and Mediterranean topics, and also more specifically with each country of the region individually, mainly after the 1970's (with the exception of postwar Italy), as J. Loughlin also points out in his foreword to the book (pp. xiii-xix). Certain characteristic identifying features held in common by the countries of the region make it possible to view Southern Europe as a single entity, as one region: i. The recognition of the unquestionable geopolitical importance of these countries. ii. Their accession to NATO and the presence of military bases operated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the USA and Great Britain. iii. The bitter confrontation between the USA and the USSR in the 1960's and 1970's in the Mediterranean, directly related to the continual crises in the Middle East. iv. Their long-term control by dictatorial governments, which was to leave its mark unmistakably on the course towards the modernization of their communities. v. The dynamic and unique role of the local communist parties. All of the above details led to heightened military interest in the area in the field of international relations, and also induced many researchers to deal more exhaustively with matters regarding the region.

The cases of Portugal (Jose Mangone, pp. 1-21) and Spain (Robert Agranoff, pp. 22-46) are typical examples of long-term government by crass dictatorships. Essentially, these two countries of the Iberian peninsula did not come out from their isolation until the middle of the 1970's with the fall of their dictatorial regimes. It would be no exaggeration to say that the rest of Europe essentially "discovered" Portugal and Spain after their accession to the then EEC (1986). These two countries are at present headed for full economic recovery, and the Iberian peninsula is thus now viewed in EU circles as a typical example of a regional unit that has adapted quickly to the demands of new European politics. Regarding Spain, under the Franco dictatorship for about forty years and to this day wrestling with the Basque question, in the form of the activities of ETA, its accession to NATO as late as 1982, and to the EEC four years later, made it a key player in European developments. The case of Spain also directly involves the *Estado de las Autonomias,* which concerns first and foremost the regions of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. The balance of power between the powerful Socialist Party (PSOE) governing in Madrid and the local governments of the above regions is an experiment, the progress of which is followed with great interest even as it relates to the more general development of a Europe of Regions. Portugal, in turn, is enjoying widespread economic progress, and is thus no longer viewed as Europe's poorest country.

Italy (Martin Bull, pp. 47-78) has always been the "most European" country of the Mediterranean. The study of Italian affairs in English-speaking lands is considered thoroughly satisfactory. Throughout the postwar period, for academic researchers, Italy has been associated with a fragile parliamentary democracy, directly related to the decisive role of the political parties, the Church (Vatican), and the activities of the terrorist organizations and the Mafia. In particular, the remarkable presence of the largest Communist Party in Western Europe (Partito Comunista Italiano) and the activity of the Mafia have led many researchers to study Italian developments. Particular reference should be made to the matter of relations between the centre and the regions, which in Italy has traditionally been a matter of intense discussion and during the last three years has taken a "dangerous" turn, as regional initiatives, movements and parties favouring autonomy have flourished.

Greece (Gabriella Lazaridis, pp. 79-97) in the postwar period has been consigned to the margin of academic research. It is basically only Greek history (chiefly the period of the Ancient Greeks and Byzantium, and to a lesser extent the revolution of 1821) that continues to attract academic attention. Regarding modern, postwar Greece, the staple objects of academic study have been the civil war, the Junta period, political reform and particularly the PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) phenomenon during the 1980's. It might be noted, regarding Greece in general, and particularly in comparison with Portugal, that, just as since the 1960's and 70's Europe has found Greece quite attractive from a cultural, tourist and economic point of view, something similar has been happening to the equally small country of Portugal since the 1980's.

The history of Cyprus (Stephen Ryan, pp. 98-118) since the Second World War has been bound up with the following events: i. The declaration of an independent democracy in 1960 (since 1878, it had been a colony of Great Britain, which continues to maintain two military bases in Akrotiri and Dekeleia) and the catalytic presence of Archbishop Makarios. ii. The Turkish invasion of 1974, and the essential division of Cyprus in 1983, when the "Turkish Republic of North Cyprus" (roughly 40% of the island) was declared under Rauf Denktash. To this day, the international community has not recognized it. iii. The uninterrupted presence of UN peacekeeping forces (UNFICYP) on the island since 1964.

The complicated nature of the Cyprus question due to the activity of many different parties, is vividly portrayed by the remarks made by Anthony Eden in his book *Full Circle,* London 1960, p. 315: "In geography and tactical considerations, the Turks have the stronger claim on Cyprus; in race and language the Greeks; in strategy the British, as long as their industrial life depends on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf".

Nineteen years have now passed since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (the only case of invasion in postwar Europe, Nicosia continuing to be a divided city), and this has led to the perpetuation of the Cyprus question, while international public opinion basically remains apathetic to the continuing daily violation of basic rules of International Law and the failure to respect human rights in the occupied part of the island. The chapter on Cyprus in the bibliographical guide is no exception to the rule of treating the Cyprus question from a distance. The reader is consequently given the impression that there is an established status quo, becoming ever stronger with the passage of time, as the invaders are treated in the same way as the free part of Cyprus, legalizing absolutely the act of occupation.

The name and the history of Malta (Adrianus Koster, pp. 118-131) are also closely connected to the long colonial presence of Great Britain (1800-1964) as well as the presence of British military bases until 1979. This young Mediterranean island democracy continues to balance its geographical position close to North Africa with its political will to be admitted into the European Union. The political leader, socialist Dom Mintoff, who was Prime Minister of Malta from 1971 to 1984, contributed to the close relations that Malta maintained with third world countries, particularly Libya, throughout this period. Malta's European prospects began in 1987, when after 16 years of continuous government of the country by the Labour Party, the right-wing liberal government of F. Adami came to power.

The new issues (demographic problems, religious fundamentalism, nationalism, minorities, non-governmental organizations, ecological matters, etc) faced first and foremost by Europe in the present transitional period, as balances are restored in a new order of things, to some degree make it necessary to publish a new and more analytical Studies Guide, both for the Mediterranean and for the Balkans.

Institute for Balkan Studies KYRIAKOS D. KENTROTIS

The Truth on Kosova, The Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Albania. Institute of History, Tirana 1993, pp. 351.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia, the most manifest and surely the most painful of the changes that the political map of the Balkans experienced during last years, gave the superficially changed Albanian state the opportunity to bring once more to the scene of the international diplomacy the question of the Albanian minority living in Kosovo and to support its historical right to self-determination. In this framework of the Albanian irredentist policy and propaganda the present publication should be included, fundamental aim of which is to inform the international public opinion about the question of Kosovo and its historical background and to refute at the same time the Yugoslav arguments, as they were expressed through the recent volume *Kosovo-Past and Present* (Belgrade 1989).

The present publication is a collection of articles by Albanian authors from Albania (S. Anamali, E. Çabej, S. Pulaha, S. Pollo, A. Puto, K. Prifti and others) or Kosovo (E. Pllana, Z. Cana, A. Hadri, L. Rushiti, H. Bajrami, H. Islami and R. Qosja), and by foreign historians from the former Yugoslavia (A. Stipcevic, R. Katicic, H. Baric, D. Tucovic and B. Krisman), from France (A. Ducellier and M. Roux), and from Austria (C. Jirecek). A good part of them were written especially for this publication, but there are also articles previously published in different scientific journals. Besides these, the publication includes articles of senior scientific researchers or candidates of historic science (P. Xhufi, P. Bogdani, Z. Shtylla, M. Verli, L. Nasi and A. Lalaj). The edition is also accompanied with six excerpts from the press referring to the years 1913-1938 and 1989 and 35 documents, most important of which should be considered the contemporary ones, from 1990 onwards, concerning the declaration of Kosovo's independence.

The contents have been arranged in seven chapters according to chronological order, starting from the time of Antiquity and arriving to the present days. Three seem to be the main topics treated by the articles included: the descent of the Albanian people from the Illyrians and its historical presence at the western side of the Balkans since the time of Antiquity; the Albanian national consciousness of the population living at the Kosovo area and its continual wish for self-determination and unification with the mother-Albania; finally, the oppressive policy that the Serbs had always followed against Kosovo Albanians and the measures they took in order to alter the national physiognomy of the region.

The entire first chapter and two of the articles of the second one are dedicated to the first main topic. Their fundamental aim, as mentioned before, is to prove the autochthony of the Albanian tribes in the Balkan peninsula. Starting from the time of Antiquity and arriving (very briefly is true) in the 6th century A.C. and using as evidence ancient historical sources, such as Herodotus and Appianus (S. Anamali and A. Stipcevic), or anthroponymies of Albanian origin (E. Çabej and R. Katicic), the authors try to prove that present Albanians are descendants of the ancient Illyrian tribes inhabiting not only the territory of the present Albanian state, but a more extensive area including the western part of the Balkan peninsula, along the coasts of the Ionian and Adriatic sea in the west to river Vardar in the east and from the rivers Sava and Danub in the north to Pindus mountains in the south. Especially for the first chapter, we should distinguish the studies of the historian S. Anamali and the ethnologist-linguist E. Çabej as particularly interesting, calm and well-documented.

The same thought continues at the articles of S. Pulaha and A. Ducellier, of the second chapter, which bring us to the 17th century A.C. Referring to Austrian historical sources or testimonies of the Ottoman period (S. Pulaha) or to Hellenic-Byzantine sources (A. Ducellier), they try to prove that the Albanians in reality didn't establish themselves in the Kosovo area after the Austro-Turkish war of 1683-1699, as Serb historians usually pretend, but that this population was autochthonus. Nevertheless, it should be noted that since this particular period is extremely poor in accurate information, a positive answer to the question is not yet possible and, as a result, the two articles do not seem to persuade the reader.

Unfortunately, from the very first chapter one of the most evident weaknesses of the volume becomes obvious: the inequality existing between the included articles as concerns their importance and documentation. Scientific studies of several authors are put side by side with propagandistic emotional excerpts of other essays, and, as a result, the trustworthiness of the entire publication is being shaked. Besides, the present publication does not manage or perhaps does not wish to leave behind the permanent weakness of Albanian historiography, i.e. the direct passing from Antiquity to Middle Ages, with a wide gap at the intermediate period. Although the *Foreword* informes us that the volume "does not claim to give a comprehensive history of Kosova and the Albanian population in Yugoslavia from Antiquity to the present day, ...but to shed light on those aspects of the past and present of Kosova and the Albanian population, which for a long time and especially during the last 8 years the Yugoslav historiography and propaganda have been presenting in a completely distorted manner and in open contradiction with the truth", nevertheless there has not been made the slightest attempt to link the periods of Antiquity and Middle Ages between them, or to make any reference to the historic continuity of the Albanian population.

The third chapter goes, with a second jump, to the last decades of the 19th century, period of the Albanian national awakening. Two of the articles included refer in general to the activity of the League of Prizren (S. Pollo) and to the creation of an independent Albanian state as a result of the Balkan wars (A. Puto). Concerning Kosovo, most importance has been given not to the description of the national awakening of the Albanian population there, but to the various atrocities that this population suffered from the Serbs (E. Pllana and Z. Cana). Thus the chapter in question seems to be considerably deficient and it doesn't manage to persuade the reader for the existance of an original national movement among Kosovo Albanians. Besides, the documents following these particular articles are official reports or protests of the

Albanian nationalist leaders in the framework of the League of Prizren and not documents referring exclusively to the national movement in Kosovo.

More interesting and well-documented is the fourth chapter concerning the living conditions of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia during the Interwar period. Special emphasis has been given to the economical and educational situation prevailing in Kosovo (A. Hadri), and to the concerted efforts pursued by Serb authorities in order to alter its Albanian ethnic character. The agrarian reform seems to be the main measure used in this direction and it gave many Serbs the opportunity to establish themselves in the region; besides, according to the authors, the authorities didn't hesitate to disarm the local populations, to incite the Albanian element to emigrate to Turkey and Albania or to use any other kind of economic pressure. Two of the four articles, these of Z. Shtylla and M. Verli, and most of the excerpts of the press and the documents included refer especially to the last subject. Very interesting are the three first studies of the chapter (A. Hadri, Z. Shtylla and M. Verli), which also give a lot of numerical and statistical data.

Contrary to the previous chapter, which could be qualified as one of the most thorough and persuasive of the entire publication, the fifth, which refers to the contribution of the Albanian population of Kosovo to the anti-fascist resistance during World War II, seems to be insufficient. This particular question is not easy to deal with, for two main reasons: first, because of the fact that the Kosovo area had been unified by the Italian occupation troops with Albania, thus fulfilling one of the national wishes of the local population, and, second, because of the leadership of the CPY, which being almost entirely Serbian caused a great mistrust to the Albanian population and discouraged it from participating to the movement. As a consequence this problem seems to embarrass to a certain extent the author (L. Nasi): since he cannot do otherwise, he admits that no remarkable resistance movement had grown up in the region till the capitulation of Italy in 1943; but, as he pretends, nothing prevented it from growing up later. The second article included (A. Lalaj) is totally dedicated to a pre-existing controversy between Albanian and Serbian historiography, the one regarding the Buja Conference of 1944 and its significance (the official decisions of the Conference are also included at the end of the chapter), and generally to the plans that the Serbs were preparing for Kosovo after the end of World War II.

With the sixth chapter we come to the contemporary history of Kosovo, within the framework of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, till 1990. Its main purpose is to prove the extend and variety of oppressive practices pursued for years by Serbian authorities in order to denationalize the region:

many Kosovo Albanians were baptised "Turks" and were obliged to emigrate to Turkey, continuing the same policy followed during 1950-1966 (Z. Shtylla), while the entire population was subject to a state of terrorism which began in 1981 and lasts until present days (K. Prifti). The lack of economic growth in the region should also be considered as an intentional and planed abscence of investments (K. Prifti-M. Verli and M. Roux, whose article is very remarkable and offers an interesting analysis of the question). The same chapter tries, finally, to deal with two more matters: first, the demographic development of the population after the end of World War II (H. Islami), and second, the state of autonomy of Kosovo through the Constitutions of the Republic of Yugoslavia during 1945-1989 (L. Omari), an article that seems to pave the way for the following chapter, which is exclusively dedicated to the declaration of Kosovo's independence in 1991.

Actually, the seventh and last chapter includes only official documents concerning the political developments of the years 1990-1992, which bring to an end the present publication by trying to give the reader the impression that the proclamation of the Republic of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state was nothing more than the happy conclusion of a long series of struggles and the expression of the national sentiment and wish of the Albanian population of Kosovo for independence and self-determination.

Institute for Balkan Studies ELEFTHERIA MANDA

Magocsi Paul Robert, *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe,* University of Washington Press 1993, pp. 218+xii.

The Historical Atlas of East Central Europe by Paul Robert Magocsi is volume one in the University of Washington's new series A History of East Central Europe. This is the first comprehensive and systematic study of the area in one language. The Atlas is written in chronological order. It clarifies and illuminates the whole history of the area from 400 AD to the present with the 89 full colour accompanying maps for each period of time showing the economical patterns, political boundaries, religious groups and conflicts, transport links and movement and migration of peoples/races and cultural boundaries. Particularly useful is the index with hundred's of variant place names. The Historical Atlas of East Europe is ideal for the journalists, the

diplomats, the politicians, the teachers and the students of the history of East Central Europe. The current developments in East Europe and particularly in the Balkan Peninsula are not understandable without the historical background. The picture of the area throughout the centuries can or cannot be a legimitation for the new state formations.

Institut for Balkan Studies
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SPYRIDON SFETAS

Brandes Detlef, *Von dem Zaren adoptiert. Die deutschen Kolonisten und Balkansiedler in Neurußland und Bessarabien 1751-1914. Schriften des Bundesinstituts für Ostdeutsche Kultur und Geschichte,* Band 2, R. Oldenburg Verlag, München 1993, 549 S.+x.

Diese Arbeit von Brandes, die das Ergebnis produktiver Archivstudien in St. Petersburg, Moskau und Kišinev ist, stellt eine breit angelegte Untersuchung über die Deutschen, Bulgaren, Griechen, Gagausen sowie einige kleinere Gruppen von Ausländern dar, die sich in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts nördlich des Schwarzen Meeres niederließen. Die Arbeit handelt von der Einwanderung, der bäuerlichen, handwerklichen und schließlich auch industriellen Tätigkeit der Kolonisten in Neurußland, der späteren Südukraine, und in Bessarabien. Sie fragt nach den Gründen ihres wirtschaftlichen Erfolgs. Sie analysiert die sozialen Konflikte im Kolonistendorf und die Antwort der Siedler auf die zunehmende Landnot und die Reformen Alexanders II. und seiner Nachfolger. Sie beschreibt das kulturelle Leben in ihren Religionsgemeinschaften und die Entwicklung des Schulwesens. Ferner untersucht sie das Verhältnis der Kolonistengruppen zueinander und zu anderen ethnischen Gruppen und schließlich ihre Einstellung zum russischen Staat. In der Arbeit werden die Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen ethnischen Gruppen aufgrund ihrer Privilegien und Sonderngesetze deutlich. Gerade durch diese komparative Behandlung der verschiedenen Kolonisten gewinnt die Arbeit an Bedeutung und bildet eine Grundlage für künftige Untersuchungen über das wirtschafliche und kulturelle Leben der Ausländischen Kolonisten im Zaristischen Rußland.

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Abstracts

CONSTANTINE PAPOULIDIS

CONCERNING THE WORK OF THE GREEK OFFICIALS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF IMPERIAL RUSSIA IN THE 18th, 19th, AND 20th cc.

More than a hundred Greeks worked in the Foreign Ministry of Imperial Russia between the 18th and 20th cc. Many of them were seeking a niche in which they could make their careers; but they all did their best to assist both Russian policy and their fellow Greeks. Their compatriots in particular they helped in many ways, politically, economically, and culturally.

ELISABETH KONTOGIORGI

FORCED MIGRATION, REPATRIATION, EXODUS. THE CASE OF GANOS-CHORA AND MYRIOPHYTO-PERISTASIS ORTHODOX COMMUNITIES IN EASTERN THRACE

The object of this essay is to investigate the demographic changes in Eastern Thrace, and in particular in the two kazas Myriophyto and Peristasis, between 1911 and 1920. Using analytical, statistical sources—hitherto unpublished—it traces the fluctuations in the ethnological composition brought about by successive waves of population displacements: forced migrations, deportation, repatriation, exodus.

Specifically, in the first part it discusses the problems created by interpretations of the statistics which have been examined to date by other researchers and, in view of the new sources, attempts to throw some light on the question of the size of the Greek communities in this region before the Balkan Wars, and establishes that the Greek component in these two kazas in fact constituted around 90% of the total population in 1911-12.

Subsequently, it examines the emigration of a considerable number of Greeks, in flight from the persecutions instigated by the Young Turks (1913-1915) and the occupation of their lands by Muslim refugees, a fact which altered the ethnological balance. It also examines the problems relating to their repatriation, scheduled by the Greek government when Eastern Thrace came under Greek control. It can be seen that less than half of those who emigrated managed to return. In 1920, two years before their exodus, in accordance with the Convention for the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey, the Greek population in the two kazas had been substantially reduced to around 80% of the total population.

LENA DIVANI

THE RUSSIAN REFUGEES IN GREECE: A FIRST ATTEMPT TO REGISTER

Over 30.000 anti-bolshevik Russians reached Greece, among other Balkan countries, during 1920 seeking temporary or permanent refuge. Greece, as part of the Entente's anti-communist campaign, welcomed the White-russians and, with great help from the League of Nations and international humanitarian organizations, tried to corpe with them along with the huge flow of Greek refugees from Asia Minor. Those (about 3-4.000 in 1928) who didn't end up to USA, Latin America, Canada or Australia, managed to settle peacefully in Greece, preserving at the same time their national identity by their own social, educational and religious institutions.

DOMNA VISVIZI-DONTAS

THE DODECANESE QUESTION DURING THE CONFERENCE OF LAUSANNE 1922-1923

The aim of this article is the analysis of the Italian policy at the Conference of Lausanne in the Dodecanece question.

The writer, making an extensive use of primary sources, brings forward that the assign to Italy of the Dodecanese Islands would become the starting point for the realization of Mussolini's policy of the Italian expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean. Britain, however, wished that the Dodecanese be ceded to Greece and Italy be recompensed in Africa. Thus, in conjunction with her domination of Cyprus. Britain would consolidate her supremacy in that area. But before any agreement could be reached between the Allies, Britain closed the first phase of the Conference and the Dodecanese question remained in suspense.

At the opening of the second phase of the Conference Italy appeared with the support of France and the consent of Britain that the Dodecanese would definitely be allotted to Italy, Greece's protests that the allied decision was against the principle of nationality and the previous agreements remained a dead letter.

The writer reaches the conclusion that the Dodecanese Islands were lost to Greece at Lausanne for reasons that had to do with a general policy of Britain and France to satisfy Italy.

XANTHIPPI KOTZAGEORGI-GEORGIOS A. KAZAMIAS

THE BULGARIAN OCCUPATION OF THE PREFECTURE OF DRAMA (1941-1944) AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON THE GREEK POPULATION

The article aims at giving a concise description of the Bulgarian Occupation in the city and area of Drama, Eastern Macedonia, during the years 1941-44. Using published and unpublished Greek, English, American and Bulgarian sources, it attempts to give the outline of Bulgarian policy in the area, in the thematical fields of (among others) administration, church affairs, education and language, economy and taxation, colonisation by Bulgarians, deportations, forced labour and other measures of oppression. Finally it attempts to assert the material damage wreaked by the occupation as well as the loss of life in the population.

Balkan Studies

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OF THE
INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES
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THESSALONIKI, GREECE

23/12/98
P. 157

Volume 35, Number Two Thessaloniki 1994

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P. O. BOX 10611, GR 54110 THESSALONIKI, GREECE

- Published twice a year under the auspices of the Institute.

- *Editor-in-Chief:* Prof. B. Kondis.
  Advisory Board: Chairman: Prof. A.-E. Tachiaos, *Members:* Prof. D. Pandermalis, Prof. J. Hassiotis, Prof. J. Koliopoulos.

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Copy editor: Kostas Christidis
Printed by: S. & J. Sfakianakis Bros Co, Thessaloniki

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Printed in Greece

GR ISSN 0005-4313

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VICTOR SPINEI

LA GENÈSE DES VILLES DU SUD-EST DE LA MOLDAVIE ET LES RAPPORTS COMMERCIAUX DES XIIIe-XIVe SIÈCLES

Les grandes migrations, qui correspondent en partie avec le soi-disant "millénaire obscur", ont marqué une période d'éclipse prolongée dans la destinée historique des communautés locales de l'espace carpato-dniestrien, là où leur existence physique elle-même est entrée sous l'incidence de l'incertitude, tandis que tous les ressorts de la vie ont été violemment ébranlés; par conséquent l'on a enregistré un prégnant recul sur le plan démographique, économique, social, politique, culturel etc. Les répercussions de la cavalcade des migrations ont atteint des limites de nocivité des plus manifestes surtout dans les contrées est-carpatiques, situées sur le trajet principal de la voie de pénétration des ethnies allogènes vers l'ouest et le sud-ouest, une véritable *via gentium,* qui reliait les steppes de l'Eurasie à la Plaine du Danube.

Dans les conditions des convulsions ethnico-polithiques de l'est de l'arc carpatique, produites vers le crépuscule de l'époque antique, le peu d'établissements de facture urbaine ou préurbaine ont disparu pour plusieurs siècles d'affilée, ne laissant s'entrevoir que de pâles prémisses pour leur réfection. Des tendances de constitution de noyaux préurbains dans les régions carpato-dniestriennes deviennent perceptibles vers la fin du Ier millénaire, étant dues avec priorité à certains éléments allogènes établis dans les zones périphériques des territoires roumains. Ces noyaux étaient en fait des établissements prévus d'un système de fortifications réalisé de palissades complexes, construites de rangées de grosses poutres, placées sur des vallum de terre, flanquées à l'extérieur par de profonds fossés. À l'abri des fortifications on a dressé pas mal d'habitations et d'ateliers artisanaux, avec une production diversifiée, à même d'assurer au moins une partie du nécessaire d'outils, d'armes et d'objets d'usage ménager et de parure. Certaines pièces de provenance étrangère attestent des contacts commerciaux assez intenses, de nature à contribuer à la prospérité des habitants.

De tels établissements fortifiés peuvent être départagés du point de vue spatial et typologique en deux groupes distincts, le premier situé dans le bassin supérieur du Pruth et dans le bassin moyen du Dniestr, correspondant à la partie du nord de la Bucovine, tandis que le second est situé entre le Răut et le Dniestr, à l'extrémité du nord-est de la Bessarabie.

Le premier groupe est illustré par les découvertes effectuées à Revna (Revne)-"Ţarina" et "Gorodişte" (rayon de Coţmani-Kitzmani), Carapciu (Karapčiv) (rayon de Vijniţa=Vižnitzkoe), Şirăuţii de Sus (Gorišni Šerivtzi), Dobronăuţi (Dobrinivtzi) (rayon de Zastavna) etc. (rég. de Cernăuţi=Černivtzi) (Ukraine). Elles étaient placées sur des formes de terrain à positions dominantes, les pentes d'accès étant défendues d'habitude par deux ou trois rangées de vallum à palissades, doublées de fossés adjacents[1]. Proches du point de vue typologique des établissements énumérés ci-dessus sont les "horodişti" (= citadelles) de Fundu Herţei et Dersca (dép. de Botoşani)[2].

Le second groupe prend relief surtout par les découvertes d'Alcedar (rayon de Şoldăneşti) et Echimăuţi (rayon de Rezina), caractérisées par des établissements circulaires prévus d'une grosse ceinture fortifiée. D'autres établissements, en partie similaires, ont été recherchés à Lucaşovca (rayon d'Orhei), Rudi (rayon de Donduşeni), Ţareuca (rayon de Rezina) (Rép. de Moldavie), Lomacinţi (rayon de Secureni) (= Sokiriani), Grozinţi (rayon de Hotin) (rég. de Cernăuţi, Ukraine), etc. Autour de ceux-ci, de même que dans le cas des établissements du nord de la Bucovine, gravitaient pas mal de villages, dont les habitants se réfugiaient, lorsqu'ils étaient en danger, dans les centres fortifiés[3].

Mais une datation exacte des centres fortifiés sus-mentionnés ainsi que l'attribution ethnique de leurs occupants comporte encore des précisions, dans le but de la clarification des aspects non-élucidés ou controversés. La plupart des spécialistes encadrent du point de vue chronologique les établissements fortifiés de la zone du nord de la Bucovine aux VIIIe-Xe siècles en les attribuant aux Croates. Pour ce qui est de la fortification de Revna, et éventuel-

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1. B. O. Timoščuk, *Slov'jani Pivnično j Bukovini V-IX st.*, Kiev, 1976, p. 60-93; idem, *Aşezări slave în Bucovina de Nord*, Užgorod, 1976; idem, "Drevnerusskie goroda Severnoj Bukoviny", in *Drevnerusskie goroda*, réd. V. V. Sedov, Moscou, 1981, p. 116-124.

2. D. Gh. Teodor, "Les établissements fortifiés des régions est-carpatiques de la Roumanie aux VIIIe-IXe siècles de notre ère", *Slovenská archeológia*, XXVI, 1978, 1, p. 69-77; M. Petrescu-Dîmboviţa, D. Gh. Teodor, *Sisteme de fortificaţii medievale timpurii la est de Carpaţi. Aşezarea de la Fundu Herţii (jud. Botoşani)*, Iaşi, 1987.

3. G. B. Fedorov, "Drevnie slavjane i ich sosedi v Moldavii", *Učenye zapiski*, VI *(serija istoričeskaja)*, Chişinău, 1957, p. 292-298; idem, "Drevnerusskaja kul'tura Podnestrov'ja (X-XII vv.)", in *Drevnjaja kul'tura Moldavii*, réd. princip. V. S. Zelenčuk, Chişinău, 1974, p. 109-126; I. G. Hîncu, *Drevnejšie pamjatniki rodnogo kraja (gorodišča severnoj Moldavii)*, Chişinău, 1987; idem, *Vestigii strămoşeşti*, Chişinău, 1990; B. A. Timoščuk, *Aşezări slave...*, p. 7 et suiv.

lement pour d'autres aussi, qui étaient de la même époque, on suppose qu'elles ont été détruites comme suite à l'offensive des armées de Vladimir le Saint sur les Croates à la fin du Xe siècle, déclenchée dans le but de les intégrer politiquement au knésat kiévien[4]. En revanche, à propos des citadelles d'entre le Răut et le Dniestr, datées habituellement aux Xe-XIe siècles et attribuées aux Tiverts, on considère qu'elles ont disparu à cause des incursions des tribus nomades des steppes nord-pontiques, en tout premier lieu des Petchénègues[5]. On a également exprimé la supposition — moins croyable, à notre opinion — qu'elles auraient appartenu aux Oulitches repoussés du bassin du Dniepr vers le milieu du Xe siècle[6]. Nous mentionnons, également, qu'à la suite d'une nouvelle et récente analyse de l'inventaire de l'établissement d'Alcedar on a essayé d'accréditer l'idée que l'habitation en a cessé à la fin du Xe siècle[7].

Pendant que dans la région délimitée par le Răut et le Dniestr on n'a plus constaté une réfection des forteresses détruites à la suite des incursions des Touraniens, à l'extrémité septentrionale de la Bucovine et de la Bessarabie on a encore signalé des établissements fortifiés de type préurbain pour les XIe-XIIIe siècles aussi.

Des résultats plus concluants ont été obtenus par les fouilles entreprises à Lencăuţi-Cernăuţi, Vasileu (Vasiliv), Dobronăuţi (Dobrinivtzi) (rayon de Zastavna), Carapciu (Karapčiv) (rayon de Vijniţa) (= Vižnitzkoe), Molodia (rayon de Gliboca) (Glibotzkoe), Lomacinţi et Neporotove (rayon de Secureni) (= Sokiriani) (rég. de Cernăuţi, Ukraine)[8]. Quelques-unes des localités recherchées du point de vue archéologique, comme Onut[9] et Vasileu[10], sont mentionnées dans les chroniques russes pour la première partie du XIIIe siècle. Sous plusieurs rapports me paraît confuse la situation de Hotin, où l'on a prétendu que la ceinture de fortifications se serait sans cesse maintenue, tout en enregistrant des perfectionnements et des extensions, du VIIIe jusqu'au XIIIe siècle, sans qu'on considère être obligé de soutenir cette assertion par la publication de matériaux archéologiques probatoires[11]. L'inventaire des découvertes des centres préurbains sus-mentionnés, des XIIe-XIIIe siècles, indiquent une vie économique dynamique, explicable en partie par la prospérité que le puissant knésat halitchien, devenu ultérieurement halitchien-volhynien, assurait même aux territoires périphériques contrôlés par celui-ci. La plupart des centres en discussion ont été détruits pendant la grande invasion mongole[12] et n'ont plus pu se redresser durant les décennies qui s'ensuivirent. Particulièrement significatif est le fait que les villes et les forteresses attestées au nord de la Bucovine après la constitution de l'État indépendant de Moldavie n'ont pas paru sur les ruines de celles détruites par les Kiéviens, les Touraniens ou les Mongols, mais sur des emplacements nouveaux, choisis en concordance avec les nécessités économiques de l'organisme politique roumain de l'est de l'arc des Carpates.

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[4] I. P. Rusanova, B. A. Timoščuk, *Drevnerusskoe Podnestrov'e. Istoriko-kraevedčeskie očerki*, Užgorod, 1981, p. 59-60 et 67.

[5] G. B. Fedorov, "Naselenie jugo-zapada SSSR v I-načale II tysjačeletija našej ery", *Sovetskaja etnografija,* 1961, 5, p. 106; I. P. Rusanova, B. A. Timoščuk, *op. cit.*, p. 82-83; V. V. Sedov, *Vostočnye slavjane v VI-XIII vv. (Archeologija SSSR)*, Moscou, 1982, p. 130; *Istoria RSS Moldoveneşti,* I, réd. V. L. Janin, V. A. Dergaciov, V. M. Masson, L. L. Polevoj, I. P. Rusanova, P. V. Sovetov, Chişinău, 1988, p. 156-157 (I. O. Knjazkij).

[6] I. G. Hîncu, "K voprosu o rasselenii tivertzev i uličej v Podnestrov'e", in *Jugo-Vostočnaja Evropa v srednie veka,* I, Chişinău, 1972, p. 159-175; idem, "Tiverţii şi ulicii în spaţiul carpato-nistrian", in *Probleme actuale ale istoriei naţionale şi universale,* Chişinău, 1992, p. 99-108.

[7] T. V. Ravdina, "O datirovke gorodišča Alčedar", in *Srednevekovye pamjatniki Dnestrovsko-Prutskogo meždureč'ja,* Chişinău, 1988, p. 54-71.

[8] B. A. Timoščuk, "Isčeznuvšie goroda Bukoviny", *Voprosy istorii,* XXXIX, 1964, 5, p. 213-217; idem, *Pivnična Bukovina - zemlja slov'jans'ka,* Užgorod, 1969, p. 76-111; idem, *Tverdinja na Pruti. Z istorij vinikrennja Černivtziv,* Užgorod, 1978; idem, *Drevnerusskie goroda...*, p. 125-136; idem, *Davn'orus'ka Bukovina (X-perša polovina XIV st.)*, Kiev, 1982;

Dans un moment où les desseins revigorateurs de l'Occident pour la civilisation européenne prenaient un contour distinct également vers les zones périphériques du vieux continent, dans sa partie orientale on enregistre une nouvelle secousse inexorable, de proportions sans précédent dans l'espace eurasiatique, due à la dernière vague migratrice, celle des Mongols. Le monde nomade des steppes frisait l'apogée dans son devenir historique, surtout par la réalisation temporaire de l'unité politique depuis les bords de l'Océan Pacifique jusqu'aux bouches du Danube, unité qui a facilité, malgré les distances malaisément surmontables, l'établissement de rapports multiples entre l'Orient et l'Occident.

Après l'achèvement de la campagne victorieuse de 1236-1242, dans la zone méridionale de l'Europe Orientale se constitue l'État de la Horde d'Or,

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idem, in *Archeologija Prikarpat'ja, Volyni i Zakarpat'ja (Ranneslavjanskij i drevnerusskij periody)*, Kiev, 1990, p. 114-115.

[9] *Ipatievskaja letopis'*, 2e éd., A. A. Šakhmatov, in *Polnoe sobranie russkich letopisej*, S.-Peterbourg, 1908, col. 735.

[10] *Ibidem*, col. 761.

[11] B. O. Timoščuk, "Chotins'ka fortetzja", *Ukrajns'kij istoričnij žurnal*, 1967, 4, p. 109-111; idem, "Seredn'ovičnij Chotin", *Archeologija*, Kiev, 22, 1977, p. 29-39.

[12] Idem, *Pivnična Bukovina...*, p. 130-131; idem, *Davn'orus'ka Bukovina...*, *passim*

qui, durant à peu près un quart de siècle, acquiert son indépendance vis-à-vis du grand khan de Karakorum. En dépit du dynamisme de la société occidentale — manifesté par un accentué essor démographique, par une courbe ascendante dans la vie économique, surtout par le ferment dans le domaine de la technologie, ainsi que par l'expansion militaire—, elle n'a pas été en mesure de péricliter par quoi que ce soit la stabilité de l'Empire mongol. Bien au contraire, celui-ci a écarté les positions gagnées par elle dans les zones orientales du continent, tout en déjouant, pour longtemps, ses initiatives politiques, économiques et confessionnelles. Après le choc des violents affrontements produits pendant la grande invasion mongole, les deux entités de la civilisation de l'Eurasie, représentées par l'ensemble mosaïqué des États européens, d'une part, et du monde en quelque sorte plus compact de la steppe dominée par les Mongols d'autre part, ont senti le besoin de se prospecter et d'engager des contacts diversifiés et approfondis au fur et à mesure de l'écoulement des décennies.

C'est la période où la société roumaine fait des efforts obstinés pour sortir de l'obscurité, en s'affirmant graduellement, malgré une ambiance politique peu favorable, au début avec une inhérente timidité, ensuite d'une façon de plus en plus tranchante. Naturellement, les réalisations dans la sphère démographique et économique se sont repercutées dans le plan politique, ce qui a influencé d'une manière bénéfique les autres ressorts de la vie également. Jusqu'aux approches de la constitution des États indépendants on n'a pas pu dépasser cependant un certain stade de développement plus évolué. La généralisation de l'univers rural ne permettait pas l'accès à un standard supérieur de civilisation, tandis que la genèse du phénomene urbain, dans les conditions de l'inexistence des traditions citadines et d'une population habituée aux pratiques de la vie urbaine, avait à affronter de grosses difficultés (fig. 1).

Le redressement après la période instable dominée par les tribus touraniennes tardives et après la grande invasion mongole s'avérait irréalisable d'une manière satisfaisante parce que l'autorité de la Horde d'Or avait été étendue aussi sur les territoires du sud-est de la Moldavie, contrôlés antérieurement par les Coumans. À la différence du nord et de l'ouest de l'espace carpato-dniestrien, où les dynastes locaux avaient maintenu leurs prérogatives dans le domaine administratif en échange de l'acceptation de l'obédience politique et de certaines prestations tributaires, les régions du sud-est sont entrées sous l'administration directe des représentants du khan de Saraï[13].

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[13] P. F. Parasca, "Zolotaja Orda i obrazovanie Moldavskogo feodal'nogo gosu-

Celui-ci avait divisé le territoire de la Horde d'Or entre les plus réputés chefs mongols, la séparation de leurs domaines étant faite, d'après les témoignages du franciscain Jean du Plan Carpin (Iohannes de Plano Carpini), l'envoyé du pape Innocent IV à la cour du grand khan en 1245-1247, par les cours des principaux fleuves de la région: le Dniepr (*Neper*), le Don, la Volga et l'Oural (*Iaec*). À droite du Dniepr, où se trouvait la Russie, gouvernait Corenza (*iuxta quod ex parte Ruscie ambulabat Corenza*)[14], qui disposait d'une armée de 6000 hommes: *Iste dux* [Corenza - n.n.] *habet sub se, ut audivimus, sex milia hominum armatorum*[15]. Ce chiffre est étonnamment réduit et peut-être c'est pourquoi l'un des compilateurs des notes de voyage du moine italien, le Français Vincent de Beauvais (Vicentius Bellovacensis), a trouvé bon de le multiplier par dix, de sorte que dans un de ses ouvrages à caractère encyclopédique les effectifs du dignitaire mongol sont estimés à 60000[16]. Sa rectification est à coup sûr sans aucun support véridique, ainsi qu'il faudra retenir toujours les données enregistrées par Jean du Plan Carpin, qui était entré en contact direct avec les réalités de l'espace ponto-caspien, en faisant toutefois mention du fait que les 6000 hommes de Corenza représentaient sans doute sa garde personnelle permanente en temps de paix et pas du tout l'armée du temps des expéditions guerrières. L'autorité de Corenza, identifié à Qouroumši, l'un des fils d'Ordu, par conséquent neveu de Batou-khan[17], s'étendait peut-être jusqu'à la zone des bouches du Danube. Les prérogatives de Corenza/Qouroumši étaient cependant limitées, car il ne se substituait pas au khan de Saraï. Pour recevoir l'investiture, les knès russes ne se présentaient pas chez lui, mais à la cour de Batou sur la Volga. De cette même façon a procédé aussi en 1245 Daniel Romanovitch, le knès de Halitch-Volhynie, mais qui, en route vers Saraï, a fait une escale pour rencontrer Corenza/

darstva", in *Jugo-Vostočnaja Evropa...*, I, 1972, p. 175-190; V. Spinei, *Moldova în secolele XI-XIV*, Bucarest, 1982, p. 164 et suiv.

[14] Iohannes de Plano Carpini, *Ystoria Mongalorum*, in *Sinica Franciscana*, I, *Itinera et relationes fratrum minorum saeculi XIII et XIV*, éd. A. van den Wyngaert, Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi-Florence), 1929, p. 108.

[15] *Ibidem*, p. 106.

[16] Vincentius Bellovacensis, *Speculum historiale (Speculum maius, IV)*, Duaci, 1624 (réimprimé Graz, 1965), p. 1293.

[17] P. Pelliot, *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or*, Paris, 1949, p. 9. Le point de vue de l'orientaliste français est accepté comme probable par B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Russland, 1223-1502*, 2e éd., Wiesbaden, 1965, p. 582, qui initialement admettait que par la forme *Corenza* le Franciscain italien aurait reproduit l'ethnonyme Hurramšakh (*Ibidem*, p. 34).

Qouroumši, que les chroniques russes appellent Kouremsa[18].

Peu de temps avant de commencer les campagnes contre la Lituanie en 1258 et l'année suivante contre la Pologne[19], Boroldaï (Bouroundaï) a pris la place de Kouremsa à la tête des armées mongoles[20]. Le motif de la substitution ne nous est pas révélé, mais il n'est pas impossible que le khan de Saraï eût été mécontent du manque d'initiative et de son attitude indécise vis-à-vis des tendances d'émancipation politique de la Russie du Sud-Ouest, qui osait faire des gestes d'insoumission[21]. Outre la campagne énergique en Pologne, lorsqu'il a prétendu être accompagné d'effectifs russes aussi, Boroldaï s'est mis en évidence par l'intransigeance avec laquelle il a imposé la destruction des fortifications des principales villes du knésat Halitch-Volhynie[22]. Dans ses actions militaires ont été probablement impliqués seulement des effectifs mongols régionaux, rassemblés rien que des territoires situés à l'ouest du Dniepr. Si les pleins pouvoirs administratifs de Boroldaï agissaient dans le même espace et étaient tout aussi grands que ceux de son prédécesseur ce serait difficile à préciser.

En revanche, durant les trois dernières décennies du XIIIe siècle, le tümen-noïan Nogaï renforce de la manière la plus ferme ses positions dans les contrées d'ouest de la Horde d'Or, qu'il avait peu à peu détachées de sous l'autorité des khans de Saraï. Entre autres, il a conduit des expéditions d'envergure dans les Balkans entre les années 1264-1265, en Lituanie en 1277 et en Hongrie en 1285[23]. Sa résidence a été fixée à Isaccea, d'où il émet une monnaie propre, dont la légende nommait sa qualité de khan indépendant[24]. Après avoir été tué dans la lutte avec les armées de Toqtaï en a.H. 699

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[18] *Ipatievskaja letopis'*, col. 806 (où les événements sont fixés de manière erronée dans l'année 6758=1250). Cf. aussi M. B. Ždan, "Do pitannja pro zaležnist' Galitz'ko-Volins'koj Rusi vid Zolotoj Ordi", *Ukrains'kij istorik*, New-York-Munich, IV, 1-2 (13-14), 1967, p. 34-35.

[19] À propos de ces expéditions, cf. R. Batura, *Lietuva tautu kovoje prieš Aukso Orda. Nuo Batu antpludžio iki mušio prie Melynuju Vandenu*, Vilnius, 1975, p. 118-144.

[20] *Ipatievskaja letopis'*, col. 846.

[21] Notre supposition s'appuie sur le fait que Daniel ne manifestait pas de crainte vis-à-vis de Kouremsa, qu'il avait même osé affronter, quelques années auparavant, de sorte qu'il préférait avoir ce dernier comme adversaire, et non pas Boroldaï. Cf. *ibidem*.

[22] *Ibidem*, col. 849.

[23] N. I. Veselovskij, *Chan iz temnikov Zolotoj Ordy. Nogaj i ego vremja (Mémoires de l'Académie de Sciences de Russie*, VIIIe série, Cl. hist. phil., XIII, 6), Petrograd, 1922; M. B. Ždan, "Do pitannja...", *Ukrains'kij istorik*, IV, 3-4 (15-16), 1967, p. 95-102.

[24] E. Oberländer-Târnoveanu, "Numismatical contributions to the history of the South-Eastern Europe at the end of the 13th century", *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, XXVI, 1987, 3, p. 245-258.

(= 28.9.1299-15.9.1300)[25], les mêmes prétentions ont été affichées également par son fils J̌ögä, mais celui-ci n'a réussi à se maintenir sur ses propres domaines que quelques mois à peine. Les frictions avec d'autres frères et la trahison de certains sujets ont considérablement diminué ses forces, de sorte qu'à l'apparition des armées commandées par Bürlük, le frère de Toqtaï, J̌ögä s'est réfugié en Bulgarie, où il a été assassiné[26]. Toqtaï a préféré d'installer dans les territoires d'ouest de la Horde d'Or son fils Tükäl Bouga, qui a établi sa résidence toujours sur la rive droite du Danube, à Isaccea[27]. Par la suppression de Nogaï et de ses fils l'unité territoriale de l'État a été rétablie et elle s'est maintenue intacte jusqu'au déclenchement des guerres civiles après la mise à l'écart du trône de Berdi-Bäg en 1359, résultats de certaines fortes tendances centrifuges.

L'intérêt des Mongols pour les régions du sud-est de la Moldavie avait deux mobiles de la plus grande importance. En premier lieu, les contrées respectives, correspondant en partie avec la steppe du Boudjac, était extrêmement appropriée à l'élevage transhumant, la zone des lacs danubiens et maritimes offrant des conditions propices pour faire hiverner les troupeaux, ce qui explique la préférence qu'on lui accordait de la part des éleveurs nomades de bétail depuis déjà la période de transition du néolithique à l'époque du bronze[28]. D'ailleurs, la détention de ces territoires — qui constituaient l'extrémité d'ouest du Dešt-i Qypčaq, occupée antérieurement par les Coumans[29] — était tout à fait légitime du point de vue des conquérants asiatiques, qui avaient soumis les tribus touraniennes.

Deuxièmement, la région méridionale de l'espace carpato-dniestrien représentait une zone stratégique d'intérêt majeur pour les velléités politiques de la Horde d'Or. Par suite à la fulminante invasion de 1241-1242, l'État des Assénides a été contraint à des prestations tributaires, dont les Mongols ne pouvaient pas bénéficier sans exercer un contrôle efficient sur les points situés au sud du Danube. D'autre part, de tels points aux vertus stratégiques étaient indispensables pour le contrôle des centres portuaires prospères des environs de l'embouchure du Danube. Comme nous avons eu déjà l'occasion de le relever, il y a plusieurs catégories de sources narratives, diplomatiques, cartographiques et numismatiques, qui certifient l'emprise et le maintien de la domination mongole dans la partie septentrionale de la Dobroudja dans la seconde moitié du XIIIe siècle et pendant les premières décennies du siècle suivant[30]. Sans être acceptés au début[31], nos arguments ont vite gagné une validation presque générale[32]. C'est pourquoi nous apparaît comme surprenante une opinion récente selon laquelle les Mongols auraient étendu leur domination sur le sud de la Moldavie à peine vers le milieu de la première moitié du XIVe siècle[33]. En réalité la Horde a pris en possession les contrées des bouches du Danube, le Boudjac y compris, aussitôt après la campagne de 1241-1242. Peu de temps après la fin de celle-ci, une lettre du roi Bela IV adressée au pape Innocent IV le 11 novembre 1250 énumérait la Bulgarie parmi les pays soumis aux Tatars[34], tandis que le franciscain flamand Guillaume de Rubrouck, qui commençait en 1253 un voyage dans l'Empire mongol, montrait que la Valachie, "qui est le pays d'Assan" (*Blakia, que est terra Assani*), la petite Bulgarie et la *Sclavonie* payent du tribut aux Tatars[35], mentionnant à la même occasion que les Vlaques (*Blaci*) et les Bulgares, ainsi que d'autres peuples, d'ailleurs, se présentaient avec des cadeaux à la cour du khan[36]. La consolidation des positions de la Horde d'Or au Bas-Danube s'est réalisée le long du temps, sans que dans l'actuel stade des recherches l'on puisse faire trop de précisions en ce sens.

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[25] *Sbornik materialov otnosjaščichsja k istorii Zolotoj Ordy*, I, éd. V. Tiesenhausen, Sanktpeterbourg, 1884, p. 114 (Baibars) et 159 (an-Nuwairi).

[26] *Ibidem*, p. 115-117 (Baibars), 160-161 (an Nuwairi) et 383-384 (Ibn Khaldun); Georgii Pachymeris *De Michaele et Andronico Paleologis*, éd. Im. Bekker, II, Bonn, 1835, p. 265.

[27] *Sbornik materialov...*, p. 117 (Baibars) et 161 (an-Nuwairi).

[28] E. V. Jarovoj, *Drevnejšie skotovodčeskie plemena Jugo-Zapada SSSR*, Chişinău, 1985; G. F. Cebotarenko, E. V. Iarovoj, N. P. Telnov, *Kurgany Budžakskoj stepi*, Chişinău, 1989.

[29] P. Diaconu, *Les Coumans au Bas-Danube aux XIe et XIIe siècles*, Bucarest, 1978, p. 35 et suiv.; O. Pritsak, "The Polovcians and Rus'", *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, II, 1982, p. 367-368.

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[30] V. Spinei, "Aspekte der politischen Verhältnisse des Gebietes zwischen Donau und Schwarzem Meer zur Zeit der Mongolenherrschaft (XIII.-XIV. Jahrhundert)", *Dacoromania. Jahrbuch für östliche Latinität*, 3, 1975-1976, p. 31-32; idem, *Moldova...*, p. 174-177 et 229-231.

[31] P. Diaconu, "Kili et l'expédition d'Umur Beg", *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, XXI, 1983, 1, p. 26; idem, "Istoria Dobrogei în unele lucrări străine recente (III)", *Revista de istorie*, 33, 1980, 2, p. 354-355.

[32] A. Ghiaţă, "Aspecte ale organizării politice în Dobrogea medievală (secolele XIII-XV)", *Revista de istorie*, 34, 1981, 10, p. 1865-1868; eadem, "Formations politiques au Bas Danube et à la Mer Noire (fin du XIIe-XVe s.)", *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, XXIV, 1986, 1, p. 42-46; E. Oberländer-Târnoveanu et I. Oberländer-Târnoveanu, "Contribuţii la studiul emisiunilor monetare şi al formaţiunilor politice din zona gurilor Dunării în secolele XIII-XIV", *Studii şi cercetări de istorie veche şi arheologie*, 32, 1981, 1, p. 99-102; E. Oberländer-Târnoveanu, *op. cit.*, p. 249-258; S. Iosipescu, *Balica, Dobrotiţă, Ioancu*, Bucarest, 1985, p. 48 et suiv.; I. G. Konovalova, "Bolgarija i Zolotaja Orda v pervoj polovine XIV v. (po dannym arabskich istočnikov)", in *Slavjane i ich sosedi. Meždunarodnye otnošenija v epochu feodalizma*, Moscou, 1989, p. 34-36; eadem, "Arabskie istočniki XII-XIV vv. po istorii Karpato-Dnestrovskich zemel'", in *Drevnejšie gosudarstva na teritorii SSSR. Materialy i issledovanija 1990 god*, Moscou, 1991, p. 92-105.

[33] T. F. Rjaboj, *Šechr-al-Džedid - zolotoordynskij gorod Dnestrovsko-Prutskogo meždureč'ja* (Avtoref. diss. na soisk. uč. step. kandid. istor. nauk), Moscou, 1993, p. 21-22.

[34] A. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*, I, Rome, 1859, p. 231; *Documente privind istoria României, C. Transilvania, veacul XI, XII şi XIII*, I, Bucarest, 1951, p. 345.

Les conceptions des Mongols sur la vie urbaine ne sont pas restées immuables le long du temps, mais, bien au contraire, ont subi une évolution structurale. Leurs traditions profondément ancrées dans un mode de vie basé sur le nomadisme équestre, dépourvus totalement de la pratique de vie en milieu citadin dans leur patrie primitive — fait déjà relevé dans la littérature des chroniques médiévales[37] — et confrontés avec des disputes incessantes avec les civilisations sédentaires, ont fait que les Mongols acquièrent une aversion ouverte pour tout ce qui tenait aux raisons d'être des ensembles urbains. Ceux-ci représentaient, d'une part, une intense attraction à cause des possibilités offertes pour les incursions pillardes, mais, d'autre part, étaient regardés avec haine, puisque leurs fortifications soulevaient des entraves devant ces incursions dévastatrices. Par le prisme de ces réalités le comportement des hordes mongoles devient explicable vis-à-vis des villes conquises lors des campagnes de Genghis Khan et de ses successeurs directs, détruites sauvagement non seulement pour des raisons de pillage, mais aussi pour l'extermination physique de l'élément humain à même d'esquisser la moindre opposition que ce soit et pour pulvériser les valeurs matérielles qui auraient été en mesure d'offrir un support quelconque pour d'hypothétiques résistances.

Une fois constitué et consolidé, l'immense Empire mongol, les confins baignés par les vagues de l'Océan Pacifique et par les eaux du Danube, il n'y avait plus de motifs pour continuer l'hostilité envers les restes des noyaux citadins. Le manque d'appétence pour la vie de facture urbaine et le conservatorisme dans le maintien de la manière de vivre traditionnelle ont déterminé les Mongols à ne pas s'impliquer eux-mêmes dans la réfection des centres dévastés, laissant cela au compte des ethnies soumises, chez lesquelles les pratiques d'une vie en milieu urbain étaient en usage depuis longtemps. Avec le temps une partie des chefs des nomades se sont rendu compte des grands gains qu'on pouvait obtenir à la suite de l'encouragement des activités artisanales et commerciales patronnées par les villes[38]. De vagues tendances de compréhension des avantages résultant de l'exploitation des sujets impliqués dans des activités sédentaires et des taxes sur le commerce avaient été signalées depuis l'époque même de Genghis Khan. Bien que ses expéditions aient paralysé temporairement le trafic sur les routes des caravanes, les initiatives pour contrebalancer de tels effets négatifs par des tentatives de cointéresser les marchands n'ont pas manqué. Les chroniqueurs contemporains racontent que, lorsque les Mongols ont étendu leur domination jusqu'aux confins du Khorezm, Genghis Khan s'est avéré généreux avec les marchands invités à sa cour, en les faisant inclure par la suite dans une mission auprès du schah Mouhammed. Leur exécution sur l'ordre de celui-ci a servi de *casus belli* avec l'imprudent schah[39]. D'autre part, alors que les chefs mongols ourdissaient l'extermination de la population d'une région du nord de la Chine, qu'ils venaient de soumettre, un influent conseiller de Genghis Khan, le Turco-Mongol sinisé Ye-liou Tchi'ou-ts'aï, leur a argumenté qu'une telle mesure serait désavantageuse, car elle frustrerait les conquérants d'importants revenus qu'on pouvait obtenir par l'imposition des marchandises et des produits agricoles[40]. Le même Ye-liou Tchi'ou-ts'aï a convaincu le grand Khan d'accepter — quoique l'idée de la sédentarité lui répugnât, parce qu'elle atténuait la vigueur guerrière des nomades — la constitution d'un centre administratif stable pour ce grand empire, qui soit connu comme un point fixe par les populations soumises qui devaient s'y présenter avec leur tribut[41]. C'est ainsi qu'a pris naissance la ville de Karakorum dans un endroit d'entrecroisement d'importantes routes commerciales. De même, au kouriltaï convoqué peu de temps après les campagnes qui ont assujetti l'Arménie, la Géorgie et l'Albanie caucasienne, l'un des commandants mongols, Č'awrman, a exprimé son avis sur l'importunité de l'extermination totale des habitants, tous en plaidant pour la clémence envers les cultivateurs, dans le but de pouvoir prélever la moitié de leur récolte[42]. De même, pendant la grande expédition contre l'État du Khorezm de 1220-1221, dans plusieurs villes conquises on a ordonné que les artisans soient épargnés, alors que les autres hommes adultes ont été massacrés, tandis que les enfants et les femmes ont été réduits en esclavage[43]. Ce traitement discriminatoire, manifesté justement dans un moment de confrontations militaires tranchantes, relève le grand prix qu'on accordait au travail des artisans, ainsi que l'intention obstinée d'user de leur habileté pour la création des biens matériels. Même si immédiatement après le partage de l'Arménie et de la Géorgie entre les chefs des envahisseurs, on avait ordonné à ceux-ci de détruire les villes et les cités — bien qu'elles eussent déjà été mises à feu et à sang—, pourtant bientôt l'optique du commandant suprême des Mongols a changé. La preuve en est que, quatre années après la conquête et la destruction de la ville de Kantzag (Gandzak), les Tatars ont imposé aux habitants des environs à la repeupler et reconstruire, à l'exception des fortifications[44]. Mais ceci n'a pas été la seule mesure de ce type de l'État ilkhanide. Mis en situation d'administrer les territoires conquis après les campagnes victorieuses du Proche Orient, culminant avec la conquête de Bagdad en 1258, son fondateur — le khan Hülägü — a pris l'initiative de la reconstruction des endroits dévastés en envoyant des artisans de l'empire dans les villages détruits[45]. C'est toujours lui qui a décidé l'élévation dans les plaines de Karni d'une ville vouée à lui servir de résidence d'été et pour ce faire il a obligé les populations assujetties à lui fournir de grandes quantités de bois de construction[46]. Dans l'État mongol voisin, celui de la Horde d'Or, Batou-khan a dirigé des projets similaires, en fondant une ville — Saraï—, qu'il a choisie comme capitale, où, pour encourager la fluence des commerçants, il leur payait des prix doubles pour leurs marchandises[47].

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[35] Guillelmus de Rubruc, *Itinerarium*, in *Sinica Franciscana, I, Itinera...*, p. 167-168.

[36] *Ibidem*, p. 209.

[37] Gregory Abû'l- Faraj (Bar Hebraeus), *The Chronography*, éd. E. A. Wallis Budge, I, Londres, 1932, p. 356.

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[38] B. Spuler, *op. cit.*, p. 264-270 et 426-434; B. D. Grecov, A. I. Iacubovschi, *Hoarda de Aur şi decăderea ei*, Bucarest, 1953, p. 132-148; V. L. Egorov, "Pričiny vozniknovenija gorodov u mongolov v XIII-XIV vv.", *Istorija SSSR*, 4, 1969, p. 39-49; G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Obščestvennyj stroj Zolotoj Ordy*, Moscou, 1973, p. 75-108; idem, *Städte der Goldenen Horde an der unteren Wolga* (Materialien zur Allgemeinen und Vergleichenden Archäologie, 11), Munich, 1984, p. 11-30.

[39] Gregory Abû'l-Faraj (Bar Hebraeus), p. 356-357; 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini, *History of the World-Conqueror*, trad. J. A. Boyle, I, Manchester, 1958, p. 78-80.

[40] R. Grousset, *L'empire des steppes. Attila. Gengis-Khan. Tamerlan*, 4e éd., Paris, 1982, p. 292 et 314-315; G. I. Brătianu, *La mer Noire. Des origines à la conquête ottomane* (Acta historica, IX), Munich, 1969, p. 193 et 197.

[41] M. Prawdin, *Genghis Khan*, trad. A. Cogniet, Paris, 1980, p. 206.

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[42] Grigor of Akanc', *History of the Nation of the Archers (the Mongols)*, éd. R. P. Blake et R. N. Frye, in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 12, 1949, 2, p. 299 et 301.

[43] Juvaini, p. 127-128, 135 et 162.

[44] Guiragos, in "Les Mongols d'après les historiens arméniens", éd. Éd. Dulaurier, in *Journal Asiatique*, Vème série, XI, 1858, 2-3, p. 215-216.

[45] Grigor of Akanc', p. 345.

[46] Guiragos, *éd. cit.*, in *Journal Asiatique*, Vème série, XI, 1858, 6, p. 506.

[47] Juvaini, p. 267.

Le changement d'attitude dans la politique économique des Mongols gagne une certaine cohérence dans les décennies ultérieures à la disparition de Genghis Khan de l'arène de l'histoire. Le fait en est tout naturel, car dans plusieurs des régions annexées par eux il y avait de longues traditions de civilisation urbaine. Une vie urbaine prospère était ébauchée avant la pénétration des Mongols dans certaines régions entrées dans les confins de la Horde d'Or du bassin du Lac d'Aral, de la Volga Moyenne et Inférieure, du Caucase, de la Crimée et du Bas-Danube également. Leur emplacement le long de quelques anciennes et importantes routes commerciales maritimes et fluviales qui suivaient les eaux de la Volga, du Danube, de la mer Noire et de la mer Caspienne, ainsi que le trajet des chemins de caravane de l'Asie Centrale a été de nature à les entretenir et à consolider leur bien-être.

Même si le commerce activé autrefois dans l'est de l'Europe surtout par les Grecs, les Varègues et les Arabes avait subi de lourds coups par l'établissement des tribus touraniennes nomades dans les steppes ponto-caspiennes après la chute du khaganat khazare, on ne l'a pas tout à fait interrompu. Il y a plusieurs informations qui attestent que les tribus des Petchénègues, des Ouzes et des Coumans aussi entretenaient des échanges commerciaux avec les Russes, les Byzantins et d'autres peuples, en vendant des esclaves, des animaux et des fourrures. D'autre part, dans les villes limitrophes à la steppe les transactions d'échange se maintenaient à des cotes élevées[48].

Les villes de la Horde d'Or ont pris naissance soit par la réfection des préexistantes, détruites pendant la grande invasion de 1236-1242, soit par l'élévation d'autres, nouvelles, la plupart des fois toujours dans les contrées où il y avait une effervescente vie urbaine et commerciale. Le processus a été plus lent dans la seconde moitié du XIIIe siècle, mais il est devenu dynamique, tout en enregistrant une plus grande extention spatiale, durant le siècle suivant. Il n'a impliqué, qu'en moindre mesure, que la population située au pôle élevé de la société de la Horde d'Or, c'est-à-dire les Mongols, se sédentarisent, eux qui s'étaient servi des représentants des communautés soumises pour la construction des villes, ainsi que pour grossir les rangs des marchands et des artisans. La structure démographique des établissements urbains était constituée de gens du pays, de groupes établis d'une façon spontanée, de leur propre initiative, mais aussi de ceux qui y avaient été colonisés de force.

La distribution du réseau urbain de la Horde d'Or était tout à fait hétérogène, les zones dans lesquelles les villes manquaient absolument ou s'y trouvaient en nombre réduit alternant avec d'autres, d'ordinaire avec des antécédents quant à la vie citadine, privilégiées donc de ce point de vue. La plupart des établissements de facture urbaine se trouvaient disposés le long des grandes artères commerciales, observation qui permet la conclusion que la raison primordiale de leur genèse et existence était liée à la qualité de centre d'échange, celle de nature artisanale et l'autre administrative et politique ayant une importance subsidiaire par rapport à la première. La sécurité assurée par les khans au trafic des marchands et des établissements citadins s'est avérée bénéfique pour leur évolution[49].

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[48] B. D. Grecov, A. I. Iacubovschi, *op. cit.*, p. 22-27; V. Spinei, *Realități etnice și politice în Moldova Meridională în secolele X-XIII. Români și turanici*, Iași, 1985, p. 133-134.

Si dans les régions centrales de la Horde, situées le long de l'avenue commerciale représentée par la Volga, les khans ont disposé de ressources pour faire élever plusieurs villes nouvelles — y compris la capitale du Vieux Saraï ("Saraï-Batu"), identifié a Selitrionnoïe, transférée bientôt au Nouveau Saraï ("Saraï-Berke"), localisé à Tzarevo[50], — en revanche, dans les contrées périphériques d'ouest de l'État, les initiatives dans cette direction se sont manifestées avec beaucoup de retard, car on préférait l'utilisation des centres préexistants. Le plus important parmi ceux-ci était situé sur la rive droite du Danube, avant le point où ses eaux se séparent pour former le Delta, à Isaccea, l'antique Noviodunum, point de passage facile de Moldavie vers la Dobroudja, choisi — comme nous l'avons déjà montré — comme résidence par Nogaï. Le riche et divers matériel archéologique et numismatique de la période de domination byzantine (XIe-XIIIe siècles) et mongole (XIIIe-XIVe siècles) découvert à Isaccea (dép. de Tulcea) — identifiée par beaucoup de médiévistes à Vicina—, font la preuve d'un flux commercial plein de vitalité[51].

N'étant pas en mesure de soutenir par des ressources propres la construction de villes dans des régions plus éloignées ou excentriques par rapport à la capitale de la Horde, les Mongols ont accepté les initiatives des commerçants italiens d'élever des établissements portuaires le long du littoral nord-pontique. On a réalisé alors le moment de conjonction de la force politico-militaire continentale des Mongols avec la vigueur économique et la versatilité dans la navigation et dans les pratiques d'échange des républiques maritimes italiennes. De la sorte l'on réitérait en grand, mais avec une toute autre distribution des rôles, la situation de l'Antiquité, lorsque les steppes ponto-caspiennes avaient abouti à être fermement contrôlées par les unions tribales des Scythes et, par la suite, des Sarmates, qui sont entrées en étroits rapports de collaboration avec les Grecs, auxquels on a concédé des zones où ils ont pu élever des cités, devenues d'actifs marchés d'échange et des centres artisanaux, avec une production orientée vers la satisfaction des nécessités des populations habitant les profondeurs du continent[52].

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[49] Cf. note 38.

[50] F. V. Ballod, *Privolžskie "Pompej"*, Moscou-Petrograd, 1923; G. A. Fedorov-Davydov et M. D. Polubojarinova, "Die Städte der Goldenen Horde", *Das Altertum*, 22, 1976, 3, p. 171-178; G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Städte...*, p. 16 et suiv.

[51] I. Barnea, "Dinogetia et Noviodunum, deux villes byzantines au Bas-Danube", *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, IX, 1971, 3, p. 343-362; idem, "Noi descoperiri la Noviodunum", *Peuce*, VI, 1977, p. 103-108; I. Barnea et Al. Barnea, "Săpăturile de salvare de la Noviodunum", *Peuce*, IX, 1984, p. 97-105; Al. Kuzev, "Prinosi kăm istorijata na srednovekovnite kreposti po Dolnija Dunav, V. Isakča (Obručitza) i Tulča", *Izvestija na Narodnija Muzej*, Varna, VII (XXII), 1971, p. 77-82; I. Vasiliu, "Cimitirul feudal-timpuriu de la Isaccea", *Peuce*, IX, 1984, p. 107-141; Gh. Mănucu-Adameşteanu, "Descoperiri mărunte de la Isaccea (sec. X-XIV)", *Peuce*, IX, 1984, p. 237-254.

Les ressources des vastes territoires limités par le bord septentrional de la mer Noire avaient retenu plus tard l'attention des Romains et des Byzantins, qui pour des périodes relativement longues ont même annexé des lopins de terre des contrées nord-pontiques. Même si la fermeture totale des Détroits pour les Occidentaux et le monopole de Byzance sur le commerce dans la mer Noire avait été promulguée, selon l'assertion de Georges I. Brătianu[53], de telles mesures ne pouvaient avoir une efficience totale. Mais, de toute façon, il nous est clair que les infiltrations des navigateurs latins au nord du Bosphore avant 1204, autant qu'elles se fussent produites, ont été en général sporadiques et inconsistantes[54]. Après la prise de Constantinople par les croisés et *partitio Imperio*, les deux États grecs ayant accès à la mer Noire, à Nycée et à Trébizonde, ne disposaient plus de la force de garder la hégémonie commerciale détenue antérieurement par Byzance, même si l'Empire de Trébizonde avait essayé d'assumer pour quelque temps une partie de l'héritage constantinopolitain de Crimée[55]. Bien qu'elle eût été le principal artisan de la constitution de l'Empire latin d'Orient et que, pendant quelques décennies, elle se fût propulsée comme force maritime majeure en Méditerranée Orientale, Venise a relativement peu fructifié ses positions privilégiées dans le bassin pontique, sans doute aussi à la suite des difficultés créées par l'instabilité et le morcellement politique dans la zone respective[56].

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[52] G. I. Brătianu, *La mer Noire...*, *passim*.

[53] Idem, *Recherches sur le commerce génois dans la mer Noire au XIIIe siècle*, Paris, 1929, p. 155; idem, *La mer Noire...*, p. 177.

[54] M. E. Martin, "The first Venetians in the Black Sea", *Archeion Pontou*, 35, 1979, p. 111 et suiv.; Ş. Papacostea, "La mer Noire: du monopole byzantin à la domination des Latins aux Détroits",*Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, XXVII, 1988, 1-2, p. 49 et suiv.; M. Balard, "Byzance et les régions septentrionales de la mer Noire (XIIIe-XVe s.)", in *XVIIIe Congrès international des études byzantines, Rapports pléniers*, Moscou, 1991, p. 233-235 (réimprimé in *Revue historique*, CCLXXXVIII, 1992, 1, p. 19-38).

[55] A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in the Crimea*, Cambridge, Mass., 1936, p. 160-170.

Une préoccupation plus obstinée de pénétrer dans la mer Noire ont manifesté les Génois. La nécessité de trouver d'autres marchés d'approvisionnement avec des marchandises exotiques s'est imposée aussi à cause de la diminution permanente des possessions des croisés sur le littoral est-méditerranéen, qui étaient d'importants avant-postes du commerce européen avec l'Orient. Mais l'attraction pour les régions ponto-caspiennes n'était pas une conséquence du recul des Occidentaux de la Terre Sainte et des territoires qui les environnaient, car l'est de l'Europe fournissait aussi d'autres produits que ceux spécifiques à l'Orient. Pour les aspirations des Génois, d'une importance écrasante s'est avéré l'acte d'arracher le traité de Nymphée à l'empereur Michel VIII le Paléologue, le souverain de Nycée, le 13 mars 1261, lorsque l'aide de la flotte ligure semblait essentielle pour reprendre le mégalopolis de la Corne d'Or aux Latins, événement qui allait se consumer quatre mois plus tard. Outre l'alliance permanente entre les Byzantins et la Commune de Gênes et la coalition contre les Vénitiens, la concession de territoires et possessions aux Génois, de certaines prérogatives dans la sphère administrative et judiciaire dans les principales villes et îles Byzantines, ainsi que d'une somme d'argent annuelle pour l'évêque de Gênes et la permission donnée aux Génois de pouvoir s'engager comme militaires dans le service des Grecs de Nycée, le traité leur accordait la libre circulation par mer et par terre, le droit de propriété et l'exemption de n'importe quels taxes et impôts commerciaux dans tous les territoires détenus à l'époque par l'Empire de Nycée, mais aussi dans ceux qui allaient être acquis. Le traité mentionnait encore que les marchands de Gênes avaient la permission d'acheter et de vendre dans l'Empire des marchandises, des aliments et des céréales sans payer des taxes, ainsi que l'interdiction de l'accès dans la mer Noire pour les marchands latins, à l'exception des Génois et des Pisains, auxquels non seulement qu'on n'imposait aucune restriction, mais, bien au contraire, on leur réitérait en l'occurrence même, l'abrogation des taxes de commerce (*Promisit iterum et convenit, quod non permittet de caetero nogotiari inter Majus mare*

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[56] F. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Age. Le développement et exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien (XIIe-XVe siècles)*, Paris, 1959, p. 91 et 100-104; idem, "Les Vénitiens en Mer Noire. Organisation et trafics (XIIIe-XVe siècles)", *Archeion Pontou*, 35, 1979, p. 38-40; M. Nystazopoulou-Pélékidis, "Venice et la mer Noire du XIe au XVe siècle", *Thesaurismata*, 7, 1970, p. 22-24; M. E. Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 116-122.

aliquem Latinum, nisi Januensem et Pisanum et eos, qui deffenderunt portum seu res Vestiarii, quibus Januensibus devetum non faciet eundi inter Majus mare et redeundi cum mercibus vel sine mercibus, sed libere possint ire et redeundi ab omni commercio et redire)[57]. La seule interdiction pour les trafiquants génois stipulait de ne pas faire passer hors du territoire de l'Empire de l'or et de l'argent, à l'exception des monnaies en or byzantines et celles des Turcs du Sultanat de Roum. Des avantages réciproques de commerce, par la suppression des taxes, étaient accordés en compensation aux marchands byzantins aussi, qui allaient descendre à Gênes[58], geste de complaisance plutôt, puisque l'on ne pouvait s'en servir qu'en moindre mesure. La stipulation précise des privilèges dans le bassin pontique, reflétant probablement l'existence antérieure des interdictions de pénétration au nord des Détroits pour les commerçants d'une autre ethnie que grecque, indique l'importance qu'on leur conférait. La générosité de Michel VIII a été enregistrée avec satisfaction dans les chroniques génoises de l'époque[59], les dirigeants de la Commune maintenant plus longtemps de bons rapports avec Byzance restaurée, même alors que les aspérités des relations avec Venise avaient diminué et que l'empereur avait élargi la levée de l'embargo commercial en mer Noire pour les Vénétiens aussi[60]. En revanche, le chroniqueur lucide qui était Georges Pachymérès, relatait avec irritation que "les Génois devinrent, par concession de l'empereur, maîtres du Pont-Euxin en bénéficiant d'une liberté totale et d'une franchise de taxes" et, par conséquent, ils traitaient avec arrogance non seulement les Vénitiens, mais aussi les Byzantins (Ῥωμαίοι)[61].

Dans les conditions où presque la moitié de l'étendue des rives pontiques se trouvaient sous le contrôle de la Horde d'Or, les fruits des concessions de Nymphée ne pouvaient pas être cueillis sans certains accords supplémentaires avec les khans mongols. Quant aux initiatives pour les faire démarrer, ainsi que leurs stipulations, nous ne disposons pas d'informations sur celles-ci. Un moment important dans l'engagement de contacts est possible s'être produit en 1269, lorsque certains émissaires, parmi lesquels des Tatars (*nunci Tartarorum*), ayant la mission de contacter plusieurs souverains européens, sont signalés à Gênes dans une chronique contemporaine: *Ipso etiam anno* [MCCLXVIIII-n.n.] *uenerunt ad ciuitatem istam* [Ianua = Gênes - n.n.] *legati soldani Babilonie et nuncii Tartarorum et imperatoris Grecorum causa loquendi cum summo pontifice et cum regibus Francorum et Sicilie, et in hac ciuitate steterunt per multos dies et postea discesserunt ad partes, sicut creditur, ad quass missi fuerant*[62]. Les rapports de beaucoup plus actifs des Occidentaux avec les Mongols de l'Iran[63] pourraient suggérer que les envoyés de 1269 auraient pu provenir, eux-aussi, toujours de là. Puisque dans la chronique on fait une délimitation entre les "émissaires du sultan de Babylone" — c'est-à-dire de l'ilkhan de l'Iran, qui était à l'époque Abaka, le fils de Hūlāgū — et "les envoyés des Tatars", on pourrait déduire que ces derniers représentaient le souverain de la Horde d'Or, Mōnghā Temūr. Selon la chronique du Vénitien Martin da Canal, seulement une année auparavant, dans la Ville des lagunes, on faisait des préparatifs dans le but d'envoyer des navires pour acheter du blé chez les Tatars et chez d'autres peuples du bassin pontique[64]. Mōnghā Temūr avait fait preuve de réceptivité dans le but de dynamiser le commerce sur le territoire de son État non seulement le long du bord pontique. Autour de l'année 1270 il a accordé aux marchands allemands de Riga le droit de faire du commerce sur le territoire de la Horde, et pour cela il a donné des dispositions aux knès russes de ne pas leur poser des entraves[65]. Exactement à la même epoque — c'est-à-dire en 1269 — a eu lieu un nouveau kouriltaï général, qui a consacré la division tranchante et irrévocable de l'Empire mongol en quatre États indépendants *de facto*[66]. Une certaine suprématie, à caractère formel cependant, paraît avoir été maintenue par le khan de *Cathay* (Chine), lequel — selon un rapport rédigé autour de l'année 1330, par l'archevêque de Soultanyekh, qui n'était autre, semble-t-il, que le dominicain Jean de Cora, — recevait des présents annuels des trois autres souverains mongols[67], signe qu'il était reconnu comme suzerain. La scission de l'État de Genghis Khan, n'a pas représenté un obstacle majeur pour le commerce à grande distance entre l'Europe, l'Asie Centrale et l'Extrême Orient, seulement les périodes de conflits militaires extérieurs et de disputes intestines étant vraiment critiques.

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[57] *Jus Graecoromanorum*, I, *Novellae et aureae bullae imperatorum post Justinianum*, éd. J. Zepos et P. Zepos, Athènes, 1931, p. 491.

[58] *Ibidem*, p. 488-495. Cf. aussi C. Manfroni, "Le relazioni fra Genova, l'impero bizantino e i Turchi", *Atti della Società Ligure di storia patria*, XXVIII, 3, 1896 (1898), p. 791-809; W. Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantenhandels im Mittelalter*, I, Stuttgart, 1879, p. 471-474; G. I. Brătianu, *Recherches sur le commerce...*, p. 81-83; D. J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 1258-1282. A Study in Byzantine-Latin Relations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, p. 86-90.

[59] *Annales Ianuenses Ann. MCCLI-MCCLXIV*, in *Annali genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori dal MCCI al MCCLXXIX*, éd. C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, IV, Rome, 1926 (Fonti per la storia d'Italia, Scrittori secolo XIII), p. 41-42.

[60] M. Nystazopoulou-Pélékidis, *op. cit.*, p. 25; J. Gill, "Venice, Genoa and Byzantium", *Byzantinische Forschungen*, X, 1985, p. 64-65.

[61] Georges Pachymérès, *Relations historiques*, II, Livres IV-VI, éd. A. Failler, trad. V. Laurent (Corpus fontium historiae Byzantinae, XXIV, 2, Series Parisiensis), Paris, 1984, p. 534-535.

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[62] Nicolai Guercii et Guillielmi de Murtedo, Enrici Droci et Bonivassalli Ususmaris *Annales Ann. MCCLXVII-MCCLXIX*, in *Annali genovesi...*, IV, p. 115.

[63] J. Richard, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient au Moyen Age (XIIIe-XVe siècles)*, Rome, 1977, p. 98 et suiv.; M. Weiers, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, in *Die Mongolen*, éd. M. Weiers, Darmstadt, 1986, p. 307-312.

[64] Martin da Canal, *Les estoires de Venise. Cronaca veneziana in lingua francese dalle origini al 1275*, ed. A. Limentani (Civiltà Veneziana, Fonti é testi, XII, Seria terza, 3), Florence, 1972, p. 324-325 et 328-329.

[65] B. Spuler, *op. cit.*, p. 403; M. G. Safargaliev, *Raspad Zolotoj Ordy*, Saransk, 1960, p. 52.

L'installation des premières enclaves génoises sur le littoral nordique de la mer Noire a eu lieu probablement pendant le règne de Mönghä Temür (1266-1280). Approximativement dans le laps de temps entre les années 1270 et 1275, sur l'emplacement de l'ancienne colonie grecque de Théodosia du sud-ouest de la Crimée, les Génois ont étayé le comptoir de Caffa[68], qui, durant deux siècles, allait être leur centre le plus fort et prospère dans le bassin pontique. Il y a des preuves que dès 1274 ils fréquentaient le grand port de Soldaïa (Sudak)[69], tandis que les registres du notaire Gabriele di Predono de Pera de 1281 relèvent leurs chiffres d'affaires extrêmement grands matérialisés à Vicina[70], d'où l'on peut déduire que leur présence sur le cours inférieur du Danube avait déjà un certain stage. Dans leur ferveur d'exploiter les grosses ressources offertes par le commerce pontique, les Génois se sont servi soit des villes portuaires préexistantes, en leur faisant regagner la prospérité, soit en fondant des établissements nouveaux, la plupart des fois sur l'emplacement des autres, abandonnés ou déchus.

Parmi les plus importants de ces derniers, il y a aussi Cetatea Albă (la Cité Blanche) située sur le bord occidental du liman du Dniestr, à quelques kilomètres seulement de l'embouchure du fleuve homonyme, là où en Antiquité s'élevait la cité grecque et, ultérieurement, romaine, Tyras. Le problème de la genèse et de l'évolution de l'établissement médiéval a suscité pas mal de controverses en historiographie à cause de l'ambiguïté de certaines sources et des confusions faites avec des localités portant des noms quasi—identiques, et qui se trouvaient dans d'autres contrées.

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[66] M. G. Safargaliev, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

[67] *The Book of the Estate of the Great Caan, set forth by the Archbishop of Soltania, circa 1330*, in H. Yule, *Cathay and the way thither*; *being a collection of medieval notices of China*, I, Londres, 1866, p. 238.

[68] M. Balard, "Gênes et la mer Noire (XIIIe-XVe siècles)", *Revue historique*, CCLXX, 1983, 1, p. 33.

[69] G. I. Brătianu, *Recherches sur Vicina et Cetatea Albă*, Bucarest, 1935, p. 101-102.

[70] Idem, *Actes des notaires génois de Péra et de Caffa de la fin du treizième siècle (1281-1290)*, Bucarest, 1927; idem, *Recherches sur Vicina...*, p. 46-50 et 147-174.

Plusieurs historiens ont considéré comme pas du tout fortuit le rapprochement qu'on peut faire entre le nom de *Asprocastron* (la Cité Blanche) et celui de la rivière *Aspros,* localisée par Constantin le Porphyrogénète entre le Dniestr (Δάναστρις) et le bras danubien Sulina (Σελινάς)[71], ainsi que celui de la cité abandonnée *Aspron,* située à l'ouest du Dniepr (Δάναπρις), aux environs du fleuve, nommée de la sorte par les Petchénègues à cause de ces murailles, faites en pierres, qui semblaient blanches[72].

De même, pour ce qui est de *Maurocastron,* mentionné dans la soi-disant notice du Toparque grec (ou gothique) — connu aussi sous la dénomination de l'Anonyme de Hase[73] — on a opiné qu'il serait identique à la cité de l'embouchure du Dniestr. De tout le texte qui a suscité tant de litiges quant à la personnalité de l'auteur, de la datation et de la localisation des événements relatés, ceci était une parmi le peu de questions où se profilait une similitude des opinions. Par malheur, le gaspillage d'énergie dans le tourbillon des controverses s'est avéré sans finalité, car l'analyse minutieuse de Ihor Sevčenko a prouvé que la "notice" publiée par le byzantinologue français C. B. Hase avait été contrefaite par celui-ci après la campagne de Napoléon Ier en Russie et n'appartient donc pas aux Xe-XIe siècles[74].

Ni "la Cité Noire" (*Maurocastron*) énumérée comme résidence métropolitaine en *Notitia episcopatuum,* incluse dans le soi-disant *Codex Coislinianus 211* — élaboré au XIIe siècle, mais transcrivant une liste du temps du règne d'Alexis Ier Comnène (1081-1118) — ne peut pas être rapporté à la ville du liman du Dniestr[75], mais, comme on l'a argumenté, à l'ancien centre russe de Tchernigov, dont le nom a un sens rapproché[76].

Des essais d'identification de Cetatea Albă ont été faits aussi avec les

[71] Konstantin Vagrjanorodnyj, *Ob upravlenii imperiej,* éd. G. G. Litavrin, A. P. Novoseltzev, Moscou, 1989, p. 50-51.

[72] *Ibidem,* p. 156-157.

[73] *Epistula Graeci cujusdam, saec. XI circa Danaprim iter facientis,* in Leonis Diaconi *Historia,* éd. C. B. Hase, Paris, 1819, p. 255.

[74] I. Ševčenko, "The Date and Author of the So-called Fragments of Toparcha Gothicus", in *Dumbarton Oaks Papers,* 25, 1971, p. 115 et suiv.

[75] E. Honigmann, "Studies in Slavic Church History", *Byzantion,* XVII (American Series, III), 1944-1945, p. 158-162.

[76] A. V. Poppe, "L'organisation diocésaine de la Russie aux XIe-XIIe siècles", *Byzantion,* XL, 1970, 1, p. 180-181.

localités *armukastru* et *akliba,* qui figuraient dans la carte élaborée en 1154 par l'arabe Idrisi en Sicile, où il se trouvait au service du roi normand Roger II. La première, *armukastru* — portant un nom qui en principe pourrait dériver de Asprocastron—, était située sur le Danube (*nahr danu*), de son côté droit, justement à l'embouchure dans la mer Noire (*bahr nitas*), ce qui fait improbable l'identification que l'on avait proposée. Quant à *akliba,* celle-ci n'est pas figurée à l'embouchure du Dniestr (*nahr dnast*), mais entre ce fleuve et le Danube, et seulement la première partie de son nom — *ak* (blanc) — ressemble à la dénomination turque de Cetatea Albă, *Akkerman.* D'ailleurs, la figuration des contours des cours d'eau et des courbes des rivages, ainsi que la dénomination des localités est extrêmement imprécise sur la carte de Idrisi[77], laissant par là le champ libre à pas mal d'ambiguïtés, ce qui fait que ses informations doivent être regardées avec la plus grande circonspection.

Des quatre textes mentionnés ci-dessus, seulement celui qu'on doit à Constantin Porphyrogénète garde une cote d'intérêt pour le sujet en discussion, bien qu'il soit quelquefois équivoque. Même si la cité Aspron (dont le nom ne conduit pas à l'idiome des Petchénègues, mais à celui des Grecs), avait été placée aux bouches du Dniestr, elle n'était plus en fonction au milieu du Xe siècle, quand l'empereur byzantin étalait ses valences d'érudit, mais avait été abandonnée, tout en laissant incertain le fait si ses ruines avaient ou non appartenu à l'ancienne Tyras. D'ailleurs, après sa destruction dans la seconde moitié du IIIe siècle, dans son périmètre on n'a identifié durant les siècles qui s'y sont succédés que des traces sporadiques d'habitation.

Quoique l'on eût entrepris à Cetatea Albă des fouilles méthodiques depuis déjà presque un siècle, en mettant à jour des surfaces assez étendues[78] (fig. 3), pas mal d'aspects de son histoire antique et médiévale n'ont pas été clarifiés, ce qui a conduit à des discordances parmi les archéologues à l'égard de l'encadrement chronologique de certaines découvertes. De la sorte, le manque de congruence avec la plupart des spécialistes les plus avisés a fait avancer l'opinion — contaminée paraît-il aussi par des considérations extra-scientifiques — que certaines couches archéologiques pourraient être datées aux XIe-XIIe siècles et appartiendraient aux populations slaves, d'ici s'ensuivant la conclusion d'une habitation relativement dense de l'établissement durant la période respective[79]. Comme l'analyse des matériaux publiés jusqu'à présent ne permet pas un tel encadrement chronologique[80], la caducité de l'opinion mentionnée est évidente.

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[77] K. Miller, *Weltkarte des Arabers Idrisi vom Jahre 1154,* Stuttgart, 1928.

[78] Un succint historique des fouilles archéologiques de Cetatea Albă chez A. A. Kravčenko, *Srednevekovyj Belgorod na Dnestre (konetz XIII-XIV v.),* Kiev, 1986, p. 4-12.

[79] L. D. Dmitrov, "Osnovni pidsumku Izmajl's'koj archeologičnoj ekspeditzij 1949-1950 rr.", *Archeologični pam'jatki URSR,* V, 1955, p. 112 et 121-122; G. G. Mezentzeva,

La plus ancienne attestation écrite certaine de Cetatea Albă — sous la forme *Malvocastro* — apparaît dans un acte rédigé à Caffa, le 8 mai 1290, dans lequel un certain Giacomo di Finale (*Jacobus de Finario*) accuse réception d'une somme d'argent à Caffa, d'où il allait partir vers le port du liman du Dniestr et ensuite pour Constantinople (*ad partes Malvocastri et deinde in Constantinopolim*)[81]. Quatre années plus tard, dans une liste de dédommagements, sollicités en 1294 par Gênes à l'administration byzantine, il y avait mention d'un navire, appartenant à Guglielmo de Berzezis et Giovanni Musso, qui se dirigeait *ad Maurocastrum* (*Gullielmus de Berzezis et Johannes Mussus de predis pro eorum ligno quod ivit ad Mauracastrum*)[82]. Le nombre des attestations écrites de Cetatea Albă, sous diverses graphies (*Mo(n)castro, Maurum Castrum, Akkerman, Belgorod, Asprocastro, Albi Castri* etc.) s'accroît grandement aux XIVe-XVe siècles, au fur et à mesure de l'augmentation de l'importance de l'établissement portuaire[83].

Le fait que la dénomination préférée par les Italiens — *Mo(n)castro* — dérive d'un toponyme grec (Μαυροκάστρον), utilisé, d'ailleurs, par eux-mêmes en une certaine mesure, suggère la fréquentation antérieure de l'établissement par les navigateurs et les marchands byzantins, lesquels peuvent avoir détenu aux bouches du Dniestr un marché saisonnier d'échange, actif seulement aux mois chauds, de sorte que leur présence avait été enregistrée dans presque tous les centres de Crimée où allaient s'établir les Génois. Après leur revigoration par la fondation de comptoirs et de forteresses, ceux-ci donnent le logement aussi aux commerçants grecs[84], aux côtés de leurs plus

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"Raskopki v Belgorod-Dnestrovskoj kreposti", in *Archeologičeskie otkrytija 1980 goda*, Moscou, 1981, p. 283-284.

[80] I. B. Klejman, "Stratigrafija kul'turnogo sloja gorodišča Tiry-Belgoroda", in *Antičnaja Tira i srednevekovyj Belgorod*, réd. princip. P. O. Karyškovskij, Kiev, 1979, p. 58-59 et 68-69.

[81] G. I. Brătianu, *Recherches sur Vicina...*, p. 102 et 176-177; M. Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, I, *Les actes de Caffa du notaire Lamberto di Sambuceto 1289-1290*, Paris-La Haye, 1973, no. 569, p. 203.

[82] *Nuova serie di documenti sulle relazioni di Genova coll'impero bizantino, racolti dal can. Angelo Sanguineti*, éd. G. Bertolotto, in *Atti della Società Ligure di storia patria*, XXVIII, 1896 (1898), p. 517.

[83] N. Iorga, *Studii istorice asupra Chiliei şi Cetăţii Albe*, Bucarest, 1899, *passim*; N. Bănescu, "Maurocastrum-Mo(n)castro-Cetatea Albă", *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secţiunii istorice*, IIIe sér., XXII, 1939-1940, p. 165-178; G. I. Brătianu, *Vicina*, II, *Nouvelles recherches sur l'histoire et la toponymie médiévales du littoral roumain de la mer Noire*, Bucarest, 1940, p. 27-35.

[84] M. Balard, *La Romanie génoise (XIIe-début du XVe siècle)*, I, Rome, 1978, p. 269

riches et entreprenants rivaux d'Italie. Leur infiltration constante dans tout le bassin pontique, y compris aux bouches du Danube, et même leur étroite coopération avec les Génois est reflétée dans différents actes du XIVe siècle. C'est ainsi que, dans les contrats rédigés par le notaire Antonio de Ponzò (Podenzolo) en 1360-1361, parmi les marchands qui déployaient leur activité à Kilia — donc très près de Cetatea Albă, et où la situation ne peut avoir été beaucoup plus différente — sont mentionnés plusieurs Grecs[85]. Selon les calculs qu'on a faits, ces mêmes années-là les Grecs disposaient à Kilia de 30% du total des navires amarrés, ayant un rôle considérable dans l'approvisionnement de Constantinople. Ils avaient adopté des techniques commerciales identiques à celles qu'employaient leurs confrères occidentaux avec lesquels ils étaient souvent associés et qui, s'étant emparé de tous les leviers du commerce, avaient imposé à chacun leur propre système économique[86]. L'élément grec des centres danubiens et pontiques avait probablement grossi à la suite des émigrations déclenchées après la conquête de Constantinople par les croisés en 1204[87]. Le long des années les Grecs s'étaient infiltrés peu à peu vers les contrées nord-danubiennes. Certaines suggestions en ce sens nous sont offertes par les analyses concernant la circulation des monnaies byzantines[88]. Comme il ressort d'un ouvrage à caractère satyrique attribué

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et suiv.; N. Oikonomidès, *Hommes d'affaires grecs et latins à Constantinople (XIIIe-XVe siècles)*, Montréal-Paris, 1979, *passim*; A. E. Laiou, "The Greek merchant of the Palaeologan period: A collective portrait", *The Proceeding of the Academy of Athens*, 1982, p. 96-124, réimprimé in eadem, *Gender, Society and Economic Life in Byzantium* (Variorum), Great Yarmouth, Norfolk, 1992, no. VIII.

[85] G. Pistarino, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia da Antonio di Ponzò (1360-61)*, Gênes, 1971, *passim*. Cf. aussi K.-P. Matschke, "Zum Charakter des byzantinischen Schwarzmeerhandels im 13. bis 15. Jahrhundert", *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig, Ges.-u. Sprachwiss. R.*, 19, 1970. 3, p. 449-450; B. Hrabak, "Transactions commerciales des habitants locaux et des étrangers à Chilia, selon les cas survenus au cours d'une année (1360-1361)", *Balcanica*, IV, 1973, p. 201-202; A. E. Laiou-Thomadakis, "The Byzantine Economy in the Mediterranean Trade System: Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 34-35, 1980-1981, p. 189 et suiv.

[86] M. Balard, "Byzance et les régions...", p. 239-240.

[87] V. Laurent, "La domination byzantine aux bouches du Danube à l'époque des premiers Paléologues", in *Revue historique du Sud-Est européen*, XXII, 1945, p. 195.

[88] O. Iliescu, "L'hyperpère byzantin au Bas-Danube du XIe au XVe siècle", in *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, VII, 1969, 1, p. 109 et suiv.; V. Spinei, *Moldova...*, p. 96-99 et 216-217. Un nombre beaucoup plus grand de monnaies byzantines des XIIIe-XIVe siècles provient de la rive du sud du Danube, en Dobroudja. Cf. E. Oberländer-Târnoveanu, "Monede bizantine din secolele XIII-XIV descoperite în Dobrogea", *Buletinul Societății Numismatice Române*, LXXV-LXXVI, 1981-1982, p. 271-313.

à Mazaris, dans la deuxième décennie du XVe siècle la Valachie était considérée dans les milieux constantinopolitains comme un pays qui offrait de consistantes possibilités pour qu'on s'enrichisse[89].

À Cetatea Albă les découvertes archéologiques correspondant aux XIIIe-XVe siècles portent une forte empreinte de la civilisation provinciale byzantine, beaucoup de leurs constructions et inventaire étant similaires à celles des autres établissements portuaires du bassin pontique et du Bas-Danube. À peu d'exceptions près, fournies par les forteresses de Crimée, même dans les centres où le poids de l'élément génois et vénitien était supérieur à celui grec, l'ambiance urbaine ne rappelle pas la spécificité du nord de l'Italie, mais, bien au contraire, celle des villes byzantines, de la culture desquelles étaient imprégnées les communautés non-grecques aussi, celles-ci contribuant par là à sa prolifération. La propagation de la civilisation byzantine dans le milieu orthodoxe ne peut pas être détachée du prestige de l'église constantinopolitaine. Une partie importante de l'inventaire céramique récupéré dans les couches médiévales de Cetatea Albă est composé de pots émaillés décorés dans la technique du *sgraffito* et du *champlevé*, les motifs ornementaux étant faits d'images géométriques, anthropomorphes, zoomorphes, végétaux (fig. 4-6) etc. Sur quelques-uns des pots on a figuré en technique *sgraffito* diverses lettres ou inscriptions abrégées grecques[90] (fig. 6/1, 4-6, 8-18). La céramique des catégories citées ci-dessus se retrouve en quantité autant dans les villes de l'Empire, que dans celles des territoires situés dans la zone de forte réverbération de la civilisation byzantine des régions pontiques et du Bas-Danube des XIIIe-XIVe siècles. Une partie de la céramique de ce type trouvée à Cetatea Albă était probablement importée, ainsi que, d'ailleurs, l'ont proposé ceux qui l'ont découverte et publiée. Mais, quant à nous, nous considérons que de tels produits, spécifiques à tout le *Commonwealth* byzantin, ont été réalisés en milieu local aussi, soit par les potiers grecs, soit par les autochtones, qui leur ont emprunté le métier[91]. En revanche, il est à peu près sûr que certaines pièces — parmi lesquelles les petites croix doubles reliquaires et simples[92] — n'étaient pas produites à Cetatea Albă, mais elles provenaient des centres byzantins. L'apport grec, ainsi que celui de l'élément local aussi, à la genèse de l'établissement portuaire du liman du Dniestr pourra être évalué avec plus de rigueur alors que les futures fouilles méthodiques intersecteront les couches médiévales les plus vieilles de cette localité.

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[89] A. Ellisen, *Analekten der mittel- und neugriechischen Literatur*, IV, *Timarion's und Mazaris' Fahreten in den Hades*, Leipzig, 1860, p. 223.

[90] Gr. Avakian, "Săpăturile de la Cetatea Albă", *Anuarul Comisiunii Monumentelor Istorice, Secţia din Basarabia*, Chişinău, III, 1931, p. 98-100 et fig. 117-123; N. Constantinescu, "Contribuţie la cunoaşterea ceramicii bizantine de la Cetatea Albă (Belgorod Dniestrovski)", *Studii şi cercetări de istorie veche*, X, 1959, 2, p. 441-446; C. Nicolescu, "La céramique émaillée de Moldavie et le Proche Orient", *Studia et acta orientalia*, VII, 1968, p. 189-190 et fig. 1, 6 et 9; V. Spinei, *Moldova...*, p. 211-212 et fig. 51-54; idem, "Restructurări etnice la nordul gurilor Dunării în secolele XIII-XIV", *Carpica*, XXIV, 1993, p. 41-42 et fig. 1-4; A. A. Kravčenko, E. S. Stoljarik, "Keramika vizantijskogo kruga iz Belgoroda XIII-XIV vv.", in *Materialy po archeologii Severnogo Pričernomor'ja*, Kiev, 1983, p. 179-190; A. A. Kravčenko, *op. cit.*, p. 102-114.

Sans pouvoir mettre en doute le rôle très consistant assumé par les Génois dans le développement de la ville, nous noterons cependant que celle-ci n'a pas gagné l'importance de ces centres comme Caffa, Soldaïa (Sudak), Balaklava (Cembalo), Vicina et Kilia, où ils disposaient d'une administration propre, dirigée par un consul, dignitaire qui n'est pas attesté dans les sources ayant trait à Cetatea Albă[93]. L'autorité suprême en ville était détenue, comme il résulte d'un écrit hagiographique sur le martyre de Saint Jean le Nouveau, par un dignitaire mongol, qu'on y désigne par le terme byzantin *iparkh* (eparkh)[94]. L'imposante forteresse rectangulaire, avec des tours circulaires aux quatre coins, du côté nord du complexe de fortifications de la ville, placée même près du liman du Dniestr (fig. 3), dans l'éventualité de son élévation par les Génois, comme on l'a supposé[95], n'a pu être édifiée que — au plus tôt possible — durant les dernières décennies du XIVe siècle, quand les forces de la Horde d'Or frisaient leur crépuscule. Si la communauté génoise avait disposé d'une telle fortification solide, réellement efficiente, avant que les voïvodes de la Moldavie eussent étendu leur autorité jusqu'aux bords de la mer Noire, il resterait inexplicable pourquoi ils n'ont pas été en mesure d'organiser un système administratif propre, semblable à celui des cités des côtes de la Crimée. Dans la première moitié du XVe siècle la forteresse rectangulaire servait sans aucun doute à l'usage des Génois, car autrement on ne pourrait pas justifier l'affirmation de Nicola da Porta de 1410, selon lequel *Mocastro* serait l'une de leurs villes "des territoires des infidèles"[96], et celle de 1445 de Jehan de Wavrin, dont les notes montrent qu'ils se trouveraient en possession d'une ville et d'une forteresse à *Moncastre*[97], dans les conditions où d'autres témoignages contemporains indiquent la domination indubitable de la Moldavie sur le port du liman du Dniestr[98].

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[91] V. Spinei, "Restructurări etnice...", p. 42.

[92] Gr. Avakian, *op. cit.*, p. 96 et fig. 109-110; V. A. Kunitzkij, "Predmety chudožestvennoj plastiki iz Belgoroda-Dnestrovskogo", in *Zemli Južnoj Rusi v IX-XIV vv.*, Kiev, 1985, p. 124-125.

[93] Tout comme N. Iorga (*Istoria poporului românesc*, éd. G. Penelea, Bucarest, 1985, p. 156), G. I. Brătianu ("Contribution à l'histoire de Cetatea Albă (Akkerman) aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles", *Académie Roumaine. Bulletin de la Section historiques*, XIII, 1927, p. 25-31) considère qu'à l'arrivée des Génois Cetatea Albă était déjà un établissement byzantin d'une certaine importance, où ils s'étaient pour le début établis dans quelques bâtiments et ils ont essayé d'obtenir la concession d'un *fondaco*. Cf. aussi M. Balard, *La Romanie...*, I, p. 147; M. M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, "G. I. Brătianu istoric al expansiunii genoveze în Marea Neagră", in *Confluențe istoriografice românești și europene. 90 de ani de la nașterea istoricului Gheorghe I. Brătianu*, réd. V. Spinei, Iași, 1988, p. 128-129.

[94] *Viața Sf. Ioan cel Nou de la Suceava*, éd. Melchisedec, in *Revista pentru istorie, arheologie și filologie*, II, 1884, III, p. 166-167.

[95] N. Murzakevič, "Akkermanskija grečeskija nadpisi", *Zapiski Odesskago obščestva istorii i drevnostej*, II, 1850, p. 480-483; A. A. Kočubinskij, "Tira (Tiras)-Belgorod-Akkerman i ego novaja lapidarna nadpis' ot 1454 goda", *ibidem*, XXIII, 1901, p. 145. Par contre, Gr. Avakian ("Cetatea Albă", *Cronica numismatică și arheologică*, IV, 1924, 11-12 (47-48), p. 79-80) conteste l'apport des Génois à la construction de la forteresse, soutenant que celle-

Même sans avoir un consul, les Génois se sont avérés très actifs à Cetatea Albă, leurs initiatives étant canalisées avec priorité dans la sphère du commerce des céréales, en premier lieu avec du blé, qui représentait, d'ailleurs, le principal article qui intéressait les marchands italiens et grecs de tout le bassin pontique, tant en Crimée qu'aux bouches du Danube[99]. Dans cet ordre d'idées, selon les actes notariaux dressés en 1360-1361 par Antonio di Ponzò, des 30 navires enregistrés à Kilia, 28 servaient au transport des céréales et seulement un pour le sel et un pour le vin[100]. Dans les transactions pour l'acquisition et le transport des céréales et du miel de Kilia ont

ci aurait été élevée par les Moldaves "probablement sur l'emplacement des anciennes fondations byzantines refaites peut-être par les Coumans".

96. Nicolai de Porta *Historia translationis reliquiarum S. Johannis Baptistae ad civitatem Januae*, in *Recueil des historiens des Croisades, Historiens occidentaux*, V, 1, Paris, 1886, p. 239.

97. Jehan de Wavrin, *Anciennes cronicques d'Angleterre*, II, éd. Dupont, Paris, 1859, p. 95; *Călători străini despre ţările române*, I, éd. M. Holban, Bucarest, 1968, p. 86.

98. N. Iorga, *Studii istorice...*, p. 60 et suiv.; I. Bogdan,"Inscripţiile de la Cetatea Albă şi stăpânirea Moldovei asupra ei", *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secţiunii istorice*, IIe sér., XXX, 1908, p. 340-351.

99. M. Balard, *La Romanie...*, II, 1978, p. 749-768; idem, "Le commerce du blé en Mer Noire (XIIIe-XVe siècles)", in *Aspetti della vita economica medievale: Atti del Convegno di Studi nel Xo Anniversario della morte di Federico Melis (Firenze-Pisa-Prato, 11-14 marzo 1984)*, Florence, 1985, p. 64-80, réimprimé in idem, *La mer Noire et la Roumanie génoise (XIIIe-XVe siècles)* (Variorum reprints), Londres, 1989, no VI.

100. R. Manolescu, "Comerţul si transportul produselor economiei agrare la Dunărea de Jos şi pe Marea Neagră în secolele XIII-XV", *Revista istorică*, SN, 1, 1990, 6, p. 554 et les annexes 1, 3 et 4, p. 557-566.

parfois été impliqués les habitants de Cetatea Albă aussi. Par exemple, un acte notarial du 5 avril 1361, rédigé à Kilia, mentionnait l'engagement de *Michael de Recha* (Michele di Recco) de *Maocastro*, copropriétaire du navire (*ciguta*) *Sanctus Nicolaus* (San Nicola), pour transporter à Constantinople 70 muids achetés par *Theodor de Maocastro* et encore 25 muids et demi par un certain *Theodor Carnavori* de la capitale de Byzance[101]. Deux jours plus tard, l'un des copropriétaires du navire, *Triandaffolo Goto, habitator Maocastri,* designait Michele di Recco comme son procurateur, les témoins étant trois autres habitants de Cetatea Albă: *Leonardo de Portu,* copropriétaire aussi, *Domenico de Sancto,* le scribe du navire, et *Iane Trapessunde* (*Ianinus de Trapessunda*)[102]. Le même *Leonardo de Portu* figure comme témoin dans un contrat notarial aussi, de Kilia, du 2 avril 1361, qui reglémentait toujours une transaction de blé[103]. De même, un habitant de Cetatea Albă, *Ioanus de Arzerono quondam Iohannis* (Giovanni), est impliqué le 28 février 1361, avec *Iacobus* (Giacomo) *de Preclario* de Gênes, dans la vente d'une importante quantité — 22 et demi de balances (*cantaria*) — de miel de Bulgarie (*cantaria viginti duo cum dimidio melis de Zagora*) *à Sarchis Erminio de Caffa,* qui résidait à Kilia[104].

Au XIVe siècle Cetatea Albă est devenue un des principaux points pour recueillir le blé du bassin pontique, étant mentionné dans cette posture (*grano da Maocastro*) — à côté de Caffa, Anchialos (*Asilo*), Varna, Bulgarie (*Zaorra*), Vicina (*Vezina*) et Sozopolis (*Sinopoli*) — dans le fameux traité de commerce dressé par le Florentin Francesco Balducci Pegolotti vers le milieu du siècle en question[105]. Par contre, dans l'énumération des centres d'acquisition des céréales de *Mare Magore,* faite dans un autre manuel de commerce florentin, composé probablement autour de l'année 1315 et gardé dans les fonds de la Bibliothèque Marucelliana[106], ceux qui étaient placés a l'embouchure du Dniestr et du Danube manquent. Si l'omission de Cetatea

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[101] G. Pistarino, *op. cit.*, no. 32, p. 52-53.

[102] *Ibidem*, no. 37, p. 59-62.

[103] *Ibidem*, no. 26, p. 42-43.

[104] *Ibidem*, no. 16, p. 24-25.

[105] Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La pratica della mercatura*, éd. A. Evans, Cambridge, Mass., 1936, p. 42.

[106] R.-H. Bautier, "Les relations économiques des Occidentaux avec les pays d'Orient au Moyen Age. Points de vue et documents", in *Sociétés et compagnies de commerce en Orient et dans l'Océan Indien: Actes du 8e Colloque international d'histoire maritime (Beyrouth, 1966)*, Paris, p. 316, réimprimé in idem, *Commerce méditerranéen et banquiers italiens au Moyen Âge* (Variorum), Great Yarmouth, Norfolk, 1992, no. IV.

Albă ne surprend pas, en revanche celle de Vicina met un point d'interrogation en ce qui concerne le bien-fondé des informations que l'auteur du manuel en question a eu à sa disposition. À propos des disponibilités agraires de la zone de Cetatea Albă allait se prononcer au XVIIIe siècle l'érudit qu'était l'Arménien Hugas Ingigian, qui précise que les environs d'Akkerman "sont très fertiles" et "donnent du bon blé en quantité"[107], ce qu'il reconfirme alors qu'il parle des territoires occupés par les Tatars du Boudjac, où l'on peut trouver cette appréciation: "La terre est en général prairie, bonne pour pâturage et fertile. Elle produit du blé de bonne qualité, de même que d'autres céréales aussi, qui sont envoyées à Constantinople"[108]. Bien que les notes de Francesco Balducci Pegolotti soient séparées de celles de Hugas Ingigian par presqu'un demi-millénaire, la situation de la région de Cetatea Albă quant à la productivité du sol et de la direction de la commercialisation du surplus de céréales ne paraît avoir changé presque pas du tout. Il n'est pas exclu que les 800 *asperi barichati* procurés à Caffa par Giacomo di Finale en mai 1290, avant de se diriger vers Cetatea Albă et Constantinople[109], aient été destinés à l'acquisition de produits céréaliers.

Si pour l'époque de l'hégémonie de la Horde d'Or les données concernant le commerce de céréales sont moins consistantes, comme d'ailleurs celles ayant trait aux transactions avec d'autres marchandises aussi, en revanche de telles informations deviennent de beaucoup plus révélatrices pour les périodes où la ville a appartenu à la Moldavie et, par la suite — après l'expédition de Bajazet II en 1484—, à l'Empire ottoman[110]. Nous guidant d'après ces informations, ainsi que d'après celles qui se sont conservées sur les échanges enregistrés dans les villes danubiennes, on peut supposer qu'au XIVe siècle aussi le contenu des transactions avec des marchandises d'exportation du grand port situé au liman du Dniestr était en grande partie le même, prédominant cependant les céréales, auxquelles s'ajoutaient différents autres produits de l'économie agraire.

La plus grande partie du blé acheté à Cetatea Albă et chez d'autres fournisseurs aussi du bassin de la mer Noire prenait le chemin de Constantinople et de Péra. Capitale avec une population exagérément grande par rapport au territoire de l'Empire, beaucoup diminuée après la restauration de 1261, Constantinople ne pouvait pas satisfaire à ses besoins de produits alimentaires en faisant appel rien qu'à ses propres domaines, c'est pourquoi elle était dépendante des ressources céréalières de la zone pontique, pour la commercialisation desquelles les Italiens ont eu un rôle toujours croissant[111]. Malgré toutes les bouffées d'orgueil des Byzantins, mécontents de l'enrichissement continuel des Génois, de l'accaparement de certaines positions privilégiées et de leurs attitudes de défi affichées avec ostentation, les conflits déclenchés par les empereurs se sont soldés avec leur défaite et humiliation, avec l'octroi de nouvelles concessions aux marchands ligures[112]. De Péra une petite partie du blé procuré était envoyé plus loin, dans la métropole de la mer de Ligurie. Gênes, ville de presque 100.000 habitants, l'une des plus peuplées du continent, satisfaisait seulement en moindre mesure au nécessaire de produits céréaliers de l'aire pontique, dont elle était assez éloignée, s'approvisionnant surtout aux greniers du bassin méditerranéen existants dans la Péninsule Ibérique, les contrées nord-africaines etc.[113].

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[107] Hugas Ingigian, *Paşalâcul din Ozu*, éd. H. Dj. Siruni ("Dobrogea şi Basarabia descrise de geografi armeni"), in *Ani*, II, 1938, IV, p. 66.

[108] *Ibidem*, in *Ani*, I, 1936, IV, p. 66.

[109] Cf. note 81.

[110] R. Manolescu, *op. cit.*, p. 555-556.

En jugeant d'après les données qui attestent l'importance du commerce avec des esclaves dans les ports de la mer Noire, ainsi que, d'ailleurs, dans le Levant tout entier, aux XIIIe-XIVe siècles, on peut estimer que l'implication de Cetatea Albă dans ce commerce datait encore avant que ville soit englobée dans les frontières de la Moldavie. Une preuve sans conteste en ce sens nous est offerte en quelques actes de septembre 1360 instrumentés par le notaire déjà mentionné Antonio di Ponzò, établi à Kilia. Dans l'un de ceux-ci on notait qu'un certain Bartholomeus de Azzano avait procuré, il y a plus longtemps, une esclave au nom de Marie d'un "Sarrasin" de Cetatea Albă (*in loco Asperi Castri*)[114]. Également, à la même époque, on enregistrait une transaction de vente d'une esclave d'origine tatare entre un Génois et un "Sarrasin" de *Maocastro*[115]. Vers une conclusion similaire mènent aussi les renvois aux transactions avec des esclaves datées aux XVe-XVIe siècles. Tout à fait significative à cet égard est l'épître du 12 décembre 1438 adressée de Constantinople par le minorite Bartolomeo da Giano à son confrère Alberto da Sarteano de Venise, d'où il résulte que *Moncastro* était, à côté de Tana et Caffa l'un des plus importants marchés de commerce avec des esclaves de la mer Noire, d'où chaque année s'écoulaient à côté de Constantinople pour jeter l'ancre au Caire, à Alexandrie, et dans d'autres ports d'Orient, 30 ou plusieurs navires chargés d'esclaves vendus par les Tatars: ... *tanta quotidie mala inferunt in Russiam, quod nullus est annus, quin triginta et plures naves Sclavis plenae Constantinopolis non veniant, qui a Tartaris venundantur ut pecora in Moncastro, in Tana et in civitate Cafae, nec hi sunt decima vel centisima par, qui capiuntur ab eis*[116]. D'une ordonnance émise en 1502, 18 années après la conquête de Cetatea Albă par les Turcs, qui reglémentait la perception des impôts, résulte explicitement l'ancienneté de la commercialisation des esclaves et l'existence de taxes spéciales à cet égard[117].

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[111] G. I. Brătianu, "La question de l'approvisionnement de Constantinople à l'époque byzantine et ottomane", *Byzantion*, V, 1929-1930, 1, p. 83-107; idem, "Nouvelles contributions à l'étude de l'approvisionnement de Constantinople sous les Paléologues et les empereurs ottomans", *Byzantion*, VI, 1931, 2, p. 641-656 (Les deux études ont été insérées in idem, *Études byzantines d'histoire économique et sociale*, Paris, 1938, p. 129-141, 157 et suiv.).

[112] Idem, *Recherches sur le commerce...*, p. 277 et suiv.; idem, *La mer Noire...*, p. 253 et suiv.; M. Balard, *La Romanie...*, I, p. 55 et suiv.; J. Gill, *op. cit.*, p. 67 et suiv.

[113] J. Heers, *Gênes au XVe siècle. Activité économique et problèmes sociaux*, Paris, 1961, p. 322-349.

[114] M. Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, II, *Actes de Kilia du notaire Antonio di Ponzo, 1360*, Paris, 1980, p. 83-86.

[115] *Ibidem*, p. 98-99.

La condamnation de ce commerce inhumain par la papauté a impressionné assez peu les Génois et les Vénitiens, lesquels se sont livrés en toute liberté à de telles affaires, qui s'avéraient assez rentables. De la missive de Bartolomeo da Giano, mentionnée ci-dessus, il résulte qu'en 1438 le prix d'un esclave à Caffa oscillait entre quatre, six et dix florins[118]. À la même époque, sur les grands marchés égyptiens, l'évaluation des esclaves, provenus dans la plupart des cas du bassin de la mer Noire et de la Péninsule Balkanique, tenait compte de leur lieu d'origine, ainsi que nous l'apprenons du traité d'un Vénitien, originaire de la Crète, rédigé entre 1420 et 1438: *tant que les plus prisiés sont les Tartres, pource que ung Tartre vauldra cent et trente on cent et quarante ducas*; *ung Charcas vouldra cent et dis ou cent et vint ducas*; *ung Grec LXXXX ducas*; *Albanois, Esclavons, Serves, de LXX jusques LXXX ducas, et plus ou moins, selon que sont les testes*[119]. La clientèle des marchés aux esclaves manifestait d'habitude une préférence pour les femmes, dont le prix était supérieur à celui qu'on offrait pour les hommes. De la sorte, le dossier du notaire vénitien Antonio Bresciano de 1350 enregistrait la commercialisation à Constantinople de 12 femmes et trois hommes, pour les femmes étant perçus en moyenne 50 hyperpères par personne, tandis que pour les hommes seulement 30 hyperpères[120]. Quelques décennies plus tard, le sandgeakbei d'Akkerman prélevait 60 aspres pour chaque esclave vendu en ville aux marchands qui arrivaient de Dešt-i Qipčaq[121].

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[116] Bartholomaei de Jano *Epistola de crudelitate Turcarum*, in *Patrologiae cursus completus, Patrologiae Graeca*, éd. J.-P. Migne, CLVII, Paris, 1866, col. 1063.

[117] N. Beldiceanu, "Kilia et Cetatea Albă à travers les documents ottomans", *Revue des études islamiques*, XXXVI, 1968, 2, p. 245-247. Le même acte de 1502 atteste le transport des arbres avec les radeaux sur la *Turla* (Dniestr) jusqu'à *Akkerman*.

[118] Bartholomaeus de Jano, col. 1063.

[119] *Traité* d'Emmanuel Piloti *sur le Passage en Terre Sainte (1420)*, éd. P.-H. Dopp (Publications de l'Université Lovanium de Léopoldville, 4), Louvain-Paris, 1958, p. 53.

Parmi les esclaves commercialisés sur les marchés méditerranéens aux XIIIe-XIVe siècles, a côtés des Tatars, des Russes, des Bulgares, des Turcs, des Sarrasins, des Circassiens, des Abkhases, des Coumans, des Alains, des Mingréliens, etc., on mentionne aussi les Valaques[122]. Parfois ils étaient achetés pour être revendus dans des endroits très éloignés des contrées natales. C'est ainsi qu'une ordonnance du pape Martin Ier de 1401 faisait des références à des esclaves valaques (*Bloschs*) arrivés jusqu'en Espagne[123]. Des sources qui mentionnent les esclaves d'origine roumaine il ne résulte pas toujours leur lieu de provenance. Plus nombreux semblent être ceux de la Péninsule Balkanique. Si jusqu'autour de l'année 1370, quand la Horde d'Or a maintenu la domination sur les territoires du sud-est de l'espace carpato-dniestrien, les esclaves "valaques" auraient pu être vendus sur le marché de Cetatea Albă aussi, après l'entrée de cette ville sous l'autorité de la Moldavie cela n'avait plus été possible, les princes régnants du pays ne pouvant pas accepter la commercialisation de leurs conationaux. On connaît la réaction tranchante de Pierre Aron, en 1455, contre les frères Senarega, les maîtres du château de Lerici à l'embouchure du Dniepr, qui avaient acheté pour 3400 ducats 14 citadins de Cetatea Albă capturés par les Tatars[124] et qui prétendaient probablement des sommes exagérées d'argent pour leur rançon, stimulant par là ces derniers à capturer d'autres prisonniers aussi dans le but de les vendre.

Il va sans dire que les principaux fournisseurs d'esclaves des marchés nord-pontiques étaient les détenteurs de la suprématie militaire en zone,

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120. A. E. Laiou, *Un notaire vénitien à Constantinople: Antonio Bresciano et le commerce international en 1350*, in *Les Italiens à Byzance*, éd. M. Balard, A. E. Laiou et C. Otten-Froux (Publications de Sorbonne, Série Byzantina-Sorbonensia, 6), Paris, 1987, p. 91-92.

121. N. Beldiceanu, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

122. A. Pippidi, *Contribuţii la studiul legilor războiului în evul mediu*, Bucureşti, 1974, p. 247 et suiv.; Ch. Verlinden, *L'esclavage dans l'Europe médiévale*, II, Gent, 1977, p. 178-187, 220-227, 302-318, 456-493, 554-663, 910-963.

123. Ch. Verlinden, "Esclavages du sud-est et de l'est européen en Espagne Orientale à la fin du Moyen Age", *Revue historique du Sud-Est européen*, XIX, 1942, 2, p. 381 et 390.

124. A. Vigna, *Codice diplomatico delle colonie tauro-liguri durante la Signoria dell'ufficio di S. Giorgio*, I (*Atti della Società Ligure di storia patria*, VI), Gênes, 1868, p. 189-190, 307-309, 355-357 et 365-366.

c'est-à-dire les Mongols. L'origine diverse des esclaves tombés aux mains des commerçants levantins — chrétiens ou musulmans — suggère qu'ils avaient l'origine dans une aire mosaïquée du point de vue de la structure ethnique. La situation ne semble pas avoir été de beaucoup plus différente face à celle enregistrée en 1659 par l'évêque catholique bulgare Philippe Stanislavov, qui montrait que les prisonniers des Tatars de Boudjac, arrivés à Ismaîl pour être vendus, provenaient de Pologne, de Lituanie, de Russie, de Prusse, de Transylvanie, de Valachie et de Moldavie (*Tartari Buciachenses hic conducunt suos captivos ex diversis provincijs Poloniae, Lituaniae, Russiae, Prussiae, Transilvaniae, Valachiae et Moldaviae*)[125].

Toujours de Cetatea Albă (*Monocastro*) on exportait du sel aussi, qui était chargé dans des navires, comme il est mentionné dans un portulan grec des XIVe-XVe siècles. L'auteur anonyme du portulan laisse l'impression avoir été bien informé, car il donne des références quant aux distances d'entre les différents ports des côtes de nord-ouest de la mer Noire et il précise le fait que *Monocastro* se trouve dans un golfe[126]. Le lieu d'extraction du sel n'est pas indiqué, celui-ci provenant soit des salines du groupe méridional des Carpates Orientales, dont la productivité — surtout en ce qui concerne les salines de la proximité de Tîrgul Trotuş — est relevée par beaucoup de sources diplomatiques[127] et narratives[128], soit des dépôts salins qu'on pouvait exploiter dans les golfes des lacs marins d'entre le Dniestr et le Danube (Sasic, Şagan, Alibei, Burnas, Budachi), séparés de la mer par un cordon de sable, comme on avait procédé avec un rendement satisfaisant au XIXe siècle, après l'annexion de la Bessarabie à l'Empire russe[129]. Les grandes quantités de sel extraites des salines situées près de Tîrgul Trotuş étaient commercialisées, selon les données enregistrées par Pierre Bogdan Bakšić (Pietro Donato) en 1641, "sur toute l'étendue de la Moldavie, en Russie, en Turquie et en d'autres pays" sur le Danube et dans la mer Noire[130]. Quant à cet aspect, Marco Bandini, qui avait parcouru une bonne partie de la Moldavie en 1646, notait: *Ex hac fodina* [*Tatros* = Trotuş - n.n.] *non soli Moldavi sale utuntur, sed in Russiam, Podoliam, Ucrajnam, Turciam et Tartariam evehitur*[131], tandis que Démètre Cantemir, dans la première partie du XVIIIe siècle, appréciait que les salines en question approvisionnaient les habitants du Boudjac, de la Crimée et des régions plus lointaines[132].

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[125] *Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium*, XVIII, *Acta Bulgariae ecclesiastica ab a. 1565 usque ad a. 1799*, éd. E. Fermendžin, Zagreb, 1887, p. 264; *Călători străini...*, V, éd. M. Holban, M. M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, P. Cernovodeanu, Bucarest, 1973, p. 618.

[126] A. Delatte, *Les portulans grecs*, Liège-Paris, 1947, p. 232. Cf. aussi P. Ş. Năsturel, "Aşezarea oraşului Vicina şi ţărmul de apus al Mării Negre în lumina unui portulan grec", *Studii şi cercetări de istorie veche*, VIII, 1957, 1-4, p. 296-297.

[127] *Documenta Romaniae Historica, A. Moldova*, III, éd. C. Cihodaru, I. Caproşu et N. Ciocan, Bucarest, 1980, no. 283 (acte de Étienne le Grand du 17 novembre 1502) et 285 (acte du 2 février 1503).

[128] *Călători străini...*, V, p. 81 (Nicolò Barsi), 248-249 (P. B. Bakšić), 275 (Paul Beke); VI, 1976, p. 463 (Evlia Celebi, éd. M. A. Mehmed); VIII, éd. M. Holban, M. M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, P. Cernovodeanu, 1983, p. 346 (E. H. Schneider von Weismantel). Cf. les notes 131 et 132, ainsi que D. Vitcu, *Istoria salinelor Moldovei în epoca modernă* (Anuarul Institutului de Istorie şi Arheologie "A. D. Xenopol" - Supplément IX), Iaşi, 1987, p. 23 et suiv.

[129] T. Porucic, *Lacurile sărate din sudul Basarabiei*, Bucarest, 1924; Gh. I. Năstase,

Même en l'absence de toute indication documentaire, il est tout à fait vraisemblable de supposer que pas mal d'autres marchandises arrivaient sur les marchés de vente et de transit de Cetatea Albă au cours des XIIIe-XIVe siècles. Mais nous disposons encore de plus nombreuses et concluantes informations pour la période ultérieure à la conquête ottomane, quand les sources attestent que par Cetatea Albă et Kilia on exportait des troncs d'arbres, des planches, des échandoles, des chevaux, du bétail, des moutons, des buffles, des cochons, du poisson, du caviar, de l'huile de foie de morue, du miel, de la cire, du sel, etc., qui étaient produits en Moldavie, à quoi on ajoutait des marchandises transylvaines, russes, polonaises, hongroises, flamandes, allemandes, etc.: des toiles, des tissus de laine, des céréales, des esclaves, des animaux, des fourrures, des objets en métal, en verre, etc. En revanche, les marchands ottomans et levantins venaient dans les deux centres avec des objets de luxe, des tissus en soie et en coton, des vins, des épices, du savon, du riz, des fruits secs, etc. L'offre habituelle de produits sur les marchés de Cetatea Albă et Kilia était extrêmement variée, prédominant les articles alimentaires[133]. Tout en connaissant les ressources et les besoins éco-

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"Industria sării marine din Bugeac", *Buletinul Societăţii Regale Române de Geografie*, LXI, 1942, p. 266-272.

[130] *Monumenta spectantia...*, XVIII, p. 95; *Călători străini...*, V, p. 248.

[131] *Codex Bandinus. Memoriu asupra scrierii lui Bandinus de la 1646*, éd. V. A. Urechia (extrait de *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secţiunii istorice*, IIe sér., XVI), Bucarest, 1895, p. LV et 37.

[132] Dimitrie Cantemir, *Descrierea Moldovei*, Bucarest, 1973, p. 102-105. À son époque, Cetatea Albă et Kilia étant conquises par les Turcs, le principal port de la Moldavie était devenu Galaţi, d'où l'on exportait, entre autres, le sel aussi (*Ibidem*, p. 74-77).

[133] T. Gemil, *Românii şi otomanii în secolele XIV-XVI*, Bucarest, 1991, p. 201-203; I. G. Chirtoagă, *Jug Dnestrovsko-Prutskogo meždureč'ja pod osmanskim vladyčestvom (1484-1595)*, Chişinău, 1992, p. 79-84. Cf. aussi N. Beldiceanu, "La conquête des cités marchandes de Kilia et de Cetatea Albă par Bayezid II", *Südost-Forschungen*, XXIII, 1964, p. 87-89.

nomiques de la Moldavie et des pays de l'Europe Orientale, Centrale et Méditerranéenne, il est à supposer que tout au moins une partie de ses marchandises ait circulé à Cetatea Albă avant le XVe siècle aussi. Par le prisme des comparaisons avec d'autres ports du littoral nord-pontique, mieux privilégiés par l'archive documentaire, on peut admettre qu'aux XIIIe-XIVe siècles un poids assez important dans le cadre des produits d'importation à Cetatea Albă était détenu par les tissus et le vin.

Une image relevante à tous les égards, malgré son caractère unilatéral, sur les marchandises importées nous est offerte par le matériau archéologique et numismatique récupéré à l'occasion des fouilles qui se sont effectuées dans la métropole du liman du Dniestr, durant environ une centaine d'années. A côté des produits céramiques (fig. 4-6) et les pièces de culte de provenance byzantine, déjà mentionnés ci-dessus[134], du périmètre urbain proviennent beaucoup de découvertes susceptibles d'être insérées dans la catégorie des importations. La plupart sont de la sphère de la poterie, dont les produits, incomparablement moins périssables que ceux qui résultent d'autres activités humaines, se sont situés partout, pour toutes les périodes historiques postérieures au néolithique, à l'épicentre de l'intérêt des archéologues. Certaines espèces céramiques de qualité supérieure, décorées avec de l'émail polychrome, présentent de proches analogies du point de vue des formes et des ornements au nord de l'Italie et même à l'Espagne, ce qui suggère la supposition que leur importation eût été faite soit directement de Gênes ou d'autres centres italiens, soit par l'intermédiaire de Caffa[135]. Un autre groupe céramique présent dans le niveau médiéval de Cetatea Albă a pas mal de traits communs avec la poterie de Crimée et des régions nord-caucasiennes, entre autres avec celle qui a été découverte à Caffa et à Chersonèse[136]. De même, d'autres espèces de pots ont leur lieu d'origine beaucoup plus loin, en Orient, en Iran, en Asie Centrale et en Chine. D'Iran proviennent les pots de Kashan, nommé ainsi d'après un célèbre centre de poterie affirmé dès le XIe siècle et caractérisé par une céramique décorée avec un émail d'aspect vitreux, avec une chromatique harmonieuse et diverse et des ornements chargés[137]. L'espèce de pots non-émaillés à motifs imprimés a, très probablement, comme lieu d'origine l'Asie Centrale, où elle était largement diffusée[138]. Pour en finir, quelques formes céramiques en pâte fine ont été importées justement de Chine[139]. Elles ont pu y parvenir soit grâce aux routes de caravane transeurasiatiques, qui traversaient l'Asie Centrale et le bassin inférieur de la Volga, soit à celles qui reliaient les régions chinoises du Proche Orient, continuées depuis les côtes est-méditerranéennes jusqu'au littoral nord-pontique et suivant la voie marine. Ces appréciations nous sont suggérées, entre autres, par les découvertes de porcelaines chinoises des périodes des dynasties Song, Yuan et Ming de Selitrinnoĭe (le Vieux Saraĭ), la première capitale de la Horde d'Or, située non loin du Delta de la Volga[140], d'Antioche, important centre des croisés, et, par la suite, des Mamelouks du nord-est de la Méditerranée[141], ainsi que de Corinthe, en Grèce[142], etc.

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[134] Cf. notes 90 et 92.

[135] A. A. Kravčenko, *op. cit.*, p. 99-102.

[136] *Ibidem*, p. 89-93.

[137] I. B. Klejman, *op. cit.*, p. 64 et 66; A. A. Kravčenko, *op. cit.*, p. 93-94.

[138] A. A. Kravčenko, *op. cit.*, p. 95-97.

Dans la même catégorie des importations s'intègrent certains produits de verrerie, lesquels, selon la technique de préparation et de décoration, est typique pour Venise[143] et pour les centres du Proche Orient, ayant des analogies surtout en Syrie[144]. Les fouilles archéologiques méthodiques des dernières décennies de Cetatea Albă ont mis au jour beaucoup d'autres pièces en métal, en verre, en corne, etc.[145], représentant des objets d'usage ménager et de parure, des armes, etc. Pour une partie d'entre elles il est difficile dans l'actuel stage des recherches de préciser si elles ont été réalisées par des artisans autochtones ou bien si elles ont été importées. Ayant en vue leur diversité, il est fort probable que quelques-unes parmi celles-ci s'intègrent dans la seconde catégorie.

Significatives pour l'orientation du commerce de Cetatea Albă aux XIIIe-XIVe siècles sont en quelque mesure aussi les découvertes monétaires, autant celles qui faisaient partie de trésors, que celles qui étaient isolées aussi. Dans la première catégorie entre un trésor trouvé en 1904 et un autre en 1970, comprenant seulement des monnaies de la Horde d'Or. Le premier avait au total 3263 pièces en cuivre, parmi lesquelles 12 émises par Tölă-Bougha en Crimée en 1287-1288, 3224 par Toqtaï en 1291 et 1297-1300 et 17 non-précisées[146]. Par le nombre impressionnant de monnaies qu'il contient, le trésor récupéré en 1904 est la plus grande découverte de ce type de Moldavie aux premiers siècles du IIe millénaire; c'est à peine le trésor d'environ 5800 monnaies moldaves en argent de la fin du XIVe siècle, trouvé à Corlăteni (dep. de Botoşani), avec des pièces mises en circulation par Pierre et Étienne Muşat[147] qui le dépasse en dimensions. Le trésor de Cetatea Albă de 1904 a appartenu probablement à un marchand, et il a été caché, ce qui s'est passé pour d'autres trésors aussi de Moldavie, par exemple ceux de Oţeleni (com. de Hoceni, dép. de Vaslui)[148] et de Prăjeşti (com. de Traian, dép. de Bacău)[149], comme suite aux désordres provoqués par les luttes pour la suprématie d'entre Toqtaï et Nogaï[150]. Du second trésor de Cetatea Albă font partie seulement 17 pièces, parmi lesquelles trois en argent frappées sous Özbäg (1313-1342), tandis que le reste de 14 sont en bronze: une de J̌ani-Bäg (1342-1357), 12 émissions locales de type Costeşti-Gârlea I et II et une non-précisée[151].

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[139] E. v. Stern, "O poslednich raskopkach v Akkermane", *Zapiski Imperatorskago Odesskago obščestva istorii i drevnostej*, XXIII, 1901, p. 40; Gr. Avakian, "Săpăturile de la Cetatea Albă...", p. 104; A. A. Kravčenko, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

[140] G. A. Fyodorov-Davydov, *The Culture of the Golden Horde Cities*, trad. H. Bartlett Wells (BAR International Series 198), Oxford, 1984, p. 126.

[141] F. O. Waagé, "The Glazed Pottery", in *Antioch on-the-Orontes*, IV, 1, *Ceramic and Islamic Coins*, éd. F. O. Waagé, Princeton-Londres-La Haye, 1948, p. 104-105.

[142] Ch. H. Morgan II, *Corinth. Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, XI, *The Byzantine Pottery*, Cambridge, Mass., 1942, p. 171.

[143] E. v. Stern, "Raskopki v Akkermane letom 1912 goda", *Zapiski Imperatorskago Odesskago obščestva istorii i drevnostej*, XXXI, 1913, p. 99.

[144] A. A. Kravčenko, *op. cit.*, p. 97-98.

[145] *Ibidem*, p. 81-87.

Pour ce qui est des monnaies isolées des XIIIe-XIVe siècles, par des fouilles archéologiques et des découvertes fortuites on a récupéré plus d'une centaine d'exemplaires, la plupart étant des émissions de la Horde d'Or, entre lesquelles prédominaient celles en cuivre, le nombre des pièces en argent étant réduit[152]. Dans les collections du Musée archéologique d'Odessa il y avait 85 monnaies mongoles isolées, provenant des fouilles entreprises dans les campagnes de 1963-1982, parmi lesquelles deux anonymes en cuivre et une en argent de la fin du XIIIe siècle, ou des premières décennies du siècle suivant, deux en cuivre et une en argent du temps d'Özbäg, 11 en cuivre de Jani-Bäg, 28 anonymes en cuivre du milieu du XIVe siècle, une du même métal de Keldi-Bäg (1361-1362), 15 anonymes en cuivre frappées à Chekhr al-Djédid, trois autres imitées d'après cette dernière, 12 de type Costeşti-Gârlea I et II et cinq en cuivre et quatre en argent non-identifiées à cause des conditions précaires de conservation. Dix autres monnaies en cuivre étaient conservées dans les collections du même musée, provenant de divers lots de Cetatea Albă et éventuellement de ses environs: cinq anonymes du temps de Jani-Bäg, une de Abd Oullakh (1361-1369), une de Mehmed Boulaq (de a.H. 770=1368-1369) et trois anonymes de type Chekhr al-Djédid. La majorité de ces monnaies ont été frappées dans les ateliers de la capitale de la Horde d'Or de Saraï (Saraï al-Djédid), quelques-unes à Crimée et 33 en Moldavie à Orheiul Vechi (Chekhr al-Djédid) et, éventuellement, à Costeşti[153].

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[146] *Otčet Imperatorskoj Archeologičeskoj Kommissii za 1904 god,* Sanktpeterbourg, 1907, p. 121; G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, "Klady džučidskich monet", *Numizmatika i epigrafika,* I, 1960, p. 132.

[147] Al. Păunescu, P. Şadurschi, V. Chirica, *Repertoriul arheologic al judeţului Botoşani,* I, Bucarest, 1976, p. 77-78.

[148] O. Iliescu, "Monede din tezaurul descoperit la Oţeleni", *Arheologia Moldovei,* II-III, 1964, p. 363-407.

[149] O. Iliescu et P. Ţarălungă, "Un tezaur monetar de la sfârşitul secolului al XIII-lea descoperit la Prăjeşti (jud. Bacău)", *Carpica,* XXIII, 1992, 2, p. 247-257.

[150] V. Spinei, *Moldova...,* p. 214.

[151] A. A. Nudelman, "Monety iz raskopok i sborov 1972-1973 gg.", in *Archeologičeskie issledovanija v Moldavii (1973 g.),* Chişinău, 1974, p. 200.

[152] Selon L. L. Polevoj ("Redkaja serija moldavskich gorodskich monet Belgoroda na Dnestre i nekotorye voprosy ego istorii XV v.", in *Numizmatičeskie issledovanija po istorii Jugo-Vostočnoj Evropy,* réd. princip. V. L. Janin, Chişinău, 1990, p. 177, note 24) des 105 monnaies isolées, récupérées à Cetatea Albă, 99 seraient en cuivre et seulement six en argent·

Les émissions monétaires d'une autre provenance, des XIIIe-XIVe siècles, sont assez rares. Jusqu'à présent nous connaissons seulement une monnaie frappée de Abou-Saïd (1316-1335), le khan de l'Empire ilkhanide[154], trois monnaies mises en circulation par les rois arméniens Héthoum Ier (1226-1270) et Héthoum II (1289-1294, 1295-1296, 1299-1305) de la Cilicie[155] et quelque-unes du prince régnant de la Moldavie Pierre Ier Muşat[156] (1376?-1391?), pendant le règne duquel Cetatea Albă était englobée dans les confins de l'État roumain de l'est des Carpates. Ayant en vue le rôle majeur des Génois et des Grecs dans le commerce de Cetatea Albă, il nous semble en quelque sorte surprenante l'absence des émissions monétaires byzantines et italiennes, celles-ci n'étant trop fréquentes ni dans d'autres localités d'entre les Carpates Orientales et le Dniestr[157]. Cette absence s'expliquerait partiellement par le fait que le sud-est de la Moldavie faisait partie intégrante du territoire de l'Empire de la Horde, où même à partir du règne de Berke s'était imposée dans le cadre des transactions commerciales la monnaie frappée par les khans, acceptée telle quelle par les commerçants italiens. Sans compter les exemplaires thésaurisés, en moindre mesure révélateurs pour la circulation monétaire courante, nous constaterons, ayant comme principal appui l'évaluation des pièces isollées connues jusqu'à présent, que d'une économie d'échange par l'emploi de la monnaie on peut parler à peine à partir le deuxième quart du XIVe siècle.

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[153] Idem, "K topografii kladov i nachodok monet, obraščavšichsja na territorii Moldavii v kontze XIII-XV vv.", *Izvestija Moldavskogo filiala Akademii Nauk SSSR,* 4(31), 1956, p. 101; G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, "Nachodki džučidskich monet", *Numizmatika i epigrafika,* IV, 1964, p. 211-212; A. A. Nudelman, "Monety iz raskopok...", p. 199; idem, "Nachodki monet epochi feodalizma iz raskopok i sborov 1974-1976 gg. v Dnestrovsko-Prutskom regione", in *Archeologičeskie issledovanija v Moldavii (1974-1976 gg.),* Chişinău, 1981, p. 183-184; S. A. Bulatovici, "Džučidskie monety iz Belgoroda-Dnestrovskogo", in A. A. Kravčenko, *op. cit.,* p. 117-120.

[154] E. v. Stern, "Raskopki...", p. 96.

[155] Gr. Avakian, "Trei monede ale regilor armeni găsite la Cetatea Albă", *Buletinul Societăţii Numismatice Române,* XIX, 1924, 49-50, p. 10-14.

[156] E. V. Stern, "Raskopki...", p. 99; P. Nicorescu, *Monede moldoveneşti bătute la Cetatea Albă,* Iaşi, 1937, p. 8.

[157] O. Iliescu, "La monnaie génoise dans les pays roumains aux XIIIe-XVe siècles",

Cetatea Albă a assumé également un rôle important dans le commerce de transit, devenant un point intermédiaire entre le bassin pontique et l'Europe Centrale et de Nord-Ouest et cela surtout grâce à sa position géographique. La vallée du Dniestr représentait une artère de circulation aisée vers la Russie de Halitch-Volhynie et la Pologne, même si seulement son cours inférieur et moyen était navigable, motif pour lequel on devait alterner le transport par eau avec celui par terre. Un premier projet de régulariser son cours paraît avoir été celui élaboré en 1568 par un Florentin, sur la demande de la royauté polonaise[158]. Dans la proximité de l'autre extrémité du Dniestr, à plus d'un millier de kilomètres vers nord-ouest, dans une zone d'où sourdent d'importants affluents de la Vistule, il y avait un autre grand centre commercial, Lwow, par lequel on faisait la liaison avec les villes de la Hanse. Une décennie avant l'annexion du knésat de Halitch-Volhynie à la Couronne polonaise, le portulan du majorcain Angelino Dulcert, dressé en 1339 — malgré son désintérêt pour les zones continentales d'Europe — notait à propos de Lwow (*civita de leo*) que c'était de là que s'en allaient les marchands vers la mer Baltique et la Flandre, jusqu'à Bruges: *ad civitatem istam vadunt mercatores, et postea vadunt per mare gothalandie ad partes fiandres specialiter in bruges*[159]. Le texte latin de Angelino Dulcert a été reproduit en traduction légèrement modifiée dans un autre ouvrage cartographique de référence, le portulan-atlas catalan de 1374-1376, attribué par certains spécialistes à Abraham Cresques, où il y a cette mention que les marchands arrivés à Lwow (*Ciutat de Leo*) de Levant repartent ensuite vers la mer de l'Allemagne, c'est-

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in *Colocviul româno-italien "Genovezii la Marea Neagră în secolele XIII-XIV", București 27-28 martie 1975,* éd. Șt. Pascu, Bucarest, 1977, p. 155-171.

[158] N. Iorga, *Acte și fragmente cu privire la istoria românilor,* I, Bucarest, 1895, p. 14; *Călători străini*..., II, éd. M. Holban, M. M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, P. Cernovodeanu, Bucarest, 1970, p. 631 (G. Ruggiero).

[159] G. I. Brătianu, *La mer Noire*..., p. 231.

à-dire vers la mer Baltique, et vers la Flandre: *En esta ciutat venan alcuns merchanders, losquals venam ves las partides de Levant per esta mar de Lamanya en Flandes*[160]. Significative pour le rôle que les milieux polonais attribuaient à la ville de Lwow dans la pénétration vers la mer Noire est l'appellation de celle-ci par le nom de *Mare Leoninum*[161], c'est-à-dire la "mer de Lwow". Ce n'est pas pour la première fois que l'aire pontique apparaît avec une appellation empruntée aux zones continentales limitrophes, qui semblait relevante pour l'importance de cet espace marin à ceux qui l'avaient lancée en circulation. Nous mentionnons, en outre, que, toujours au XIVe siècle, l'Arabe Abou'l-Fida le désignait par le nom de la mer de Crimée (*Bahr-alkirim*)[162]. Le privilège accordé le 21 août 1379 par le roi Louis Ier d'Anjou aux marchands de Pologne, reprenant certaines stipulations d'un acte similaire émis par Casimir III, mentionnait le rôle primordial de la ville de Lwow (*Lemburg*) dans le commerce qu'on faisait le long de la "route tatare" (*via Thartarica*)[163], qui supposait l'accès non seulement vers les possessions de la Horde d'Or, mais aussi vers de florissants centres italiens nord-pontiques. Pour l'ampleur du commerce de transit qu'on faisait à Cetatea Albă, révélateurs sont les témoignages de certains chroniqueurs de la Pologne du XVIe siècle, d'où il résulte que, pendant le règne du roi Casimir, le blé provenu de Podolie était envoyé par le port de l'embouchure du Dniestr jusqu'à Chypre[164]. Cette information a toutes les chances d'être correcte, étant donné qu'il y a aussi des confirmations antérieures des rapports entre la Pologne et la grande île de l'est de la Méditerranée. On sait, entre autres, que le roi Pierre Ier de Chypre, acceptant l'invitation aux noces de la nièce de Casimir III avec l'empereur Charles IV, arrivait à Cracovie en l'année 1363. La précision de la chronique de Dlugosz, selon laquelle il serait venu par *Mare Leoninum,* et ensuite par voie continentale, à travers *Walachia* (= Moldavie) et *Russia*[165], suggère le fait que son trajet avait suivi le cours du Dniestr, probablement par la route Cetatea Albă-Lwow-Cracovie. D'un autre privilège commercial —à savoir celui qu'Alexandre le Bon concédait aux marchands de Lwow le 8 octobre 1408— il résulte que l'un des points les plus importants pour leur passage de Moldavie vers "la contrée tatare" (*do tatarskoĭ storone*) était Cetatea Albă (*Belyi gorod*), où ils payaient la douane. Pour le bétail qu'ils menaient chez "les Tatars" (*do Tatar*) on percevait les droits de douane à Suceava, Iaşi et Tighina[166]. Du même acte il ressort qu'une série de soi-disant "marchandises tatares" (*tatarskyi tovar*), c'est-à-dire de différents tissus fins, du poivre, de l'encens et du vin grec (*gretzkyi kvas*) étaient procurées par les commerçants de Lwow à Suceava[167], où elles étaient peut-être apportées par les marchands grecs, moldaves ou génois.

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[160] J. A. C. Buchon et J. Tastu, "Notice d'un atlas en langue catalane", *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du roi et autres bibliothèques*, XIV, 1841, p. 79 (réimprimé in *Acta Cartographica*, XI, 1971, p. 79).

[161] Ioannis Dlugossi *Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae* [1,] *Liber primus, Liber secundus*, éd. I. Dabrowski, Varsovie, 1964, p. 87 et 110; [V,] *Liber nonus*, éd. D. Turkowska, Varsovie, 1978, p. 318.

[162] Aboulféda, *Géographie*, II, 1, trad. par M. Reinaud, Paris, 1848, p. 38-41.

[163] *Monumenta medii aevi historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia*, V, 1, *Codicis diplomatici civitatis Cracoviensis (1257-1506)*, éd. F. Piekosiński, Cracovie, 1879, p. 69-70. Cf. aussi le privilège du même roi du 11 mars 1380 (*Ibidem*, p. 72-73). In 1356, le roi Casimir III avait octroyé à la ville Lwow le droit de Magdebourg (*ius Thewtunicum, quod vulgariter Ma(g)deburgense appellatur*). Cf. *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, III, Lwów, 1872, p. 13-18.

[164] Stanislai Sarnicii *Descriptio veteris et novae Poloniae cum divisione eiusdem veteri et nova*, in Ioannis Dlugossi seu Longini *Historiae Polonicae liber XIII et ultimus*, éd. H.L.B. ab Huyssen, II, Lipsiae, 1712, col. 1890: *Fuit quodam Bialogrodum emporiam celebre et obuium nostris hominibus. Nam temporibus Cazimiri Cyprum usque demeabant naues onerariae tritico Podolico plena.* Cf. aussi P. P. Panaitescu, *Interpretări româneşti. Studii de istorie economică şi socială*, Bucarest, 1947, p. 122.

À propos d'un itinéraire en partie identique à celui esquissé, dans les portulans de 1339 et 1374-1376, prolongé de beaucoup plus vers le sud, qui reliait l'Allemagne et la Livonie avec la Terre Sainte par la mer Noire, le littoral de l'Asie Mineure, la Cilicie et la Syrie, parle Ludolf de Sudheim, originaire de Westphalie, qui voyage en Proche-Orient en 1340 et note ses impressions — insérées dans un manuscrit gardé à Dantzig — en 1348; *Qui autem per terram sicco pede sine navibus ire cupiunt de Theutonia ad Livoniam et ibi mare Ponticum et Hilesponticum ad littora Azie Minoris divertunt ad orientem et sic per Ciliciam veniunt ad Syriam, cuius provincia et Iudea*[168].

Près de Cetatea Albă et sur le cours du Dniestr passait l'une des routes principales qui reliait les knésats russes à Constantinople dans la seconde

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165. Ioannis Dlugossi *Annales....* [V,] p. 318. Cf. aussi Marcin Bielski, *Kronika polska,* I, éd. K. J. Turowski, Sanok, 1856, p. 408.

166. M. Costăchescu, *Documentele moldoveneşti înainte de Ştefan cel Mare,* II, Iaşi, 1932, p. 631 et 634.

167. *Ibidem,* p. 630 et 633.

168. Ludolphus de Sudheim, *De itinere Terre Sancte,* in *Archives de l'Orient Latin,* Paris, II, 1884, 2, p. 330. Le même Ludolf de Sudheim mentionnait aussi le trajet d'une route qui reliait par terre et par eau la Hongrie à la Terre Sainte en passant par la Bulgarie, Constantinople, le Hellespont, la Frigie et l'Asie [Mineure] (*Ibidem*). À propos de cet auteur, cf. G. A. Neumann, "Ludolphus de Sudheim, De itinere Terre Sancte. Introduction critique", *Archives de l'Orient Latin,* II, 1884, 2, p. 305-328.

moitié du XIVe siècle et la première partie du siècle suivant. Ce fait se reflète dans plusieurs écrits contemporains, où sont insérés des détails sur l'itinéraire entre les zones nordiques de la Russie et la Terre Sainte, lorsqu'on mentionne aussi —en diverses graphies— Cetatea Albă. De la sorte, dans un ouvrage de l'archimandrite Agrefenie sur un pèlerinage en Palestine, rédigé autour de 1370, qui débutait par un indicateur des distances entre les différents points inscrits sur le trajet, on spécifie qu'entre Sloučk — petite ville située sur un affluent mineur à gauche du Dniepr Supérieur — et *Belagorod* (Cetatea Albă) il y aurait 500 verstes, tandis qu'entre Belagorod et Constantinople il y aurait toujours 500 verstes[169]. Les mêmes distances entre Sloutsk (respectivement Velikij Sloutsk), *Belogorod* (respectivement *Belagrad*) et Constantinople sont mentionnées dans les notes de voyage de l'archimandrite Grethenios fait aux environs de l'année 1400[170], de même que dans celles du moine Epiphane fait autour de 1416[171]. On sait, également, du récit d'Ignace de Smolensk, que le retour plein d'aventures en Russie du métropolite Ciprian en 1389, de sa mission de l'Empire byzantin, aurait eu lieu par *Belugrad*[172], c'est-à-dire par Cetatea Albă.

Une dynamisation du trafic sur le Danube, qui n'a pas été sans réverbération sur Cetatea Albă également, s'est produite comme suite à l'extension des intérêts économiques des marchands transylvains, surtout ceux de Braşov, vers l'est[173]. Les privilèges obtenus par les habitants de Braşov le 28 juin 1358 de Louis Ier d'Anjou[174] (renouvellés de 7 mars 1395 par Sigismond de Luxembourg)[175], le 20 janvier 1368 de Vlaicu-Vladislav[176] et le 22 juin 1368 du même Louis Ier[177] étaient de nature à leur assurer des zones de libre circulation vers les bouches du Danube et le littoral ouest-pontique, où allait se produire la jonction entre le commerce génois et celui transylvain. Autant dans le cas de Lwow, que dans celui de Braşov, les principaux partenaires des Génois dans le cadre des relations d'échange étaient les marchands allemands. Les colons allemands formaient la majorité de la population des centres urbains médiévaux du sud de la Transylvanie[178], de même qu'à Lwow, où entre 1405 et 1426, par exemple, ils constituaient 82% du total des nouveaux habitants de la ville[179].

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[169] *Choždenie Archimandrit Agrefenija*, réd. archim. Leonid, in *Pravoslavnyj Palestinskij sbornik*, 48, XVI, 3, S.-Peterbourg, 1896, p. 1.

[170] *Pèlerinage de l'archimandrite Grethenios du couvent de la Sainte Vierge (vers 1400)*, in *Itinéraires russes en Orient*, trad. B. de Khitrowo, I, 1, 1889 (réimpression Osnabrück, 1966), p. 167.

[171] *Itinéraire à Jérusalem du moine Epiphane vers 1416*, in *Itinéraires russes...*, p. 195.

[172] *Choždenie Ignatija Smolnjanina*, réd. S. V. Arseniev, in *Pravoslavnyj Palestinskij sbornik*, 12, IV, 3, S.-Peterbourg, 1887, p. 11; *The "Journey to Constantinople" of Ignatius of Smolensk*, in G. P. Majeska, *Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* (Dumbarton Oaks Studies, XIX), Washington, 1984, p. 98-99.

[173] Z. P. Pach, "Le commerce du Levant et la Hongrie au Moyen Age. Thèses, polémiques, arguments", *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 31, 1976, 6, p. 1176-1194; S. Iosipescu, "Drumuri comerciale în Europa Centrală şi Sud-Estică şi însemnătatea lor politică (secolele XIV-XVI)", *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie si Arheologie* "A.D. Xenopol", XIX, 1982, p. 265 et suiv.; Ş. Papacostea, "Începuturile politicii comerciale a Ţării Româneşti şi Moldovei (secolele XIV-XVI). Drum şi stat", *Studii şi materiale de istorie medie*, X, 1983, p. 9 et suiv.

[174] *Documenta Romaniae Historica, D. Relaţii dintre Ţările Române*, I, éd. Şt. Pascu, C. Cihodaru, K. G. Gündisch, D. Mioc, V. Pervain, Bucarest, 1977, no. 39.

Se trouvant en guerre avec les Vénitiens, la pomme de discorde étant la côte de la Dalmatie, Louis Ier d'Anjou avait tout intérêt à soutenir leurs rivaux inexorables de Gênes, but dans lequel le traité militaire conclu avec ces derniers, le 16 février 1378[180], a été succédé par le généreux privilège du 24 juin 1379, où l'on stipulait le libre passage de marchandises de toutes sortes, avec des exemptions de droits de douane, sur le cours du Danube et par terre[181]. Par le fait que dans cet acte, outre les trajets d'entre le bord de la Dalmatie et Buda, on indiquait aussi une autre route, qui de Orşova jusqu'à Buda passait par Timişoara, il ressort que les Génois qui arrivaient à Orşova auraient dû y venir non pas par la mer Adriatique, mais par la mer Noire et par le Danube. Les Génois, dont la sphère d'activité se localisait dans l'aire ouest-pontique, trouvaient ainsi la possibilité de compenser les pertes produites à la suite du conflit avec Dobrotitch[182], fini à peine pendant le règne de son successeur, Ivanco, en 1387, quand on leur concédait de nombreux privilèges[183]. La voie danubienne de commerce allait gagner une importance accrue les décennies suivantes, ce qui résulte, entre autres, de l'intérêt manifesté pour le contrôle de Kilia par Sigismond de Luxembourg et Jean Corvin de Hunedoara (Hunyade)[184], de même que de l'irritation affichée par ce même Sigismond en 1429, quand, sur l'ordre d'Alexandre le Bon, un convoi de 12 navires avait été empêché de pénétrer de la mer Noire dans le Danube, étant dirigé vers son port de *Alba* (Cetatea Albă)[185].

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[175] *Ibidem*, no. 88.

[176] *Ibidem*, no. 45.

[177] *Ibidem*, no. 49.

[178] G. D. Teutsch, *Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen für das sächsische Volk*, I, 4e éd., Hermannstadt (Sibiu), 1925, *passim*; G. Gündisch, "Sächsisches Leben im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert", in *Geschichte der Deutschen auf dem Gebiete Rumäniens*, I, *12. Jahrhundert bis 1848*, réd. C. Göllner, Bucarest, 1979, p. 38-66.

[179] H. Weczerka, *Das mittelalterliche und frühneuzeitliche Deutschtum im Fürstentum Moldau von seinen Anfängen bis zu seinem Untergang (13.-18. Jahrhundert)*, Munich, 1960, p. 55.

[180] A. Lukács, "O campanie angevină necunoscută din anul 1382", *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie "A.D. Xenopol"*, XXVIII, 1991, p. 175.

[181] *Documente privind istoria României, C. Transilvania, veacul XIV*, IV, Bucarest, 1955, p. 486, dont la datation erronée — en 1349 — a été reprise aussi par C. C. Giurescu, "Les Génois au Bas-Danube aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles", in *Colocviul româno-italian...*, p. 58-60.

[182] M. M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, "Formarea despotatului lui Dobrotici",

En ce qui concerne le soi-disant *Demetrius, princeps Tartarorum* — mentionné dans le diplôme du 22 juin 1368, qui reglémentait la circulation des marchands de Braşov dans ses territoires, ainsi que celle des commerçants de Demetrius dans le royaume hongrois[186] — il nous semble peu probable qu'il ait résidé à Cetatea Albă, comme le soutiennent pas mal d'historiens[187].

Peuce, IV, 1973-1975, p. 243-246; V. Eskenasy, "Notes concernant l'histoire du littoral ouest de la Mer Noire: Dobrotitch et ses relations avec Gênes", *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, XXI, 1982, 2, p. 239-256; E. Todorova, "Otnošenijata na Dobrotitza s genueztzite", in *Srednovekovna Bălgarija i Černomorieto*, réd. Al. Kuzev, Varna, 1982, p. 111-118; eadem, "Le relazioni di Dobrotiza con i Genovesi", in *Genova e la Bulgaria nel Medioevo*, Gênes, 1984, p. 235 et suiv.

[183] *Documente privind istoria României, B. Ţara Românească, Veacul XIII, XIV şi XV*, Bucarest, 1953, p. 34-40; I. Barnea, Şt. Ştefănescu, *Din istoria Dobrogei*, III, *Bizantini, români şi bulgari la Dunărea de Jos*, Bucarest, 1971, p. 355-361.

[184] H. Heimpel, "Zur Handelspolitik Kaiser Sigismunds", *Vierteljahrschrift für Social- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, XXIII, 1930, p. 145 et suiv.; Şt. Andreescu, "Une ville disputée: Kilia pendant la première moitié du XVe siècle", *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, XXIV, 1985, 3, p. 217-230.

[185] Ş. Papacostea, "Caffa et la Moldavie face à l'expansion ottomane (1453-1484)", in *Colocviul româno-italian...*, p. 145-147; C. Cihodaru, *Alexandru cel Bun (23 aprilie 1399-1 ianuarie 1432)*, Iaşi, 1984, p. 266-267.

[186] Cf. note 177.

[187] N. Iorga, *Basarabia noastră. Studii şi documente cu privire la istoria românilor*, XXIV, Vălenii de Munte, 1912, p. 6; idem, *Histoire des Roumains et de la romanité orientale*, III, Bucarest, 1937, p. 264; P. Georgian, "Invaziile tătăreşti până la întemeierea Principatelor, II, Tătarii în Ţările Româneşti până în secolul al XV-lea", *Convorbiri literare*, 57, 1925, p. 658; I. I. Nistor, "Localizarea numelui Basarabiei în Moldova Transpruteană", *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secţiunii istorice*, IIIe sér., XXVI, 1943-1944, p. 4; G. I. Brătianu, "Demetrius, princeps Tartarorum (Ca. 1360-1380)", *Revue des études roumaines*, IX-X, 1965, p. 45-46; A. V. Boldur, "Die Herrschaft des litauischen Fürsten Jurij Korjat in der Moldau (1374-1379)", *Südost-Forschungen*, XXXII, 1973, p. 14; Ş. Papacostea, "Începuturile politicii...", p. 16, note 30. D'autres spécialistes considèrent que les domaines de Demetrius s'étendaient autant dans la région de Cetatea Albă, que dans le nord de la Dobroudja. Cf. C. C. Giurescu, D. C. Giurescu, *Istoria românilor*, 2, Bucarest, 1976, p. 283;

Bien au contraire, les données concernant l'ensemble de la situation politique du nord du Bas-Danube ne plaident pas pour la fixation des domaines de Demetrius dans la région respective, mais plutôt à droite du grand fleuve. "Le prince" qui soutenait le commerce avec les habitants de Braşov a été quasi-unanimement identifié à Démètre, l'un des trois "knès" tatars vaincus en 1362/1363 par Olgerd à Sinie Vody (Les Eaux Bleues)[188], lequel, selon les témoignages tardifs de Stanislas Sarnicki[189] et Maciej Stryjkowski[190], se serait sauvé devant l'offensive lituanienne en Dobroudja. De même, certains historiens ont avancé l'ingénieuse supposition de l'identification de Démètre avec un dignitaire de Gothie ou Théodoro-Mangoup, partant du texte d'une inscription grecque de la ville de résidence pour la seigneurie de Crimée, qui mentionne la construction en 6870 (= 1362) d'une tour "avec l'aide de Dieu et de Saint Démètre et par le soin de notre trop honorable centurion (ἑκατοντάρχης) Houïtani". Tout en appréciant comme inhabituel le rapprochement du saint combattant à côté de Dieu, on a supposé que la mention de celui-là s'expliquerait par le fait que le Tatar christianisé Houïtani aurait eu lui aussi le nom de Démètre[191]. Même dans le cas où cette supposition pourrait être prouvée par d'heureuses circonstances, resterait téméraire et risquante cette association d'entre un commandant des contrées d'ouest de la Horde d'Or et un dignitaire au service des seigneurs grecs de Théodoro-Mangoup, sur lesquels revendiquaient leur suzeraineté les empereurs de Trébizonde.

À beaucoup d'égards le cadre urbain de Cetatea Albă rappelle l'ambiance décrite par Ioannes Kameniates pour le Thessalonique du Xe siècle. Celuici évoque la vie trépidante des rues agglomérées d'une foule toujours agitée, faite d'autochtones et d'étrangers, et contaminée par la fièvre des négocia-

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C. Cihodaru, *Alexandru cel Bun...*, p. 229. En quelque sorte plus originale est l'hypothèse de la localisation de la résidence de Demetrius à Brăila. Cf. Al. I. Gonţa, *Legăturile economice dintre Moldova şi Transilvania în secolele XIII-XVII*, éd. I. Caproşu, Bucarest, 1989, p. 54.

[188] *Polnoe sobranie russkich letopisej*, XV, 1, Petrograd, 1922, p. 75 (*Rogožskij letopisetz*); XVII, S.-Peterbourg, 1907, col. 81 *(Suprasl'skij spisok)*, 99 *(Uvarovskij spisok)*, 170 *(Spisok grafa Krasinskago)*, 278 *(Spisok Archeologičeskago Obščestva)*, 327-328 *(Spisok grafa Račinskago)*, 389 *(Evreinovskij spisok)*, 453-454 *(Ol'ševskij spisok)*, 496 *(Spisok Bychovtza)*.

[189] Stanislai Sarnicii *Annales sive de origine et rebus gestis Polonorum et Litvanorum*, in Ioannis Dlugossi seu Longini *Historiae Polonicae liber XIII...*, II, 1712, col. 1134.

[190] M. Stryjkowski, *Kronika Polska, Litewska, Zmódzka i wszystkiéj Rusi*, II, Varsovie, 1846, p. 7.

[191] A. A. Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, p. 184-187; M. A. Tichanova, "Doros-Feodoro v istorii srednevekovogo Kryma", *Materialy i issledovanija po archeologii SSSR*, 34, 1953, p. 130.

tions de marchandises de la plus grande diversité. La qualité de port important assurait à la ville de réels avantages, générés par la possibilité d'exploiter les ressources agricoles du hinterland et de compléter leurs nécessités avec des produits amenés en navires. D'une manière suggestive l'auteur byzantin soulignait la complémentarité de la terre et de la mer pour offrir de la prospérité au grand établissement portuaire[192]. De même que la mer Egée au Xe siècle, la mer Noire, dynamisée par l'habileté et les aptitudes des marchands italiens, était capable, quatre siècles plus tard, de garantir des transactions importantes, devenant pour quelque temps, selon l'heureuse formule de Georges I. Brătianu[193], adoptée par beaucoup d'autres spécialistes[194], "la plaque tournante du commerce international".

Cetatea Albă et les villes de la rive danubienne du côté de la Dobroudja, même si elles étendaient leurs rayons d'influence vers la zone centrale de l'espace carpato-dniestrien aussi, ne réussissaient cependant pas à être aussi efficientes pour y suppléer à l'absence des centres urbains, de sorte que l'exploitation des ressources locales se heurtait à d'inhérentes difficultés. D'autre part, les principaux bénéficiaires des échanges commerciaux des centres portuaires danubiens et maritimes étaient les marchands originaires d'Italie et non pas les couches de l'aristocratie mongole. Ayant les moyens de constater d'une façon directe le bien-être dont respiraient les villes d'une certaine ancienneté des différentes régions de l'Empire de la Horde, tout au moins dans le cas des catégories sociales privilégiées, et d'estimer les modalités concrètes pour arrondir leurs biens, certains représentants de celles-ci, moins ankylosés par les préceptes traditionnels du nomadisme, se sont assurément senti tentés d'adopter une politique encourageant la création de centres urbains, surtout grâce au fait que le sud-est de la Moldavie avait de consistantes disponibilités de produits agricoles, qui pouvaient être mis en valeur dans les conditions où la *pax Mongolica* avait assuré un climat nondéséquilibré de confrontations militaires et de chaos pour plusieurs décennies de suite. Reste pour le moment obscur le fait si le rôle de promoteur quant à la stimulation de la vie citadine dans les provinces périphériques de l'ouest de la Horde d'Or a été assumé par les émirs locaux ou bien par les autorités centrales. De toute façon, à un certain moment de leurs démarches dans cette direction on a dû aboutir à une coopération de leur part.

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[192] Ioannes Cameniata *De excidio Thessalonicensi,* in Theophanes Continuatus, Ioannes Cameniata, Symeon Magister, Georgius Monachus, éd. Im. Bekker (Corpus scriptores historiae Byzantinae), Bonn, 1838, p. 500-501.

[193] L'appelation apparaît pour la première fois dans une étude publiée pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale ("La mer Noire, plaque tournante du trafic international à la fin du Moyen Age", *Revue historique du Sud-Est européen,* XXI, 1944, p. 36-69), qui a été insérée par la suite, avec des modifications infimes, comme un chapitre à part dans le volume *La mer Noire...,* p. 225-249.

[194] F. Braudel, *Mediterana şi lumea mediteraneană în epoca lui Filip al II-lea,* I, trad. M. Gheorghe, Bucarest, 1985, p. 205; P. Schreiner, "Kuptzy i tovary Pričernomor'ja: fragment vizantijskoj kontorskoj knigi", *Bizantino-bulgarica,* VII, 1981, p. 215; M. Balard, "Gênes et la mer Noire" ..., p. 33; Ş. Papacostea, "Începuturile politicii...", p. 52; S. Iosipescu, *Balica...,* p. 24; P. Teodor, "Gheorghe I. Brătianu şi spiritul "Analelor". Analogii, sincronisme şi convergenţe", in *Confluenţe istoriografice...,* p. 38-39; idem, "Gheorghe Brătianu, istoric al relaţiilor internaţionale", *Revista istorică,* SN, 4, 1993, 1-2, p. 34,; T. Gemil, *op. cit.,* p. 193; V. Ciocîltan, "Geneza politicii pontice a Hoardei de Aur (1261-1265)". *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie "A.D. Xenopol",* XXVIII, 1991, p. 81; R. Manolescu, "Marea Mediterană şi Marea Neagră în evul mediu", *Revista istorică,* SN, 4, 1993, 1-2, p. 50.

Malheureusement, les sources écrites ne nous fournissent pas de données sur la configuration du réseau urbain des territoires mongols d'ouest situés au-delà du bandeau du littoral pontique, et c'est exclusivement du ressort de l'archéologie la mission de tirer du cône d'ombre un tel aspect de réel intérêt. De ce point de vue les recherches archéologiques des décennies d'après-guerre ont été auréolées par des résultats de marque, quelques-uns à juste titre spectaculaires. Ayant comme point de départ les mentions de certaines découvertes plus anciennes, en partie fruits du hasard ou bien des efforts de quelques amateurs, dans la région d'entre le Pruth et le Dniestr on a réussi à identifier deux villes inconnues de la période de domination politique de la Horde d'Or à Orheiul Vechi (point situé entre les villages Butuceni et Trebujeni du rayon de Orhei)[195] et à Costeşti (rayon de Ialoveni)[196] (Rep. de Moldovie) (fig. 1), où l'on a entrepris d'amples fouilles méthodiques — et surtout dans la première de ces localités — mais, ce qui est regrettable, pas encore tout à fait valorisées.

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[195] G. D. Smirnov, "Archeologičeskie issledovanija v Starom Orchee", *Kratkie soobščenija Instituta istorii material'noj kul'tury Akademii Nauk SSSR*, 56, 1954, p. 24-39; idem, "Iz istorii Starogo Orcheja", *Izvestija Moldavskogo filiala Akademii Nauk SSSR*, 4 (70), 1960, p. 77-88; E. N. Abyzova, P. P. Bârnea, A. A. Nudelman, *Drevnosti Starogo Orcheja. Zolotoordynskij period*, Chişinău, 1981; *Archeologičeskie issledovanija v Starom Orchee*, réd. princip. P. P. Bârnea, Chişinău, 1991; T. F. Rjaboj, *op. cit.*

[196] E. A. Rikman, "Archeologičeskie raboty v 1954 g. na gorodišče u s. Kostešty", *Izvestija Moldavskogo filiala Akademii Nauk SSSR*, 5 (25), 1955, p. 95-112; L. L. Polevoj, "Gončarnaja masterskaja XIV v. iz poselenija Kostešty", *Izvestija Akademii Nauk Moldavskoj SSR*, 12, Serija obščestvennych nauk, 1965, p. 68-73; idem, "Poselenie XIV v. u s. Kostešty", *Zapiski Odesskogo archeologičeskogo obščestva*, II (35), 1967, p. 119-130; E. N. Abyzova, "Žilye postrojki poselenija XIV v. u s. Kostešty Kutuzovskogo rajona", in *Srednevekovye pamjatniki Dnestrovsko-Prutskogo meždureč'ja*, réd. princip. P. P. Bârnea, Chişinău, 1988, p. 106-111.

Orheiul Vechi était situé sur une hauteur dominante, entouré de trois parts par les méandres du Răut, à seulement quelque 20 kilomètres de sa confluence avec le Dniestr. La seule portion d'accès, étroite comme un isthme, a été prévue de deux rangées de fortifications, faites de vallum de terre à poutres et de fossés de défense, lesquelles, grâce à leur insertion stratégique dans le milieu naturel, rendaient cet établissement difficilement accessible (fig. 7, B et 8). Selon les estimations, celui-ci aurait eu une superficie d'environ 2 km carrés.

L'établissement urbain de Costeşti, situé à l'extrémité du sud des Codri, sous-unité du Plateau Central Moldave, se trouvait sur le cours moyen de la Botna, sur ses deux rives, dans une zone relativement basse à douces pentes, qui lui a permis une large extension spatiale, appréciée à plus de 4 km carrés. Dans ce cas le terrain n'offre pas de conditions de défense naturelle, ce qu'on a essayé de compenser par les deux forteresses rectangulaires en terre situées dans le voisinage, au nord et à l'est de la localité, dont on considère l'une comme avoir été contemporaine avec la ville, tandis que l'autre est datée à la fin du XIVe siècle (fig. 7, A). Faute de fouilles avec des résultats concluants, leur encadrement exact reste pour le moment incertain.

Étant élevées dans la zone centrale de la Bessarabie, sillonnée de collines majestueuses et bénéficiant aujourd'hui encore — malgré tous les défrichages irresponsables du temps de l'occupation tzariste — d'un recouvrement forestier assez dense, qui était à coup sûr plus compact dans le passé, les deux villes ne disposaient pas de voies d'accès trop aisées venant de toutes les directions. On pouvait y parvenir plus facilement seulement du sud-est, en faisant un écart de la vallée du Dniestr, le long du cours du Răut et, respectivement, de la Botna, ce qui est révélateur pour l'orientation qu'on leur avait réservée. Il nous semble significatif aussi le fait que les deux villes n'ont pas été élevées dans la zone de steppe du Boudjac, endroit traditionnel d'installation des bergers nomades touraniens et mongols, mais dans les territoires du nord, coupés de collines, à d'autres dominantes économiques et à une coloration démographique différente. Réitérant d'habitude les trajets des migrations saisonnières des Touraniens tardifs, dont les complexes funéraires parsèment les vallées des rivières du Răut et de la Botna, de même que le cours de leurs affluents secondaires[197], les Mongols ont sans doute eu l'occasion de prospecter longtemps les endroits où ils ont décidé de placer leurs établissements urbains. Dans les régions respectives un poids à part était détenu par l'élément ethnique roumain, lequel, même s'il n'avait pas dépassé le niveau de la vie rurale, était pourtant ancré d'une façon durable dans la manière de vivre d'une existence strictement sédentaire, basée sur une économie mixte agricole et pastorale.

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[197] V. Spinei, *Realităţi etnice...*, p. 123 et la carte de la fig. 5.

Le périmètre central des deux villes englobait divers édifices à destination publique et des bâtiments spacieux en pierre, à plusieurs pièces, appartenant probablement aux autorités et au patriciat urbain. Les constructions importantes étaient plus rares vers les périphéries, où prédominaient les maisons toutes simples et les huttes élevées à force de poutres, de briques en torchis, de branchages et plus rarement en pierre. Toujours là était agglomérée la plupart des ateliers artisanaux, groupés probablement selon leur domaine d'application. À l'extérieur des zones d'habitation se situaient les cimetières, où la disposition des tombes était faite selon des critères confessionnels.

Le centre de Orheiul Vechi était dominé de trois constructions monumentales: une mosquée et deux caravansérails, tous de forme rectangulaire (fig. 7, B). La première, avec une surface d'environ 3000 m^2 était munie à l'entrée d'un portail fixé par deux pylônes, d'un côté se trouvant un socle hexagonal, où l'on a vu les fondations d'un minaret[198]. Une inscription arabe ciselée en pierre, trouvée sur les ruines de la mosquée, comprend une spécification d'où il ressortirait que l'élévation de ce majestueux édifice sacral aurait été réalisé grâce aux moyens financiers d'un riche habitant de la ville: "Le pieux bienfaiteur lui a commandé d'élever cette mosquée à la gloire de Alikh... san"[199]. Les caravansérails, ayant des superficies un peu plus réduites, servaient à l'hébergement des marchands qui venaient de l'est avec les caravanes. L'effervescence des transactions de ces endroits-ci est reflétée, en outre, par le fait que l'on a dépisté à l'intérieur du périmètre du caravansérail II non moins de 114 monnaies mongoles en argent et en cuivre[200]. Près de ces édifices, sur la place de la ville, il y avait une rangée de petites maisons, utilisées probablement en tant que boutiques, ainsi qu'un atelier fait de trois pièces. Non loin de la rive du Răut on a découvert trois bains de facture orientale, construites en pierre, disposant de pièces chauffées par un système de conduites placées sous les planchers. On amenait l'eau du Răut par des conduites en céramique[201].

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[198] E. N. Abyzova, P. P. Bârnea, A. A. Nudelman, *op. cit.*, p. 9 et suiv.; P. P. Bârnea, "Kamennoe sooruženie I v Starom Orchee", in *Archeologičeskie issledovanija srednevekovych pamjatnikov v Dnestrovsko-Prutskom meždureč'e*, réd. princip. P. P. Bârnea, Chișinău, 1985, p. 24-35; T. F. Rjaboj, *op. cit.*, p. 9-10.

[199] G. D. Smirnov, "Iz istorii...", p. 80.

[200] A. A. Nudelman, "Nachodki monet...", p. 174-175.

Dans l'endroit avec la plus dense population de l'établissement citadin de Costeşti, situé vers le sud-ouest, il y avait le quartier du patriciat urbain, qui s'individualisait par quelques habitations en pierre à plusieurs pièces (fig. 7, A). Quelques-unes parmi celles-ci disposaient d'un système d'adduction de l'eau de la Botna à l'aide des tuyaux en terre cuite, reliés avec du mortier en calcaire. Dans le voisinage de ces habitations se trouvait une construction plus spacieuse, avec une superficie d'environ 30×20 m., ayant probablement une destination civique. Dans les autres quartiers de la ville, bien que les maisons en pierre ne manquassent pas, prédominaient pourtant les habitations faites en bois, en branchages et en terre glaise. Pour l'élévation de certaines maisons on a cependant utilisé autant les briques que la pierre et le bois également. D'un côté de la localité il y avait un grand nombre de fours à cuire la céramique, zone correspondant à un quartier des potiers[202].

Dans les dizaines d'habitations, d'ateliers, d'annexes domestiques, de fosses ménagères, de fours, etc. mis au jour jusqu'à présent à Orheiul Vechi et à Costeşti, on a découvert un riche inventaire constitué de céramique (fig. 10), d'objets en métal, en corne, en pierre, etc., ce qui reflète, d'une part, la diversité des marchandises sollicitées par un marché à grandes capacités d'absorption et, d'autre part, un rétrécissement de la spécialisation des branches artisanales, qui autrement n'auraient pas pu répondre aux exigences des acheteurs. Pas mal des produits réalisés dans les ateliers locaux sont sans antécédents dans les découvertes correspondant à la période prémongole de l'espace carpato-danubien, ayant en revanche des analogies frappantes dans les centres urbains de la Horde d'Or situés sur la Volga, en Crimée, en Khorezm, au nord du Caucase, etc., ce qui suggère les directions de recrutement de certaines catégories d'artisans arrivés dans les villes de Moldavie[203].

Plusieurs découvertes reflètent les connexions des villes avec les pratiques agricoles. Nous avons en vue en premier lieu les outils et les grains calcinés depistés le long des années en différents complexes d'habitation. Des premiers se détache le grand depôt de pièces agricoles en fer trouvés en 1963 à Orheiul Vechi, dans un niveau archéologique correspondant au milieu du XIVe siècle, qui englobait 68 socs (64 asymétriques et seulement 4 symétriques), 42 coutres de charrue, des manches pour les parties en bois, une petite pelle, un cadre de pelle, une serfouette, une faux et des outils pour le cultivateur[204]. De même, dans une fosse recherchée en 1983, parmi d'autres pièces on a trouvé deux socs de type asymétrique et une coutre de charrue[205]. Divers outils plus petits (serpes en fer, serfouettes en corne, etc.) proviennent autant de Orheiul Vechi que de Costeşti aussi[206]. Pour mettre en stock les céréales on employait des fosses de différentes formes et capacités[207], pratique qui remontait loin dans le passé des traditions des pays roumains[208]. L'analyse des grains carbonisés récupérés à Orheiul Vechi indique parmi ceux-ci plusieurs variétés de blé (*Triticum aestivum*; *Triticum compactum* et *Triticum spelta*) et d'orge (*Hordeum vulgare, Hordeum lagunculiforme*) et une seule espèce de seigle (*Secale segetale*), une d'avoine (*Avena sativa*), une de millet (*Panicum miliaceum*), une de sorgho (*Sorghum cernum*), auxquelles s'ajoute les petits pois (*Pisum sativum*)[209].

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[201] P. P. Bârnea, E. D. Zilivinskaja, "Bani Starogo Orcheja", in *Srednevekovye pamjatniki...*, p. 4-27.

[202] Cf. note 196.

[203] L. L. Polevoj, "Pamjatniki zolotoordynskogo vremeni (XIV v.)", in *Drevnjaja kul'tura...*, p. 155-168; L. L. Polevoj, P. P. Bârnea, *Srednevekovye pamjatniki XIV-XVII vv.* (Archeologičeskaja karta Moldavskoj SSR, 7), Chişinău, 1974, p. 13-26.

Même si nous admettons que certains habitants des villes avaient des préoccupations agricoles, ce qui se passait fréquemment dans les bourgs médiévaux de l'Europe Orientale, il est sûr que la majorité de leurs nécessités de céréales — pour leur propre consommation, ainsi que pour la vente sur des marchés plus éloignés — était fournie par les communautés rurales des environs, qui recevaient d'eux, en échange, des outils et d'autres marchandises. Ces communautés étaient constituées en tout premier lieu par les Roumains, qui formaient la majorité de la population villageoise de l'est des Carpates. Il n'y a pas, tout au moins jusqu'à présent, des preuves palpables qu'à l'est de la Moldavie se soit produite — comme on l'a soutenu il n'y a pas longtemps — en plus d'une colonisation urbaine, une autre rurale aussi, avec des agriculteurs et des bergers venus des zones ponto-caspiennes de la Horde d'Or[210]. La théorie de la colonisation des contrées boisées d'entre le Pruth et le Dniestr avec des Roumains rien qu'à peine après la mise en fuite des Mongols, à la fin du XIVe siècle et au début du suivant[211], est également sans support documentaire. Certains matériaux archéologiques et surtout les espèces céramiques archaïques moldaves, caractéristiques pour les XIIIe-XIVe siècles, découvertes autant à Orheiul Vechi[212] qu'à Costeşti[213] aussi, de même que dans certaines localités rurales de la Bessarabie[214], ignorées par une série d'archéologues de Chişinău, pour des raisons injustifiées, contreviennent aux assertions mentionnées ci-dessus.

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[204] G. D. Smirnov, "K voprosu o pašennom zemledelii v Moldavii v svjazi s nachodkoj klada sel'skochozjajstvennych orudij XIV v.", in *Tezisy dokladov i soobščenij sed'moj (Kišinevskoj) sessii simpoziuma po agrarnoj istorii Vostočnoj Evropy (oktjabr', 1964 g.)*, Chişinău, 1964, p. 42.

[205] P. P. Bârnea, "Novye materialy iz Starovo Orcheja", in *Archeologičeskie issledovanija v Starom Orchee*, p. 93-96.

[206] L. L. Polevoj, "Pamjatniki...", p. 161 et fig. 62/1,13; P. P. Bârnea, "Usad'by remeslennikov XIV v. v Starom Orchee", in *Archeologičeskie issledovanija v Moldavii (1972 g.)*, Chişinău, 1974, p. 197 et 199.

[207] P. P. Bârnea, "Usad'by remeslennikov...", p. 189 et 199-202.

[208] D. Gh. Teodor, "Descoperiri arheologice în Moldova referitoare la agricultura din secolele VI-XI e.n.", *Terra nostra*, III, 1973, p. 228-229; V. Neamţu, *La technique de la production céréalière en Valachie et en Moldavie jusqu'au XVIII siècle*, Bucarest, 1975, p. 258-261.

[209] Z. V. Januševič, P. P. Bârnea, "Iz istorii zemledelja na territorii Starogo Orcheja", in *Voprosy ekonomičeskoj istorii Moldavii epochi feodalizma i kapitalizma*, réd. princip. P. V. Sovetov, Chişinău, 1972, p. 267-276; Z. V. Januševič, *Kul'turnye rastenija jugo-zapada SSSR po paleobotaničeskim issledovanijam*, Chişinău, 1976, p. 78, 86, 95, 99-101, 117-123, 129, 130, 139, 142, 151, 165-167 et 173.

Les rapports entre les villes et les villages des alentours n'étaient pas limités aux livraisons d'outils agricoles envers les cultivateurs ruraux et à la réception en échange de produits alimentaires, mais ils s'étendaient à d'autres sphères aussi. Les marchandises de qualité supérieure réalisées par les artisans des centres citadins avaient à coup sûr un débouché constant dans les zones rurales aussi. Une pénétration d'une amplitude particulière peut être constatée dans le cas de la céramique soi-disant rouge-jaunâtre, qui était produite dans les centres mongols du nord-est de la Moldavie d'après le modèle des prototypes existants dans le bassin inférieur de la Volga et dans d'autres régions de la Horde. Grâce à ces particularités d'ordre technique, qui la rendaient supérieure à la poterie locale, l'espèce mentionnée a connu une large prolifération le long du temps, arrivant à être travaillée dans les ateliers du milieu rural aussi[215]. Durant la première moitié du XIVe siècle son aire d'utilisation s'élargit vers l'ouest jusqu'au bassin du Bârlad, qui marquait probablement la limite d'ouest des possessions administrées effectivement par les Mongols[216].

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[210] *Istoria RSS Moldoveneşti*, I, 1988, p. 328 (P. F. Parasca).

[211] P. P. Bârnea, *Orheiul Vechi. Staryj Orchej. L'Ancien Orhey*, Chişinău, 1986, p. 21. Sur les assertions de ce type, cf. I. Hîncu, Gh. Postică, "Despre greşeli evidente şi falsificări intenţionate din istoria veche a Moldovei", in *Pagini de istorie*, Chişinău, 1991, p. 7-13.

[212] L'existence d'une couche compacte antérieure au niveau correspondant à la Horde d'Or, attribuée aux "Slaves et au Volochs" et datée à la fin du XIIIe siècle et au début du siècle suivant (cf. G. D. Smirnov, "Iz istorii...", p. 79), a été contestée par certains archéologues (cf. P. P. Bârnea, "Iz istorii issledovanija Starogo Orcheja", in *Archeologičeskie issledovanija v Starom Orchee*, p. 25-29). Cependant, les collections de l'Institut d'Archéologie de Chişinău et du Musée de Orheiul Vechi contiennent, comme j'ai eu l'occasion de le constater personnellement, plusieurs fragments céramiques — pour le moment inédits — spécifiques pour les XIIIe-XIVe siècles, avec de proches analogies dans les découvertes du nord-ouest de la Moldavie.

[213] L. L. Polevoj, "Pamjatniki...", p. 167, fig. 63.

[214] A. P. Gorodenco, "K probleme issledovanija rannemoldavskoj keramiki", in *Drevnosti jugo-zapada SSSR (I-seredina II tysjačeletija n.e.)*, réd. princip. P. P. Bârnea, Chişinău, 1991, p. 256-263; Gh. Postică, "Satul medieval Petruha - argument al continuităţii românilor din Moldova", in *Procesele etnoculturale şi etnosociale la finele mileniului I î.e.n. - prima jumătate a mileniului I e.n. în sud-vestul URSS şi teritoriile limitrofe* (Tezele referatelor sesiunii a III-a a şcolii seminar, 27-29 noiembrie 1991), réd. I. Niculiţă, I. Hîncu, Chişinău, 1991, p. 66-68.

Bien que le métier du potier dans les villes de la Horde d'Or de Moldavie eût atteint des performances qualitatives notables, surtout pour ce qui est de la céramique émaillée (fig. 10/1), certaines catégories de pots en terre cuite étaient apportées d'autres zones. Il est à remarquer en ce sens le cas de la céramique de type Kashan, qui à Orheiul Vechi recouvre 12,5% du total de la catégorie couverte d'émail[217] (fig. 10/2-4).

Hormis les pots, dans les centres urbains du sud-est de la Moldavie on importait sans aucun doute d'autres produits aussi. Parmi ceux-ci nous mentionnons un cadenas à aspect zoomorphe et une assiette en cuivre ayant divers ornements gravés et une inscription en arabe, qui reproduit les mots: "vie-pouvoir-succès", les deux avec des analogies dans les régions centrales et orientales de l'Empire de la Horde[218].

Sur le territoire de Orheiul Vechi et de Costeşti on constate une circulation monétaire assez active. Jusqu'à présent, de la première localité proviennent presqu'un millier de monnaies, tandis que de la seconde plus d'une centaine. Ce décalage numérique ne reflète pas des différences d'ordre économique ou d'une autre nature, mais elles sont dues purement et simplement à l'intensité fluctuante avec laquelle ont été effectuées les recherches archéologiques dans les deux centres. Conformément aux pourcentages calculés dans le dernier en date des ouvrages de synthèse concernant la numismatique des regions prutho-dniestriennes depuis l'Antiquité jusqu'à la formation de l'État moldave, publié par Avraam A. Nudelman en 1985, des 4539 monnaies de la Horde, 74,09% proviennent de trésors et seulement 25,93% proviennent de découvertes isolées, qui totalisaient alors 1177 pièces. Pendant que dans la première categorie 99,43% du total des monnaies sont des pièces en argent, dans la seconde le rapport est tout à fait inversé: 91,25% exemplaires sont en cuivre et seulement 8,75% en argent. La plupart des monnaies isolées — 78% — de l'espace prutho-dniestrien ont été découvertes à Orheiul Vechi, le reste provenant de Costeşti (9,09%), Cetatea Albă (7,9%), de localités rurales (4,92%) et de points non-précisés (0,8)[219].

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[215] L. L. Polevoj, *Gorodoskoe gončarstvo Pruto-Dnestrov'ja v XIV v.*, Chişinău, 1969, p. 108-113; L. L. Polevoj, P. P. Bârnea, *op. cit.*, p. 5-42; V. Spinei, *Moldova...*, p. 209-211.

[216] V. Spinei, "Începuturile vieţii urbane la Bârlad şi problema berladnicilor", *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie şi Arheologie "A.D. Xenopol"*, XVI, 1979, p. 283-287.

[217] E. N. Abyzova, P. P. Bârnea, A. A. Nudelman, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[218] P. P. Bârnea, *Orheiul Vechi...*, p. 20.

Selon la micromonographie sur les recherches du niveau correspondant à la période de la Horde d'Or de Orheiul Vechi, parue en 1981, dans l'établissement du Răut on a identifié un nombre de 926 monnaies du XIVe siècle, dont 918 sont des émissions des Mongols (fig. 11) (99,14% du total), à côté desquelles on a encore signalé sept monnaies européennes (trois du XIVe siècle et quatre d'une période à la charnière des XIVe-XVe siècles) et une indienne. Les plus anciennes entre celles-ci sont deux pièces anonymes en cuivre, sans indications sur l'endroit et l'année de leur frappe, supposées avoir été émises entre les années 1280-1310, correspondant aux règnes de Tõda-Mönghã, Tõlã-Bougha et Toqtaï. Il s'ensuit une émission certaine de Toqtaï de a.H. 710 (= 1310-1311) et 11 dirhèmes frappés sous Özbäg (1313-1342), pour la plupart dans ses premières années de gouvernement. Le nombre des monnaies connaît un accroissement explosif pendant le règne de J̆ani-Bäg (1342-1357), lorsqu'on a émis 193 pièces. Toujours du temps où il se trouvait sur le trône de la Horde d'Or, ainsi que des années où les freins du pouvoir sont revenus à son successeur, Berdi-Bäg (1357-1359), il y a non moins de 351 émissions anonymes en cuivre. Des khans qui lui ont suivi proviennent, de même, plusieurs exemplaires: Berdi-Bäg (six), Hizyr (1360-1361) (neuf), Keldi-Bäg, (1361-1362) (19), Aziz-Cheikh (1364-1367) (un) et Abd Oullakh (1361-1369) (18), ayant comme indication du lieu de frappe, ainsi que celles de Toqtaï, Özbäg et J̆ani-Bäg, plusieurs centres, quelques-uns de ceux-ci apparaissant même avec des dénominations différentes: Saraí, Saraï al-Makhrousa, Saraï al-Djédid, Krym, Goulistan, Azak, Barğin. À ces exemplaires s'ajoutent quel-

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219. A. A. Nudelman, *Očerki istorii monetnogo obraščenija v Dnestrovsko-Prutskom regione (s drevnejšich vremen do obrazovanija feodal'nogo Moldavskogo gosudarstva)*, Chişinău, 1985, p. 100 (où, malgré le titre de l'ouvrage, on a en vue — y compris pour la détermination des pourcentages — également le matériel numismatique ramassé dans les contrées transdniestriennes de la République. Moldave).

ques monnaies anonymes en argent, frappées à Ianghi-Chekhr en a.H. 765 (un exemplaire) et à Chekhr al-Djédid en a.H. 767 (deux) et 769 (deux), et un gros lot de pièces en cuivre — en nombre de 252 — toujours anonymes, sans l'indication de l'année d'émission, mais seulement celle du centre de monnayage de Chekhr al-Djédid. Un nombre de trois monnaies en argent et 48 en cuivre sont restées non-identifiées, ayant la légende effacée ou étant fragmentaires[220]. Des 918 monnaies, 855 sont en cuivre et 63 en argent, ce qui représente 93,14% et, respectivement, 6,86% du total, pourcentage rapproché de celui qu'on avait calculé pour les pièces isolées de tout le territoire prutho-dniestrien[221]. Les plus tardives pièces du lot énuméré ci-dessus sont les monnaies anonymes en argent émises à Chekhr al-Djédid en a.H. 769 (= 1367-1368).

Pour ce qui est des monnaies d'autre origine identifiées à Orheiul Vechi, elles ont été frappées par le sultan Muhammad Chakh Ier ibn Toughlouk à Delhi en a.H. 752 (= 1351-1352) (un exemplaire en or), par le roi tchèque Jean Ier de Luxembourg (1310-1346) (un groschen) et par le roi polonais Casimir III (1333-1370) (deux deniers pour la Russie Rouge, donc ultérieurement à l'année 1349)[222]. À la différence des groschen de Bohême (*grossi Boemicales*) ou de Prague (*grossi Pragenses*) et en quelque mesure des deniers de Casimir III, qu'on rencontre aussi dans d'autres localités de la Moldavie[223], la monnaie indienne en or est une vraie rareté, car jusqu'à présent on n'a connaissance que d'une seule pièce similaire, englobée dans le trésor de ducats vénitiens (authentiques et imités) et hongrois de Brăeşti (dép. de Botoşani), daté dans la période qui est à cheval sur les XIVe-XVe siècles[224].

Après la publication de ces données synthétiques sur le matériau numismatique de Orheiul Vechi, dans les campagnes de fouilles des dernières années en a mis au jour d'autres monnaies aussi, toutes étant des émissions mongoles[225]. Comme leur nombre exact ne nous est pas connu, nous avons préféré ne pas les inclure dans les calculs des pourcentages de monnaies citées ci-dessus. D'ailleurs ils ne changent presque en rien les proportions respectives, ni ne modifient les termes *post quem* et *ante quem* dans lesquels s'encadrent les émissions qui étaient en circulation dans le territoire de la ville.

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[220] E. N. Abyzova, P. P. Bârnea, A. A. Nudelman, *op. cit.*, p. 81-87.

[221] A. A. Nudelman, *Očerki istorii...*, p. 106.

[222] E. N. Abyzova, P. P. Bârnea, A. A. Nudelman, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

[223] V. Spinei, *Moldova...*, p. 216-217.

[224] O. Iliescu, "Însemnări privitoare la descoperiri monetare", *Studii şi cercetări de numismatică*, I, 1957, p. 463; idem, "Une monnaie indienne du Moyen Age découverte en Moldavie", *Studia et acta orientalia*, IV, 1962, p. 249-251.

[225] De ces pièces, le plus grand lot provient de la fosse 137, fouillée en 1980, où il y avait 178 monnaies en argent — un vrai trésor—, appartenant à la période comprise entre es règnes d'Özbäg et de Abd Oullakh. Cf. E. N. Abyzova, "Issledovanija Moldavskoj srednevekovoj ekspeditzii", in *Archeologičeskie otkrytija 1980 goda*, Moscou, 1981, p. 386·

Bien que de beaucoup plus réduit quantitativement, le lot numismatique provenant de Costeşti n'est pas dépourvu d'intérêt, ayant une composition en partie semblable à celle que l'on constate pour les monnaies de Orheiul Vechi. Des 117 pièces antérieures au XVe siècle, analysées dans une étude parue en 1969, 113, c'est-à-dire 98,29%, sont des émissions de la Horde d'Or. Les monnaies en argent, sept en nombre, représentent 6,10% du total, le reste de 106 pièces étant en cuivre. Des pièces déchiffrées, dont le nombres 'élève à 75, sept sont du temps de Özbäg (1313-1342), 66 de J̌ani-Bäg (1342-1357) et une de Hizyr (1360-1361) et une autre de Keldi-Bäg (1361-1362)[226]. Selon quelques recherches faites après la publication de l'étude sus-mentionnée, où l'on a pris en calcul 96 pièces numismatiques mongoles, du temps d'Özbäg provenaient six exemplaires, de J̌ani-Bäg 71, de Hizyr un, de Keldi-Bäg un, à ceux-ci s'ajoutant 15 — tous en cuivre — de Chekhr al-Djédid[227]. Excepté les émissions mongoles, dans le niveau médiéval citadin de Costeşti on a encore signalé une monnaie romaino-byzantine du IVe siècle, une autre probablement hongroise du XIIIe siècle (?), une en cuivre de Jean Alexis III Comnène (1349-1390) de Trébizonde et un groschen du roi tchèque Jean Ier de Luxembourg (1310-1346)[228], ce qui reflète de pâles orientations du commerce local non seulement vers les territoires de la Horde d'Or.

Parmi les émissions monétaires évoquées ci-dessus, un intérêt spécial présentent celles qui sont anonymes ayant la légende en arabe avec la spécification "frappé à Chekhr al-Djédid", c'est-à-dire à *La Ville Nouvelle* (fig. 11/18-21). Sur quelques monnaies ce lieu d'émission a été remplacé avec "Ianghi-Chekhr", qui en turc a le même sens de *La Ville Nouvelle*. La plupart des monnaies de la catégorie en question sont en cuivre et n'ont pas l'indication de l'année de frappe. En revanche, sur le peu d'exemplaires en argent

Dans les campagnes de fouilles de 1988-1989 on a découvert, également, 13 monnaies de la Horde d'Or, toutes en cuivre: 11 de J̌ani-Bäg, une non-précisée et une frappée à Chekhr al-Djédid, sans l'indice de l'année ou de l'émetteur. Cf. S. N. Travkin, "Monetnye nachodki v Starom Orchee v 1988-1989", in *Archeologičeskie issledovanija v Starom Orchee*, p. 111-113.

[226] L. L. Polevoj, "Monety iz raskopok i sborov na poselenii Kostešty-Gyrlja (1946-1959 gg.)", in *Dalekoe prošloe Moldavii*, réd. princip. L. L. Polevoj, Chişinău, 1969, p. 146-161.

[227] Idem, *Očerki istoričeskoj geografii Moldavii XIII-XV vv.*, Chişinău, 1979, tableau 17.

[228] Idem, "Monety iz raskopok...", p. 149.

trouvés à Orheiul Vechi on a marqué a.H. 765 (1363-1364), 767 (1365-1366) et 769 (1367-1368)[229]. Étant donné que le plus important lot fait de telles monnaies provenait de Orheiul Vechi et que quelques autres pièces ont été signalées à Costeşti, à Cetatea Albă et à Lozova, donc toujours dans l'interfleuve Pruth-Dniestr, S. A. Ianina a exprimé l'opinion que les émissions en cause auraient été frappées environ cinq années de suite à Orheiul Vechi, dont le nom pendant la domination mongole était par conséquent La Nouvelle Ville. Une très courte période dans l'activité de l'atelier de monnayage, qui n'aurait pas dépassé deux années (a.H. 765-766=1363/1364-1364/1365), a été mise en relation avec un présumé stationnement de la cour de Abd Oullakh à Orheiul Vechi, car on est parti de l'observation que sur quelques monnaies gardées dans de vieilles collections des musées russes le nom du khan apparaît sur la légende avec celui de Chekhr al-Djédid[230].

Les points de vue énoncés par S. A. Ianina ont gagné une reconnaissance sans aucune hésitation de la part des spécialistes de Chişinău[231], auxquels nous nous joignons nous aussi[232]. En revanche, ils n'ont point été acceptés par le numismate et l'orientaliste de marque qui est G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, qui a exprimé l'opinion qu'après la victoire du knès Olgerd sur les Tatars à Sinié Vody (Les Eaux Bleues) en 1363, la Horde aurait perdu son autorité dans les contrées du nord des bouches du Danube, de sorte qu'elle ne pouvait plus détenir un centre de frappe de la monnaie sur la vallée du Răut[233]. Une réticence encore plus accentuée vis-à-vis des assertions mises en circulation par S. A. Ianina peut être constatée chez V. L. Egorov, qui reprend en grand les arguments invoqués par G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, tout en soutenant en même temps qu'après la lutte de Sinié Vody les régions de l'ouest du Dniepr, où la présence de Abd Oullakh et de Mamaï n'est jamais signalée dans les sources écrites, seraient entrées sous le contrôle des Lituaniens d'Olgerd, tandis que celles d'entre le Pruth et le Dniestr sous celui de l'État moldave. Sans accepter l'idée de l'existence d'un centre de monnayage à Orheiul Vechi, V. L. Egorov a lancé l'hypothèse de la localisation de Chekhr al-Djédid à l'actuelle citadelle de Velikii Koutchioughour[234] — située sur la rive gauche du Dniepr, à quelque 30 km au sud de la ville de Zaporožie—, où les fouilles entreprises en 1953 avaient identifié un centre urbain étendu sur une superficie d'environ 10 hectares, où l'on a découvert une mosquée à minaret, un bains et plusieurs constructions en pierre[235]. Cette localisation aurait de chances à se confirmer uniquement dans la mesure où les futures investigations archéologiques y surprendraient une grande quantité de monnaies ayant la légende "Chekhr al-Djédid", de nature à indiquer la présence d'un centre de frappe de la monnaie.

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[229] E. N. Abyzova, P. P. Bârnea, A. A. Nudelman, *op. cit.*, p. 82 et 84.

[230] S. A. Janina, "Novyj gorod" (= Jangi-Šechr=Šechr al-Džedid) — monetnyj dvor Zolotoj Ordy i ego mestopoloženie", Trudy Gosudarstvennogo ordena Lenina Istoričeskogo Muzeja, 49, *Numismatičeskij sbornik*, V, 1, 1977, p. 193-213.

[231] L. L. Polevoj, *Očerki...*, p. 69; E. N. Abyzova, P. P. Bârnea, A. A. Nudelman, *op. cit.*, p. 84-85 et 89-90; A. A. Nudelman, *Očerki istorii...*, p. 97-98; *Istoria RSS Moldoveneşti*, I, 1988, p. 324 et 327 (P. F. Parasca); P. P. Bârnea, *Orheiul Vechi...*, p. 16-17; idem, "Iz istorii issledovanija...", p. 28 et 30; N. D. Russev, "Gorodskie tzentry Dnestrovsko-Dunajskich zemel' i Zolotaja Orda (momenty i arealy evoljutzii)", in *Moldavskij feodalizm. Obščee i osobennoe (Istorija i kul'tura)*, réd. princip. P. V. Sovetov, Chişinău, 1991, p. 41-45 et 60; T. F. Rjaboj, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

[232] V. Spinei, "Coexistenţa populaţiei locale din Moldova cu grupurile etnice alogene în secolele XIII-XIV", *Acta Moldaviae Meridionalis, Anuarul Muzeului Judeţean Vaslui*, II, 1980, p. 163; idem, *Moldova...*, p. 215 et 276-277; idem, "Restructurări etnice...", p. 61.

[233] G. A. Fyodorov-Davydov, *The Culture...*, p. 30. Cf. aussi notre compte-rendu de *Arheologia Moldovei*, XII, 1988, p. 338-339, où nous avons exprimé la suspicion à l'égard des arguments de l'auteur.

D'autre part, nous tenons à preciser que l'idée de la retraite des Mongols du sud-est de la Moldavie après la combat de Sinié Vody — rivière identifiée à Sinioukha, affluent à gauche du Boug Méridional — accréditée depuis plus longtemps déjà par certains chercheurs[236], ne peut pas être retenue, puisque le matériau archéologique et numismatique des centres urbains de l'ouest du Dniestr plaide pour le maintien du pouvoir de la Horde d'Or jusque vers la fin de la 7e décennie du XIVe siècle[237]. Par conséquent, il n'y a pas d'incompatibilité entre la localisation du centre de monnayage de Chekhr al-Djédid au sud-est de la Moldavie et le statut politique de cette zone. De plus, les découvertes signalées après l'exposition des opinions de S. A. Ianina sur les émissions ayant la marque de "Chekhr al-Djédid" ont été de nature à les confirmer, parce que la plupart d'entre elles provenaient de Moldavie[238], et seulement une moindre partie du nord de la Dobroudja[239].

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[234] E. L. Egorov, *Istoričeskaja geografija...*, p. 81 et 84-85.

[235] V. I. Dovženok, "Tatars'ke misto na nižn'omu Dnipri časiv pizn'ogo seredn'oviččja", *Archeologični pamjatki URSR*, 10, 1961, p. 175-193.

[236] G. D. Smirnov, "Iz istorii...", p. 80; N. A. Mochov, *Formirovanie moldavskogo naroda i obrazovanie moldavskogo gosudarstva*, Chişinău, 1969, p. 54.

[237] V. Spinei, *Moldova...*, p. 176-178; idem, "Restructurări etnice...", p. 53.

[238] E. N. Abyzova, P. P. Bârnea, A. A. Nudelman, *op. cit.*, p. 82-85; S. A. Bulatovič, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

[239] E. Oberländer-Târnoveanu, "Documente numismatice privind relaţiile spaţiului est-carpatic cu zona gurilor Dunării în secolele XIII-XIV", *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie şi Arheologie "A.D. Xenopol"*, XXII, 1985, 2, p. 589.

Cependant, à notre avis, il reste encore à tirer au clair le problème du séjour de Abd Oullakh et de Mamaï à Orheiul Vechi, d'autant plus qu'aucune attestation écrite ne prouve leur présence à l'extrémité d'ouest de l'Empire de la Horde. Nous savons avec exactitude seulement que Abd Oullakh avait été contraint à céder pour quelques années le trône de Saraï à des prétendants plus forts, lorsqu'il s'était replié dans les zones de l'ouest de son État, où il avait réussi à garder ses prérogatives de khan[240]. Les émissions monétaires qui nominalisaient sa suprématie à Saraï al-Djédid (Le Nouveau Saraï) cessent après a.H. 764 (1362-1363), pendant que des monnaies à son nom étaient frappées annuellement à Azak (Azov), l'un des centres de monnayage les plus actifs de la Horde d'Or. Abd Oullakh n'allait pas se contenter de cette posture, ce qu'on peut déduire du fait qu'en a.H. 768 (1366-1367) apparaissent de nouveau ses monnaies frappées à Saraï, indice qu'il avait regagné le pouvoir dans la capitale, mais qu'il allait bientôt perdre à la faveur d'un autre aspirant au trône[241]. La qualité de centre de frappe de la monnaie, qui avait échu à Orheiul Vechi, n'impliquait cependant pas la présence effective de la cour du khan en localité, car, comme on le sait, sur le territoire de la Horde d'Or ont été en fonction concomitamment plusieurs centres de ce type, hormis celui de la résidence principale de Saraï, depuis déjà cette période où l'on n'avait pas encore abouti à des scissions territoriales[242].

Le matériau numismatique récolté dans l'aire des deux villes situées sur le Răut ou la Botna relève le rôle important de la monnaie dans le cadre des transactions commerciales. En comparaison avec ce matériau, dans les établissements à caractère urbain de l'ouest, du nord et du centre de la Moldavie des dernières décennies du XIVe siècle, on constate — tout au moins d'après ce qu'il ressort des découvertes faites jusqu'à présent, malheureusement en partie inédites et non-systématisées — une utilisation de beaucoup plus réduite de la monnaie, même après de lancement des premières émissions par Pierre et Étienne Muşat[243].

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[240] E. L. Egorov, "Zolotaja Orda pered Kulikovskoj bitvoj", in *Kulikovskaja bitva*, réd. princip. L. G. Bezkrovnyj, Moscou, 1980, p. 185-186, 189-191, 196-199 et 207.

[241] V. Spinei, *Moldova...*, p. 276-277.

[242] G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, "Nachodki...", p. 165-221.

[243] À Siret, par exemple, dans les 13 habitations de la fin du XIVe siècle et du siècle suivant, recherchées autour de l'église de la Sainte Trinité (Sfânta Treime) dans les campagnes de fouilles de 1992 (V. Spinei et C. Asăvoaie, "Date preliminare privind rezultatele săpăturilor din 1992 de la Siret", in *Arheologia Moldovei*, XVI, 1993, p. 220) et 1993, on n'a découvert aucune monnaie contemporaine. À la différence de Siret, où les investigations des dernières années ont visé la zone roumaine de la ville, à Baia, qui entre 1967 et 1980 a béné-

D'ailleurs, une comparaison des villes du sud-est de l'espace carpato-dniestrien avec celles du reste du territoire moldave sous l'aspect planimétrique et architectural est également défavorable à ces dernières, lesquelles, en ce qui concerne les constructions à caractère civil antérieures au XVe siècle, n'avaient pas trop dépassé la configuration des établissements ruraux[244]. En ce qui concerne les différenciations sus-mentionnées entre les villes moldaves, dues à leur inscription sur une courbe évolutive selon des rythmes non-identiques et non-synchrones, il ne faut pas omettre que, à l'opposé des chefs mongols qui avaient concentré leurs efforts pour constituer un nombre très réduit de centres citadins à l'ouest du Dniestr, les voïvodes de Moldavie ont eu en vue un réseau urbain de beaucoup plus dense, bien que les possibilités de leur État, dans une étape incipiente d'organisation, confronté avec des obstacles extérieurs difficiles à surmonter, fussent incomparablement inférieures à celles des khans de la Horde d'Or, maîtres d'un empire arrivé à l'apogée de son développement.

En ce qui concerne les fonctions assumées par Orheiul Vechi et par Costeşti, il est sans aucun doute que celles-ci étaient multiples. À côté de prérogatives économiques, à rôles dans la sphère commerciale, artisanale, monétaire et agricole, elles détenaient aussi un important rôle politico-administratif et, éventuellement, même religieux.

À la différence de Cetatea Albă, qui, une fois constituée dans les dernières décennies du XIIIe siècle, a maintenu son statut d'établissement urbain jusqu'à nos jours, la durée d'existence de Orheiul Vechi et de Costeşti a été limitée. Comme pour les autres villes de Moldavie, le moment de leur genèse ne peut pas être fixé exactement, et c'est aux recherches ultérieures qu'incombe la tâche de fournir des éléments capables de conduire à des précisions

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ficié de fouilles de beaucoup plus amples, concentrées notamment dans le quartier des colons saxons, on a trouvé un nombre de 20 monnaies moldaves et 13 étrangères (neuf de Hongrie, trois de Bohême et une de Valachie) de la seconde moitié du XIVe siècle, 28 autres monnaies de Hongrie et une de Pologne étant des émissions de quelques rois de la fin du XIVe siècle et des premières décennies du siècle suivant: Sigismond Ier de Luxembourg (1387-1437) et Ladislas II Jagellon (1386-1434). Cf. V. Neamţu, S. Cheptea, "Contacte între centrul şi sud-estul Europei reflectate în circulaţia monetară de la Baia (secolele XIV-XV)", in *Românii în istoria universală*, I, réd. I. Agrigoroaiei, Gh. Buzatu, V. Cristian, Iaşi, 1986, p. 18-30.

[244] Le manque de la possibilité de départager de façon tranchante les habitations des villages par rapport à celles des villes avant le XIVe siècle a été observé aussi en ce qui concerne les régions de Transylvanie colonisées avec des Saxons. Cf. P. Niedermaier, *Siebenbürgische Städte. Forschungen zur städtebaulichen und architektonischen Entwicklung von Handwerksorten zwischen dem 12. und 16. Jahrhundert*, Bucarest, 1979, p. 214-215.

chronologiques en ce sens. D'ailleurs dans la plupart des cas le passage du stage rural à l'étape préurbaine et urbaine s'est déroulé le long d'une période qui recouvre plusieurs décennies. Des données archéologiques et numismatiques qui sont à notre disposition à présent il ressort que des traces d'habitation apparaissent déjà dans les deux localités en question à partir de la période à la charnière des XIIIe-XIVe siècles, mais d'un commencement de la phase urbaine on ne peut parler qu'à peine des premières années de règne du khan Özbäg (1313-1342), c'est-à-dire vers la fin de la 2e décennie et au début de la 3e du XIVe siècle. La circonscription de l'intervalle d'existence citadine de Orheiul Vechi à seulement 20 ans, tel qu'on l'a récemment postulé[245], nous paraît exagérément restrictive. L'épaisseur des couches archéologiques, l'extension de l'espace habité, l'envergure et la diversité des constructions, l'ampleur de la circulation monétaire, ainsi que d'autres considérants, tout cela rapporté au rythme de développement de la société médiévale, plaide, à notre opinion, pour une persistance des ensembles urbains de Orheiul Vechi et de Costeşti durant un demi-siècle tout au moins.

La destruction des villes situées sur le Răut et la Botna a eu lieu, comme nous l'avons déjà montré, à la fin de la 7e décennie du XIVe siècle[246], en de circonstances politiques pas encore clarifiées, qui pour le moment peuvent être tout au plus supposées. Le fait que le recul des frontières d'ouest de la Horde d'Or a correspondu avec la désarticulation de la vie citadine des deux centres est plein de significations pour définir les principaux éléments qui ont concouru à leur apparition et développement, mettant en relief le poids important de la composante allogène dans les structures urbaines — non seulement dans le plan politico-administratif et religieux, mais aussi dans la sphère artisanale et commerciale—, ainsi que leur ancrage insuffisant dans les réalités locales. Ainsi s'explique le fait que, lorsque les villes n'ont plus disposé de support militaire, elles sont devenues incapables de survivre au choc généré par les changements politiques majeurs de la zone[247].

Dans l'éventualité où dans les noyaux constitutifs des centres citadins situés sur le Răut et la Botna le facteur autochtone aurait été représenté plus amplement, les tendances d'autorégénération de l'armature urbaine aurait eu une finalité, même dans le cas où le nouveau pouvoir ne se serait pas impliqué d'une façon prégnante dans l'opération de redressement de la vie urbaine des territoires de l'est de l'espace carpato-dniestrien. Comme l'indique une série de matériaux archéologiques — jusqu'à présent non-publiée — de Orheiul Vechi, qui s'encadre du point de vue chronologique à la fin du XIVe siècle[248], des groupes relativement petits d'autochtones ont continué à vivre ou bien ils sont revenus dans le périmètre de la ville détruite, sans pouvoir lui redonner sa qualité de centre urbain, ce qui allait se passer à peine dans la première partie du XVe siècle, plusieurs décennies après la mise en fuite des Mongols à l'est du Dniestr[249]. En revanche, Costeşti n'a jamais atteint le stade de ville, étant mentionné comme village à commencer par l'acte du 4 mai 1573, émis par Jean le Téméraire[250].

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[245] P. P. Bârnea, *Orheiul Vechi...*, p. 17; N. D. Russev, *Nizov'ja Dunaja i Dnestra vremeni formirovanija Valašskogo i Moldavskogo knjažestv (Problemy istorii gorodov kontza XIII-XIV vv.)*, Avtoref. dissert. na soisk. učenoj step. kandid. istor. nauk., Chişinău, 1992, p. 13.

[246] Cf. note 211.

[247] Dans les deux villes on a observé des traces de destruction par incendie de certains édifices, tandis qu'à Costeşti on a découvert aussi des squelettes humains fragmentaires, qu'on pourrait mettre au compte des massacres produits durant les confrontations qui ont conduit à sa dévastation (Informations que nous devons à L. L. Polevoj et G. Cabac).

La destruction, qui n'a pas été accompagnée d'une réfection immédiate, des deux villes s'est produite non à la suite du fait que l'élément local des régions environnantes n'aurait pas été rendu conscient de leurs rôles commerciaux et artisanaux profitables pour plusieurs catégories de la population, y compris pour celles du milieu rural, d'autant plus que dans les contrées avoisinées, du nord-ouest et du centre de la Moldavie, le processus de la constitution des noyaux urbains *in statu nascendi* avait gagné de l'extension, se trouvant tout à fait en congruence avec l'évolution générale de la société. Le sacrifice de certains centres prospères, avec des marchés d'échange actifs, avec des mécanismes de transaction monétisés et avec des débouchés en zones étendues, ne représentait pas une réaction de rejet ou répudiation du système économique, juridique et administratif qu'était en fait une ville, mais il a été déterminé par une bouffée de révolte contre l'oppression contraignante des

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[248] Nous avons en vue surtout certains lots céramiques qu'on trouve dans les collections de l'Institut d'Archéologie de Chişinău et du Musée de Orheiul Vechi, consultés grâce à la bonne volonté de P. P. Bârnea, A. A. Nudelman et A. Gorodenco.

[249] E. A. Abyzova, P. P. Bârnea, A. A. Nudelman, *Drevnosti Starogo Orcheja. Moldavskij period*, Chişinău, 1982; P. P. Bârnea, "Orheiul Vechi: unele observaţii cu privire la procesul de urbanizare în Moldova feudală", *Arheologia Moldovei*, XV, 1992, p. 181-184.

[250] *Documente privind istoria României, A. Moldova, veacul XVI*, III, Bucarest, 1951, p. 24; V. Nicu, *Localităţile Moldovei în documente şi cărţi vechi. Îndreptar bibliografic*, I, A-L, Chişinău, 1991, p. 250-251. Les recherches de surface ont conduit au dépistage de quelques traces sporadiques d'habitation dès le XVe siècle, succédées par d'autres des siècles suivants. Cf. L. L. Polevoj, "Archeologičeskie pamjatniki verchnego tečenija r. Botna", in *Dalekoe prošloe Moldavii*, p. 203-204.

Mongols, dont les victimes ont été également — comme il arrive souvent dans de telles situations — les côtés positifs des initiatives des khans et des émirs.

La genèse du phénomène urbain médiéval au sud-est de l'espace carpato-dniestrien, dans les occurrences politiques configurées par la suprématie de la Horde d'Or dans la zone des bouches du Danube, par l'extériorisation d'énergies occidentales, a connu des traits spécifiques, qui ne se retrouvent pas dans les autres régions extracarpatiques roumaines, ce qui explique aussi ses coordonnées particulières.

[Traduit par MICHAELA SPINEI]


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Fig. 1. La carte du réseau urbain dans l'espace carpato-danubien aux XIVe-XVe siècles. A— Centres urbains du XIVe siècle, du territoire placé sous la domination de la Horde d'Or. B— Centres urbains des XIVe-XVe siècles sous la domination des princes de la Moldavie.


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RODOSTO
PERA
CONSTANTINOPLE
HÉRACLÉE
AMASTRIS
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SIMISSO
VATIZA
TRAPEZONDE
PEZONDA
SAVASTOPOLI
Kouban
MATRACHA
VOSPERO
ESKI-KRYM
(SOLHAT)
CAFFA
SOLDAIA (SUDAK)
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Fig. 2. La carte des principaux centres urbains du bassin pontique aux XIIIe-XIVe siècles.



Fig 3. Le plan de la zone fortifiée de Cetatea Albă avec l'emplacement des recherches archéologiques. I — Fouilles entreprises en 1900-1940: fouilles et sondages de 1900, 1904, 1912 (1-14), 1919, 1928-1930 (15-23) et 1940 (24); II — Fouilles entreprises en 1945-1984: sondages de 1969-1973 (1-10), couche culturelle correspondant à l'antique Tyras (11), couche culturelle médiévale de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du siècle suivant (12), découvertes des XVIe-XVIIe siècles (13), les murailles de la cité (14), les fouilles centrales (15), section qui a intercepté des habitations de la première moitié du XIVe siècle (16, 17), la tour de "Ovide" (18), le supposé pourtour de la ville du temps de la domination de la Horde d'Or (19) (apud A. A. Kravčenko, 1986).


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Fig. 4. Céramique émaillée de facture byzantine de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du XIVe siècle, décorée de motifs divers, découverte à Cetatea Albă.



Fig. 5. Céramique émaillée de facture byzantine de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du XIVe siècle, décorée de motifs divers, découverte à Cetatea Albă.


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Fig. 6. Céramique émaillée de facture byzantine de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du XIVe siècle, décorée de monogrammes (1, 4-6, 8-18), et de motifs anthropomorphes (2, 3, 7), découverte à Cetatea Albă (apud A. A. Kravčenko, 1986).



Fig. 7. A — Le plan de l'établissement urbain de Costești. 1 — la superficie approximative de la ville; 2 — le quartier des potiers; 3 — zone à constructions de pierre à destination administrative; 4 — fortifications; 5 — tombeau; 6 — cimetière; 7 — zone à force résidus ferreux (apud L. L. Polevoj, 1969); B — Le plan de l'établissement urbain de Orheiul Vechi. 1 — vallum; 2 — grands édifices en pierre; 6 — cimetières; 7 — ateliers de forgerons; 8 — la zone centrale à édifices importants en pierre; 9 — la superficie approximative de la ville; 10 — la superficie approximative du quartier des artisans (apud L. L. Polevoj, P. P. Bârnea, 1971).





Fig. 8. Vue générale des établissements urbains de Orheiul Vechi (photo V. Spinei, 1993).





Fig. 9. Les ruines des bains I de Orheiul Vechi, situés sur la rive du Răut (photo V. Spinei, 1993).



Fig. 10. Écuelle décorée à motifs géométriques, recouverte d'émail jaune (1) et tasses à motifs incrustés et en relief réalisés avant l'émaillage, de type Kashan (2-4) du XIVe siècle, découvertes à Orheiul Vechi (apud E. A. Abyzova, P. P. Bârnea, A. A. Nudelman, 1981).


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Fig. 11. Monnaies mongoles émises par les khans zbăg (1-3Ö), J̌ani-Băg (4-9), Keldi-Bàg (10, 11) et Abd-Oullakh (12-13) et monnaies anonymes frappées à Cheklır al-Djédid (Nouvelle Ville) (18-21), découvertes à Orheiul Vechi (apud L. L. Polevoj).

J. V. IVANOVA

THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS OF LIFE SUBSISTENCE OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE: A GLIMPSE FROM RUSSIA

In the given article the culture of the peoples of South-East Europe is studied within the bounds of those theoretical principles Russian ethnography (ethnology, social anthropology) is guided by. We consider such notions as "historico-ethnographic area", "culture", "traditional culture" and its component elements, pay attention to the combination of the natural-geographical conditions, historical and social factors acting in the process of forming traditions, as well as psychological aspects of innovations included into traditional cultural complex. Since the Russian scientists of our time solve those problems differently, the author presents here her own, personal point of view.

The author has come to the conclusion that ethnic culture of the peoples of South-East Europe is an integral cultural mass (the local variants are not excluded), therefore the area under consideration can be defined as a single historico-ethnographic area.

Some facts used in the article have no special references, it means that they have been taken from the personal archives of the author, who, during the last three decades has managed to visit all the countries of South-East Europe with the purpose of studying ethnography of all those countries without exception.

Ethnos and Culture. In the course of history each generation uses the experience of the preceding generation including the material side of production and the relations among the people in the process of production. Fixed in the memory of generations the habits and relations among the people become traditions. All the traditions are historical phenomena; they are concrete and correlate with the time and place they exist in.

Each given generation carries on the traditions inherited from the previous generations even in the changing conditions of life, and at the same time if the conditions of life change radically, the given generation is ready to change its traditions and even to change the very conditions of life. In such extraordinary circumstances the gradualness of the process in being interrupted, the traditions existing before gradually extinguish or disappear altogether and the process of their replacement by innovations begins. There are mobile enough traditions referring to the sphere of material production and a mode of life. The traditions, characterising general notions, beliefs, religious notions, ethical norms, aesthetical tastes, as a rule, remain invariable for much longer periods of time.

Traditions and innovations supplement each other. The process of the reproduction of culture may proceed only in their unity.

Culture is a specific form of human activity, being formed not in the process of biological development[1]. All the numerous variants of the definition of "ethnos" (= ethnical community) given in special literature, contain, as a necessary component, the notion of "culture" (= cultural peculiarities, cultural features). For a long time ethnographers used to classify all the facts and things pertaining to people's activity either as material or spiritual culture. The approximate character and inadequacy of such classification were already realized by the scientists long ago and has become more evident in the course of development of ethnographic terms and notions. To be convinced of the truth of these words one should consider any cultural element of any ethnos. Take, for instance, traditional dwelling house as a self-evident object of "material culture". Its outer appearance refers to the sphere of architecture, that is to a rather important field of amateur and folk arts, this is especially true of exterior and interior decor of the house. The use of the inside of a building designed for domestic purposes and the very appearance of different-purpose sections in a house are directly linked with the type of the family living there and with the family traditions of its inhabitants, characteristic of a given ethnos at a given time. The erection of a house is always accompanied with a number of distinctive marks and superstitions, the traditions of making a sacrifice to a building god, shift of fire from the hearth of an old house to the new one and many other customs, the observation of which seems to form the notion of "spiritual culture".

Any rite or ceremony, whether it is a calendar festival, celebration of a wedding, the ceremonies linked with birth or funerals and so on, consist not only in the ritual actions but includes also the numerous set of objects —ritual clothes, special food and other accessories. What kind of culture— "spiritual" or "material" one —should they be referred to? These examples are not new— the ethnographers have known about them well enough.

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1. Markaryan E. S., *Ocherki istorii kultury*, Erevan, 1969.

The problem is in the development of a theoretically founded and practically applied classification of concrete ethnographical material.

Modern Theories. At present a considerable number of Russian specialists are inclined to accept the classification of ethnographic materials worked out by S. A. Arutyunov, E. S. Markaryan and Y. I. Mkrtumyan[2]. These authors denied the generally accepted classification of traditional culture into "material" and "spiritual" ones. They suggested another scheme, including the following segments of culture: culture of primary production (CPP), culture of life subsistence (CLS), socio-normative culture (SNC), humanitarian culture (HC), the latter being sometimes called cognitive culture. Having in mind that all the aspects of traditional culture are connected with each other by the links of different character, the researchers consider the culture of each ethnos as a system capable to be self regulated and subjected to changes in the course of historical development, each culture (CPP, CLS, SNC and HC) being considered as a subsystem. Depending on the tasks set before the researchers, each culture can be considered as an independent open system inside common ethnic culture. At the same time each culture consists of a complex of components (= elements), that are not only unbreakably linked with each other, but correlate in one way or other with the elements of other culture and through this unity - with ethnic culture as a whole. At the same time the above-mentioned segments of culture interact with the people's environment. For instance, the anthropogenic landscape includes not only the devastation of forests, ploughing up of the earth, road building, irrigation (i.e., CPP) but also the settling of towns and villages, construction of new houses, erection of administrative, military-defensive, and cult buildings that can be classified as CLS, SNC or HC. In the given case there is a dialectical unity of technology and social conditions accompanying its development[3].

According to the accepted classification the culture of life subsistence (CLS) includes the following elements, that should provide for the satisfaction of vital requirements of the people (= of the human collectives). Here we refer meals, in other words, the system of nourishment that is directly associated with CPP, i.e. with the process of getting the means of subsistence.

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[2] *Metodicheskiye problemy issledovaniya etnicheskikh kultur*, Erevan, 1983; Arutyunov S.A., *Narody i kultury*, Moscow, 1989.

[3] Artanovsky S. N., "Obshchestvenno-kulturniye aspekty ekologii cheloveka", *Voprosy filosofii*, 1975, No. 3; Kozlov V. I., "Osnovniye problemy ekologii", *Sovietskaya etnografiya*, 1983, No. 1.

At the same time the act of taking food is correlated with family and social etiquette, and certain utensils are used for interior design. The notion of life subsistence culture includes settlements and dwellings: the way of settling in a given locality, the forms and types of settlements being associated with the development of geographical environment and with the social system of a given society; the erection of a dwelling and a farmstead, the lay out and architectural design reflect the method of housekeeping, the type of family and aesthetic tastes underlying the handicrafts and folk art works. The culture of life subsistence embraces all the complex of creation and existence of traditional costume including the production of clothes and footwear depending on the character of economy, the mode of life of the people in the given natural geographic conditions; the type of costume characterises the age, family and social position of man; decorations and other additional accessories of costume almost entirely can be referred to ethnic artistic traditions but bear also the direct relation to the social sphere of life. Besides, some additional elements such as household utensils, furniture etc. can be classified as pertaining to CLS. The whole culture of life subsistence can be considered as the complex the parts of which are interrelated with each other and with many other aspects and circumstances of human life in the process of dynamic development.

One can on no account think that our ethnographers have up to now ignored the complex interrelation of all the elements of ethnic culture and have not mentioned that in their research works. However, the formal and limited scheme of classification of culture into spiritual and material ones makes some monographs describing the peoples, to a certain extent stiff.

At present there is also another approach to the very term "life subsistence" in our home literature on ethnography. It is presented mainly by the works of V. I. Kozlov. This researcher thinks that the above-mentioned term describes all the conditions necessary for the normal human life as a whole, the social relations and especially production activity of man. I. I. Krupnik is close to V. I. Kozlov in his definition of the same term. A. N. Yamskov approaches the problem from the positions of ethnology giving a more detailed definition: he suggests that four principal components should be distinguished in the culture of a traditional society - they are: land use and means of subsistence, material life subsistence (food, clothes, dwellings), humanitarian and socio-normative components. Thus, he tries to solve the problem by giving a more detailed definition of the term: issimplies not only life subsistence but also material life subsistence[4].

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[4] Kozlov V. I., "Zhizneobespecheniye etnosa: soderzhaniye ponyatiya i yego ekologi-

We think that this dispute about terms is of no great or principal importance, since we discuss only the right use of the word but not the principles of research. The author of the present paper joins the opinion of the authors who hold with the first variant of the term definition (Arutyunov and oth.) because the variant suggested by V. I. Kozlov broadened the sense of the term and, to a considerable degree, became the synonym of ethnic culture.

The Culture of Life Subsistence. This paper deals with concrete features characterizing the culture of life subsistence (LS), predominantly of the peoples of South-East Europe in pre-industrial times (our facts deal mainly with the 19th and the first decades of the 20th centuries).

Essentially, all the progress of the CLS in the pre-industrial epoch is none other than the development of the place of people's habitation, to actively make it serve the production purposes as well as the purposes of reproduction of life of the community. This can be considered as a manifestation of the biological and social essence of man. In the process of the functioning of a "man-nature" system the continuous optimization of the peoples' environment, labour conditions and the mode of life takes place. The social in this process more and more prevails over the biological[5].

The peoples of South-East Europe are characterized by the similar aspects of CLS most fully reflecting the laws of man's adaptation to natural-geographic conditions. They are: the peculiar character of the settling in the locality, types of settlements, choice of building materials; the system of nourishment, household utensils, the source material for making clothes. It is obvious that these elements are inseparably linked with the culture of primary production[6].

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cheskiye aspekty", *Etnicheskaya ekologiya: teoriya i praktika,* Moscow, 1991, pp. 14-43; Krupnik I. I., *Arkticheskaya ekologiya,* Moscow, 1989; Yamskov A. N., *Otgonno-pastbishchnoye skotovodstvo,* The Abstract of Dissertation by I. N. Yamskov, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), Moscow, 1987, pp. 7-8.

[5] Arutyunov S. A., "Kulturologicheskiye issledovaniya i globalnaya ekologiya", *Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR,* 1980, No. 12, pp. 93, 94; Alekseyev V. P., "Antropogeotsenosy, sushchnost, tipologiya, dinamika", *Priroda,* 1975, No. 7; idem., *Stanovleniye chelovechestva,* Moscow, 1984, p. 356 passim.

[6] Andrianov B. A., *Zemledeliye nashikh predkov,* Moscow, 1987; Zhukovsky P. M., *Zemledelcheskaya Turtsiya,* Moscow-Leningrad, 1933; Biro P., Dresh Zh., *Sredizemnomorye,* Vol. I, Moscow, 1960; Markov G. E., "Skotovodcheskoye hozyaistvo i kochevnichestvo: definitsii i terminologiya", *Sovyetskaya etnograpfiya,* 1981, No. 4; Freidenberg M. M., "Problemy otgonnogo skotovodstva v sovremennoi balkanistike", *Etnicheskaya istoriya vostochnikh romantsev,* Moscow, 1979; Klepikova G. P., *Slavyanskaya pastusheskaya ter-*

There is also a great likeness in the forms of housekeeping, types of agricultural implements[7], means of transport. At the same time such elements of culture as dwellings and clothes have much more features and peculiarities that have ethnic characteristics. In these spheres of the peoples' life, the social line was being traced during the whole history of the people - from the epoch of ethnogenesis to the time of forming the modern way of life.

The System of Nourishment. The system of nourishment of the people is closely connected with their economy and the mode of life peculiar to it. Meat and milk products, animal fat, unleavened bread preferable in conditions of a nomad life prevailed in the ration of cattle-breaders. Kitchen utensils were adapted to the mobile mode of life: the people used wooden and copper kitchen utensils, butter was made in a wineskin or in a wooden churn, water was transported and stored in wooden barrels[8]. In the ration of the tillers there, naturally, were meat and milk products but in addition they used flour and cereals products and vegetable oil more often than cattle-breeders. They used to bake sour bread in bakeries (along with that they used unleavened bread too)[9], they used to transport water in earthenware pots, food was boiled in earthenware pots too.

The Way of Settling. The peculiar features characteristic of the way of peoples' settling in the given locality are the component parts of the common mechanism of interaction between natural conditions and society[10]. The most

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minologiya, Moscow, 1973; Odredbe pozitivnog zakonodavstva i obichajnog prava o sezonskim kretanima u Jugoistochnoj Evropi krozvekove, Beograd, 1976; Vladuţiu J., *Etnografia văii Bistriţei: zona Bicar,* Piatra Neamţ, 1973; idem, *Almenwirtschaftliche Viehhaltung und Transhumance im Brangebiet (Südkarpaten Rumänien)*, Budapest, 1961; Hughes T. S., *Travels in Greece and Albania,* Vol. I, London, 1830; *Carpatobalcanica,* XIV, Bratislava, 1985.

[7] Vyzharova Zh. N., *O proiskhozhdenii bolgarskikh pakhotnikh orudij,* Moscow, 1956; Marinov V., "Drvjanijat plug v Bulgarija", *Izvestija na Etnografski institut i muzej,* T. VI, Sofia, 1963; Demchenko N. A., "Svyaz traditsionnykh form pakhotnykh orudij Moldavii i stran Balkano-Karpatskogo areala", *Balkanskiye issledovaniya: problemy istorii i kultury,* Moscow, 1976.

[8] Dojaka A., "Enë dhe orendi të Dukagjinit", *Etnografia shqiptare,* I, Tiranë, 1962; Idem, "Enë e orendi të Labërisë", *Ibidem,* II, Tiranë, 1963.

[9] Δευτεραίου Α. Κ., Το ψωμί ως δώρο στις κοινωνικές σχέσεις του ελληνικού λαού»; *Επετηρίς του Κέντρου Ερεύνης Ελληνικής Λαογραφίας της Ακαδημίας Αθηνών,* t. 15, 1977/80.

[10] Biro P., Dresh Zh., *Sredizemnomorye,* p. 91.

ancient settlements in South-East Europe go back to that period of history when the vital activity of each local group of people was directly linked with the landscape in the locality where they settled. It goes without saying that the reasons for founding towns and rural settlements were diverse. For instance, the cattle-breeders used to settle on distant moundainous sunlit and warm slopes in the places with more or less flat grounds suitable for the erection of houses and with natural foundains that would supply them with water good for drinking; as a rule, the plots of land were chosen in order that it should be convenient for the people to drive the flocks or herds of domestic animals down to the mountainous pastures in spring and to the low-lying winter pastures in autumn. In the foothills the settlements were erected by the tillers close by the foot of the slope in order that their buildings should occupy as little plots of land fit for cultivation as possible. In the Albanian lowlands, in the vicinity of the low coast of the Adriatic Sea the people formed their settlements on the tops of the hills, evading the marsh-ridden areas[11].

However not only natural-geographic conditions and economic requirements dictated the choice of places for settlements: at the moment of acute political conflicts, for instance, in the period of Tansimata reforms (in the middle of the 19th century) the people went to the places that were less accessible for the Osmanli administration as well as for tax-collectors and this resulted in the appearance of many settlements in the mountainous zone of Albania. In the period of especially active attacks of the Turks the Serbian lands between the Drina and Morava Rivers have become deserted, the locality overgrown with oak forests has assumed the name of Shumadia; it became populated all over again after the appearance of the autonomous Serbian principality (in the middle of the 19th century)[12].

It is characteristic of South-East Europe, especially of those regions that were part of the Osmanli Empire, that their population used to migrate as a result of wars, insurrections and also as a result of the realization of the feudal lords' right to transfer the population of the whole villages or even regions from one place to another in accordance with their own will[13].

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[11] Budina O. R., *Poseleniya i zhilishche Severnoy Albanii.* The abstract of the dissertation by O. R. Budina, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), Moscow, 1968, pp. 10-12; Edem, "Poseleniya Severnoy Albanii kak etnograficheskу istochnik", *III-e Congres International des études du Sud-Est Européen,* Bucureşti, 1974.

[12] *Narody zarubezhnoi Evropy,* Vol. I, Moscow, 1964, p. 379 passim; *Historia e Shqipërisë,* V. 2, Tiranë, 1965, f. 57-68.

[13] Arsh G. L., *Albania i Epir v kontse XVIII-nachale XIX v.,* Moscow, 1963, pp. 197, 222, 253, 263.

Under certain concrete historical conditions the character of settling in the locality and the types of settlements depended only upon the natural-geographic environment where the character of the people's economic activity was formed, while in other cases they were linked with the events of social and political history, in that situation the people adapted a newly developed natural landscape to their traditional forms of economy. Though there were some exceptions, of course. For instance, in the northern part of Shkodrinsk Laké, on a little Vranina Island there gradually formed a settlement of Montenegrins, who saught refuge from vendetta. A new and the only possible occupation for the people in specific conditions of life on the island was fishery, as it was the basic means of life subsistance.

Thus it becomes clear that the history of material, technical progress in the activity of men is directly linked with social history[14]. Direct contacts and feedback occurred between man and specific landscape and the influence of the environment on man and vice versa changed, naturally, in the course of history[15].

Types and Forms of Settlements. The types of settlements depend directly upon the development of economy: in South-East Europe the permanent settlements predominate. Such are all the settlements of toilers of the sea-fishers, sailors busy with the fishing of molluscs and sponges on the islands near the coast of the Aegean, Adriatic and Ionic Seas and on the continent, preferably in the North-West part of the Balkan Peninsula (Dalmatian coast) and in its southern part (on the territory of Greece). Besides permanent settlements of tillers there were sometimes the temporary ones-those situated near the fields being cultivated and used during urgent agricultural work. There were the two types of settlements characteristic of one and the same group of peasants, namely, of cattle-breeders. The main permanent settlements, as it has already been mentioned, were as a rule, situated in the middle of a mountain slope, while temporary settlements were set up in the summer pastures, with the dwellings for shepherds and women busy with the processing and storing of milk products. In the winter lowland pastures there were temporary settlements too[16]. As a result of relative overpopulation, when cattle-breeders were forced to become tillers, winter settlements, and later summer settlements too, turned to become permanent. Thus, the level of cultivated lands was rising higher and higher over the sea level.

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[14] Andrianov B. V., "K metodologii istoricheskogo issledovaniya problem vzaimodeistviya obshchestva i prirody", *Obshchestvo i priroda: istoricheskiye etapy i formy vzaimodeistviya,* Moscow, 1981.

[15] Danilova L. V., "Prirodniye i sotsialniye faktory proizvoditelnykh sil na dokapitalisticheskikh stadiyakh obshchestvennogo razvitiya, *Ibid.*

[16] Trifunosky J. C., "Geografske karakteristike srednevjekovnikh katuna", *Simposium o srednevjekovnom katunu,* oderzhan 24 i 25 novembra 1961, Knj. 2, Sarajevo, 1963.

The form of settlements all over South-East Europe depends upon the locality relief: dense (everywhere, but mainly in the river valleys and in the hollows between mountains), where houses were built without any definite plan, with entrance doors facing either south or the slope of a mountain where pastures, gardens and kitchen-gardens were situated outside the village, scattered households (more often it took place in mountainous or hilly localities) in such settlements were situated at some distance from each other being surrounded with plots of cultivated land. Sometimes the settlements used to stretch either along the river, road or narrow gorge between hills or mountains as along the main axis[17]. There were, settlements of a round or an oval form: buildings were grouped around a square - the social centre of a settlement[18]. The settlements at the seaside were of fan-like lay-out: the streets took their beginning in the embankment which was the centre of the settlement with shops and stolehouses situated there and climbed upwards in a fan-like manner.

The urban settlements as well as the rural ones were shaped with the account taken of the locality relief. The causes of their appearance and the character of their development depended on historical conditions. The towns-fortresses, erected on the elevations are the most ancient kinds of settlements on the Balkan Peninsula. Inside the walls there were the defensive works, public buildings and temples, as well as dwelling houses and estates. In time the dwelling houses turned to be beyond the borders of a fortress, the people had to erect additional defensive works, that in their turn became cramped, the suburbs and new settlements were included into the main settlement, while the trade route the fortress was often erected to safeguard, became the main trade street of the town. Such was the case with Athens, Berata (Albania), and many other towns in Croatian Seaboard, on the Sava, Drina and the Danube. Some urban settlements used to appear near the fortresses, under the protection of their walls (Shkodra, Budva).

The second variant of towns' emergence - the settlement of the people near the trade routes at a cross-road, not far from a monastery or at a harbour (in a bay, near the mouth of a river), i.e. in the places of accumulation of the people, where the people used to trade and to barter handicrafts for agricultural products, and where, finally, permanent fairs appeared.

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[17] For instance, some of Bulgarian settlements. See: *Narody zarubezhnoi Evropy*, Vol. I, p. 326.

[18] Such is the case with Macedonians, *Ibid.*, p. 469.

Naturally, besides those main types and forms of urban and rural settlements mentioned above there were other transitional forms of settlements that possessed local peculiarities[19].

The Organization of Settlements in Space Area. It is worth noting that at the vast area of South-East Europe the public centre and the arrangement of dwellings in the settlements remained invariable irrespective of the time of their forming and a great variety of concrete conditions for their emergence. In the rural areas a square, i.e. an open space where a considerable number of people should gather, served the centre of the settlement. The point is that the public life was based on the community principles (beginning with the epoch of feudalism), the main legal organ of the rural community being the meeting of all competent men[20]. During the 19th century when the communal structure was gradually losing its significance and was being replaced by the administrative and territorial structure (for instance after the Serbs have found their political independence)[21] the traditions of the general meeting have remained. The village festivals were held at these squares too.

In the centre of the settlement there were shops, taverns (cafes) where men spent their time, sometimes a spring around which women used to gather, very often there was a church or a school there.

Around the public centre of the settlement there were the most ancient dwellings the rest buildings being scattered at some distance from the centre. As a result of irregular housing construction the groups of farm-yards were divided by narrow streets. Such groups of farm-yards may be called "quartiers"

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[19] Verner E., "Visantiisky gorod v epokhu feodalizma: tipologiya i spetsifika", *Visantiisky vremennik*, 1975, No. 37; *Bulagarski srednevekovni gradove i kreposti*. Varna, 1981; Georgiev G., *Sofiya i sofijanci, 1878-1944,* Sofia, 1983; Dzhorzhevich Zh., "Stanovnishtvo Beograda prez 1859-1863", *Istorijski glasnik,* Beograd, 1983, No. 1-2; Todorov N., *Balkansij gorod XV-XIX v.*, Sofia, 1972; Kojić B., *Stari balkanski gradovi, varoši i varošice,* Beograd, 1976; *Structure social et développement culturel des villes sud-est européennes et adriatiques dux XVII-XVIII siècles,* București, 1975.

[20] Ivanova J. V., "Osnovniye problemy izucheniya selskoi obshchiny na Balkanakh v trudakh sovietskikh uchyonykh", *VIIe-Congress International des sciences anthropologiques et ethnologiques,* Moscow, 1964; Ivanova J. V., "Commune rurale des albanais (XVIII-debut du XX siècle)", *Recueils de la société Jean Bodin pour l'histoire comparative des institutions,* XLV, Paris, 1986.

[21] Shihareva (Kashuba) M. S., "Selskaya obshchina u serbov", *Slavyansky ethnografichesky sbornik,* Moscow, 1960.

(Fr.) (in Albanian it is called "lagje" which literally means "a side"). In the time of the Osmanli rule it was usually called mahala (in Serbian-mahala, Albanian-mahalle, Greek γειτονιά). Even separate farm-yards belonged to a certain mahala and this was quite natural, since the "quartier" is not a mere group of houses or farm-yards but also a kind of a community that historically usually inherited the rights and the duties of patronimia[22].

As a rule, there were beither handicraft nor trade institutions in residential districts (the tradition in still felt in the organization of housing construction nowadays).

The space organization of urban settlements is also rather traditional: the centre of the town including the handicraft and trade "quartier" with its market and numerous cafes, public baths, etc., is surrounded with the residential districts (in seaside towns there was a tendency to build dwelling houses stretching up the slope, while in mountainous and hilly localities the houses were situated down the hill). Polyethnical character of the population in the Balkan towns of the 18th and 19th centuries made the citizens of different ethnical and religious affiliation to inhabit different "quartiers".

The Types of Dwelling Houses. The initial type of a dwelling house existing in South-East Europe is a one-chamber building with a hearth. This type developed both vertically (the number of storeys increased) and horizontally (the lay-out of the main dwelling space in a house became more complicated with its division into different sections and with the building of additional rooms). But family life focussed in a room with a hearth (or a stove). In all languages it means the house proper: kyћa, къшта, vea, shtēpi, σπίτι, οικία. In time this principal cell in the majority of design variants turned to be a warm inner hall. The house of this type of development, conditionally called the south-eastern one, differs in principle from the Middle-European eastern type dwelling house with a cold hall and a stove. The border between them passes somewhere north of the Danube[23].

We can classify the types of dwelling houses in South-East Europe of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries as follows:

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[22] Kosven M. O., *Semeinaya obshchina i patronimiya*, Moscow, 1963; Ivanova J. V., "Rodstvenniye objedineniya na zapade Balkanskogo poluostrova v ikh pozdneishikh variantakh", *Actés du Prenier congrés international des études Balkaniques et Sud-Est Européennes*, Sofia, 1966.

[23] *Tipy selskogo zhilishcha v stranakh zarubezhnoy Evropy*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 53, 362-364.

The Levantine type - a small, often a one, one-and-a-half-or two-storey building under a flat, semi-spherical or span roof. Widespread all over the Mediterranean, often in the islands of South-Eastern Coastline of the Pyrenean Peninsula, through South Italy, North Africa up to Syria and the Lebanen. Such dwellings were inhabited by fishermen as well as by the peasants busy with the gathering and vine-growing[24].

The Mediterranean type - a two-storey stone house under a span roof. A house for cattle-breeders and later for handicraftsmen. On the ground floor of the house there were cattle-sheds, workshops, wine cellars, and in some later variants - kitchens. On the upper floor with an outside staircase there were rooms to live in. It is characteristic of the mountainous zones of Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia, Adriatic Coast of Croatia and of some islands of the eastern part and northern coast of the Mediterranean, South France including[25].

The Pannonian type - a one- or two-storey house without foundation where all the rooms stretch in one line, with the exits to the sheltered gallery. It is characteristic of the lowland agricultural zones of Hungary, Rumania, Voevodina, Chroatia, Slovenia, Albania[26].

The fortified type - a stone, often three-storey tower. It was especially widespread in the west of the Balkan Peninsula from Bosnia to the Mani region in the south of Peloponnesus. Here also belong the low fortified stone houses in the islands of the Aegean Sea[27].

The Alpine type - a two-storey house, with rooms to live in and other different-purpose rooms under a single roof. Such houses are widespread in

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[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 128-133; Polevoi V. M., *Iskusstvo Gretsii. Novoye vremya,* Moscow, 1975, pp. 63-85; Smith A., *The Architecture of Chios,* London, 1962; Γ. Α. Μέγα, «Μελέται λαϊκής Αρχιτεκτονικής», *Λαογραφία,* v. 26 (1969); Παπαχαραλάμπους Γ. Χ., *Η κυπριακή οικία,* Λευκωσία, 1968, Ν. Γ. Μουτσόπουλου, *Θέματα αρχιτεκτονικής μορφολογίας,* Θεσσαλονίκη, 1977; Στεφ. Δ. Ημέλλου - Αικ. Πολυμέρου-Καμηλάκη, *Παραδοσιακός υλικός βίος (ερωτηματολόγιο),* Αθήνα, 1983, p. 1-31.

[25] Budina O. R., "Narodnoye zhilishche severnoj Albanii", *Kultura i byt narodov zarubezhnoi Evropy,* Moscow, 1966; *Tipy selskogo zhilishcha...*, pp. 24, 94-96, 103, 126-128; Nopcsa F., *Haus und Hausrat in Katolischen Nordalbaniens,* Sarajevo, 1912.

[26] *Tipy selskogo zhilishcha...*, pp. 79, 109-111, 124.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 96-98, 104-105, 116-117, 136; Polevoi V. M., *Iskusstvo Gretsii. Novoye*

Central Europe while in South-East Europe the occur in some zones of Slovenia and partly in Croatia[28].

The Balkan type - as distinct from all the previous types has taken shape only by the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. One-, more often two-storey houses were built in most cases with the frame-work method under a hipped roof. The part of the upper floor built without bearing walls formed a covered verandah. This type of dwelling turned to be the most productive one and stimulated the building of many modern variants of a dwelling house[29].

The borders of different types of traditional dwelling houses intersect each other and not one of them coincides with any ethnographic border. There is no type that should be characteristic of only one ethnos. Moreover, not one of the above-mentioned types is localized in the borders of only South-East Europe. The conception of ethnic characteristics may include: the density of this or that type, details, concrete features of housing construction, outer and inner decor, specific use of inner and subsidiary rooms.

There existed, however, up to the middle of the 20th century, a type of a dwelling house known only in South-East Europe, in large islands (e.g., Crete) and in the Mediterranean Coast of the Peninsula of Asia Minor: this is the so-called *Oriental type* (it is also called Rodopian or North-Greek) - a two-storey building with an interior staircase and advanced bay window in the middle of the second storey. This house is one of characteristic elements of syncretic Osmanli culture, formed on both sides of the Aegean Sea in the period of the rule of the Osmanli dynasty[30]. The construction of such dwellings mainly in the towns of the central zone of the Balkan Peninsula was due to the fact that the politically dependent population acquired the prestigious forms of culture penetrating from the centre of the Empire[31]. Oriental-type houses along with the typical religious and public buildings created the "oriental" appearance of towns in Bulgaria, Albania, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Mace-

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vremya, pp. 91-94; Ivanova J.V., *Severnaya Albaniya*, Moscow, 1973, p. 152, passim; Thomo P., "Banesa popullore e tipit kullë në Mat dhe Mirditë", *Etnografia shqiptare*, IV, Tiranë, 1973.

[28] *Tipy selskogo zhilishcha...*, pp. 75, 86.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 17-19, 21, 24-34, 42-44, 76-77, 85-88, 107-111, 124-126, 135.

[30] Dimitrov Ś., Manchev K., *Istoriya na balkanskite narody;* XV-XIXv, Sofia, 1971.

[31] The details of the prestigious forms of culture in the Balkans see in Ivanova J. V., "Formirovaniye kulturnoi obshchnosti narodov Yugo-vostochnoi Evropy", *Balkanskiye Issledevaniya*, Vol. 7: *Istoricheskiye i istoriko-kulturniye protsessy na Balkanakh*, Moscow, 1982, pp. 183-188.

donia, in the north of Greece (where they were called "archontico")[32]. This type did not develop and cannot be referred to modern domestic culture.

The process of adapting oneself to a new dwelling as a place of habitation of a family collective is realized with the observance of the following parameters: 1) the adaptation to the natural-geographic (climatic) conditions of life and forms of economy (that was developed in accordance with the geographic zones but not with ethnographic borders); 2) the adaptation to the legal reguations and etiquette, existing in the given locality (division of a house into male and female sections, special rooms for guests, defensive accommodations) - were formed in accordance with the peculiarities of social history and only sometimes in accordance with ethnic culture; 5) the attitude to inner space in a dwelling from the point of view of ecophilia and to outer space - from the point of view of ecophobia, hence the significance of the threshold in a house as a border dividing the two worlds; such notions are characteristic of most peoples[33].

Traditional Costume Typology. The costume reflects the features common to the peoples of the whole of South-East Europe (especially it is proved by the genesis of costume), as well as the features characteristic of each ethnic culture and also the mobility with which deep-rooted traditions were combined with quickly changing innovations.

The choice of the material for making clothes is conditioned by the peculiarity of the economy characteristic of the given locality. We may mark out the two traditional costume complexes: 1) the first complex consists of the clothes made of knitted, woven and felt material, as well as of leather and fell; 2) the second complex is the combination of the above-mentioned articles produced by cattle-breeders with those made of flax, hemp, silk and cotton, i.e. grown and processed by tillers.

There are the two main types of costumes as far as its genesis is concerned: 1) clothes worn over shoulders; 2) clothes fastened on waist. The costume of the first type is observed in many variants which can be traced back to the culture of ancient pre-Slav population of South-East Europe. Its main component elements are tunic-like shirt with sleeves (Bulgarian "riza", Serbian and Macedonian "košula", Chroatian "rubina", Rumanian "camăşa", Albanian "kẽmisha", Greek "πουκάμισο") and outer clothes with a cut in the front, based evidently on cloak-type clothes (Bulgarian "opanzhak", "jarmurluk", Serbian "kabaniza", Montenegrin "struka", Albanian "guna")[34], transformed in time after many modifications into a long or short outer clothes (Bulgarian "saja", "kosak", Serbian and Montenegrin "zubun", "dolama", "gunj", Chroatian "zubun", "kozet", Rumanian "suman", Albanian "zhuba", Greek "καβάδι", "αντερί" etc.)[35], and also into sleeveless blouses of different fashion (Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Albanian, Greek "jelek", Rumanian "pieptar" etc.).

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[32] *Tipy selskogo zhilishcha...*, pp. 30, 96, 135-136; Polevoi V. N., *Iskusstvo Gretsii. Novoye vremya*, pp. 35-37, 94-101.

[33] Arutyunov S. A., *Kulturologicheskiye issledovaniya...*, pp. 96, 97; Bajburin A. K., *Zhilishche v obrazakh i predstavleniyakh vostochnykh slavyan*, Leningrad, 1933; Idem, "Semiotichesky status veshchei i mifologiya", *Sbornik Museya antropologii i etnografii, XXXVII. Materialnaya kultura i mifologiya*, Leningrad, 1981; Civjan T. V., "Dom v folklornoy modely mira", *Trudy po znakovym sistemam;* Vol. X. *Semiotika kultury*, Tartu, 1978, pp. 69-83; Van-Gennep A., *Rites de passage*, P., 1909, pp. 19-34.

The clothes fastened on waist (at first not sewn and later sewn, preserved in the female costume complexes) is in all probability of Slav origin (Bulgarian "prestilka", Rumanian "fotă", "katrinţă", "fusta"). The Albanian "fustan", and Greek φούστα clothes fustened en waist became widesprend in the zones of intensive contacts with Slavs.

The female garment' fastened on waist in combination with a shirt of a Carpathian type prevail in the area from South Bulgaria, through Rumania and Moldavia to the Ukraine and southern districts of Russia thus forming a wide transitional zone from South-East Europe to East Europe.

The costume of the Slovenes and also of some groups of the Chroats, in Slavonia in particular, differs greatly from the traditional clothes of all the Slav-Balkan cultural community. I approaches the costume of the countryfolk of the neighbouring regiens of Central Europe.

In pre-industrial epoch the clothes marked a person from the point of view of his ethnic affiliation, sex, age, family and social status, profession. In different ethnic groups there were their own variants of initial components of traditional costume. Clothes is a very mobile element of ethnic culture, it is subject both to inner and temporal changes depending on the utilization of new technical materials, on the development of trade and handicrafts, and mostly on the interaction of neighbouring peoples and cultures, i.e. on social and cultureforming factors. The character of clothes colour and decorations should also be associated with ethnic features[36].

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[34] Zojzi Rr., "La "guna" dans la tradition vestimentaire des peuples balkaniques", *Studia albanica*, Tiranë, 1966, No. 1.

[35] These names of articles of different clothes as well as thos that will be used further do not exhaust the long list of various articles of clothes worn by the Balkan peoples, and are cited here as mere examples.

Innovations of Prestigious Culture. In the time when the Balkan lands were a part of the Osmanli Empire the culture of towns and some of the rural localities, especially in the central regions of the peninsula, the clothes of "eastern character" ware widely spread. This fashion that gradually has become a tradition was followed not only by the Moslems but also by Christians.

The above-mentioned appearance of towns of central regions of the Balkan Peninsula and the West Coast of Asia Minor, the oriental type of dwelling houses characteristic chiefly of urban buildings, their specific inner design and decorations, the peculiarities of costumes - all this is linked with the mode of life in the time of the rule of Osmanli Empire. Therefore, life subsistence culture reflects many sides of socio-normative culture; it has cult-ritual, aesthetic aspects as well as the aspects of prestige. The latter aspect deserves greater attention when it is necessary to leveal the causes of intensive penetration of Osmanli culture into the mode of life of the Balkan population - not only of Islamic people (they were always less in number), but also of those ethnic communities that during the period of Osmanli rule retained their religion and, what is most important, their self-consciousness.

In the given case we come across the phenomenon which is called the phenomenon of referential group; for the social higher sciety in the Balkans with its polyethnic genesis it was logical to follow the traditions penetrating from the capital and other towns of the Osmanli Empire, it corresponded to their value orientations and served the purpose of social self-assertion[37]. For the rest of the population but mainly for the townsfolk of average class, the corresponding behaviour was imitative. We should not, however, think that the higher cultural development and educational qualification were always characteristic of the referential group, as it was stated by some specialists[38].

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36. *Narody Zarubezhnoi Evropy,* Vol. I, pp. 337-340; 441-444, 459-461, 473-475, 487-488, 541-546, 583-586; Markova L. V., "O proyavlenii etnicheskoi spetsifiki v materialnoi kulture bolgar", *Sovietskaya etnografiya,* 1974, No. 1; Veleva M., "Za periodizacjata v razvitieto na bolgarskite narodni nosii", *Izvestija na etnografskiya institut i muzej,* Knj. 15, Sofia, 1974; Martynova M. J., *Horvaty. Etnicheskaya istoriya XVIII-XIX v.,* Moscow, 1988, pp. 90-106; Gjergji A., *Veshjet shqiptare në shekuj,* Tiranë, 1988; Χατζημιχάλη Αγγ., *Η ελληνική λαϊκή φορεσιά,* Αθήναι, 1977.

37. Gilferding A. F., "Bosniya, Gertsegovina i Staraya Serbiya", *Sobr. soch.,* Vol. 3, St. Petersburg, 1873.

38. Arutyunov S. A., *Kulturologicheskiye issledovaniya...,* p. 97.

For South-East Europe just the opposite is characteristic: the above-mentioned indices of definite groups of the Balkan population were higher than that of the ethnic Turks. The favourable economic conditions for accepting and transforming the "oriental" patterns into local variants included the rising of the purchasing power of a certain part of the urban population in the second half of the 19th century, that made it possible to use the textiles manufactured at a factory, to make clothes, to invite specialists for building and decorating residential and public buildings etc.[39]. However, these social groups were included into the system of feudal hierarchy, with its idea of the superiority of a mode of life of higher social strata. The self-determination of a person in that hierarchy, the determination of his consciousness that united both the material and spiritual side of his life, made him to acknowledge the prestige of referential group[40].

It goes without saying that the innovations suggested by the referential group were accepted by the people subjectively as a natural component of their own culture, the more so that they were transformed and accommodated to each ethnic group in their own way. In the given case we speak not about the assimilation but about the contamination of cultural habits. Therefore, everyday domestic culture that has appeared as a result of syncretism as well as the achievements of high professional culture, the value orientations, ethical and aesthetical norms - all that has gradually acquired the stable forms, has been inherited by the following generations from the preceding ones as the usual and compulsory thing for everybody, i.e. the traditional one.

Summary. Thus, we have got acquainted with the general features of culture of life subsistence, considering it as a component part of the whole cultural mass, to be more exact, the culture of historico-ethnographic region of "South-East Europe". Of course, there were local variants inside the whole area. They did not remain stationary influenced by various historical and social factors, the improvement of production technology, transformation of tastes and appraisals. The contacts among persons and groups were the main channels for transmitting various information.

The culture of life subsistence of every ethnos is a definite combination of the elements of culture, characteristic only of that ethnos, of their local variants, methods of their use and other segments of culture of that ethnos.

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[39] *Istoria na Bolgaria*, Vol. VI, Sofia, 1987, pp. 489-496, 538-541.

[40] Pollo S., "Les contradiction dans la formation de la consciens nationale chez les peuples du Sud-Est Europeen", *Etudes balkaniques*, 1986, No. 4, pp. 40-52.

I. KYZLASOVA

GREEK ICON OF THE XVIII c. WITH THE VIEW OF THE MONASTERY OF CHRIST PANTOCRATOR ON MOUNT ATHOS

The great collection of icons of the Moscow Historical Museum possesses an unique, never published before and previously not closely studied monument — a greek icon that we refer to the middle of the XVIII c. It can be titled "The Transfiguration with the By-standings and the View of the Monastery of Christ Pantocrator on Mount Athos" (И VIII 3645/58271). It is a well preserved icon of the middle size (0,55 × 0,4 m) with a trustwortningly drawn architectural ensemble, historical characters and inscriptions in greek. Greek origin of this relic is without any doubt. From ancient times russian iconpainting school included a tradition of making icons in which a picture of a town or more often a monastery occupied an important place. For greek monuments it is a very rare thing. Not long ago a group of triptychs became known that had been created in the XVI c. and had been dedicated to the monastery of St. Catherine on the Synai. Each triptych together with the other subjects has a detailed description of the monastery. It is an enigma for researchers why only this monastery was done such an honour of an iconpainting glorification unlike many others, the depiction of which can be found only on the engravings. Such engravings circulated widely in the XVII - XIX centuries. They were available for many pilgrims and had to remind them of holy things they had seen, serve as a support in their stories about pilgrimage and even prove it.

The entry in the inventory book about the icon that interests us is rather peculiar: instead of the objective information about this monument it contains a wordy account of the whole hypothesis explaining the subject. E. S. Ovchinnikova, who made this entry many years ago mistakingly read the name of the monk as "Nikon" instead of "Ioanikios, Emperor's Brother", whose figure is depicted to the left side of the cartouche with the "Transfiguration". The first mistake was followed by others. The figure close to the imaginary Nikon, "Basileos Alexios" was misinterpreted as "Tsar Alexei Michailovich".

Among other by-standings three Patriarchs are specially noticable: St. Callistos and Anfim from Constantinople and Paisios from Pecz. The idea to link this icon to the russian history turned to be so appealing and probably the general view of the drawing seemed so peculiar that it was characterized later on as an icon ordered to glorify a good turn of Partriarchs who had come to Moscow in 1666 to try Patriarch Nicon who had been later on turned back to monk and exiled to the North. The inventory book states that in the lower side of the icon Constantinople is depicted and suggests that it was drawn after the departure of Partriarchs and was sent to Alexei Michailovich as a gift.

Even from the first aquaintance with the monument we can see that there is a difference in the names of the Patriarchs who came to Moscow with those presented on the icon. Besides it becomes clear that even taking into account the tradition of the relative depiction of towns that existed all through the middle age period it is impossible to connect the painting on the lower side of the icon with the former Bysantian capital with its well-known one-headed St. Sophie's Cathedral. On the icon we see an architectural ensemble of the typical greek monastery with the five-headed cathedral with its main icon "Transfiguration" (it is depicted twice on the larger cartouche in the upper zone and above the entrance gate of the monastery) and the environs painted in detail. Lifting a glance to the upper side of the relic in the narrow cartouche we can already find the title of the cloister "Pantocrator"[1].

Starting to explore the subject of the icon its necessary to find a greek abbey with the same title situated most probably on the shore of the sea. The style of this icon proves to the fact that it relates to the middle of the XVIII c. An intense blue background of the by-standing figures, the form of the cartouche with the "Transfiguration" and a major detalisation of the picture show to that fact. Some figures of monks and life scenes near the monastery walls reflect a nonprofessional painting. It is obvious that this is a large abbey with three-storeyed walls and a "ring" of small temples outside and around the wall. Their titles are inscribed: St. Onufrios, St. Dimitrios, SS. Out-of-Moneys, SS. Apostles and Panagia. Only a widely respected monastery could order an icon in its honour, reminding of its own view, its main holy thing (an icon) and its history (by-standing figures). In accordance with an ancient

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1. Unfortunatey the signatureson the margines of three other cartouches were accurately cut away. And only the first letter "χ" from the word "χερ" that is "by the hand" of was left from the traditional formula of writing the name of the author on the right side of the lower margine.

tradition one group of by-standings was composed of monastery founders, the other of the contemporaries to the painting or its original. The sign tells us that Constantinople's Partriarch St. Callistos — "agios" was depicted with a nimbus. In the right group their are no people honoured as holy; the names of Patriarchs-Anfim from Constantinople and Paisios - from Pecz - are preceded by the word "cir" (master) used only when addressing a living person[2]. To the right there are also Abbot Ananius and Noble Parpulas with three boys.

There are several Patriarchs in the history of the greek church known as Callistos and Anfim as well as several Patriarchs named Paisios in the serb town of Pecz. But precisely the figure of the last Patriarch helps us to find a supplementary chronological reference-point: the Pecz Patriarchy is known to be destructed in 1766. What monastery is depicted on the icon then? If it was serbian this fact should have been reflected in signatures. Most probably it is a greek abbey connected with the Balkans. No doubt the only place for it could be Athos.

Among twenty four main monasteries of the "Holy Mountain" there is one dedicated to Pantocrator. We tried to explore its history and find a description of the architectural ensemble preferably of the XVIII c.

Russian monks — scientists Vasilij Grigorovich — Barskij and bishop Porfirij Uspenskij were outstanding specialists on Athos. The first visited and discribed the monastery twice shortly in 1725 and at large in 1744[3]. During the last visit he made a wonderful drawing of the monastery's general look from a close hill from another then on the icon point of view. But we can easily recognise main buildings and other peculiarities of the monastery and its surroundings as well as the same form of the gulf and the location of this ensemble on its shore. Trying to make a precise and lively view of the place, the painter couldn't but depict monks' figures walking or carrying loads, swimming in a boat. The picture made in 1744 coincides with the icon in every detail. The coincidence is seen not only in the buildings of the monastery itself — a cathedral, a belfry, three storeyed cells, walls and towers with two entrances, "thresholds" on the pillars, the sacred image on the wall, a pavilion for rest of the monks — but also in temples ontside the wall, a cross near the covered well, a mill, an aqueduct, a yard, a cemetery, two ship depositories and at last in the river and the sea that surrounds the monastery from the East, and in its precipice shores and narrow, shallow entrance for ships. A hundred years later Porfirij Uspenskij shortly and expressingly related what his respected predecessor had seen: the monastery "stands on the firm, precipice as a wall high place more than twenty sagenes above the water, overhanging surprisingly and awfully the sea; and there are the cells there hanging over the water with those sitting inside not even able to hear each other but only the raw of the waves"[4].

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[2] On the opinion of B. L. Fonkich who gave a consultation about all the signatures of the icon.

[3] *Stranstvovaniy Basil'y Grigorovicha-Barskogo po Svytim Mestam Vostoka s 1723 po 1747 g.*, SPb., 1885, ch. 1, s. 232; SPb., 1887, ch. III, s. 182-189.

V. Grigorovich-Barskij had already mentioned two brothers: "Greek Tsar" Alexios and John later Father Ioanikios the founders of the abbey. But only Porfirij Uspenskij who critically studied written and other sources was the first to restore a true picture of the creation of Pantocrator monastery. This is a precious work for us. The researcher obtained a more specific information about the mistakes of those who rewrote the history of the monastery and who erroneously read one important date. Thus he rejected a false monastery legend. The core of this discovery was following. There was a document in the abbey according to which its founding brothers had lived in the XIII c. and Alexix had been the "Tzar of Romans" because of the fact that he was a Stratopedarch and his infantry had liberated Constantinople from latins in 1261 and afterwards he became Caesar. The document turned to be false. "Pantocratorians would not deceive a specialist on Bysantian history", — the scientist wrote. The monastery wanted to lengthen its history to the utmost and exalt it by relating to the Emperor's family. Certain nondirect grounds surely existed for that: the brothers had lived in XIV c. and John's wife had relatives in the Emperor's family. Approximately in 1353 the brothers had helped Empress Anna Penkernissa to return one of her estates seized by foreign oppressors. In reward the Pantocrator monastery founded earlier had been given its estate. After Alexix had died Great Primirkirij John had built the abbey to the end, took monastic vows and died in 1363[5].

It is known that St. Callistos I was a Patriarch in 1350-1353, 1355-1363. We see that the icon from the Historical Museum correctly reflects the existence of the monastery's founding fathers in the XIV c. and a legend about "Basileus Alexios".

[4] Porfiriy Uspenskiy, *Vostok Hristlanskiy. Afon: Pervoe Puteshestvie v Afonskie Monastiri i Skiti. 1846 god.*, M., 1880, ch. 2, otd. 11, s. 109-110.

[5] Porfiriy Uspenskiy, *Vostok Hristlanskiy. Afon. Istorya Afona.* Ch. III. *Afon Monacheskij*, Otd. II, SPb., 1892, s. 119-127; Pelekanidis S. M., Christou P. C., Tsioumis Ch., Kadas S. N., *The Treasures of Mont Afons. Illyminated Manuscripts*, Vol. I, Athens, 1974, p. 120.

Major difficulties occur when we try to desifer the group of by-standings to the right. It seems that we should never posses any data about a Father-Superior and a Noble. The figures of the two Patriarchs also present difficulties. The only time the years of the rule of Constantinople's "Patriarch Anfim and Pecz's Patriarch Paisios" coincided was 1623. They are Anfim II (1623) and Paisios I (1614/1615-1646). The style of our icon cannot be refered to such an early time, thus we can only suggest that that was the time when a protooriginal (maybe an engraving) was created which was repeated in the icon later on. The date of 1623 doesn't contradict the history of existence of a peculiar, not widely known type of gravings and icons known in the european literature as "topographic loca sancta". As mentioned above the tradition of precise depiction of orthodox holy places goes to the XVI c.[6]. It became relatively popular in the XVII c. That's why a suggested version is quite rightful. But Paisios I was never related to Athos[7] that's why another version seems to be reasonable: in XVIII c. when this icon was created an unknown figure on the protooriginal was replaced by the figure of Paisios II. No historical data is left about this Patriarch-even about the precise time of his rule. It was probably one or two years (about 1755). History left us nothing but a usual supplement to the name — "greek". Does an icon from Moscow indeed give us a true depiction of this person not at all mentioned both in greek and balkan sources? In this case we cannot uxclude a possibillity that this man himself ordered an icon. The date — 1755 — corresponds to the style of the relic very well.

There is still another moment that can indirectly prove our considerations. It was already mentioned that simplified monks' figures near monastery's walls differ from the drawings in the upper part which are rather modest but professional in form and colouration. That's why it seems quite probable that this icon was made on the basis of an earlier engraving. An iconpainter could more easily interpret in familiar terms the upper part of the composition than the view of the monastery and its surroundings.

There are several engravings left which can be related to the last quarter of the XVIII-middle of the XIX c.[8]. Exept for several details they reproduce

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6. Sotheby's, 28 november 1991, Russian Pictures, Icons and Works of Art, London, 1991, N541, p. 96, bibl.

7. This opinion was rather categorically expressed by S. Petkovich.

8. Mylonas P. M., *Athos and its Monastic Istitutions Old Engraving and Other Works of Art*, Athen, 1963, p. 104, N40; Polevoy B. M., *Iskusstvo Gretsii*, M., 1984, T. 2, s. 278, N37; Παπαστράτου Ν., *Χάρτινες εικόνες, ορθόδοξα φράγκικα χαρακτικά, 1665-1899*, Αθή-

very accurately a general view of the abbey, its territory, the sea. In the upper side of the engravings there is an icon "Transfiguration" and three main scenes from the life of prophet Ilya and his small and secluded monastery (it is absent on the icon). We know that Ilya's small and secluded monastery got a special significance in the end of the XVIII c. and in the XIX c. thanks to the ukrain and moldovian monks headed by the famous Paisij Velichkovskij.

The presence in Pantocrator at the end of 1750 of a large group of monks closely connected with Russia gives us a possibility to suggest coutiously that Ilya's small monastery possessed russian icons painted in the mentioned above tradition of the depiction of architectural ensembles. They could have made a greek icon-painter think about turning of the engraving into a colourful painting on a desk. No doubt Ilya's small monastery attracted the attention of the public mainly because of a community charter previously unknown on the "Holy Mountain" put in force by Paicij Velichkovskij.

Thus compositions with donators on the sides of the upper part were not regarded as necessary a few time ago. The drawings of the monastery and its main holy thing were most often made in the same manner. This tendency was probably born in the middle of the XVIII c. when one figure of a donator could possibly be replaced by another.

It is remarkable that a peculiar manner of painting started appearing in the monastery already in XIV c. Thanks to Porfirij Uspenskij we know that in one of the church-porches there was a marble tomb of the founders and above it there was a niche with Pantocrator and Alexix' and John's signs proving their donatorship were beneath. In the XVI c. a new figure and another donator sign were added nearby[9]. So untill XVI-XVII c. which were the centuries of the development of "Topographic loca sancta" ancient patterns of monumental painting existed, becoming more complex. The fresco was ruined only in the middle of the XIX c. during the repairment.

It should be mentioned here that a well known icon "Pantocrator" (1363) from Hermitage which is one of the best bysantian icons in all russian collection also relates to this composition. In the lower part of the icon we see small kneeling figures of Alexix and John and the same signs as on the fresco above

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va, 1986, t. II, N 477, p. 446 (1779 y.); N. 478, p. 446-447 (about 1850 y.); N 479, p. 448 (1844 y.). I thank S. Petkovich because he sent to me photographies of two engravings. On his opinion the date of one engraving (Παπαστράτου N., N 478) about 1830 y.; the origing of another sheet (1844 y.) is Xilandar.

[9] Porfiriy Uspenskiy, *Vostok Hristianskiy. Afon: Pervoe Puteshestvie v Afonskie Monastiri i Skiti. 1846 god.*, M., 1880, ch. 2, otd. II, S. 112-114.

the tomb. We possess only a small piece with a part of an elder brother's figure. John, unlike on the icon of the XVIII c. is presented in a secular dress with a two-headed eagle[10].

Two greek relics created in one and the same monastery of Athos with an interval of 400 years are found in two russian museums.

A whole series of frescos from the collection of Hermitage comes from this monastery as well as a wonderfull and often reproduced icon "Twelve Apostles" (first third of the XIV c.) from the Moscow Museum of Fine Arts and a fragment of the fresco "Christ of the Vigilent Eye" from the Historical Museum (about 1360-1370)[11]. Most of these relics were in XIX c. removed from Athos by famous collectors A. Muraviev and P. Sevastyanov.

A. Muraviev visited the monastery in autumn 1849 and saw the repairment there, many of the frescos were ruined. A russian writer and pilgrim A. Muraviev appreciated ancient drawings: "I didh't see such frescos even in Italy", — he said, trying to explain to the monks who made the reconstruction what they were doing. In the result they started to regret about the destruction. A small piece of a fresco (0,45 × 0,35 m) with the head and an arm of "Christ of the Vigilent Eye" was already brought down, but "I collected the parts and carried the fragments to Russia", — Muraviev wrote. He also found some relics in a "pile of stored icons". Besides he stated that Alexix' and John's tomb was moved to another place at that very time and a window made instead of drawing in the niche, the view of the monastery and donators signs ...[12].

Finally we should say that the origin of the icon of the XVIII c. described above is still unknown. It is clear only that in 1920-s it was kept in the State Museum Fund a major part of which was in the Historical Museum. This icon was not necessarally brought to Russian by a collector because it was intended for a pilgrim. Icons dedicated to the same theme were already known in Russia in the first half of the XVII c. There is a precious illustration to that: the Solovetskij Monastery's monk Alexander Bulatnikov placed the icon "Mount Athos" in his abbey[13]. But still among the previously published and preserved till nowadays icons the same portrayal of the Athos' monastery wasn't seen either by the historians of art from Greece and Balkans to whom the author of this article showed the icon in the museum's depository or by those who saw it in the exhibitions "Postbysantian Painting. Icons of the XV-XVIII c. from the Collections of Moscow, Sergiev Pasad, Tver and Ryazan", that took place in Moscow in July-August 1991[14].

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[10] Bank A. V., *Vizantiyskoe Iskusstvo v Sobraniyah Sovetskogo Sojuza,* L.-M., 1966, s. 324-325, N 265-269; *Iskusstvo Vizantii v Sobraniyah SSSR. Katalog Vistavki,* L., 1987, N 947.

[11] *Vizantiya, Balkany, Rus'. Ikony Kontsa XIII — Pervoy Poloviny XV Veka. Katalog Vystavki, Gosudarstvennaya Tret'yakovskaya Galereya. Avgust-Sentyabr' 1991 goda,* M., 1991, s. 263-264, Prilozhenie A (I. Kyzlasova).

[12] [Murav'yov A. N.], *Pis'ma s Vostoka v 1849-1850 godah,* SPb., 1851, s. 182, 346; [Murav'yov A. N.], *Opisanie Predmetov Drevnosti i Svytyni, Sobrannyh Puteshestvennikom po Svyatym Mestam,* Kiev, 1872, s. 16.

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[13] Shchennikova L. A., *Voprosy Izuchenlya Solovetskih Ikon XVI-XVII vv.—Drevnerusskoe Iskusstvo. Hudozhestvennye Pamyatniki Russkogo Severa,* M., 1989, s. 274.

[14] *Postvizantiyskay Zhivopis'. Ikony XV-XVIII vekov iz Sobraniy Moskvy, Sergieva Posada, Tveri i Ryzani. Katalog Vistavki. Gosudarstvennyy Musey Izobraziteľnyh Iskusstv, Iuľ—Avgust 1991 goda,* N 106 (I. Kyzlasova), v pechati.



1. Icon "The Transfiguration with the By-standing and the View of the Monastery of Christ Pantocrator on Mount Athos". Middle of the XVIII c., Moscow Historical Museum.



2. Fragmant of drowing by V. Grigorovich - Barskij. "Monastery of Christ Pantocrator on Mount Athos". 1744 y.



3. Athor unknown. Engraving "Monastery of Christ Pantocrator on Mount Athos". Middle of the XIX c. Byzantin Museum in Athin.

ATHANASSIOS CHRISTOU

K. D. SCHINAS UND DAS ERSTE REKTORAT AN DER OTTONISCHEN UNIVERSITÄT (1837-1838)

Mit der Verordnung "Über die Gründung der Universität" am 22. April 1837[1] entstand in Athen die Universität. Sie ist die erste höhere Bildungsanstalt (in der offiziellen juristischen Abfassung wird sie als Verein bezeichnet)[2], nicht nur im neugegründeten griechischen Staat, sondern auf dem ganzen von den Türken besetzten Balkan, mit dem Ziel der Verbreitung und Pflege von Bildung in dem "Uns eigenen Osten"; deshalb ist sie auch die erste Universität des Ostens[3].

"Zu Ehren des Gründers soll sie den Namen 'Ottos'-Universität' tragen", —oder gemäss dem zeitgenössischen Sprachgebrauch "Ottoneion" oder "Ottonikon"[4]— schreibt der Gesetzgeber in Artikel 1 der Verondnung des 14./26. Aprils 1837 "Über die provisorische Ordnung (Statut) der in Athen gegründeten Universität". So begründet er die Namensgebung der neuen Lehranstalt; eine Begründung, die ihren Ursprung in der Tradition der deutschen Universitäten des Mittelalters hat, die in ihrem Titel den Namen ihres Herrschers - Gründers führen[5].

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[1] *Regierungsblatt des Königreichs Griechenland*, Nr. 16, Athen, 24. April 1837, im Folgenden: *Regierungsblatt*.

[2] *Regierungsblatt*, Nr. 86, Athen, 31.12.1836/12.1.1837, Art. 25: "Die Universität wird als Verein Gebildeter betrachtet".

[3] A. Dimaras, *Η μεταρρύθμιση που δεν έγινε* (Die Reform, die nicht stattfand), Athen 1973, Bd. 1, S. 113 und 115. Ebenfalls P. Moullas, «Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών: ποιητικοί διαγωνισμοί και ιδεολογία (1851-1877)», στο: *Τα Ιστορικά* ("Universität Athen: dichterische Wettbewerbe und Ideologie (1851-1877)", in: Historika), Bd. 7 (1990), S. 206-212.

[4] K. Th. Dimaras, *Εν Αθήναις τη 3 Μαΐου 1837* (Athen, am 3. Mai 1837), Athen 1987, S. 14 und 191.

[5] Siehe die Bezeichnungen der deutschen Universitäten noch heute. Ebenfalls siehe R. Benveniste, «Τα Μεσαιωνικά Πανεπιστήμια. Κοινωνικές όψεις και πολιτικός ρόλος», στο: *Πανεπιστήμιο: Ιδεολογία και Παιδεία* ("Die mittelalterlichen Univetsitäten. Soziale Aspekte und politische Rolle", in: Universität: Ideologie und Erziehung), Athen 1989, Bd. 1, S. 67-80.

"Die griechische Universität ... zwischen Okzident und Orient gelegen, ist vorgesehen, einerseits die Samen der Weisheit (im Okzident, Anm. d. Verf.) aufzulesen und nachdem sie diese in sich keimen und gedeihen lässt, sie andererseits jung und früchtetragend im angrenzenden Orient zu verbreiten"[6], bemerkt treffend der erste Rektor dieser Bildungseinrichtung in der Einweihungsfeier, die gleichzeitig der offizielle Beginn der Vorlesungen war. So eröffnet er zwei bedeutende Kapitel bezüglich der ideologischen Ziele und der verwaltungstechnischen Mängel, das für die junge Lehranstalt von besonderer Wichtigkeit war[7]. Gleichzeitig steckte er ideologisch und geographisch das Tätigkeitsfeld der neugegründeten Einrichtung ab[8].

Mit Artikel 2 der gleichen Verordnung wird Konstantinos Dimitriou Schinas (1801-1857)[9] zum ersten ordentlichen Professor für den Lehrstuhl der Geschichte in der Philosophischen Fakultät sowie auch zum Rektor der Universität ernannt. So war also der phanariotische Gelehrte und Politiker, der Jura, Philologie und Geschichte an den Universitäten Berlin, Bonn und Paris studiert hatte (1823-1828)[10], der erste Rektor des Ottoneions.

Gleichzeitig aber ist die Berufung Schinas auf den Rektorenstuhl die dritte und vielleicht schöpferischste Phase seines Lebens (1837-1849). Sie wird als Phase des Rektorats und der Professur bezeichnet und ist von seinem Lehrwerk und seiner wissenschaftlichen Integrität geprägt. Das bedeutet natürlich nicht, dass die übrigen Lebensphasen weniger inhaltsreich oder gar von geringerer Bedeutung waren.

Geburt und Jugend in Konstantinopel sowie die Studien Schinas in Westeuropa (1801-1828) sind die Ereignisse, welche die erste Phase seines Lebens ausmachen. Diese Phase steht auch im Zeichen der Bekanntschaft mit der Geschichte des Griechentums. Dagegen wird die zweite Phase (1828-1837) der Einwanderung des phanariotischen Gelehrten nach Griechenland, des Beginns seiner politischen Aktivität, wie auch letztendlich seiner vollständigen politischen Kaltstellung, von der erfolglosen Suche einer alternati-

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6. K. Th. Dimaras, *s.o.*, S. 34.

7. K. Th. Dimaras, *s.o.*, S. 12-15.

8. B. Sphiroeras, «Εκατόν πενήντα χρόνια του Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών (βραχύ χρονικό)», στο: *(1837-1987) Εκατόν Πενήντα Χρόνια* ("Hundertfünfzig Jahre Universität Athen (Kurze Chronik)", in: (1837-1987) Hundertfünfzig Jahre), Athen 1987, S. 12-19.

9. *Παγκόσμιο Βιογραφικό Λεξικό* (Internationales Biographisches Lexikon), Athen 1988, Bd. 9_2, S. 44; ebenfalls H. Gollwitzer, "Konstantin Demetrius Schinas und die 'ottonische' Ära Griechenlands. Aus einer neuen Quelle zur Geschichte des griechischen Königreichs und der deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen", in: *Festschrift für Max Spindler zum 75. Geburtstag*, München 1969, S. 709-742.

10. Die Fakten stammen aus den Archiven der Universitäten Berlin, Bonn und Paris.

ven politischen Rolle gekennzeichnet. Die vierte und letzte Lebensphase von Schinas (1849-1857) ist die seiner diplomatischen Tätigkeiten in Zentraleuropa. Das ist die Periode, die die endgültige ideologische Orientierung des phanariotischen Diplomaten zu Tage bringt[11].

Den eigentlichen Verfasser des provisorischen Statuts der ersten Universität müssen wir in der Person des Ignaz von Rudhardt suchen, der bei seinem Versuch systematisch von Christian-August Brandis unterstützt wurde[12].

Wenn man die Versuche der Bayern vor 1837, die griechische Universität gesetzlich zu verankern und somit ihren Grundstein zu legen, beurteilen will, ist es sicher, dass man erstens auf das vollendete Programm, das Friedrich von Thiersch für die Organisierung des griechischen Erziehungswesens 1832[13] und 1833[14] zusammenstellte, treffen wird; zweitens, dass man den Anstrengungen von Georg Ludwig von Maurer ebensolche Anerkennung zukommen lässt, welche aber wegen seiner vorzeitigen Abberufung nach München im Juli 1834 unvollendet blieben[15]; drittens, dass man die Versuche K. D. Schinas, die entsprechenden Gesetze der Universität Berlin zu besorgen, durchleuchten wird[16]; viertens, dass man die Bedeutung Alexanders Rizos Rangavis während der allgemeinen Vorbereitung des Universitätsstatuts untersuchen wird[17] und letztens wird man auch im politischen Geschehen der Zeit das Gesetz des 31.12.1836/12.1.1837 finden, das Maximilian Frey[18], Geheimrat des Joseph Ludwig von Armansperg, verfasste, aber von Otto nicht in Kraft gesetzt wurde.

Zusammenfassend sollte festgehalten werden, dass man im provisorischen Statut der griechischen Universität zwar genügend geliehene Elemente findet, welche allerdings keine Abschriften der entsprechenden Statute der europäischen Universitäten, wie z. B. Berlin, Göttingen, München und Paris sind. Wir müssen im Versuch der Verfasser des vorläufigen Statuts einen positiven Beitrag für eine möglichst gemässigte und kompromissbereite Zusammensetzung zwischen einheimischen Bedürfnissen und europäischen Neuerungen, welche stärker durch die deutschen Bildungsgesetze beeinflusst waren, sehen[19]. Am Ende der ersten Phase seines Rektorats (1837-1838) bestellte Schinas in gewissenhafter Anwendung des Art. 35 des provisorischen Statuts alle Mitglieder der akademischen Gemeinschaft "um über seine Verwaltungstätigkeit und die akademischen Ereignisse in diesem Zeitraum Rechenschaft abzulegen"[20].

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[11] A. Christou, "Die politische Korrespondenz von Friedrich Thiersch mit Konstantin Demetriou Shinas", in: *Friedrich Thiersch und die Gründung des Griechischen Staates aus der Sicht des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Athen 1990, S. 125-144.

[12] C.-A. Brandis, *Mittheilungen über Griechenland*, Leipzig 1843, Bd. 3.

[13] *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München* (im Folgenden: *BStB*), Nachlass Thierschiana I, Sign.: 87. Memorandum Friedrich von Thierschs an J. L. v. Armansperg (München, 20. Oktober 1832).

[14] Fr. v. Thiersch, *De l'état actuel de la Grèce et des moyens d'arriver à sa restauration*, Leipzig 1833, siehe die Kapitel über die Erziehung.

[15] *BStB*, Nachlass Maureriana, Sign.: III, 1.1., S. 19.

[16] *Universitätsbibliothek Münster*, Nachlass F. C. v. Savigny, Sign.: Kaps. 12.

[17] A. R. Rangavis, *Απομνημονεύματα* (Memoiren), Athen 1894, Bd. 1, S. 387f.

[18] L. Ross, *Erinnerungen und Mittheilungen aus Griechenland*, Berlin 1862, S. 101.

Der Rechenschaftsbericht des Rektors erweist sich als wesentlicher Wegweiser für die Untersuchung der Leistungen des ersten akademischen Jahres, weil es das zuverlässigste Schriftstück ist, das wir besitzen; es wurde zudem von der geeignetsten Person der Lehranstalt verfasst und vorgetragen. Das Informationsmaterial beschränkt sich jedoch nicht auf dieses Schriftstück. Im selben Zusammenhang gibt es auch Quellen von dieser Zeit, die nicht übersehen werden können, wie z. B. die Presse[21], die Protokolle des Akademischen Rats[22], schriftliche Zeugnisse in Bezug auf die Studenten[23] usw.

Es wäre U.K. ein Versäumnis, wenn an dieser Stelle nicht betont würde, dass die Sprache der untersuchten schriftlichen Quellen von semantischer Unbeständigkeit und Ausdrucksschwäche gekennzeichnet ist, was bis zu einem bestimmten Grad verständlich ist. In jener Zeit werden die ersten Schritte in Sachen Verwaltung und Organisierung des Staatsapparats unternommen und so ist es natürlich, dass einige der Versuche und Anstrengungen zu zweifelhaften Ergebnissen führten.

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[19] A. Christou, «Απόψεις σχετικά με την οργάνωση της εκπαίδευσης στις απαρχές της ίδρυσης του νεοελληνικού κράτους», στα: *Πρακτικά του ΙΑ' Πανελληνίου Ιστορικού Συνεδρίου* ("Ansichten bezüglich der Organisation der Erziehung in den Anfängen der Gründung des neugriechischen Staates", in: Sitzungsberichte des XI. panhellenischen Historikerkongresses), Thessaloniki 1991, S. 105-120.

[20] *Regierungsblatt*, Nr. 16, Athen, 24. April 1837.

[21] Über die Haltung der Presse gegenüber der Universität siehe das Werk von M. D. Stasinopoulos, *Τα πρώτα βήματα της ανωτάτης παιδείας μετά την απελευθέρωσιν* (Die ersten Schritte der Hochschulerziehung nach der Befreiung), Athen 1971, S. 28-29, 61, 66, 78, 83-84, 87 und 96-97.

[22] Die Protokolle des Akademischen Rats befinden sich in dem "Archiv der Nationalen Kapodistrischen Universität von Athen", im Folgenden: *ANKUA*. Mit dem Erlass "Über die Änderung der Benennung der Verwaltung der Universität" (Athen, 10./22. Oktober 1841) wurde der Akademische Rat in Akademischer Senat umbenannt siehe A. Bampas, *Οι Νόμοι του Εθνικού Πανεπιστημίου* (Die Gesetze der Nationalen Universität), Athen 1885, S. 54.

[23] A. Dimaras, *s.o.*, Bd. 1, S. 115-118; ebenfalls siehe A. Liakos, «Σκέψεις για την ιστορία του φοιτητικού κινήματος», στο: *Πανεπιστήμιο: Ιδεολογία και Παιδεία* ("Gedanken zur Geschichte der Studentenbewegung", in: Universität: Ideologie und Erziehung), Athen 1989, Bd. 1, S. 327-333.

Die Untersuchung des Profils der Universität wird demnach hauptsächlich durch den 15seitigen Bericht des Rektors geschehen, welcher den Titel trägt: "Rede, gehalten von K. D. Schinas am 3. Mai 1838, beinhaltet: Rechenschaftsbericht über die Leistungen an der Ottonischen Universität während der abgeschlossenen Verwaltungsperiode" (1838)[24].

Der Hauptteil der Rede Schinas wird vom ihm selbst in neun Teile gegliedert mit einem ganzseitigen Vorwort und einem kurzen Nachwort. Hier möchte ich einen kurzen Überblick über die Hauptpunkte der Rektorenrede bieten, damit wir das Spektrum der Probleme haben, welche die akademische Gesellschaft in den ersten Anfängen ihres Zusammenkommens beschäftigte.

Es ergeben sich folgende Themen:

1. Die Organisation der Verwaltung und die reibungslose Arbeit der Leitung der Anstalt.
2. Die Art der Anwerbung von Studenten und ihrer Immatrikulation; Einführung von Prüfungen für diegenigen ohne gymnasialen Abschluss.
3. Die Herausgabe von Informationsblättern über die Vorlesungen für die Studenten, d.h. die Zusammenstellung des ersten Studienführers.
4. Die rechtzeitige Veröffentlichung des Vorlesungsverzeichnisses, dem eine philologische Abhandlung vorangestellt sein musste.
5. Die ständig steigende Studentenzahl sowie die bewusste Verzögerung der Anordung über die Entrichtung von Lehrgeldern (Studiengebühren) durch die Studenten.
6. Der Lehrkörper, sein Verhalten sowie sein Beitrag für den harmonischen Ablauf der Dinge in der Lehranstalt.
7. Die Berufung eines Ausschusses, dessen Leiter Schinas war, mit dem Ziel der Verfassung des endgültigen Universitätsstatuts.
8. Die Einstellung von drei Privatdozenten durch die Philosophische Fakultät und letztlich.
9. Die Spende von Büchern an die Universitätsbibliothek durch Winthrop, Gouverneur eines der damaligen US-Staaten.

Im Vorwort hebt der Rektor das "wertvolle Privilleg der Vollversammlung der Professoren, ihre Vertreter aus den eigenen Reihen zu wählen"[25] hervor, im Rahmen ihrer Tagungen. Ziel und Ergebnis zugleich war eine relativ unabhängige Selbstverwaltung der Einrichtung. Ein pluralistischer Ablauf, der nicht ganz selbstverständlich für das politische Klima und den "monolithischen" Aufbau des Staatsapparates war. Laut Universitätsstatut "soll der Rektor jedes Jahr mit der absoluten Mehrheit nach zwei Namensvorschlägen gewählt werden. Die Fakultätsvorsitzenden dagegen werden in ihren Fakultäten mit einfacher (relativer) Mehrheit gewält"[26]. Bei der Wahl des Rektors schritt jedoch grundsätzich der Staat ein, indem er die Protokolle des Wahlgangs dem "Sekretariat für Kirchenangelegenheiten und staatlichen Erziehungswesens" zur Anerkennung vorlegte.

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[24] Der Rechenschaftsbericht des Rektors (im Folgenden: *Rede*) ist in gegenüberliegenden Seiten auch auf französisch veröffentlicht worden: *Université Othon. (Séance du 3 (15) Mai 1838). Discours de Mr. C. D. Schinas. (Compte rendu de la gestion 1837-1838).*

[25] *Rede*, S. 2-3.

Schinas versäumte auch nicht die vielfältigen Schwierigkeiten zu erwähnen, die er am Anfang der Gründung und Funktion der Anstalt bewältigen hatte. Schwierigkeiten, die allerdings durch ehrliche Zusammenarbeit und Solidaritätsgeist unter den Professoren überwunden wurden.

1. In der brennenden Frage um den Aufbau der Verwaltungsstrukturen der Hochschule lohnt sich eine Darstellung der ersten kleinen aber wichtigen organisatorischen Schritte. Trotz des Mangels an Fachpersonal wurde das Rektorenbüro von Schinas selber funktionsmässig eingerichtet[27]. Es wurden nicht nur die im Gründungserlass vorgesehenen Verzeichnisse und Protokollbücher zusammengestellt, numeriert und abgezeichnet, sondern auch noch zusätzlich solche, die als notwendig für spezielle Bedürfnisse erachtet wurden. Sie sind in insgesamt neun Kategorien eingeteilt worden:

I. Das Immatrikulations - und Exmatrikulationsverzeichnis der Studenten für die jeweiligen Fakultäten, wie im entsprechenden Erlass vorgeschrieben (Matrikelverzeichnis der Studenten)[28].
II. Das Protokollbuch der Konferenzen des Akademischen Rats[29].
III. Das Protokollbuch der Vollversammlungen aller Professoren der Universität[30].
IV. Die vier Protokollbücher der Versammlungen der vier Fakultäten.
V. Ein formloses Anwesenheitsbuch für den Besuch der Vorlesungen von staatlichen Angestellten.
VI. Das Protokollbuch des Rektorenbüros.

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[26] *Regierungsblatt*, Nr. 16, Athen, 24. April 1837, Art. 27.
[27] *ANKUA*, Protokolle des Akademischen Rats, Erste Tagung (11. Mai 1837).
[28] *Regierungsblatt*, Nr. 16, Athen, 24. April 1837, Art. 11 und 21.
[29] *Regierungsblatt*, Nr. 16, Athen, 24. April 1837, Art. 32.
[30] *Regierungsblatt*, Nr. 16, Athen, 24. April 1837, Art. 34.

VII. Das der Geschäftsleitung.
VIII. Das Notenbuch, in dem Fleiss und Verhalten der Studenten eingetragen wurden.
IX. Ein provisoriches Buch für die Buchführung, in dem die Finanzen der Anstalt niedergeschrieben wurden[31].

Aus dem oben angeführten ist leicht zu ersehen, wie gross die Anstrengungen des ersten Rektors waren, eine Institution aufzubauen, bei der er bei Null anfangen musste, da es in diesem Land bislang noch keine ähnliche Einrichtung gegeben hatte. Und trotzdem waren die Anstrengungen des Rektors erfolgreich. Das Ergebnis war, dass dieses Verwaltungssystem viele Jahre effektiv arbeitete[32].

2. Nach dem Organisatorischen widmet Schinas einen grossen Teil seiner Rede dem wichtigen Thema des Auditoriums, d.h. der Auswahl der Studenten und ihrer Einschreibung in die entsprechenden Fakultäten. Eine Frage, die in der Vergangenheit schon einige Zuständige beschäftigt hatte und ähnliche Versuche scheitern liess[33]. So verfolgte die Universität in bezug auf die Immatrikulation der Studenten zwei Wege. Nach dem ersten wurden Bewerber mit gymnasialem Abschluss (Abitur) aufgenommen und das waren die meisten, insgesamt 37. Davon hatten 31 ihr Abitur am Gymnasium in Athen, 5 in Nauplion und einer am Gymnasium von Syros. Parallel dazu wurden 15 weitere Kandidaten, die sich ohne Abitur beworben hatten, von einer Kommission geprüft, die aus dem Rektor Schinas, G. Gennadios und I. Bouros bestand[34].

So studierten im ersten Studienjahr 52 Studenten an der Ottonischen Universität, 22 davon Jura, 8 Theologie, 4 Medizin und 18 in der Philosophischen Fakultät. Zusätzlich gab es 75 ständige Zuhörer sowie eine Zahl freier Hörer, die ab und zu Jura-Vorlesungen besuchten[35]. Folglich kamen in die ersten Vorlesungen einige rein aus Lerneifer und Neugier und die Auditorien waren “nach Alter und äusserer Erscheinung bunt gemischt. Junge Leute und Schüler des Gymnasiums, Leute mittleren Alters und ältere, Trachtenträger und modern gekleidete, Männer in Priestergewand und andere in traditionellen Trachten aus den Inseln, alle sassen geduldig in den Hörsälen der Universität”[36].

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[31] Alle Bücher befinden sich im *ANKUA*.

[32] Das erste endgültige Universitätsstatut wurde mit den Gesetzen 3823 und 3825 (Juli 1911) festgelegt. Siehe Rektorat I. E. Messoloras, *Συλλογή Νόμων και Β. Διαταγμάτων. Περί Οργανισμού του Εθνικού και του Καποδιστριακού Πανεπιστημίου* (Sammlung von Gesetzen und Königlichen Erlassen. Über Statut der Nationalen und Kapodistrischen Universität), Athen 1916.

[33] Vergleiche die Ansichten, die Kapodistrias in bezug auf die allgemeinen Schwierigkeiten der Organisierung des Erziehungswesens im Rahmen der 4. Nationalversammlung der Griechen in Argos (Juli 1829) darstellte; siehe A. B. Daskalakis, *Κείμενα-Πηγαί της ιστορίας της Ελληνικής Επαναστάσεως. Σειρά τρίτη, Τα περί Παιδείας* (Texte-Quellen der Geschichte der griechischen Revolution. Dritte Serie. Über die Erziehung), Athen 1968, Bd. 1, S. 241-243 und 247-249.

[34] *Rede*, S. 4-7, ebenfalls siehe *ANKUA*, Protokolle des Akademischen Rats, Sechste Tagung (6. Oktober 1837).

Als beweglich und effektiv erwies sich die dreiköpfige Prüfungskommission in ihrer Auswahl der Bewerber ohne Abitur. Bei den jenigen, die sich für die medizinische Fakultät oder für die naturwissenschaftliche Abteilung der Philosophischen Fakultät bewarben, waren die Prüfer mild in ihren Fragen bezüglich des Allgemeinwissens, während sie bei den Bewerbern für Jura oder Philologie strenger waren.

Allgemein aber waren die Prüfer tolerant und “nachsichtig bei den Studenten, die aus dem Ausland kamen und vor hatten in Zukunft einen Beruf ausserhalb der Grenzen des Königreichs auszuüben”[37]. Eine Formulierung mit stark diplomatisch geprägtem und phanariotischem Charakter, die einerseits zwar ohne Schärfe aber andererseits sehr bestimmt ein sehr wichtiges Problem aufwarf: “Die griechische Universität eröffnete Vertretern des unbefreiten Griechentums ihre Tore mit besonderen Erleichterungen”[38]. Dadurch wurden indirekt aber entscheidend die ideologischen Ziele der neuen Erziehungsanstalt offengelegt und gleichzeitig eine erste Absteckung des Gebietes “Uns eigener Osten” unternommen. Ein Gebiet, das nach der Gründung des griechischen Staates den grössten Teil der griechisch orthodoxen Welt in seinem Schosse hielt, allerdings unter osmanischer Herrschaft.

Die Prüfungskommission sorgte darüberhinaus für das sensible Gleichgewicht zwischen einheimischen und zugewanderten Studenten; ausserdem wandte sie ein System an, das den Studenten mit mässigen Leistungen aber der Aussicht auf Verbesserung im ersten akademischen Jahr die Möglichkeit zur Wiederholung der Prüfung gab: ein System, das in deutschen Universitäten für Studenten mit ungleichen Ausbildungsmöglichkeiten Anwendung fand. Ein kultureller Einfluss aus Deutschland, der zusammen mit anderen eine bedeutende Rolle im Aufbau des ganzen griechischen Bildungssystems spielte[39].

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[35] *Rede*, S. 4-9.

[36] I. Pantazidis, *Χρονικόν της πρώτης πεντηκονταετίας του Ελληνικού Πανεπιστημίου* (Chronik der ersten fünfzig Jahre der griechischen Universität), Athen 1889, S. 30.

[37] *Rede*, S. 6-7.

[38] K. Th. Dimaras, *s.o.*, S. 39.

3. Revolutionär war die Massnahme des Rektors schon mit Inbertiebnahme der Universität, den ersten Studienführer zu verfassen, der von ihm "Informationen an die Studenten aller Fakultäten" genannt wurde. Sein Untertitel lautet: "Über das Verhältnis der verschiedenen Wissenschaften und über die während des Studiums an der Universität zu beachtende Ordnung" (Athen, 25 März 1838).

Er schlägt sogar "die Ermutigung aller Studenten zu einer allgemein wissenschaftlichen Ausbildung" vor und verteilt den Studienführer an alle. Offen lässt er die Frage der Studiendauer, obwohl der Art. 17 des vorläufigen Statuts von drei Jahren mit der Möglicheit einer ein - bis zweijährigen Verlängerung spricht.

Das wichtigste aber im ganzen Studienaufbau ist, dass den Studrnten das Recht gegeben wurde, ihr Vorlesungsprogramm frei nach persönlicher Wahl zusammenzustellen[40]. Ein Vorrecht, das man erst viel später in Universitäten mit ausführlichem Programm antreffen wird.

4. Im selben organisatorischen Rahmen wie der Studienaufbau ist auch die Initiative der rechtzeitigen Veröffentlichung der vorgesehenen Vorlesungen, nach Uhrzeit und Fakultät aufgelistet. So waren die Studenten schon zu Beginn des akademischen Jahres über das Vorlesungsangebot informiert und konnten in Ruhe ein für sie vorteilhaftes Vorlesungsprogramm zusammenstellen. Aber eigentliches Ziel des Rektors war, gleichzeitig mit dem Vorlesungsverzeichnis einen einführenden philologischen Aufsatz eines Professors zu veröffentlichen. Ein Usus, der in europäischen Universitäten konsequent und erfolgreich durchgeführt wurde.

Im Bereich dieser Initiative gehört die Veröffentlichung der Arbeit von Ludwig Ross "Archäologie der Insel Sikinos", Athen 1837 und der Arbeit von Misail Apostolidis "Das Leben und die Schriften des Heiligen Johannes von Damaskus", Athen 1838. Zweifellos dient dieser Versuch zunächst dem einfachen Wissens - und Meinungsaustausch innerhalb der akademischen

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[39] S. Phassoulakis, «Γερμανικές καταβολές του ελληνικού Πανεπιστημίου και ελληνικές αμφισβητήσεις του γερμανικού Πανεκιστημίου», στο: *Πανεπιστήμιο: Ιδεολογία και Παιδεία* ("Deutsche Einflüsse in der griechischen Universität und griechische Bean standungen in der deutschen Universität", in: Universität: Ideologie und Erziehung), Athen 1989, Bd. 1, S. 99-104.

[40] *Rede*, S. 8-9,

Gemeinschaft, aber darüber hinaus war es eine einfache Lösung, die Druckkosten gering zu halten[41]. Diese Taktik Schinas' wurde aber von seinen Nachfolgern an der Ottonischen Universität nicht weiter geführt, was langfristig zu einer Introvertierung der Forschungsinteressen der Professoren führte[42].

5. Mit besonderem Fingerspitzengefühl behandelt Schinas die Frage der Erhöhung der Studentenzahl in der neuen Ausbildungsanstalt aber auch den Aufschub der Zahlung von Lehrgeldern durch die Studenten. Es ist in der Tat vom Wintersemester 1837/38 bis zum Sommersemester 1838 ein Anstieg um 20 Studenten zu verzeichnen. Eine Tatsache, die einerseits die Lernbegierde und Neugier der Griechen, aber auch die Bedeutung und Rolle der unteren Erziehungsebenen zeigt. Ein Beispiel dafür ist das Gymnasium von Athen, dessen Schülerzahl sich nach der Eröffnung des Ottoneions von 200 auf 530 erhöhte.

Bezeichnend für die geniale Verwaltungsfähigkeiten des phanariotischen Rektors ist seine Initiative, die Einnahme der Einschreibgebühren auf eigene Verantwortung zu verzögern. Als Garantie für diese Massnahme erklärte sich Schinas sogar bereit, den Verlust in Höhe von 320 Drachmen aus der eigenen Tasche abzudecken[43]. Soweit brauchte es aber nicht zu kommen, denn es schritt der Staat mit dem Erlass des 7./19. März 1838 "Über die 'Nicht-Einnahme' der Gelder von den Studenten der Universität" ein und gab folgende Lösung: "Urteilend, dass bis zur Anerkennung eines endgültigen Statuts dieser Einrichtung von den Studenten keine Gelder eingenommen werden dürfen"[44].

Mit dieser gesetzlichen Regelung wurde realistisch die Forderung nach der Verfassung des endgültigen gesetzlichen Rahmens der ersten Hochschule gestellt und mit der Entrichtung der Studiengebühren direkt in Verbindung gesetzt. Die Verbindung der endgültigen Festlegung des Gesetzes mit der Einnahme der Lehrgelder wirkte sich günstig für die Studenten aus, da die Festlegung des Gesetzes lange auf sich warten liess.

Hier muss allerdings erwähnt werden, dass die schlechte finanzielle Lage des Landes und somit auch die der Studenten in den ersten Jahren beim Aufschub der Zahlungsforderungen von seiten der Universität ernsthaft mit-berücksichtigt wurden. Eine wichtige Rolle für die Massnahme spielte auch die Überzeugung, dass die Universität im Raum des unterdrückten Griechentums eine bedeutende kulturelle und nationale Aufgabe erfüllte. Dies war einer der Hauptpunkte der Politik der "Grossen Idee" (Megali Idea).

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[41] *Rede*, S. 8-11.

[42] I. Pantazidis, *s.o.*, S. 45-46, siehe ebenfalls in dem *ANKUA*, Protokolle des Akademischen Rats, Sechzehnte Tagung (14. Mai 1838).

[43] *Rede*, S. 10-13.

[44] A. Bampas, *s.o.*, S. 51.

So blieb die Frage der Studiengebühren aufgrund der ideologischen Überzeugung für Erleichterungen gegenüber den Auslandsgriechen weiterhin offen- Aber nicht für lange, denn die Entwicklungen in diesem Bereich werden gegen Ende der 50er Jahre spürbar und es machten sich erste Anflüge von Zweifeln an der Universität bemerkbar. Es handelt sich hierbei um die Probleme, die einerseits durch den unverhofften Anstieg der Studentenzahl[45] und andererseits durch die immer stärkere Politisierung und Radikalisierung der Studentenschaft entstanden sind[46].

Aus dieser Perspektive betrachtet nimmt das Problem der Studiengebühren politische Ausmasse an und wird zum wichtigsten Tauziehen zwischen den verschiedenen Interessengruppen der Zeit. Endgültige Lösung brachte das Sondergesetz Nr. 254 des 31. Juli 1892 der Regierung Charilaos Trikoupis, welches Gebühren für die mittlere und höhere Erziehungsebenen auferlegte[47].

6. Die Tatsache, dass die Bedeutung der Professoren für den Aufbau der neuen Lehranstalt besonders hervorgehoben werden, ist nicht zufälling. Dies geschieht m.E. aus zwei Gründen: erstens, weil der Verfasser eine klare Botschaft an die Vorsitzenden des "Erziehungssekretariats" (Erziehungsministerium) schicken will, dass die Zahl der Professoren gering und die technische Ausstatung mangelhaft seien. Zweitens, weil Schinas glaubt, den äusserst wertvollen Beitrag seiner Kollegen für den reibungslosen Ablauf der Dinge in der Hochschule moralisch unterstützen zu müssen.

Ihre konstruktive Mitarbeit zeigt sich sowohl in den von ihnen vorgeschlagenen Massnahmen für die Befriedigung bestimmter Bedürfnisse der Einrichtung als auch in der Reife und Konsequenz, mit der sie trotz fehlender Erfahrung die Vorstandswahl angingen[48].

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[45] I. Pantazidis, *s.o.*, Tafel A'.

[46] Manifestation von "Skiadika" (Studentische Bewegung - Mai 1859) und Gründung der Universitäts - Phalanx (Oktober 1862).

[47] K. Lappas, «Το ζήτημα των διδάκτρων στο Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών κατά το 19ο αιώνα», στο: *Προσεγγίσεις στις νοοτροπίες των βαλκανικών λαών (15ος-20ός αι.)* ("Das Problem der Studiengebühren an der Universität Athen im 19. Jahrhundert", in: Annäherungen der Mentalitäten der Balkanvölker (15.-20. Jhrd.)), Athen 1988, S. 131-152, genauer siehe S. 144.

[48] *Rede*, S. 12-13, auch in dem *ANKUA*, Protokolle des Akademischen Rats, Neunte Tagung (30. Januar 1838).

Das aktive und passive Wahlrecht, welches zweimal von den Professorne im Rahmen ihrer Vollversammlung in Anspruch genommen wurde, machte die Fähigkeit zur Selbstverwaltung sowie die Selbständigkeit der neuen Lehranstalt deutlich[49]. Dieses System setzte sich einfach und schnell in einigen Bereichen durch, während es in anderen arg hinterherhinkte[50].

7. Den umstrittenen Punkt der Fertigstellung des endgültigen Statuts der Universität, welcher die Akademiker 75 Jahre lang beschäftigte, behandelt Schinas kurz in einen eigenen Kapitel, gibt aber gleichzeitig alle nötigen Informationen. Gemäss Art. 1 der Gründungsverordnung des 22. Aprils 1837 hatte ein Ausschuss ernannt werden müssen, mit ausschliesslichem Ziel die Zusammenstellung des betreffenden Statuts. Dies geschah auch, der Ausschuss mit Vorsitzendem den ersten Rektor[51] wurde sofort gebildet und er kam auch zu einem konkreten Ergebnis. Dazu gab K. D. Schinas am 3./15. Mai 1838 bekannt: "Die oben erwähnten definitiven Regelungen für die Universität ... sind seit langem verfasst worden ... Das Gesamtwerk wurde vor angemessener Frist dem "Sekretariat für Kirchenangelegenheiten und staatlichen Erziehungswesens" vorgelegt, so dass wir hoffen nach Annahme und Anerkennung dieses Gesetzesvorschlages durch S.M., bald über ein vollständiges Universitätsstatut zu verfügen"[52].

Wenn man die bekannten Schwankungen und Inkonsequenzen der akademischen Kreise bezüglich der Zusammenstellung und Anerkennung eines definitiven Statuts für die Universität während der 75 Jahre nach ihrer Gründung im Nachhinein bewertet, wird man die oben angeführte Äusserung des ersten Rektors sicher als Feuerwerk oder als Verzögerungstaktik ansehen. Trotzdem ist die Äusserung des Rektors alles andere als eine diplomatische Floskel. Wie aus indirekten Äusserungen, welche sich in den Dokumenten des privaten Archivs von Schinas[53] befinden, hervorgeht, ist die Aufrichtigkeit des Rektors erwiesen.

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[49] *ANKUA*, Protokolle der Vollversammlungen der Universität, siehe die ersten drei Tagungen; siehe auch die Protokolle des Akademischen Rats, Achte Tagung (22. Januar 1838).

[50] A. Bampas, *s.o.*, S. 31-35 siehe die Erlasse bezüglich freigewordenes Lehrstuhls.

[51] Γενικά Αρχεία του Κράτους (Allgemeine Staatsarchive) (Athen), Ottonisches Archiv, II. Erziehungssekretariat, A. Universität, Akte 32: In den Ausschuss für die Zusammenstellung des endgültigen Universitätsstatus wurden berufen: K. Schinas, N. Bambas, M. Apostolidis, G. Gennadios, E. Ulrich, G. Rallis, L. Ross, Th. Pharmakidis und A. Rangavis.

[52] *Rede*, S. 12-13.

[53] Εθνική Βιβλιοθήκη Ελλάδος (Nationalbibliothek Griechenlands), Handschriften- und Inkunabel-Abteilung, Archiv K. Schinas - P. Argyropoulos, A 13268.

Trotztdem ist nach meiner Kenntnis der Bibliographie über den behandelten Zeitraum nichts über eine vollständige juristische Ausarbeitung des Universitätsstatuts während des ersten akademischen Jahres geschrieben worden. Die erwähnte Bekanntmachung ist aber aus offiziellem Munde und mit grosser Sicherheit über das Ergebnis der Anstrengung geschehen, da das Statut als ausgewogen für die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Verwaltung und Fakultäten charakterisiert wurde[54].

So entsteht freilich die Forderung nach einer Aufklärung der Aussage des Rektors über die erste Umänderung des Statuts von 1838 durch die Forschung. Eine Forderung die sowohl eine methodische Untersuchung im Archiv der Universität von Athen als auch die gleichzeitige Unterstützung und Bestätigung durch die Bibliographie voraussetzt.

8. Mit der Einstellung der drei Gelehrten J. Benthylos, S. Wilke und K. Tissavas als Privatdozenten in der Philosophischen Fakultät, mit dem Ziel unentgeldlich philologische Vorlesungen zu halten. schneidet Schinas kurz das Thema der Erneuerung und Neueinstellung von Lehrpersonal an der Universität an.

Natürlich haben sich die Verfasser des Gründungsgesetzes ausführlich über dieses Thema in einer Gruppe von fünf Artikeln mit dem Titel: "Über Professoren und Lehrer" (Art. 6-10) ausgelassen. Besonderes Gewicht hat der Artikel 6, da mit ihm 45 Jahre lang der Modus der Einstellung der Professoren geregelt wurde: "Die Professoren erhalten von uns sofort die Berufung, wenn sie vom 'Sekretariat für Kirchenangelegenheiten und staatlichen Erziehungswesens' vorgeschlagen sind"[55]. So wurde jede Beteiligung, sogar jegliche Meinungsäusserung von Seiten der Universität, die als einzige die Kompetenz hatte, wissenschaftliches Werk kritisch zu bewerten, ausgeschlossen.

In die gleiche Richtung zielte auch Art. 9, mit dem das hierarchische System der Hochschullehrer festgelegt wurde. Dieses System galt für viele Jahre und sah folgende Grade vor: "Das Personal der Hochschullehrer setz sich zusammen aus:

1. Ordentlichen Professoren;
2. Honorarprofessoren;
3. Ausserordentlichen Professoren;
4. Dozenten für besondere Übungen, Wiederholungen von Vorlesungen und Sprachstunden"[56].

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[54] *Rede*, S. 12-13.

[55] *Regierungsblatt*, Nr. 16, Athen, 24. April 1837, Art. 6.

[56] *Regierungsblatt*, Nr. 16, Athen, 24. April 1837, Art. 9.

Für das bessere Verständnis dieser Professorenpyramide und der Bewerglichkeit in ihr hilft uns der Art. 10: "Das Recht, den Studenten an der Universität Unterricht zu erteilen, soll den Privatdozenten von den Fakultäten gegeben werden, (vorbehaltlich der Zustimmung des 'Sekretariats für staatliches Erziehungswesen') an solche, die dafür ausgebildet sind ... Die Privatdozenten als solche sollen nicht das Recht auf Beförderung und Lohnzahlung haben. Wenn sie sich in angemessenem Zeitraum als nützlich für die Universität erweisen, sollen sie bei Neueinstellungen von Professoren berückisichtigt werden"[57].

Es wird also deutlich, dass der Staat mit besonderer Aufmerksamkeit und Strenge die Universität schon von den ersten Jahren ihrer Gründung an kontrollierte. Und das wurde nicht nur durch die zentrale Auswahl und Einstellung der Professoren erreicht, sondern auch durch die strenge Kontrolle der Erziehung und des allgemeinen gesellschaftlichen Umgangs der Studenten[58].

Die unkontrollierbaren staatlichen Eingriffe bei der Einstellung von Professoren wurden durch zwei Erlasse in den Jahren 1882 und 1883 zum Teil eingeschränkt. Der erste "Über die Art der Neubesetzung eines freigewordenen Lehrstuhls" vom 9. April 1882 und der zweite "Über die Art der Durchführung einer Ausschreibung zur Neubesetzung eines freigewordenen Lehrstuhls" vom 28. Februar 1883[59]; beide veränderten das innerunversitäre Gleichgewicht, indem sie der Professorenschaft Wort und Macht gaben.

So war bis 1882 die einzige Möglichkeit der Erneuerung des akademischen Personals die Einstellung der jenigen Professoren, die der Staat vorschrieb. Auch nach 1882 ging die Einstellung nach dem staatlichen System vor sich, aber jetzt mit der teilweisen Mitsprache und Beteiligung der Professoren. Trotzdem gab es neben diesem staatlichen System für de Neueinstellungen auch ein alternatives: die langjährige freie Mitarbeit mit dem Ziel der festen Einstellung. Diese alternative Lösung war nichts anderes als die leidgeprüfte Möglichkeit der Habilitierung[60]. Im vorliegenden Fall waren die Privatdozenten, die nicht das Recht des Aufstiegs und der Bezahlung hatten, entsprechend Art. 10 des vorläufigen Statuts die Habilitanden.

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[57] *Regierungsblatt*, Nr. 16, Athen, 24. April 1837, Art. 10.

[58] *Regierungsblatt*, Nr. 16, Athen, 24. April 1837, Art. 11-26. Siehe ebenfalls die Ausfuhrungen von K. Tsoukalas bezüglich der sozialen Wandlung, welche die Universität innerhalb und ausserhalb des Griechischen Staates bewirkte; in K. Tsoukalas, *Εξάρτηση και αναπαραγωγή. Ο κοινωνικός ρόλος των εκπαιδευτικών μηχανισμών στην Ελλάδα (1830-1922)* (Abhängigkeit und Reproduktion. Die soziale Rolle des Erziehungswesens in Gtiechenland (1830-1922)), Athen 1985, S. 430-448.

[59] A. Bampas, *s.o.*, S. 31-35.

[60] K. Lappas, «Το διδακτικό προσωπικό του Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών τον ΙΘ' αιώνα», στο: *Πανεπιστήμιο: Ιδεολογία και Παιδεία* ("Das Lehrpersonal der Universität Athen

Die Regelungen bezüglich der Habilitation entstanden in der Zeit von 1841-1870 vorallem mit dem Erlass "Über Privatdozenten" vom 3. November 1841 und mit dem Erlass "Über die Prüfung von Privatdozenten" vom 23. Oktober 1843 sowie fünf ministeriellen Verfügungen[61].

9. Auf die Bücherspende des amerikanischen Gouverneurs Winthrop, an die Bibliothek des Ottoneions[62] bezieht sich der Rektor ziemlich ausführlich. Dadurch schneidet er einerseits das Problem des Materialmangels und der unzureichenden technischen Ausstattung an; andererseits weist er direkt auf die Tatsache des Einflusses, welchen die erste Lehranstalt des Ostens als kultureller Mittelpunkt ausübte, hin. Eine zweifellos grossartige und zugleich attraktive Aussicht, welche als Ziel die Mobilisierung aller Kräfte des Griechentums hatte, damit sie ihrem Beitrag zur Etablierung und Stärkung der neuen Institution leisteten[63].

Im kurzen Nachwort drückt der phanariotische Professor seine Erkenntlichkeit an alle seine Mitarbeiter und Helfer aus, die sich mit ihm um den Aufbau der Lehranstalt bemüht hatten. Er vergass natürlich auch nicht in diplomatischer Sprache seinen Dank für seine Wiederwahl zum Rektor bei der Magistratswahl am 12. März 1838[64] zu äussern. Er lehnte sie allerdings fünf Tage später während der Vollversammlung am 17. März[65] unter dem Vorwand gesundheitlicher Gründe ab.

Mit dem Rechenschaftsbericht übergab Schinas in konsequenter Anwendung des Art. 35 des provisorischen Statuts die Verwaltung der Ottonischen Universität seinem Nachfolger, dem Professor für Handelsrecht an der Juristischen Fakultät G. A. Rallis. Rallis seinerseits hielt eine knappe Rede. Er

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im 19. Jahrhundert", in: Universität: Ideologie und Erziehung), Athen 1989, Bd 1, S. 137-147, genauer siehe S. 141-145.

[61] A. Bampas, *s.o.*, S. 41-45.

[62] *Regierungsblatt*, Nr. 1, Athen, 4. Januar 1839 siehe: "Bekanntmachung der verschiedenen Angebote an die Bibliothek der Ottonischen Universität", ebenfalls siehe in dem *ANKUA*, Protokolle des Akademischen Rats, Zwölfte Tagung (2. Marz 1838).

[63] *Rede*, S. 14-15.

[64] *ANKUA*, Protokolle der Vollversammlungen der Universität, Zweite Tagung (12. März 1838).

[65] *ANKUA*, Protokolle der Vollversammlungen der Universität, Dritte Tagung (17. März 1838). Es lohnt sich die Diskussion während der Tagung am 17.3.1838 zu verfolgen. In ihrem Mittelpunkt war der Rücktritt von K. D. Schinas vom Posten des Rektors und die Besetzung des Rektorenstuhls durch den zweiten in Wahlgang am 12.3.1838 G. A. Rallis.

bewegte sich im selben Rahmen wie Schinas und skizzierte die Hauptlinien, auf denen sich seine Initiativen bewegen würden[66].

Es muss betont werden, dass die Frage der Erneuerung des akademischen Personals, die 1882 behelfsmässig und vorübergehend gelöst wurde, in Zusammenhang mit der Frage der Lehrgelder betrachtet werden muss. Sie wurde zehn Jahre später, 1892, endgültig geregelt. Beide zusammen mit der wichtigen Forderung nach der Fertigstellung des endgültigen Universitätsstatuts, die erst 1911 mit relativ langfristiger Aussicht erfüllt wurde, bildeten eine der Hauptachsen, um die sich Kämpfe und Ideale, der Professoren und Studenten, aber auch der ganzen Gesellschaft drehten und entwickelten.

Die neue Lehranstalt musste eine ideologische und nationale Aufgabe erfüllen; sie musste aber genauso den Verwaltungsbedürfnissen des neugegründeten griechischen Staates Genüge tun. Es gab sicherlich genügend Lücken und es sind wahrscheinlich einige Fehler beim Aufbau der neuen Institution zu verzeichnen. Trotzdem bleibt der Gründungsakt der neuen Hochschule ein Ereignis von grosser historischer Bedeutung, weil sie ab 1837 für fast ein ganzes Jahrhundert ausschliesslich für die geistige Erziehung des Griechentums zuständing war. Zweifellos waren auch die Gründerväter in Kenntnis von der Grösse ihrer Tat. Man darf jedoch die Lernschwierigkeiten und Gewissenskonflikte in Zusammenhang mit der allgemeinen Auseinandersetzung um das Problem der Sprache, die das archaische Klima in der Universität den nachfolgenden Generationen verursachte, nicht verheimlichen. Ein wichtiger Punkt, der einen langen Schatten auf die kulturellen Perspektiven des 155 jährigen Bestehens der akademischen Institution wirft.

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[66] *ANKUA*, Protokolle der Vollversammlungen der Universität, Vierte Tagung (3. Mai 1838).

Documents

LA POLITIQUE DU SULTAN HAMIT II ENVERS LES CHRÉTIENS, VUE PAR LES DIPLOMATES FRANÇAIS (1897)

Introduction

Après la guerre gréco-turque de 1897 et les succès militaires des Turcs, des diplomates français en poste à Constantinople constatent la résurgence du panislamisme. Le texte que j'ai l'honneur de vous présenter[1] provient des archives du Ministère français des Affaires Étrangères[2]. Son rédacteur est à l'époque, l'attaché de l'Ambassade de France à Constatntinople, R. Clausse. Le document est daté du 27 octobre 1897 et a été rédigé sur la demande du directeur de M. Clausse, vraisemblablement le conseiller de la même ambassade. Celui-ci, dans un rapport joint[3] qu'il adresse au ministre français des Affaires Étrangères de l'époque, Hanotaux (1896-98)[4], écrit que le rédacteur du document a été proposé depuis quelques mois par l'ambassadeur de France à Constantinople[5] à un avancement au rang de 3ème secrétaire de l'Ambassade. Clausse rédige son mémoire à la suite de l'étude d'autres mémoires de collaborateurs de l'ambassade ainsi que de la presse quotidienne et périodique dont il dispose à l'ambassade. Le mémoire est considéré comme une étude "consciencieuse", qui a été rédigée par un subordonné sur la demande de son directeur, au sujet de la politique de l'époque (en 1897) du Sultan Hamit II envers les chrétiens. Enfin, le mémoire, dont le titre est *La politique du Sultan et le Panislamisme après la guerre turco-grecque,* porte le sceau du bureau du ministre en date du 31 octobre 1897, ainsi que, pour avoir été confié à la Direction des Affaires Politiques du ministère, la date du 1er novembre 1897.

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[1] Communication qui a été donnée en grec au 7ème Congrès International d'Etudes, du Sud-Est Européen (Thessalonique, 29 août - 4 septembre 1994).

[2] Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères français, Turquie, Nouvelle série, vol. 165, série B, Carton 58, Dossier 6, ff. 191^a-215^b.

[3] Op. cit. ff. 189^a-190.

[4] Albert-Auguste-Gabriel Hanotaux est ministre plénipotentiaire de la France du 30 avril 1896 au 27 juin 1898. Voir B. G. Spiridonakis, *Empire Ottoman; Inventaire des mémoires et documents aux archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France*, Thessalonique, (Institut for Balkan Studies, n° 132), 1973, p. 448.

[5] Pierre-Paul Cambon est ambassadeur de France à Constantinople de 1891 à 1898. Voir B. G. Spiridonakis, *op. cit.*, p. 460.

Le rédacteur considère que la victoire de l'armée ottomane sur les Grecs en Thessalie en 1897 a provoqué une résurgence du panislamisme de l'Afrique aux Indes. Les gouvernements des états européens, dit-il, semblent incapables devant un tel phénomène d'influer en faveur des chrétiens. La presse quotidienne de Constantinople tient ses renseignements du Palais et du gouvernement, et les trois nouveaux journaux *Chalumat, Sabah* et *Ikdam* ne font qu'exalter la gloire de l'islam et ne cessent d'accuser les gouvernements des puissances européennes d'entraver chaque fois que celles-ci interviennent dans les affaires ottomanes les relations entre les musulmans et les rayas. Tandis que dans les mosquées les prédicateurs ravivent les sentiments patriotiques du peuple musulman, les autorités ne délivrent qu'avec difficulté les autorisations de se déplacer à l'intérieur du pays aux touristes étrangers et aux archéologues. D'ailleurs, selon le rédacteur, l'Anatolie est devenue aussi difficile d'abord pour les étrangers que l'est à la même époque la China centrale. En Turquie, la vie est devenue difficile pour les ressortissants et les militaires français qui travaillent pour les services de l'État turc, et c'est la raison pour laquelle nombreux sont ceux qui quittent le pays. Les Turcs n'essaient pas de faciliter la vie des Français dans leur pays, et, par exemple, ne reconnaissent même pas les diplômes de la Faculté de Médecine de Beyrouth. Il est désormais difficile, sinon impossible, d'obtenir un firman pour ouvrir une école ou une église chrétienne[6]. L'administration publique a généralement un comportement hostile envers les employés d'Europe occidentale.

Pire est la façon dont sont traités ceux qui sont soumis au Sultan dans les provinces de l'Empire[7]. Aucune des réformes qui ont été annoncées en Europe n'a commencé. Dans la région de Trébizonte, la seule réforme qui a débuté est l'arrêt provisoire des massacres. Selon le général Chakir Pacha, les musulmans en étaient non pas les instigateurs mais les victimes. Il soutient également que les Européens, avec les discours qu'ils adressent aux pauvres musulmans sur la liberté et la civilisation, font germer des idées révolutionnaires. La politique du Sultan divise le peuple. Les Kurdes ne cessent de faire des actes de banditisme et ne relâchent pas les femmes chrétiennes qu'ils enlèvent. La police locale n'intervient pas. Les tribunaux et le palais assurent l'impunité pour les méfaits commis à l'encontre des chrétiens[8]. Les collecteurs d'impôts achèvent la faillite d'un état un décomposition. Les habitants des provinces sont sans défense. Une cohabitation pacifique semble irréalisable et les réformes restent lettre morte. La nouvelle victoire de l'armée ottomane et le fanatisme des musulmans font désormais obstacle à une coexistence pacifique entre chrétiens et musulmans dans les provinces. Le droit du plus fort est de retour avec des retombées négatives dans le commerce, l'artisanat et l'agriculture. L'intervention des gouvernements étrangers devient difficile et chimérique par rapport à ce qu'elle était par le passé. Tout pousse à croire que le pays va vers l'anarchie. La nouvelle victoire des Turcs provoque la terreur chez les rayas. Tous les Grecs qui tentent de se réfugier sur le territoire grec sont punis de mort et les Arméniens qui résistent sont décimés, et cela en vue de leur extermination. Le raya chrétien humilié est impuissant devant le musulman[9]. Le rédacteur du mémoire juge la situation sans remède et ajoute que les interventions des ambassadeurs et des consuls n'auront que des incidences limitées car, selon lui, une intervention n'a jamais de résultat: les Turcs font des promesses, mais on ne voit jamais aucun résultat concret. Le rédacteur propose enfin l'intervention permanente de la France en faveur des chrétiens de l'Empire ottoman[10].

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[6] Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères français, Turquie, Nouvelle Série, vol. 165, série B, Carton 58, Dossier 6, f. 195^a.

[7] Op. cit. f. 195^b.

La question de la Crète ne peut être réglée ni par l'envoi d'une armée internationale ni par l'intervention, effective, de l'armée ottomane. Et c'est ce qui, selon le rédacteur, éternise les rixes. La difficulté vient du fait que le Sultan ne retire pas ses troupes. Par ailleurs, les presses turque et allemande ont écrit que les Européens, qui ont promis de pacifier la Crète, ont contribué à la dégradation des relations entre les populations chrétienne et musulmane de l'île. Le journal *Sabah* a érit que le Sultan va interdire le droit d'intervention aux grandes puissances en Crète, puisque celles-ci n'ont jusque là apporté aucun résultat. Le rédacteur considère aussi que les réformes ne sont plus appliquées en Crète alors que le Sultan avait fait des promesses à ce sujet le 7 mars 1897 et que des rumeurs avaient même circulé sur une prétendue installation d'un gouverneur ottoman dans l'île[11]. Enfin, le rédacteur prévoit

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[8] Op. cit. f. 199.
[9] Op. cit. f. 201.
[10] Op. cit. f. 203.
[11] Op. cit. f. 205^b.

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des difficultés dans la résolution de la question crétoise dues au fait que les Ottomans ont gagné la guerre gréco-turque de 1897.

Le rédacteur considère les conséquences de cette victoire inquiétante pour la tranquillité des pays civilisés et pour la résolution des questions crétoise et arménienne. Après la victoire de l'armée ottomane, la Turquie encourage le prosélytisme panislamique particulièrement au Kurdistan, en Tripolitaine et dans les possessions européennes où le califat de Constantinople exerce son pouvoir religieux. Le Sultan redoute les idées libérales. C'est la raison pour laquelle le palais utilise davantage les Kurdes. Les mouvements et les révoltes sont incessants dans l'est de l'Empire. D'ailleurs, pour étouffer ces révoltes des Arméniens, le Sultan utilise les Kurdes qui vont piller les villages arméniens. Le maréchal Kurde Zekki Pacha s'est rendu maître de la région. Il est lié à la famille du Sultan, mais, en même temps, veut agir seul. Il nomme et renvoie lui-même des fonctionnaires en abusant du pouvoir que lui donne le gouvernement ottoman.

De la Libye au Maroc, des envoyés du Sultan féchauffent le fanatisme musulman, et en faveur du califat de Constantinople. Le cheik Zafer qui dirige toute cette action depuis Yldiz a des contacts incessants avec les cheiks de la Mecque et les responsables des différents grands groupes religieux islamiques. D'autre part, le Sultan, dans cet effort pour exploiter l'enthousiasme du peuple à la suite de la victoire de son armée, a envoyé des agents secrets en Tripolitaine, à Tunis, jusqu'aux frontières de l'Algérie, dans le but d'étendre la zone d'influence du califat de Constantinople. Au Soudan, des agent du Sultan veulent faire nommer un gouverneur. En Tripolitaine, alors que les Arabes refusaient auparavant d'entrer dans l'armée, sont organisés des corps d'armée. La propagande est telle parmi les populations ottomanes de l'est de l'Empire que les tribus indiennes, qui sont aux frontières des colonies britanniques et pour qui "européen" signifie "anglais", en apprenant la victoire de l'armée ottomane en Europe, ont cru que les Turcs avaient vaincu les Anglais... Cette situation doit provoquer une réaction de l'Europe et le premier cri d'alarme vient de Londres. La presse anglaise fait savoir que le Sultan pousse en secret les Indiens à se révolter contre les Anglais. On rapporte encore que l'émir Abdur-Rahman d'Afghanistan a envoyé une délégation à Constantinople. Lorsque les Anglais protestent à Constantinople, les Turcs démentent tout. Le journal anglais *Standart* entreprend de s'attaquer à la Turquie en mettant en doute les droits du califat de Constantinople avec la publication d'articles politico-religieux signés par le grand shérif de la Mecque. Dans le même but circulent des brochures qui proviennent de l'université religieuse du Caire. Derrière ces actions, il faut chercher, selon le rédacteur du mémoire, la volonté politique anglaise d'enrayer le panislamisme qui est à l'origine des soulèvements des tribus indiennes. Mais la presse allemande veut, à la suite d'une intervention turque, minimiser le facteur anglais en attribuant les mouvements contre le califat de Constantinople à des mouvements de groupes religieux islamiques. Il est un fait, conclut le rédacteur, que d'une victoire facile un état ne peut acquérir aucune gloire, ni se présenter comme un organisme sain quand il est économiquement en faillite. Mais cette victoire militaire n'a fait que retarder d'un peu la chute, inéluctable selon le rédacteur, de l'Empire ottoman.

Et le rédacteur a raison. La chute ne tarde pas à venir. Simplement, "la victoire militaire (de 1897) n'a fait que la retarder d'un peu". Même si le mémoire n'est pas prophétique, il est un fait que le "grand malade" n'a pas été guéri, surtout avec l'arrivée du XXème siècle et bien qu'une constitution soit accordée en 1908.

Mais voyons les textes.

Institut d'Études Balkaniques CONSTANTIN PAPOULIDIS

Ambassade de France
près
la Porte Ottomane
Direction Politique
Midi
No 241

Thérapia, 26 Octobre 1897

Envoie d'un travail de M. Clausse,
sur la politique du Sultan et le
Panislamisme.

Son Excellence
Monsieur Hanotaux
Ministre des Affaires Étrangères

Monsieur le Ministre,

M. Clausse, Attaché à cette Ambassade à qui j'avais demandé d'appécier dans un rapport la politique actuelle du Sultan à l'égard des Chrétiens en basant son opinion sur les éléments d'informations que possède l'Ambassade, vient de me remettre son travail.

C'est une étude consciencieuse que je recommande très specialement à l'attention de Votre Excellence; la recrudescence de l'orgueil des Musulmans et les difficultés constantes qui en sont la conséquence ou de leurs privilèges, le rôle agressif et tout nouveau que le Sultan fait jouer à la presse turque, tous ces faits devraient être signalés et font l'objet dans ce travail de remarques fort justifiées.

M. Clausse a donné la preuve de soin et de l'intérêt avec lesquels il a suivi les travaux de l'Ambassade et pris connaissance des rapports de nos agents; il a montré aussi un réel esprit d'observation et du jugement. Je suis heureux d'avoir à signaler chez cet Attaché proposé il y a quelques mois par l'Ambassadeur pour le grade du troisième secrétaire, des qualités de travail et d'intelligence qui lui donnent des titres sérieux à la bienveillance de Votre Excellence.

Veuillez agréer les assurances du respect avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être

Monsieur le Ministre
de Votre Excellence
le très humble et très
obéissant serviteur
J. De la Bouiliniere

La Politique du Sultan et le Panislamisme après la guerre turco-grecque

Les succès de l'armée ottomane en Thessalie et en Grèce ont eu un grand retentissement dans tout le monde Musulman. En apportant un surcroit de confiance et de force aux populations mahométanes de l'Empire, la victoire a donné une autorité nouvelle à l'Administration du Sultan dans les Provinces, fortifié la diplomatie impériale en Europe et doné d'un nouvel essor l'idée panislamique en Afrique et jusque dans les Indes. L'orgueil, jadis assagi, du conquérant s'est trouvé tout-à-coup ravivé et voici qu'après des siècles de torpeur, les puissances latentes de l'Islam s'éveillent à nouveau, donnant naissance à un ensemble de faits qui méritent tout au moins d'attirer l'attention. Peut-être n'est-il pas inutile, dès à présent de préciser quelques uns de ces faits et d'en évaluer la portée.

Le Sultan attribue visiblement les ménagements des Cabinets européens vis à vis de son Gouvernement à la révélation récente qu'ils ont eue de la vitalité et de la puissance persistantes de l'Empire Ottoman. Et si même la longue expérience qu'il a acquise de la politique des Etats européens l'avertir que la lenteur apportée dans la solution des questions pendantes provient, pour la plus grande part, des difficultés d'une entente rapide entre les Grandes Puissances, tous ses actes tendent à présenter à ses sujets l'Europe chrétienne respectueuse et impuissante en face du turc vainqueur. La presse musulmane de Constantinople qui ne reçoit d'inspirations que du Palais ou de la Sublime Porte a quotidiennement recours aux mensonges les plus grossiers pour dénaturer l'action des Puissances. Des journaux ont été fondés après la guerre pour exalter la gloire de l'Islam et il s'imprime tous les jours dans le "Chalhumat", le "Sabah", l'"Ikdam", des articles tendant à démontrer l'inefficacité et même les effets désasteux de l'intervention européenne qui "chaque fois qu'elle s'est manifestée dans les affaires Ottomanes n'a réussi qu'à envenimer les rapports entre musulmans et raias".

Lorsque répondant à l'appel du Sultan qui avait sollicité la charité des Chefs d'États européens en faveur des familles des soldats morts en Grèce, les Souverains et le Président de la République faisaient parvenir à Yldiz des objets d'art pour être vendus au bazar de la Charité, organisé sous les auspices de S.M.I., on lisait dans les feuilles turques que "de somptueux cadeaux avaient été envoyés par les Gouvernements à S.M., en hommage à la gloire du Padichah victorieux".

Les prédicateurs des mosquées se livrent continuellement à des interprétations aussi ridicules des évènements politiques et tandis que s'exaspèrent les sentiments patriotiques de la population musulmane, les Européens se voient traités avec desinvolture dans les administrations publiques et jusque dans la rue.

La Porte refuse d'accorder les lettres vizirielles aux étrangers, touristes ou archéologues, qui veulent pouvoir circuler librement dans l'intérieur. Deux ingénieurs français qui désirent visiter les mines d'Héraclée—une entreprise française— n'obtiennent pas les teskérés nécessaires; les administrateurs de la Compagnie, eux-mêmes, doivent subir des formalités nouvelles avant de se mettre en route. Deux protégés français sont arrétés et emprisonnés sans motifs, l'un à Kérassunde, l'autre à Platana; un Suisse, également protégé français, est expulsé de Sivas. Bref, la Porte, craignant qu'ils ne racontent au retour ce qu'ils ont vu, ne veut plus laisser pénétrer les Européens dans les régions de l'Empire saccagées et dépeuplées pendant les évènements de ces dernières années, et l'Anatolie est devenue subitement un pays plus fermé aux étrangers que ne l'est actuellement le centre de la Chine.

Quantité d'autres mesures arbitraires permettent de constater l'attitude nouvelle des fonctionnaires ottomans. L'importation d'un grand nombre de produits français devient impossible par suite des entraves de toutes sortes que la Douane oppose à leur mise en circulation. Les Ambassades ont du échanger pendant un mois des Notes avec la Sublime Porte avant que les préliminaires de paix fussent rendus exécutaires en ce qui concerne la libre circulation des navires grecs dans les eaux ottomanes. Les Français au service du

Gouvernement ottoman, tant militaires que civils, ne reçoivent plus leur traitement depuis des mois et plusieurs d'entre eux sont décidés à quitter le pays, désespérant d'y pouvoir vivre. Le Drogman Chancelier de notre Consulat à Angora, soupçonné de porter des armes sur lui, s'est vu fouillé de force par la police turque. La Porte qui craint la surveillance de notre Vice-Consul dans la région toujours troublée de Marache s'oppose avec une violence nouvelle à lui accorder l'exequatur et demande son changement. Le Conseil de l'enseignement médical s'obstine à refuser de reconnaitre le diplome de notre Faculté de médecine de Beyrouth. Les autorités locales inventent chaque jour de nouvelles difficultés pour entraver le développement de nos établissements religieux et l'œuvre de nos missionnaires. Il est désormais devenu impossible d'obtenir un firman pour la construction d'une école ou d'une église. La Porte ne tient plus aucun compte des demandes d'indemnités que l'Ambassade n'a cessé de renouveler en faveur de nos nationaux lesés pendant les troubles de Constantinople, en Août 1896. L'agent du Lloyd Autrichien à Mersina a été dernièrement embarqué de force sans que le Consul ait été même avisé. Enfin partout les Administrations turques usent avec les Européens d'un sans-gène agressif, parfaitement en rapport d'ailleurs avec l'impossibilité où se trouvent ces derniers de faire respecter les droits et privilèges que leur conférent les traités.

L'influence de la victoire pése plus lourdement encore sur les sujets chretiens du Sultan dans les Provinces. Aucune amélioration n'est tentée dans l'Administration des Vilayets, aucune des réformes dont l'application a été solennelement promise à l'Europe n'est sérieusement prise en considération. Le gérant de notre Consulat de Trébizonde a eu, à cet égard, un entretien bien significatif avec le Maréchal Chakir Pacha, dont la "mission d'inspection pour l'application des réformes" ne semble avoir pour but réel que d'empécher momentanément l'effusion du sang et de rendre compte au Palais des facultés imposables d'une population ruinée. D'après lui, les Musulmans auraient été les victimes et non les auteurs des massacres et il prétend rapporter des documents irréfutables sur la responsabilité enorme par les Comités et les Evêques Arméniens. La cause initiale du mal serait "la propagande religieuse et politique faite par les Européens qui, en vulgarisant parmi de pauvres gens des idées de liberté et de civilisation, en les instruisant de sciences dont ils n'ont que faire au lieu de les laisser s'imprégner de l'esprit de l'Islam, les rend hostiles à tout ce qui est turc et les prépare au recrutement révolutionnaire". Et il demeure sous-entendu qu'il convient de s'opposer énergiquement au développement de nos écoles et à l'introduction de toute réforme émanant de l'influence de l'Europe.

Telles sont en effet les nouvelles théories professées ouvertement depuis quelque temps au Palais et à la Porte. Aussi nos Consuls signalent-ils des meurtres et de fréquentes paniques à Van, à Marache, à Orfa, à Trébizonde. L'attitude plus arrogante des Musulmans depuis la guerre et la persistance du régime administratif le plus abusif entretiennent dans la population chrétienne un état constant de nervosité.

Sans doute, le Sultan n'a, en ce moment, aucun intérêt à provoquer ou à laisser se produire des troubles. Il n'ignore pas que l'insuccés des efforts de son Gouvernement pour tirer profit d'une guerre victorieuse vient, en grande partie, des sentiments d'aversion qu'inspire à toutes les nations civilisés le Souverain qui a permis ou ordonné les massacres d'Asie-Mineure et de Constantinople. Aussi, l'a-t-on vu, ces derniers mois, multiplier dans les Provinces et dans la Capitale les ordres les plus rigoureux en vue du maintien de l'ordre. La bonne volonté éclairée de Valis, tels que Cadri Bey à Trébizonde, Enver Bey à Bitlis, Chenisi Pacha à Van, n'est d'ailleurs pas douteuse et peut être parviendront-ils, pendant quelque temps encore, à limiter les soulèvements des fidaïs sur la frontière persane et à conjurer de nouveaux massacres. Mais s'il est légitime de supposer que l'orgeuil national satisfait et l'intérêt bien compris de l'Empire fasse taire aujourd'hui chez le Sultan et quelques hauts fonctionnaires les sentiments indérainables de méfiance et de haine contre les chrétiens, il n'en faut pas moins reconnaître qu'aucun ordre, aucune bonne volonté ne sont capables d'étouffer les rancunes irréconciliables qu'on s'est plu à semer entre les différents éléments de la population. Il n'est pas d'acte officiel qui puisse dissiper le souvenir du sang répandu. Les appétits qu'on a laissé librement s'assouvir renaissent nécessairement et il devient de plus en plus difficile de les réfréner. Au surplus, les Kurdes n'ont jamais fait trêve de brigandage en face des autorités complices ou incapables; leurs agas refusent de rendre les femmes chrétiennes enlevées; et ces crimes se perpetuent sous les regards bienveillants de la police locale; les tribunaux et le Palais assurent toujours l'impunité contre les Chrétiens. Enfin les zapties collecteurs d'impôts n'ont pas rompu avec les exactions et les violences qui achèveront, à brève échéance, la ruine d'un pays déjà épuisé.

Les causes du mal sont permanentes et développeront, sans arrêt, leurs tristes conséquences en dépit de toute action extérieure, —si par hasard il devait s'en produire. Il n'est pas douteux que les populations des villages soient destinées à succomber peu à peu sous l'arbitraire et les vexations de tout genre auxquelles elles sont livrées sans défense. L'impuissance du Gouvernement est avérée, quelles que soient ses intentions, et malgré l'intérêt évident qu'il se reconnait à suspendre momentanément l'exécution du plan primitif d'extermination. La pacification parait désormais impossible et les réformes présentes ou à venir sont condamnées, de l'aven même des fonctionnaires, à rester lettre morte dans des contrées si profondément et irrémédiablement troublées.

Aussi bien, les faciles victoires de l'armée turque, en relevant la fierté des Musulmans et en surexcitant leur fanatisme religieux reculent indéfiniment les temps où mahomètans et chrétiens parviendront à vivre en paix dans les mêmes provinces. Elles aggravent les effets de cette politique si extraordinairement paradoxale qui, en amenant le Gouvernement à reconnaître officiellement, au profit du plus fort, les bénéfices du meurtre, du vol, de la délation, de l'injustice, à porté un coup mortel au commerce, à l'industrie et à l'agriculture dans mes régions les plus riches de l'Empire et brisé tous les liens sociaux entre les individus. Enfin—et conséquence non moins grave du succès de cette campagne—une intervention sérieuse des Cabinets Européens est devenue plus difficile et plus chimérique encore que par le passé. Et rien ne s'oppose plus désormais aux paisibles progrès de l'anarchie existante.

En face des Turcs victorieux, la timidité et la faiblesse des populations chrétiennes de l'Empire sauroît de jour en jour. Les Grecs raïas qui tentent de fuir en Grèce sont mis à mort, aussitôt arrétés. Les Zeitounlis sont décimés un à un autour de leur citadelle par les émissaires des beys qui ne leur pardonnent pas de les avoir jadis forcés à capituler. Et les Arméniens militants, en ayant recours au crime et aux révoltes partielles vont tout juste à l'encontre du but poursuivi et l'absurdité des moyens qu'ils emploient les méne droit à l'abolition définitive de leur nation.

Abattu, avili, traqué, le raïa n'obtient le droit à la vie qu'en s'abritant de ruses hypocrites et de fourberies, et tandis qu'il s'asservit chaque jour plus avant, le Turc satisfait du succès librement savouré de son œuvre de violence et de mort, glorieux de ses récents triophes, contemple, plus méprisant encore que par le passé, le spectacle immémorial de l'abaissement ignominieux des races chrétiennes.

Cette situation est —nous l'avons montré— actuellement sans remède. Le mal peut-il du moins être atténué par l'action diplomatique des Consuls et de l'Ambassade? —Sans doute, mais dans une mesure très restreinte.

Les avertissements des Agents aux Valis, les réclamations des Drogmans à la Sublime Porte, ne sont certainement pas toujours inutiles. Qu'il s'agisse du maintien de l'ordre, des abus du haut commandement militaire, de la condammation des assassins, de l'exécution des sentences prononcées par les tribunaux ou de quelque incident concernant nos protégés, l'Ambassade demande aussitôt l'envoi d'instructions appropriées et précises aux autorités locales. Les démarches, il est vrai, sont rarement suivies d'effet. L'immixtion des Agents de la diplomatie étrangère dans les affaires intérieures du pays est devenue plus difficile qu'autrefois et est à peine tolérée. On obtient bien des assurances satisfaisantes mais les résultats effectifs sont souvent nuls et, dans tous les cas, toujours incomplets. Puis les affaires de ce genre sont tellement fréquentes que la Porte en arrive, malgré l'envoi de notes sans cesse reitéré —et en raison même de la fréquence de ces communications—à les confondre avec les affaires courantes auxquelles on n'attribue pas d'importance spéciale.

L'expérience a démontré combien était illusoire l'intervention concertée des Puissances dans les questions de politique intérieure en Turquie. Mais si les intérêts supérieurs de la paix et de la politique de la France en Europe, nous interdisent l'emploi de toute action isolée et par là privent peu à peu notre diplomatie de tout moyen vraiment efficace de se faire entendre dans ce pays, il est utile cependant—dans la sphère restreinte où nous pouvons agir—de multiplier sans relâche nos efforts afin de ne pas laisser prescrire, durant cette période critique, nos droits séculaires à la protection des chrétiens d'Orient et pour ne pas renoncer aux avantages matériels, qu'elle nous procure.

La victoire de l'armée ottomane, que la crainte de complications plus grandes, pouvant résulter d'une fortune contraire, avait amené finalement l'Europe à considérer comme un événement favorable, lui a fait perdre, par contre, en Créte comme en Anatolie, la possibilité de parvenir à une solution satisfaisante.

L'affaire crétoise—l'opinion est unanime à cet égard—ne peut se résoudre ni par le maintien des forces militaires internationales ou le renvoi de nouveaux contingents ni par le débarquement d'un ou de plusieurs corps d'armée ottomans. Ce serait, dans les deux cas, en raison de la complexion du pays, prolonger indéfiniment les troubles et provoquer le recommencement d'une lutte barbare et sans issue. La difficulté capitale—et qui, si elle était réglée trancherait d'un seul coup toutes les autres—provient de ce qu'il a été impossible jusqu'à present, d'obtenir du Sultan le rappel des troupes ottomane. Or, depuis la signature des préliminaires de paix, le Sultan prescrit à ses Ambassadeurs de présenter aux Ministres des Affaires Étrangères des Grandes Puissances, des circulaires tendencieuses et la Sublime Porte fait imprimer dans les journaux turcs et allemands des articles où il est démontré que "les Européens qui ont promis de pacifier l'Île n'ont fait, par leur intervention, que perpétuer l'insurrection et empirer les rapports entre crétois musulmans et crétois chrétiens—et qu'il ne pouvait d'ailleurs en être autrement". "Au point de vue du droit international, lit-on dans le "Sabah", les légistes les plus consciencieux estiment que l'inexécution de l'engagement pris par les Puissances vis-à-vis de la Turquie implique la déchéance—après sept mois d'expérience et d'insuccés de l'espèce de convention bilatérale par laquelle S.M. a confié aux Cabinets européens le soin de rétablir l'ordre en Crète. En conséquence, le Gouvernement Imperial ne peut consentir plus longtemps à la prolongation d'un état de choses aussi pitoyable dans une Province de l'Empire et récupére le droit de prendre, seul, les mesures propres à assurer la tranquillité et la prospérité de la population restée fidèle". Il n'est plus question, bien entendu, de l'organisation de l'autonomie telle qu'elle a été imposée par les Puissances puis ratifiée par le Sultan le 7 Mars dernier; et contrairement aux engagements pris, on discute la candidature d'un sujet ottoman pour remplir les fonctions de Gouverneur.

Il n'y a pas lieu de s'étendre plus longuement ici sur la question crétoise, mais il était nécessaire d'indiquer combien la victoire, en augmentant les prétentions de la Porte, a rendu plus inextricable une affaire qui, en égard aux intérêts divergents des Puissances, ne comportait déjà qu'une solution assez précaire.

Des symptômes peut être plus inquiétants pour la tranquillité des nations civilisées que les complications des affaires crétoises et arméniennes résulteux de la recrudescence, après la guerre, du proselitisme panislamique sur les confins de l'Empire, dans le Kurdistan, en Tripolitaine et surtout dans les régions où les Puissances européennes possèdent des territoires peuples de Musulmans sur qui s'exerce l'autorité religieuse du Khalife de Constantinople.

Abdul-Hamid effrayé de la Propagande faite par la Jeune Turquie parmi les plus éclairés de ses sujets et redoutant, pour l'avenir de l'Islam autant que pour sa sureté personnelle, la diffusion des idées libérales dans l'Empire a choisi quelques arabes et plusieurs Kurdes pour en faire des instruments de Gouvernement. Moins aptes à s'assimiler les idées européennes et plus foncièrement fanatiques, ils lui rendent le double service, comme conseillers au Palais et comme fonctionnaires dans les Provinces d'espionner et de contenir les Turcs acquis aux idées nouvelles d'entretenir au loin des relations utiles à l'extension de son autorité politique et réligieuse.

Dans toute la région qui s'étend entre le Tigre et l'Euphrate supérieurs, de Malatia à Van et jusqu'au delà de la frontière persane, l'état de troubles est endémique. Le Sultan s'efforçait naguère de se concilier ces populations turbulentes et mal soumises en leur laissant pleine liberté de piller les villages des Arméniens, de les exproprier de leurs biens et de les massacrer. Le maréchal Kurde Zekki Pacha est le maître intangible de ce territoire. Allié à la famille Impériale, mais très indépendant, il a su prendre un ascendant redoutable sur les Kurdes en favorisant leurs appetits et en les faisant armer (formation des Régiments Hamidiès). Il fait nommer ou destituer à sa volonté les fonctionnaires dans plusieurs provinces et se trouve actuellement assez fort pour soustraire toute la contrée à l'autorité du Sultan, si telle était sa fantaisie. Mais satisfait de la liberté abusive que lui laisse le Gouvernement Impérial contraint de ménager sa puissance, fier des récentes victoires des Turcs, il semble désormais que Zekki Pacha ait affermi l'influence du Sultan sur les populations Kurdes.

Depuis les hauts plateaux de Lybie jusqu'à la côte occidentale du Maroc, dans toute la région du Maghreb, des émissaires partis de Constantinople échauffent la fanatisme musulman au profit du Khalife de Constantinople. Le Cheikh Zafèr dirige le mouvement du Palais de Yldiz où il réside. Il est en relation constante avec les Cheikhs de la Mecque et les chefs des sectes religieuses arabes, principalement les Sénoussis, dont le prosélitisme s'exerce dans toute l'Afrique mahométane jusque dans le Soudan.

Désireux d'exploiter l'enthousiasme causé dans toutes ces régions par la nouvelle de la "défaite des chrétiens par les soldats de l'Islam", le Sultan envoie un grand nombre d'agents secrets en Tripolitaine, en Tunisie, sur la frontière de l'Algérie, et les négociations de la Porte, récemment reprises, en vue d'établir une mission ottomane à Tanger, si elles aboutissent au résultat qu'on poursuit ne tendent à rien moins qu'à développer jusqu'aux côtes marocaines de l'Océan Atlantique l'influence du Khalifat de Constantinople.

Des intrigues se noment également dans les régions méridionales du Soudan égyptien. Des émissaires du Mehdi de Khartoum sont arrivés recemment à Constantinople chargés de remettre des lettres au Sultan pour le féliciter de ses victoires, lui demander d'oublier le passé, l'assurer que le Soudan lui était ouvert et le prier de désigner un Gouverneur. On ne voulu pas reconnaître la qualité officielle de cette mission ou bien elle ne put l'établir; toujours est-il qu'il ne fut pas tenu compte, à la Porte des propositions formulées. Mais il y a là un indice qui méritait d'être signalé.

En Tripolitaine, les arabes s'étaient jusqu'à présent soustraits à l'obligation du service militaire qu'ils considèrent comme le signe de l'esclavage. La fantaisie de leur caractère les rendait d'ailleurs impropres à toute discipline et leur dispersion ne permettait guère de les recruter. Mais le Sultan confiant dans la renommée de ses victoires à présent, il y a quelques semaines la formation à Tripoli de Régiments Hamidiés analogues à ceux qu'il a créés dans le Kurdistan, et les principaux chefs arabes, répondant à l'appel du Gouverneur de la Province, se sont assemblés pour faire solennellement profession de loyalisme à S.M.I. Des armes ont été distribuées aux nouvelles troupes; les fusils leur sont, il est vrai rétirés après les exercises, mais il est évident que le jour venu, le Sultan pourra se servir utilement des ces nouvelles recrues bien armées et exercées.

Le Cheikh des Sénoussis de la Mecque vient de s'embarquer à Djeddah avec un certain nombre d'ulémas pour se rendre en

Tripolitaine. Son activité est très appréciée d'Abdul Hamid et il est à croire qu'il obeit à des directions venues du Palais. On peut craindre qu'il ne se rende sur les frontières de nos professions et sa présence n'y serait pas sans danger parmi des populations où l'arrivée des nouvelles du théâtre de la guerre étaient accueillies avec une exaltation confinant à la révolte.

Enfin, d'un grand nombre de points de l'Asie Musulmane, de Colombo à Caboul, des adresses de félicitations sont parvenues au Sultan. Il est malaisé de savoir si l'effervescence guerrière qui règne actuellement chez les tribus indiennes voisines de la frontière anglaise est spontanée et causée uniquement par la peste, la famine et la misère, ou bien si elle est due, dans une mésure quelconque, à une action venue de l'extérieur. Les éléments d'information manquent et on en est réduit aux inductions. Les émissaires du Palais et les missionnaires musulmans procèdent d'ailleurs avec une prudence qui défie toute surveillance, du moins en Turquie. Mais le commencement des troubles s'est trouvé coïncider avec la diffusion du bruit des victoires turques. On conçoit facilement que ces peuplades profondément ignorantes, ne connaissant en fait d'Européens que les Anglais et pour qui tout chrétien est anglais, se soient figuré que les soldats battus par le Padichah ne pouvaient être que des sujets de S.M. Britannique. Et, leur fanatisme s'excitant, ils ont cru le moment favorable pour déchaîner toutes leurs forces contre l'oppresseur momentanément affaibli qu'ils rendent responsable de tous les maux dont ils souffrent.

Un pareil développement de la politique panislamique devait nécessairement rencontrer de l'opposition de la part des Gouvernements qui s'en trouvaient le plus atteints. C'est de Londres qu'est parti le premier cri d'alarme. Tout d'abord une violente campagne a été menée dans la presse pour montrer la main du Sultan poussant claudestinement les Indiens à la révolte contre le Gouvernement de la Reine et l'on faisait grant bruit d'une Ambassade Afghane que l'Emir Abdurrahman aurait envoyée à Constantinople. En même temps Lord Salisbury prescirvait à Sir Ph. Currie d'adresser des remontrances à la Sublime Porte et de tenir la main à ce qu'aucun agent provocateur ne partit de Constantinople dans la direction des Indes. Mais l'Ambassade Afghane n'avait jamais existé et l'intervention du Sultan ne fut être prouvée. Il fallut abandonner ce système.

Le "Standard" a inaugurées ces jours derniers, une tactique plus habile. Le journal, très lu dans le monde entier, s'institue tout à coup le vulgarisateur des théories religieuses et politiques du Grand Chérif de la Mecque et, en rappelant les souvenirs des anciens Khalifes de Cordone, de Bagdad et d'Alexandrie, il conteste les droits au Khalifat du Sultan de Constantinople. Si les articles savamment documentés du "Standard" n'étaient qu'un fait isolé, il n'y aurait pas lieu d'attacher autrement d'importance à une discussion historique qui ne saurait avoir qu'une valeur littéraire et toute platonique en présence d'une situation acquise et de la possession de fait dont bénéficie depuis des siècles le chef du plus puissant Etat musulman. Mais cette polémique de l'organe anglais se produit concurremment avec une campagne très vive menée dans le même sens en Egypte et en Syrie. Des brochures en langue arabe provenant de l'Université religieuse de la Djami Ezhéré (du Caire) sont distribuées à profusion dans ces deux Provinces. Bien que les Arabes aient souvent refusé de reconnaître les droits de la maison d'Osman au Khalifat, il est difficile d'admettre, dans le cas présent, une initiative spontanément prise par le Grand Chérif de la Mecque. Ses prétentions n'ayant jamais été efficacement appuyées, il a depuis longtemps renoncé à toute propagande active contre le Sultan de Constantinople. Mais par contre, l'identité des théories émises par les ulémas de l'Ezhérie et les rédacteurs du "Standard" ne permet guère de douter que l'Angleterre, trouvant le moment opportun pour ranimer d'anciennes querelles, n'exerce son influence en Egypte pour combattre le panislamisme ottoman auquel elle attribue, pour une part, l'insurrection des tribus indiennes.

La presse allemande cherche à détruire l'effet de ces manœuvres de la politique anglaise en désignant les Sénoussis comme les seuls auteurs du mouvement et cette secte agirait suivant la "Gazette de Cologue" (19 octobre) en dehors de l'influence du Sultan qui se desintéresse de son action. Cette riposte évidemment inspirée par la Sublime Porte, ne répond pas à la réalité des faits et elle indique combien le Sultan est préoccupé de cette agitation née d'hier. Le Iradé récent d'expulsion des Egyptiens de Syrie témoignait d'ailleurs suffisamment de son inquiétude.

Quoi qu'il en soit nous ne pouvions terminer un travail tendant à mettre en lumière la puissance envahissante des Turcs depuis l'issu de la guerre sans mentionner les symptômes de réaction qui commence à apparaître.

Au reste ce serait le fait d'un esprit pessimiste où paradoxal que de prêter une trop grande valeur à tout cet étalage de force et de grandeur. Il est impossible, en effet, qu'un pays, financièrement ruiné, où s'est irrémédiablement établi un régime administratif qui ne sait tenir aucun compte des conditions matérielles et morales nécessaires au fonctionnement normal des relations politiques et sociales et dont la substance est, j'ose dire, aussi vernoulue puisse par la vertu de quelques faciles victoires, reconquérir un organisme sain et solide. Toutefois les succès de la guerre ont enrayé pour un moment le déclin de l'Empire en le parant d'une puissance faitice, et peut-être n'était-il pas sans intérêt de manquer les procédés auxquels le Sultan a recours pour entretenir cette vie apparente et converrait-il aussi d'indiquer les dangers qui, résulltant pour les Puissances Européennes de cette politique, doivent, plus tard, par une sorte de choc en retour, amener l'heure de la déchéance fatale.

R. Clausse

Le 27 Octobre 1897



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La Politique du Sultan 191
et le Panislamisme
après la guerre turco-grecque

Les succès de l'armée ottomane en Thessalie et en Epire ont eu un grand retentissement dans tout le monde Musulman. En apportant un surcroît de confiance et de force aux populations mahométanes de l'Empire, la victoire a donné une autorité nouvelle à — l'administration du Sultan dans les Provinces, fortifié la diplomatie impériale en Europe et doué d'un nouvel essor l'idée panislamique en Afrique et jusque dans les Indes. L'orgueil, jadis assagi, du conquérant s'est trouvé tout à coup ravivé et —

Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères français, Turquie, Nouvelle série, vol. 165, série B, Carton 58, Dossier 6, f. 191ª.



toutefois les succès de la guerre ont enrayé pour un moment le déclin de l'Empire en le parant d'une puissance factice et peut-être n'était-il pas sans intérêt de marquer les procédés auxquels le Sultan a recours pour entretenir cette vie apparente et convenait-il aussi d'indiquer les dangers qui, résultant pour les Puissances européennes de cette politique, doivent, plus tard, par une sorte de choc en retour, amener l'heure de la déchéance fatale./.

A. Clausse

le 27 Octobre 1897

Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères français, Turquie, Nouvelle série, vol. 165, série B, Carton 58, Dossier 6, f. 215ᵇ.

Review Essays

SPYRIDON SFETAS—KYRIAKOS KENTROTIS

SKOPJE
IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

A CRITIQUE OF THE RECENT PUBLICATION BY THE SKOPJE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS *MACEDONIA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH GREECE* (SKOPJE 1993)*

Preface

Following the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is now seeking international recognition as an independent state. Greece does not accept that the republic has the right to use the term 'Macedonia' in its name; nor does Greece —or Bulgaria— recognise the historical existence of a 'Macedonian nation'. As a result, Skopje has found it necessary to refute Greece's views by presenting the international scientific community with 'historical arguments' which, Skopje's historians claim, prove both the existence of Macedonia as 'a historical entity and unit' and 'the historical continuity of the Macedonian people'. This is the purpose of the recent publication by the Skopje Academy of Sciences and Arts, *Macedonia and its Relations with Greece* (Skopje 1993). The present publication, by the Thessaloniki Institute for Balkan Studies, offers a step-by-step critical analysis of the basic views and claims expressed in the Academy's book. The historical issues touched upon in *Macedonia and its Relations with Greece* (chapters 1-13, 15, and 16) are dealt with by Dr Spyridon Sfetas, while those connected with the independence and diplomatic recognition of the FYROM (chapter 14) are covered by Dr Kyriakos Kentrotis; both writers are research associates of the Institute for Balkan Studies.

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* The original critique was published in 1994 in Greek by the Institute for Balkan Studies (No 257).

The whole philosophy of *Macedonia and its Relations with Greece* is based on a perceived distinction between 'Macedonians' and Greeks and a challence to Greece's exclusive right to use the term 'Macedonia'. It is a work of sheer propaganda, characterised by a distorted presentation of Greek and Bulgarian history that attempts to give the term 'Macedonia' an ethnological dimension and illustrate the supposed historical development of the 'Macedonian people'. The approach to the issues is a superficial one: only those which support Skopje's version of history are touched upon, while proven facts that demolish the views of Skopje's historians are completely ignored. *Macedonia and its Relations with Greece* comprises sixteen chapters and covers the ancient period, the Middle Ages, the Turkish period, and modern and contemporary history up to the independence of the FYROM.

> Chapter One ('The Ancient Macedonians and their Language', pp. 11-14) challenges the fact that the ancient Macedonians were Greek and argues that the language they spoke does not correspond to the phonetic system of Greek. The basic argument is that the Indo-European aspirated medias *bh, dh, gh* become φ, θ, χ in Greek and β, δ, γ in 'Macedonian'. Alexander the Great, apparently, propagated Greek education on his campaign because of his great esteem for Hellenic culture.

The fact that the ancient Macedonians were indeed Greek is attested by historical sources, linguistic evidence, and archaeological finds, all of which link the region of Macedonia with the Greeks from Mycenaean times onwards. Such well respected scholars as Hoffmann, Beloch, and Droysen have substantiated this. Certain political agents' hostile attitude to the ancient Macedonians was due to the differences between the political systems of southern Greece and Macedonia (the latter shared neither the institution of the city-state nor that of democracy) and to the southerners' fear of the imposition of a monarchy. Demosthenes' aggressiveness towards Philip was also due to the fact that Athens was losing not only its colonies to the expanding Macedonian state, but also its access routes to the breadbasket of Thrace. The Macedonians followed Greek ideology (as expressed by Agesilaus and Isocrates) by uniting the politically fragmented Greeks; and one outcome of Alexander's campaign was the diffusion of Hellenic culture throughout the East and the birth of the Hellenistic world. Not only was Macedonia the Greeks' bastion against the barbarians:

> of what great honour are the Macedonians worthy, who, for the greater part of their life, never cease to struggle against the bar-

> barians for the security of the Greeks; for the situation in Greece would be in grave jeopardy had we not the Macedonians as a bulwark (*Polybius* 9,35);

it was also an integral part of Greece: 'Macedonia too is Greece', as Strabo said (*Geographica*, Book VII, C 229). The Slav inhabitants of the FYROM cannot possibly have any connection with the ancient Macedonians; nor, from an ethnological point of view, can they appropriate the ancient Macedonians' name, for the Slavs did not put in an appearance until the sixth to seventh century AD.

The heart of the kingdom was the Macedonian seaboard (Pieria and Bottiaea). In 471-452 BC, Alexander I extended Macedonia's borders eastwards to the River Strymon, taking territory from neighbouring barbarian tribes; and he also imposed his dominion over Hellenic tribes to the north (Upper Macedonia)[1].

During Philip II's reign (359-336 BC), with the incorporation of Paeonia, the borders of the Macedonian state were pushed back as far as Dardania, the capital of which was Scupi, modern Skopje. Under Roman rule, the administrative centres of the province of Macedonia (established in 148 BC) were Thessalonica, Amphipolis, Pella, and Pelagonia (Bitola). The borders of historical Macedonia included only part of what is now the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (the broader area of Bitola and Strumitsa). That area is scarcely representative of historical Macedonia.

The language the ancient Macedonians spoke was a dialect of Greek, the only phonetic feature distinguishing it from other Greek dialects — β instead of φ, δ instead of θ, and γ instead of χ — being perfectly explicable in the context of Greek dialectology. We may surmise that the Macedonian ethnic branch broke away from the Ionian, Aeolo-Achaean, and Dorian branches before the Protohellenic language developed φ, θ, χ from the corresponding Indo-European phonemes and embarked upon its own evolutionary course; or else that the Macedonian branch, while never ceasing to be Greek, assimilated a considerable proportion of Thraco-Illyrians, who exerted an alien influence on this particular phonemic feature[2]. The dialectal differences between the Greeks were due to the various external influences they received when they settled in the broader geographical area of Greece.

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[1] *Thucydides*, Book II, 99.

[2] N. Andriotis, *The Language and the Greek Origin of the Ancient Macedonians*, Institute for Balkan Studies, No 185, Thessaloniki 1978, p. 27.

Chapter Two ('Macedonia from the Settlement of the Slavs to the Ottoman Empire', pp. 15-20) describes how the arrival of the Slavs altered the ethnological composition of the Macedonian region. The Slavonic tribes intermingled with the Macedonians and assimilated them; but the Slavs took for themselves the local name 'Macedonians', and it now signified a Slavonic ethnic group (p. 16). The Slavs of Macedonia aspired to establish a state of their own and tried to conquer Thessalonica. The *sclaviniae* evolved into independent enclaves with their own rulers, outside the Empire's control. In the ninth century, most of Macedonia was annexed by the mediaeval Bulgarian state; but the 'Macedonians' (i.e. the Slavs living in Macedonia) managed to shake off Bulgarian rule and to establish, under Samuel, the first 'Macedonian state' in 969. The Byzantines demolished Samuel's state in 1018, but the 'Macedonians' preserved their ethnic identity through the Archbishopric of Ohrid. In the fourteenth century, the Serbs occupied most of Macedonia. After the collapse of Stefan Dushan's state a number of minor independent states sprang up, the most important of which was the kingdom of Prilep, established by Vukashin (p. 20). It is particularly emphasised that the language into which Cyril and Methodius translated the Gospels and other ecclesiastical texts was the language of the 'Macedonian Slavs' (p. 17).

It is a well-known fact that in the early Byzantine era the term 'Macedonia' had a purely administrative significance, for Macedonia was part of Illyricum; and from 800 onwards the theme of Macedonia also included Thrace. But there was never a Slavonic tribe, called 'Macedonians'. It is important to note that, even when the Byzantine writers applied ancient ethnonyms, which were of only geographical significance in their own time, to the new tribes that were inundating the Balkan Peninsula (the Serbs, for instance, are described as 'Triballi', the Bulgars as 'Scythians' and 'Mysians'), under no circumstances did they ever apply the term 'Macedonian' to any Slavonic tribe, for it was considered applicable only to Hellenic tribes. What the book under review has to say about the genesis of the 'Macedono-Slavs' is sheer groundless hypothesis on the part of Skopje's historians. The Slavs' arrival in the geographical region of Macedonia certainly changed its ethnological make-up; but they never posed a substantial threat to the Empire. They were vassals of the Avars and were rapidly absorbed by the Empire's administrative machinery[3]. The hagiological texts inform us that the Avaro-Slavs made three attempts to take Thessalonica (586, 614-15, and c. 618) — though it must be borne in mind that these were written at a considerably later date and their purpose was to recount the thaumaturgical interventions of the city's patron saint[4]. The Avaro-Slavs, however, were not acting on their own initiative, they were carrying out the orders of the Avar Zhan. Theirs were simply some of many barbarian raids launched against Thessalonica.

In the second half of the ninth century, the present territory of the FYROM became part of the, already Slavicised, Protobulgarian state. Ohrid was the spiritual centre of mediaeval Bulgaria, for it was there that Cyril and Methodius' disciples went after being expelled from Moravia, to continue their task of translating the Greek ecclesiastical texts into Church Slavonic using the Glagolitic alphabet. Nothing of what is said in *Macedonia and its Relations with Greece* to the effect that Samuel founded the 'first Macedonian state' is supported by the Byzantine sources. The Byzantine Emperor John Tsimisces did conduct a campaign in Preslav and Dorystolon and overthrew the Protobulgarian state in 971. But the fact that he did not then move into the western part of the Bulgarian state does not mean that it had not been subjugated by Byzantium. These western regions were part of the Bulgarian state, and in 969 the Cometopouli did *not* establish a 'West Macedonian state' that had splintered off from the East Bulgarian state[5], after Svjatoslav's Russians had conquered it and been attacked by Tsimisces. It was only after Tsimisces' death in 976 that Samuel began to reconstruct the mediaeval Bulgarian state, starting with the western provinces[6]. After long, fierce wars, his kingdom was overthrown in 1018 by Basil II of Macedon, who, precisely because he had quelled the rebellious Bulgars and overthrown the Bulgarian state, became known as 'the Bulgar-slayer'. The Byzantine sources mention neither a Macedonian state ruled by Samuel nor 'Macedonian' Slavs laying the foundations of such a state; the sources mention only Bulgars, and refer to the Archbishopric of Ohrid as the 'archbishopric of All Bulgaria', under the title *Prima Justiniana.* The decline of the Bulgarian state permitted the rise of the Serbian state, which flourished briefly under Stefan Dushan. After his death in 1355 it collapsed and was succeeded by a number of small Serbian principalities. Vukashin, for instance, who ruled the region of Prilep, Skopje, and Prizren, styled himself 'King of the Serbs and the Romans', because he held sway over areas with a strong Greek presence, as had the Bulgar Symeon and the Serb Stefan Dushan before him. Cyril and Methodius certainly translated the Gospels and the church texts into South Slavonic, but that language cannot be identified with any one specific Slavonic people. It is quite rightly termed 'Old Church Slavonic'. It is also conventionally called 'Old Bulgarian'[7], owing to the modification of *tj* and *dj* into *sht* and *zhd* respectively (dentopalatalisation) in Old Church Slavonic and Bulgarian.

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[3] P. Malingoudis, *Σλάβοι στη Μεσαιωνική Ελλάδα* (Slavs in Mediaeval Greece), Thessaloniki 1988, p. 51.

[4] *Θαύματα Αγίου Δημητρίου* (Miracles of St Demetrius), I 152.2-5: 'Σκοπὸς γάρ μοι μόνον παραστῆσαι τῇ φιλοθέῳ ἀκοῇ ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἡ σωτηρία τότε τῇ πόλει γεγένητο, καὶ διεγεῖραι τὰς διανοίας ἁπάντων πρὸς θείαν κατάνυξιν καὶ θεάρεστον ἐξομολόγησιν καὶ εὐχαριστίαν τοῦ ἀθλοφόρου διηνεκῆ'.

[5] See G. Ostrogorsky, *Geschichte des Byzantinischen Staates*, München 1963, p. 250-251, n. 2.

[6] For more specific problems relating to Samuel's state, see A.-E. Tachiaos, *Το εφήμερο κράτος του Σαμουήλ (976-1018)* (Samuel's ephemeral state, 976-1018), Hellenic Association for Slavic Studies, Thessaloniki 1990.

For instance:

svět-ja	(Old Slavonic)
svešta	(Bulgarian and Church Slavonic)
sveča	(Russian)
sveća	(Serbo-Croat)
sveḱa	(Skopje dialect)

medja	(Old Slavonic)
mežda	(Bulgarian and Church Slavonic)
meža	(Russian)
međa	(Serbo-Croat)
meǵa	(Skopje dialect)

Old Church Slavonic was not a spoken language, but an inveted scholarly tongue with a Greek conceptual basis. Slavonic linguistic material was used in its construction, but the formulation of the ecclesiastical terms and the theological concepts, as also the syntax, was based on Greek models.

> Chapter Three ('Evidence of Macedonia in the Ottoman Period', pp. 21-4) points out that the terms 'Macedonia' and 'Macedonians' continued to be used, in an ethnological sense, during the period of Ottoman rule.

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[7] A. Leskien, *Grammatik der altbulgarischen (altkirchenslavischen) Sprache*, Heidelberg 1919, p. 27.

This assertion is based chiefly on travel writings, in which the term 'Macedonia' is used, but without any clear ethnological reference. As we know, under the Turks the historical area of Macedonia was not a single administrative unit, but lay among three *vilayets,* those of Monastir, Thessaloniki, and Kosovo. Nor, under the *millet* system, was it possible to draw a clear distinction between the various ethnic components. The terms 'Macedonia' and 'Macedonians' therefore were of purely geographical significance. After the Congress of Berlin, 'Macedonia' was conventionally used in European diplomacy with reference to the three *vilayets*. This created a certain amount of confusion, because they extended beyond the territory of historical Macedonia and included parts of modern Kosovo (e.g. Prizren) and Northern Epirus (e.g. Korcë).

> In Chapter Four ('The Archbishopric of Ohrid and the Macedonian Orthodox Church', pp. 25-30), the autocephalous Archbishopric of Ohrid is described as the fundamental factor in the preservation of the 'Macedonian people's national identity'. When it was abolished in 1767, the 'Macedonians' lost their national church, and in the nineteenth century they made unsuccessful efforts to restore it. Only after the birth of the FYROM in 1944 did it become possible to re-establish a 'Macedonian' Orthodox Church.

As has already been pointed out, the Archbishopric of Ohrid originally represented a Bulgarian church, established by Basil II 'the Bulgar-slayer'. Its jurisdiction extended not only to the Bulgars, but also to the Greek, Vlach, and other ethnic groups living in the region. The archbishopric gradually lost its Slavonic aspect, however, and evolved into a Greek spiritual centre[8].

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[8] G. Konidaris, *Συμβολαί εις την εκκλησιαστικήν ιστορίαν της Αχρίδος* (Contributions to the ecclesiastical history of Ohrid), Athens 1967, pp. 72-4. As Sir Dimitri Obolensky points out.

> The evidence suggests that the authorities in Constantinople and their local agents in the field, while aiming at the total assimilation of Bulgaria into the empire's political structure, did not carry this policy as far as a systematic attempt to subvert the culture of the Bulgarian people by outlawing their language and literature. The role played by Ohrid in transmitting Byzantine civilisation to the Balkan Slavs during the Middle Ages would hardly have been so great had the two literary traditions, the Greek and the Slav, not continued to exist side by side in the country's schools and monasteries and to interact in a bilingual milieu.

The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500-1453, London 1971, p. 218.

Samuel's overthrow was followed by the Hellenisation of the western parts of the Protobulgarian state. The restoration of the Bulgarian Patriarchate at Tărnovo in 1235 as part of the second Bulgarian state (1186), coupled with the establishment of the Serbian Archbishopric of Petch in 1219 with St Sabbas, of the house of Nemanja, as its first archbishop, not only further diluted the Slavonic character of the Archbishopric of Ohrid, but also limited its jurisdiction. The archbishops were usually Greek and the archbishopric's documents were written in Greek. The term 'Macedonian' served to differentiate the Greeks from the Slavs; this is the purpose of the expression 'the race of Macedonians' used by the Archbishop of Ohrid, Demetrius Chomatianus (12-13th cc.), and mentioned on p. 25 of *Macedonia and its Relations with Greece*. He was pointing out the different origins of a Greek, 'John surnamed Ierakaris', who was of Macedonian descent (Τοιοῦτός τις πέφηνην ἄρτι καὶ Ἰωάννης ὁ ἐπιλεγόμενος μὲν Ἱερακάρης, γαμβρὸς δὲ τοῦ Βλαστηνοῦ Βρατωνοῦ τοῦ Ῥάδου, τὸ δὲ γένος ἕλκων ἐκ Μακεδόνων), and his Slav relations by marriage (Rados, Vratonos, etc.)[9]. The abolition of the archbishopric in 1767 and its incorporation within the jurisdiction of the Oecumenical Patriarche were the result both of the dire financial straits into which it had fallen and of Turkish pressure. Consequently, the Archbishopric of Ohrid cannot be regarded as the 'national Church of the Macedonian Slavs'. The establishment of the autocephalous 'Macedonian' Church in 1967 in the Federal Socialist Republic of Macedonia[10] was a political act by the Communist régime, whose intention was that the Church would assist its policy of altering the population's national consciousness. It is no wonder that this arbitrary action has not been recognised by the various branches of the Orthodox Church.

> Chapter Five ('Attempts at Hellenization', pp. 31-6) relates how both the Oecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek state implemented a policy of assimilating the Macedonian Slavs through the Church and education. The 'Macedonians' went over to the Exarchate in an attempt to escape Hellenisation. The Ilinden Uprising demonstrated that efforts to Hellenise the 'Macedonians' had failed. In 1904, Athens began dispatching bands of armed guerrillas to Hellenise the 'Macedonians' by force.

The cultural influence of the Oecumenical Patriarchate and the dynamic

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[9] I. Tarnanidis, *Στα Βόρεια της Μακεδονίας* (In the North of Macedonia), Thessaloniki 1992, pp. 34-5; J. B. Pitra, *Analecta Sacra et Classica VI*, Paris and Rome 1891, col. 315.

[10] See C. K. Papastathis, 'L'Autocéphalie de l'église de la Macédoine yougoslave', *Balkan Studies* 8 (1967), 151-4.

presence of the Greek element, chiefly in Macedonia's urban centres, undeniably meant that major segments of the Slavonic-speaking population had Greek national consciousness and based their hopes of liberation from the Turkish yoke chiefly on Greece[11]; for Greece was an independent nation state from 1830 onwards, and throughout the Greek War of Independence and the Crimean War the Greeks organised liberation risings on Macedonian soil. This 'Hellenisation' could not be counteracted by the notion of Macedono-Slavonic national consciousness, for there was simply no such thing. So the reaction was manifested in the national awakening of the Bulgarians and the formation of the Exarchate. By exploiting the factor of language and by invoking mediaeval history, the Bulgarians were able to wrest the Slavonic-speakers away from the Greek cultural ambit and inculcate in them a Bulgarian national consciousness. The Bulgarians' aim was to annex the whole of Macedonia and wipe out the Greek element there. In self-defence the Greeks embarked upon the Macedonian Struggle (1904-8), after the Bulgarian uprising at Ilinden.

> Chapter Six ("The Development of the Idea of the Macedonian Nation', pp. 37-47) discusses the agents of the national ideology of Macedono-Slavism. Since they were essentially the agents of a Bulgarian national ideology, Skopje's historians attempt to skirt this problem

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[11] A report from the Russian consul in Monastir to the Russian ambassador to Constantinople, dated 16 January 1864, had this to say about the necessity of educating the Bulgarians:

> Macedonia, being separated from the other Slav regions in the South, fell completely under the influence of the Greeks a very long time ago. ... For a long time services have been conducted almost everywhere exclusively in Greek, and in practically none of the schools was the Bulgarian language taught. The few prospering Bulgarians did not dare to call themselves Bulgarians — they were ashamed of their nationality.
>
> The Cyrillic alphabet was preserved only in the Northern parts of Macedonia and in the oldest manuscripts, which could be found only in some monasteries. The local Bulgarians were compelled to devise a new way of writing by using Greek letters to express Slav sounds. ... But in spite of this moral oppression, the rural population everywhere preserved the Slav legends, language and traditions. ...
>
> But, while remaining true to the ancient legends — to the Slav language and customs, the same rural population under the influence of the higher circles of society gradually lost almost completely its consciousness of the other Slav peoples and became accustomed to base all its hopes for the improvement of its situation solely on Greece.

See *Macedonia: Documents and Material,* Sofia 1980, pp. 209-10.

by regarding the 'Macedono-Slavonic renaissance' as Bulgarian only in its outward manifestation, and as 'Macedonian' in essence:

> In the resistance to Hellenization, Slav Orthodoxy was emphasized, which, as a result of the medieval inheritance, had surfaced as "Slavo-Bulgarian". However, during the 1840's the Macedonian population came into contact with Bulgarian literacy and the Bulgarian language, and in so doing differentiated themselves from those already known as Bulgarians. They rejected Bulgarian features, but being unable to refer to themselves simply as Slavs (a name which had no ethnic differentiation) they took the name of their country, which possessed a long tradition and a famous past (p. 38).

This is a blatant usurpation of the Bulgarian cultural renaissance. The Bulgarian intellectuals who originated within the bosom of the Bulgarian Exarchate and agitated in Bulgaria for Macedonian autonomy have suddenly become naturalised 'Macedonians'.

> Chapter Six also mentions the activities of associations of 'Macedonian' students in St Petersburg, with emphasis on the 'national' contribution of Dimitrija Tchupovski and Krste Misirkov (pp. 42-5). In Skopje, the latter is regarded as the Vuk Karadzhitch of 'Macedonia' and the number one national enlightener.

Misirkov is worth discussing. In his *Za makedonckite raboti* (On Macedonian matters), which was published in Sofia in 1903 and written not in the scholarly Bulgarian language but in the local Bulgaro-Macedonian dialect, Misirkov did indeed expound the theory of 'Slavo-Macedonianism' — i.e. the creation of a new, non-Bulgarian Slavonic ethnicity. It was Stoyan Novakovitch, Serbia's Minister for Education in 1881-3 and *chargé d'affaires* in Constantinople (1886-91) and St Petersburg (1900-2) — where he maintained close relations with Slav students from Macedonia — who originally developed this theory. In order to prevent the Macedonian Slavs from acquiring Bulgarian national consciousness, from 1881 onwards the Serbs expounded the notion of Slavo-Macedonianism and tried to turn the Bulgaro-Macedonian dialect into a literary language by enriching it with Serbian words. The Serbs' aim, needless to say, was not to create a new Slavo-Macedonian ethnicity, but, by cultivating Slavo-Macedonianism as a countervailing force against Bulgarianisation, gradually to Serbianise the Slav population of Macedonia[12].

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[12] For Macedonianism as a political concept in the late nineteenth and early twentieth

As the recipient of a scholarship from the St Sabbas Association, the Bulgarian-born Misirkov was imbued with the Serbian notions of Slavo-Macedonianism. During his further education in St Petersburg, he met Novakovitch. Realising that Bulgaria could not liberate Macedonia and that Russian policy was not in favour of the revolutionary activities of IMRO (the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation), after the failure of the Ilinden Uprising Misirkov devised the concept of Slavo-Macedonianism as a political means of achieving independence for Macedonia within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. He was fully aware that the new ethnicity was a complete fabrication, that there was in fact no such thing as a Slavo-Macedonian ethnicity.

> 'Many people will wonder', he wrote,
> what national fragmentation we are talking about. Can we be thinking of creating a new, Macedonian ethnicity? That would be a factitious thing and would not last a day. What kind of Macedonian ethnicity is this, when our fathers, our grandfathers, and our great-grandfathers were called Bulgarians? ... There have always been two nationalities in Macedonia: the Bulgarians and the Serbs. A Macedono-Slavonic renaissance is an empty dream of star-gazers who have no idea of the Southern Slavs' history[13].

He waves away these objections with the simple argument: 'but what does not exist can be created, if the historical circumstances call for it'[14].

Naturally enough, Misirkov's views, like the similar views of Tchupovski, met with no substantial response. It was not long before he himself described the theory of Macedono-Slavism as unscientific and conceded that his book *On Macedonian Matters* was a political tract. In his study 'Notes on South Slavonic Literature and History', which was published in the periodical *Balgarska Sbirka* (1910-11) and expressed Bulgarian views, he wrote:

> My readers will be astonished by the great contrast between this study and my tract *On Macedonian Matters*. To clarify this contrast I need only remind them that in that work I was playing the part

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century, see H. Hristov, 'Makedonizmat kato politicheska kontsepsija v kraja na 19. i natchaloto na 20. v.', *Istoritcheski Pregled*, 3 (1979), 23-40, who closely analyses the views of Novakovitch and Misirkov.

[13] K. Misirkov, *Za makedonckite raboti*, Sofia 1903, pp. 100-1.

[14] *Ibidem*, p. 101.

> of a politician extemporising on the Macedonian Question. Nothing in that tract has anything to do with impartial science[15].

At the beginning of the century the notion of Slavo-Macedonianism served ulterior political motives and was restricted to a coterie of intellectuals. It had no foundation amongst the people.

> In Chapter Seven ('Macedonian Uprisings in the 19th and the Beginning of the 20th Century', pp. 49-52) the uprisings at Kresna (1878) and Ilinden are described as insurrectionary movements by the 'Macedonian' people, and the IMTRO (Internal Macedono-Thracian Revolutionary Movement; later IMRO) as a mass popular organisation of the 'Macedonians'.

This is basically a distortion of Bulgarian history. The Kresna Uprising was a Bulgarian revolt in protest against the revision of the San Stefano Treaty by the Congress of Berlin. The Ilinden Uprising was also a Bulgarian revolt, a consequence of the Djumaya disturbances (1902) fomented by the Supreme Macedonian Committee in Sofia and of the increased diplomatic activity in Europe in late 1902 and early 1903 (for instance, the Russian foreign Minister Count Lambsdorf visited Sofia after the Djumaya incidents and the European Powers were promoting a programme of reforms for Macedonia). We now know that IMRO decided to launch the Ilinden Uprising basically because Bulgaria had promised to help, even to the extent of declaring war on Turkey[16]. Despite the various changes visited upon its name for tactical reasons, IMRO, which had been founded by a group of Bulgarian intellectuals in Thessaloniki in 1893, never lost its Bulgarian identity. It sought autonomy for Macedonia as a means of annexing the region to Bulgaria. Christo Tatartchev, one of IMRO's founder members, was quite clear on this point:

> The Organisation's aims were discussed at great length. We decided to pursue the autonomy of Macedonia, with the Bulgarian element particularly in mind. We could not accept that Macedonia should be immediately annexed to Bulgaria, for we realised that such a move would encounter great difficulties, owing to the objections

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[15] K. Tsarnushanov, *Makedonizmat i saprotivata na Makedonija sreshtu nego,* Sofia 1992, p. 76

[16] See *Zlatna Kniga — 100 Godini VMRO: Glas na VMRO-DPMNE,* Skopje 1993, p. 53.

> of the Great Powers and the ambitious plans of the small neighbouring states and Turkey. We thought an autonomous Macedonia could be annexed to Bulgaria more easily at a later stage. If this, in the final analysis, were not achieved, it could serve as a link to unite the Balkan states into a single confederation[17].

> Chapter Eight ('Programmatic Premises for a Macedonian State', pp. 53-8) discusses IMRO's post-Ilinden manifesto, which was hammered out at a conference at Rila Monastery. It included propaganda for establishing an independent Macedonia within the framework of a Balkan federation, discrediting Bulgaria's part in the liberation struggle, and implementing a policy that would be independent of Sofia.

This new orientation of many of IMRO's cadres after the Ilinden Uprising resulted from the political crisis in and the ideological fragmentation of this Bulgaro-Macedonian organisation. Many members had been disappointed by the Bulgarian government's inertia during the Ilinden Uprising and were now seeking a new strategy. The fundamental dilemma the organisation was facing was how far support for the Bulgarian government might benefit or prejudice the Bulgaro-Macedonian revolutionary movement[18]. One of the chief advocates of an independent line from Sofia was Jane Sandanski, who, without repudiating his Bulgarian origin, joined forces with the Young Turks after 1908[19]. The restricting of IMRO's relations with the Bulgarian government was a purely tactical move and was by no means an attempt to emancipate the 'Macedonians' from the Bulgarians.

> Chapter Nine ('The Macedonian Question in Foreign Relations'. pp. 59-65) conducts a very brief and superficial examination of the Great Powers' policy towards the Macedonian Question from the time of the Eastern Crisis (1875-8) until the end of the First World War, in the context of their general policy towards the Eastern Question. The American stance at the Paris Peace Conference after the War is both overrated and distorted, and it is claimed that the United States favoured the formation of an autonomous Macedonian state (p. 63).

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[17] Christo Tatartchev, *Spomeni, Documenti, Materiali*, Sofia 1989, p. 27.

[18] For a critical analysis of the developments, see F. Adanir, *Die Makedonische Frage: Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1908*, Wiesbaden 1979, pp. 226-34.

[19] *Ibidem*, p. 248.

There is ample proof that US Balkan policy after World War I was manifestly pro-Bulgarian. The United States was anxious to exert political influence over the defeated Bulgaria, which had lost its traditional allies, tsarist Russia and Germany. This was why President Wilson opposed ceding Western Thrace to Greece and favoured giving Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria, at the same time urging the formation of an international state in Eastern Thrace under American protection and proposing that Constantinople serve as a bridgehead against the Soviet Russia[20]. Given the United States' pro-Bulgarian stance, American envoys in Bulgaria were chiefly influenced by Bulgaro-Macedonian circles and expressed in their memoranda to President Wilson the desirability of the formation of an autonomous Macedonia. However, when the Macedonian Question was discussed by the Commission for New States and the Protection of Minorities between July and September 1919, the US Peace Delegation did not table the subject[21], because its members believed that the preconditions did not exist for the formation of an autonomous or independent Macedonian state. It was chiefly the Bulgaro-Macedonian organisations that were lobbying for the formation of an independent Macedonia in memoranda to the Peace Conference, and they were supported by the Bulgarian delegation in Paris[22].

> The assertion that Greece acknowledged the existence of a 'Macedonian minority' at the Paris Peace Conference is also totally unfounded. The Greek delegation's every reference to Slavonic-speakers or Slav communities in Macedonia is interpreted as recognition of the existence of a 'Macedonian minority' (p. 64).

The Greek delegation to the Paris Peace Conference sought and achieved an exchange of populations between Greece and Bulgaria. The Slavonic speakers in Greek Macedonia who had a fully developed Bulgarian national consciousness would be allowed to emigrate to Bulgaria, while those who wished to stay were considered to have Greek national consciousness, since they had remained loyal to the Oecumenical Patriarchate and had fought with the Greeks in the Macedonian Struggle. Likewise, the Greeks in Bulgaria would be allowed to emigrate to Greece. It should be noted that the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920) made no reference whatsoever to a Bulgarian or 'Macedonian' minority in Greece.

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[20] H. Hristov, 'On the Question of the Entente's and USA Policy in Southeastern Europe in 1918-1919', *Études historiques*, VII (1975), 389-404; N. Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference (1919)*, Institute for Balkan Studies (No 175), Thessaloniki 1978, p. 261.

[21] H. Hristov, *Balgarija, Balkanite i mirat 1919*, Sofia 1984, p. 109.

[22] I. Mihajlov, *Spomeni*, vol. 2, *Osvoboditelnata borba 1919-1924 g.*, Louvain 1965, pp. 345-6.

> Chapter Ten ('The Balkan Wars and the Partition of Macedonia', pp. 67-70) repeats the claim that the Balkan Wars supposedly divided Macedonia amongst Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria. It is stated, however, that 'Macedonians' joined the Bulgarian and Greek armies to fight for their liberation (p. 67).

The Balkan Wars are the Achilles' heel of Skopje's historiography. If the Slav population really did have a well-developed 'Slavo-Macedonian' national consciousness, it would surely have manifested itself in the form of resistance to the 'expansionism' of the three Balkan states. The fact that Slavonic-speakers with Bulgarian national consciousness fought with the Bulgarian army, and Slavonic-speakers with Greek national consciousness fought with the Greek army demonstrates the non-existence of 'Slavo-Macedonian' national consciousness. It was chiefly the Bulgaro-Macedonian organisations that were agitating for an independent Macedonia after Bulgaria's defeat in the Second Balkan War.

> Chapter Eleven ('The Aegean Part of Macedonia after the Balkan Wars', pp. 71-86) relates that after the First World War Greece embarked on a campaign of 'ethnic cleansing' against the 'Macedonians' and, by settling the Greek refugees from Asia Minor in Macedonia, changed the region's ethnic composition. Under pressure from the League of Nations Greece did, apparently, acknowledge the existence of a 'Macedonian minority'. Proof of this is taken to be the *ABECEDAR* case (pp. 73-5). The changing of local place-names is proffered as further evidence of Athens' 'anti-Macedonian' policy (pp. 75-80). Greece's 'anti-Macedonian' campaign culminated after the Second World War, when the Greek authorities persecuted the 'Macedonians', who joined forces with the democratic people of Greece during the Occupation and the Civil War and fought for their national reinstatement (pp. 80-6).

As we have seen, on 27 November 1919 Greece signed a special accord with Bulgaria for a reciprocal exchange of populations. After the Bulgarian parliament had ratified the Treaty of Neuilly on 9 August 1920, Bulgaria did not proceed to grant rights to the Greeks living in Bulgaria in accordance with the Treaty's minority provisions. Greece also conducted an exchange of populations with Turkey, under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923). Over 300,000 Moslems left Greek Macedonia for Turkey, and 700,000 Greeks from Asia Minor came and settled in Macedonia. In 1926 the ethnic composition of Greek Macedonia was as follows[23]:

Greeks	1,341,000
Moslems	2,000
Slavonic-speakers	77,000
Other	91,000
Total	1,511,000

It is obvious that Greece carried out no 'ethnic cleansing'.

The question of the *ABECEDAR* has to be examined in its historical context. On 6 August 1924 the Greek parliament ratified the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres concerning the protection of minorities. On 29 September 1924, the Greek representative at the League of Nations, Nikolaos Politis, and the Bulgarian foreign minister, Christo Kalvov, signed a protocol under the aegis of the Secretary General of the League of Nations, Eric Drummond, to meet the demands of the Bulgarian minority in Greece and the Greek minority in Bulgaria. Emigration was still continuing, and IMRO was provoking border incidents (one example being the Terlis case in July 1924) and harassing the Greeks in Bulgaria (notably in the summer of 1924). The protocol chiefly provided for two League of Nations representatives (A. C. Corfe and Marcel De Roover) to act as advisers to the Commission for Greek and Bulgarian Emigration on the measures to be taken by each government. For Bulgaria the significance of the protocol lay chiefly in the fact that it was the first time since the First World War that an official diplomatic document referred to the presence of Bulgarians in the broader region of Macedonia. However, two factors made the protocol impossible to implement. The first was Yugoslavia's attitude. Belgrade objected to the fact that the Slavonic-speakers in Greek Macedonia were referred to as 'Bulgarians' (for this undermined the policy of 'Serbianisation' being carried out in the Serbian part of Macedonia, where no Bulgarian presence was recognised), demanded that the Slavonic-speakers in Greek Macedonia be referred to as Serbs, and revoked the Greek-Serbian treaty of 1913. Owing to Belgrade's stance, the Greek government could not ratify the protocol. The second factor was the end of the emigration process. The last day of December 1924 was the deadline for Slavonic-speakers with Bulgarian national consciousness to apply to emigrate to Bulgaria. Greece regarded the remaining Slavonic-speakers as a linguistic minority (*minorité de langue slave*), and not as an ethnic minority in the sense in which the term is used in international law.

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[23] League of Nations, *Greek Refugee Settlement*, Geneva 1926, in E. Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*, Institute for Balkan Studies, No 70, Thessaloniki 1964, p. 47. The figure 77,000 refers only to the former Exarchists, whom Greece regarded as a separate linguistic group.

In order to avert the diplomatic consequences of non-ratification of the protocol, and also to make it apparent that Greece was meeting its obligations arising out of the minority provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, on 29 May 1925 the Greek government assured the League of Nations that it would respect the Slavonic-speakers' demands in the spheres of education and religion.

> Le Gouvernement hellénique examinera avec bienveillance toute demande qui lui serait soumise par cette minorité pour l'ouverture et le fonctionnement d'une école où l'enseignement serait donné dans sa propre langue, conformément aux lois et règlements du pays sur les écoles privées ou l'instruction primaire. Il lui fera en outre profiter de toute autre mesure qui serait prise ultérieurement en faveur des écoles des minorités, notamment pour le recruitement du personnel enseignant.
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> Les ressortissants grecs appartenant à la minorité de langue slave étant orthodoxes ne peuvent certes prétendre constituer une minorité de religion dans un pays dont la religion prédominante est leur propre croyance. Néanmoins, et bien que depuis l'apparition du christianisme jusqu'il y a quelques dizaines d'années l'office divin dans leurs églises était célébré en langue grecque, le Gouvernement hellénique serait toujours disposé à examiner avec bienveillance toute demande provenant de ces ressortissants en question, et visant l'emploi, dans une église, de leur propre langue à la place du grec[24].

The educational measures Greece was prepared to implement included the compiling of a primer in the local Slavonic dialect printed in the Latin alphabet. Greece also intended to promote the teaching of the Greek language to the Slavonic-speakers, a proposal which the League of Nations accepted. 'Il est bien entendu que l'enseignement créé au profit des populations grecques de langue slave comportera aussi un enseignement de la langue grecque'[25].

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[24] See 'Réponse du Gouvernement hellénique aux trois questions formulées par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, au sujet de la protection des Minorités ethniques, de religion et de langue en Grèce'; appendix to A. Tounda-Fergadi, *Ελληνο-βουλγαρικές μειονότητες: Πρωτόκολλο Πολίτη-Καλφώφ 1924-1925* (Greek and Bulgarian minorities: The Politis-Kalfov protocol, 1924-5), Institute for Balkan Studies, No 201, Thessaloniki 1986, p. 216.

Nowhere in the relevant diplomatic documents is the term 'Macedonian ethnic minority' or even 'Macedonian minority' to be found.

Bulgaria, however, did not institute similar measures for the Greeks, as the Treaty of Neuilly stipulated that it should for all its minorities; and Greece could hardly implement the declared measures unilaterally. Furthermore, during the Greek-Serbian negotiations held in April and May 1925 (and later) to settle the issue of the free zone in Thessaloniki, Belgrade was pressing Greece to recognise the Slavonic-speakers in Greek Macedonia as a Serbian minority, so that Greece could indirectly help Serbia to implement its policy of 'Serbianising' the Serbian part of Macedonia. The issue of the Slavonic-speakers in Greek Macedonia inevitably became embroiled in the Bulgaro-Yugoslav contention over the Macedonian Question, and the political situation in the Balkans deteriorated. From mid-1925 onwards the League of Nations ceased to concern itself with the Politis-Kalvov Protocol and the Slavonic-speakers in Greek Macedonia. After all, the Slavonic-speakers themselves had never complained of oppression by the Greek authorities either to the Greek government or to the League of Nations' representatives on the Joint Committee for Greek and Bulgarian Emigration.

It has been standard practice in the modern history of the whole of Europe, and elsewhere too, to change place-names when borders shift. In the Balkans and Asia Minor, the countries that acquired nationhood after the collapse of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires conducted a similar process of toponymical change within their territories — particularly in areas where speakers of the 'other' language had moved away or considerably dwindled in number. In many parts of Macedonia, more especially, it was a question of restoring Slavonic distortions to their proper Greek form (Kastoria instead of Kostur, for instance, Veria instead of Ber) or officially redefining areas by their original Greek names (Naoussa/Negush, for instance, Pella/Postlo, Edessa/Voden). In many cases, Greeks had always called such places by their

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[25] See 'Réponse du Gouvernement hellénique à certaines questions qui lui ont été adressées par le Conseil en mars 1925: Procès verbal de la sixième séance (publique) tenue à Genève le mercredi 10 juin 1925'; appendix to Tounda-Fergadi, *Ελληνο-Βουλγαρικές μειονότητες*, p. 219.

Greek names. The radical ethnological changes the region had undergone between 1912 and 1925 made it vital to replace Turkish and Slavònic place-names, because Greek Macedonia now had an overwhelmingly homogeneous Greek-speaking population.

During the Second World War and the Greek Civil War (1946-9), some of the Slavonic-speakers experienced a genuine crisis of conscious, chiefly owing to external factors. While the Bulgarians were occupying Greek Macedonia, many Slavonic-speakers, either out of self-interest or in response to pressure, became tools of the the occupiers and organised security corps, known collectively as the *Ohrana*. On the initiative of the Yugoslav Communist Party (which had accepted the International's 1934 decision to recognise the existence of a 'Macedonian nation', was promoting 'Macedonianism' as a counterweight to 'Bulgarianism', and in 1943 began efforts to unite the three parts of Macedonia in the framework of the Yugoslav Federation) the SNOF (Slavo-Macedonian National Liberation Front) was formed in Greek Macedonia in 1943. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) acquiesced to the setting up of the SNOF, in the belief that the Slavonic-speakers who had been seduced by Byulgarian Fascist propaganda could thus be prevailed upon to resist. Although the Communist Parties of Greece and Yugoslavia had jointly decided that the SNOF would join the Greek resistance movement of the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), the former organisation was being secretly primed by Yugoslav partisans, who were spreading propaganda about a 'Macedonian nation' and a 'united Macedonia' within the Yugoslav Federation[26]. In 1944, when the Nazi grip on Europe was weakening and

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[26] Tito's envoy to Yugoslav Macedonia, Svetozar Vukmanovitch (nicknamed Tempo), put the question of uniting Greek Macedonia and Yugoslav Macedonia in a future Yugoslav federation directly to the KKE's representative. Andreas Dzimas, when they met in the summer of 1943. Dzimas refused point blank to dscuss the proposal with him. See the Archives of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and the Georgi Dimitrov Archive in *1931-1944 Φάκελλος Ελλάς: Τα Αρχεία των μυστικών σοβιετικών υπηρεσιών* (1931-1944 Greece file: the archives of the Soviet secret services), Athens 1993, pp. 143-5. This was the main reason why the KKE's Central Committee rejected Tempo's proposal to establish a Balkan headquarters. At the seventh plenary session of the KKE's Central Committee (14-18 May 1950), Zachariadis said:

> Ever since 1943, Tito's history has been, amongst other things, an endless series of subversion, provocation, informing, and betrayal of the popular revolutionary movement in our country. Since the moment Tito's agents made contact whit ELAS, they have been trying to create their own organisation and to recruit agents chiefly from amongst the Slavo-Macedonians. Their aim ever since has been to

Bulgaria was once again destined to be a defeated country, many supporters of the *Ohrana* shed the insignia of the Bulgarian Fascist army and joined the armed battalions of Slavonic-speakers under Ilias Dimakis (Gotche) and Gjorgi Urdov (Dzodzo), presenting themselves as 'Macedonian' Communists fighting for the resistance. The battalions' direct dependence on Yugoslavia and their agitating for a free and united Macedonia aroused considerable alarm within the Greek resistance movement, and in October 1944 ELAS clashed with Gotche's battalion and pushed it back into Yugoslavia.

In April 1945, the Yugoslavs took advantage of the irregular political situation in Greece after the events of December 1944 and formed the SNOF's successor, the NOF; and when the Civil War broke out in Greece, the latter joined the Greek Communist movement. Very soon, however, Gotche (Ilias Dimakis), Keramidzhiev (Mihalis Keramidzis), and Mitrevski (Paskhalis Mitropoulos) began spreading propaganda for the union of Greek Macedonia with Yugoslav Macedonia, causing serious problems for the leadership of the KKE, which was conducting its war operations chiefly with Yugoslav assistance[27]. After the International had recognised the existence of a 'Mace-

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> create a rift between the Greeks and the Slavo-Macedonians, because they have set their sights on Thessaloniki and the whole of Macedonia. Basically, they have been continuing the grand Yugoslav policy of conquest, which has always targeted the whole of Macedonia, with Thessaloniki as its centre.

Quoted in *Η 7η Ολομέλεια της ΚΕ του ΚΚΕ (14-18 Μάη 1950): Εισηγήσεις — Λόγοι — Αποφάσεις* (The seventh plenary session of the Central Committee of the KKE (14-18 May 1950): Proposals, speeches, and decisions), Published by the Central Committee of the KKE, September 1950, p. 275.

[27] No document has yet been found confirming that the KKE officially agreed that Greek Macedonia should be ceded to Tito as a *quid pro quo* for Yugoslav help. Nonetheless, the Yugoslav leadership did seem to expect that the KKE would repay its help by satisfying its designs on parts of Greek Macedonia. The process had already begun with negotiations for the incorporation of Bulgarian Macedonia. The agreement of 14 October 1946 signed by Ioannidis, Rankovitch, and Karaivanov (see E. Kofos, *The Impact of the Macedonian Question on Civil Conflict in Greece (1943-1949)*, Athens 1989, p. 42) simply regulated the relations between the NOF and the KKE. Zachariadis had this to say at the seventh plenary session:

> As far as the significance for us of the Yugoslav factor is concerned, it is important to remember that Tito's clique waged an underhand subversive war against us for years amongst the Slavo-Macedonian population. An understanding with the Yugoslavs at that time meant an end to that war and the Slavo-Macedonians fighting at our side. In fact in the agreement we made with Tito, we did touch on this point.

See *Η 7η Ολομέλεια της ΚΕ του ΚΚΕ,* p. 173.

donian nation', the KKE also, in theory, recognised the Slavonic-speakers as a 'Slavo-Macedonian minority'. But by 1935 it had abandoned the slogan of a 'united and independent Macedonia within a Balkan federation' that the International had imposed in 1924, and, having provoked a split within the party, was now supporting the full equality of the minorities in the Greek state. After Tito's rupture with the Cominform in 1948, the KKE leaders joined the Soviet Union in attacking Tito, and at the fifth plenary session in January 1949 adopted the slogan of the 'national re-establishment and self-determination of the Macedonian people', so that Yugoslav Macedonia could be freed from Tito's dominion.

> In Northern Greece the Macedonian [Slavo-Macedonian] people have given their all to the struggle and are battling on with absolute and admirable heroism and self-sacrifice. There can be no doubt that, as a result of the victory of the Democratic Army of Greece and the People's Revolution, the Macedonian people will gain full reinstatement as a nation, precisely as they themselves wish, spilling their own blood today in order to achieve it. The Macedonian Communists are always ready to lead their people's struggle. At the same time, the Macedonian Communists have to beware of the disruptive tactics employed by foreign-influenced, chauvinistic, and reactionary elements in order to destroy the unity between the [Slavo-] Macedonian and Greek people; a destruction that will benefit only their common enemy, monarcho-Fascism and Anglo-American imperialism[28].

At the seventh plenary session of the Central Committee of the KKE (14-18 May 1950), Zachariadis explained that the decision was also aimed

> at Tito, who, like monarcho-Fascism, is tyrannising the Macedonian people. The prospect we were giving them was liberation not only from monarcho-Fascism but from Tito also, who is bringing, nay has already brought, Macedonia back under the imperialist yoke and imperialist exploitation[29].

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[28] See *5η Ολομέλεια της ΚΕ του ΚΚΕ (30-31 του Γενάρη 1949): Εισηγήσεις — Λόγοι — Αποφάσεις* (The fifth plenary session of the Central Committee of the KKE (30-31 January 1949): proposals, speeches, and decisions), published by the Central Committee of the KKE, June 1949, p. 16.

[29] See *Η 7η Ολομέλεια της ΚΕ του ΚΚΕ,* p. 175. After Tito had severed relations with

The fifth plenary session had also harshly criticised the NOF cadres who were tools of Yugoslavia[30] and had already been removed from their positions of leadership.

The second plenary session of the Central Committee of the NOF (3 February 1949) adopted the old slogan of a 'united and independent Macedonia in the framework of a Balkan Communist federation'[31], which was to be ratified by the second NOF conference. The decision was aimed against

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Stalin and the KKE had aligned itself with the Cominform, the former leaders of the NOF, Gotche, Keramidzhiev, and Ajanovski-Otche (Vangelis Ayannis), helped Slavonic-speakers to desert from the Democratic Army to Yugoslavia and cultivated a spirit of defeatism, arguing that the KKE had betrayed the struggle of the 'Macedonian' people, and that their blood was being shed in vain. This was the basic reason why Zachariadis — or so he claimed — brought up the Macedonian Question at the fifth plenary session and put Slavonic-speakers in ministerial posts in the interim government. He was trying to create a diversion among the NOF's pro-Tito clique and secure the support of the Slavonic-speakers for the fortcoming battle for Florina, where the rebel government was to install itself. He said:

> The second point is that, though we could have postponed announcing this thing, which was basically the right thing to do, we brought it up at the fifth plenary session because we were under pressure. In my article I say that, although it was not in the general interest, we gave the signal. Why did we do so? I see it this way, and I shall explain it to you — from my own point of view, of course. Broadly speaking, it was not in our immediate interests. But the first thing we had in mind was that we had to win the battle of Vitsi. Everything else took second place. This was the thought, my thought at least, when I proposed it, when I wrote it down, and when I explained it. We had to mobilise all the forces of the Slavo-Macedonian people, and stop the desertions and the subversive and disruptive work being done by Tito's agents by putting a political obstacle in their way. And we did put a political obstacle in their way and averted the immediate danger posed by this work. We put a stop to that immediate danger.

See *Η 7η Ολομέλεια της ΚΕ του ΚΚΕ,* p. 175. After Zachariadis had been removed from the leadership of the KKE (in 1956), the seventh general plenary session of the Central Committee of the KKE (18-24 February 1957) described his policy as erroneous and brought back the old slogan of the 'the Slavo-Macedonians' right to equality ... in indissoluble unity with the Greek people'. See *Η 7η Πλατιά Ολομέλεια της ΚΕ του ΚΚΕ (18-24 Φεβρουαρίου 1957): Εισηγήσεις — Αποφάσεις — Ομιλίες — Πραχτικά* (The 7th general plenary session of the Central Committee of the KKE (18-24 February 1957): Proposals, decisions, speeches, proceedings), published by the Central Committee of the KKE, February 1957, p. 21.

[30] See *5η Ολομέλεια της ΚΕ του ΚΚΕ,* p. 38.

[31] See *Egejska Makedonija vo NOB 1949,* vol. VI, Arhiv na Makedonija, Skopje 1983, pp. 52-4. Owing to the reaction of both the Greek government and Yugoslavia, for tactical reasons the second NOF conference (25-26 March 1949) did not proclaim this slogan, but replaced it with the 'Macedonian people's right to self-determination'.

Yugoslavia, which was seeking to establish a united Macedonia within the Yugoslav federation. The *volte-face* also had serious repercussions in the sphere of military operations. In an attempt to protect their rear, the Yugoslavs closed the border which had hitherto served as the Greek Communists' main supply route. Some of the NOF's Slavonic-speaking supporters fled to Yugoslav Macedonia. After the defeat of the Greek Communists in 1949, the NOF's remaining supporters followed the leaders of the KKE and settled in East European countries. As a result, the Slavonic-speakers who had joined the Greek Communist movement during the Civil War suffered the same fate as the Greek Communists. The Greek state had every reason to be extremely wary of those who settled in the Federal Socialist Republic of 'Macedonia', became naturalised 'Macedonians', and applied themselves to an anti-Greek campaign. But what Skopje's historians neglect to mention is that, during the Occupation and the Civil War, many Slavonic-speakers remained firmly committed to Hellenism, and many of them, indeed, took up arms against the members of the NOF.

> Chapter Twelve ('The Idea of Macedonian Liberation between the Two World Wars', pp. 87-90) discusses the 'Macedonian national forces' which struggled to achieve an independent Macedonian state in the inter-war period: IMRO, the Executive Committee of the Macedonian Brotherhoods, the Federalists, and IMRO (United). The attempt to unite the 'Macedonian' forces in May 1924 and the publication of the revolutionary manifesto on 6 May 1924 are extolled, and the Comintern's 1934 decision to recognise the existence of a 'Macedonian nation' is considered to be the first international recognition of the 'Macedonian national entity' (p· 89).

However, the actual historical facts are somewhat different. Chiefly after the First World War, the Bulgarian organisation IMRO, led by Todor Alexandrov and Alexander Protogerov, sought autonomy for Serbian and Greek Macedonia, with the ulterior motive of annexing the region to Bulgaria. As far as Greek Macedonia was concerned, IMRO tried (unsuccessfully) to frustrate the implementation of the Greek-Bulgarian agreement on the exchange of populations; and in the Serbian part of Macedonia, where a considerable proportion of the population nursed pro-Bulgarian sentiments, its tactics were guerrilla warfare (1920-4) and the assassination of Yugoslav state officials (1926-33) in protest against Belgrade's policy of Serbianising the region[32]. In 1933, under the leadership of Ivan Mihajlov, IMRO began agitating for a 'unified and independent Macedonia', which would include the Bulgarian part of Macedonia. IMRO regarded the political label of 'Macedonian' as perfectly compatible with the national identity of 'Bulgarian'. The 'unified and independent Macedonia' was in fact intended to be a second Bulgarian state. The Federalists (Todor Panitcha and Filip Atanasov), who had broken away from IMRO in 1920/1, were pushing for the establishment of a Federation of Southern Slavs as a way of resolving the Macedonian Question. They used the term 'Macedonian' in its geographical sense. Their disagreement with IMRO was partly ideological, partly personal, and partly strategical. Soviet diplomats made efforts to the unify the two organisations in 1924,, so that the unified Bulgaro-Macedonian organisations, the Communist Party of Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian Agrarians could together overthrow Tchankov and install a workers' and agrarian government in Bulgaria. Soviet diplomacy and the Communist International did their best to alienate the Bulgaro-Macedonian organisations from Bulgarian nationalism, talked about a 'Macedonian people' divided among Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, and pressed for a 'unified and independent Macedonia in the framework of a Balkan federation', in order to undermine the Balkan nations. The Manifesto of 6 May 1924[33] — which was signed by IMRO and the Federalists and was a veiled declaration of the collaboration between the Bulgaro-Macedonian organisations and Soviet Russia and the start of a struggle against the 'imperialist' Balkan states in the name of 'Macedonianism' and an independent Macedonia — was the brainchild of Soviet diplomacy[34].

The same spirit governed the decision of the International's Fifth Congress (17 June-8 July 1924) on the Macedonian Question.

The partitioning of Macedonia among Yugoslavia, Greece, and

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[32] See S. Sfetas, *Makedonien und interbalkanische Beziehungen (1920-1924)*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Geschichte Osteuropas und Südosteuropas der Universität München, vol. 12, Munich 1992, pp. 51-61, 89-127, 145-50, 187-97, 209-24, 240-1; S. Troebst, *Mussolini, Makedonien und die Mächte 1922-1930*, Cologne and Vienna 1987.

[33] The Manifesto was published in the first issue of the periodical *La Fédération balkanique* (15 July 1924).

[34] The negotiations between IMRO, the Federalists, and the Bulgarian Communist Party, which were held in Vienna with the aim of creating 'a unified popular front' against the Tchankov government, were led by the International's Soviet agent in Vienna Dr Efraim Goldenstein. For information about him, see F. Litten, 'Die Goldstajn/Goldestein-Verwechslung: Eine biographische Notiz zur Komintern-Alktivität auf dem Balkan', *Südost-Forschungen L* (1991), 245-50.

> Bulgaria has even further strengthened the desire of the Macedonian people throughout their dismembered land for unification and the creation of a unified and independent Macedonia ... The Congress considers the slogans of the 6th Conference of the Balkan Communist Federation [held in Moscow in December 1923] — 'a unified and independent Macedonia' and 'a unified and independent Thrace' — to be absolutely correct and genuinely revolutionary. The slogans concerning the autonomy of those parts of Macedonia and Thrace that lie within the borders of the bourgeois states artificially created by the Treaties of Sèvres etc. must be dismissed as opportunistic. They are tantamount to an agreement between the wealthy strata of the Macedonian and Thracian population and the ruling classes of the respective states. They are tantamount to further social and ethnic oppression of the poorer Macedonian and Thracian population. The Congress also points out that the revolutionary struggle of the Macedonian and Thracian people for their national and social liberation will be successful only if it is waged in common with the revolutionary workers and farmers of all the Balkan states[35].

The International's plans to turn Bulgaria Communist and destabilize the Balkans in 1924 were ultimately unsuccessful[36]. However, Soviet intervention in the Macedonian Question had the effect of politically and ideologically polarising the Bulgaro-Macedonian movement. The Tchankov government proceeded to purge IMRO of all those cadres who had been in favour of collaboration with the Communists. Chiefly with the help of the International, the survivors formed IMRO (United) in October 1925, as the ideological and political counterweight to Mihajlov's IMRO, and adopted as their main slogan 'a unified and independent Macedonia in the framework of a Balkan federation'. IMRO (United)'s political influence in the Balkans was negligible, for its headquarters were in Vienna and the Balkan states regarded it as a Communist organisation. Its propaganda activities were chiefly conducted through its organs *La Fédération balkanique and Makedonsko Delo* and it was completely under the thumb of the Bulgarian Communists. It now acquired a broader inter-Balkan aspect. IMRO (United) supported the national liberation of all the oppressed minorities in Macedonia. By 'Macedonian people' they meant all the nationalities living in Macedonia, but particularly the Bulgarians. As far as Greek Macedonia and Serbian Macedonia were concerned, IMRO (United) severely censured the ethnic oppression of the Bulgarians; as far as Bulgarian Macedonia was concerned, it condemned the political oppression and economic exploitation of the Bulgarian population.

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[35] 'Resolution zu den nationalen Fragen in Mitteleuropa und auf dem Balkan-Mazedonische und Thrakische Frage' *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz* (Berlin 1921—November 1923 and Vienna 1923—March 1926), No 134, 15 October 1924, pp. 1272-3.

[36] For a critical approach to these issues, see Sfetas, *op. cit.*, pp. 302-37, 362-72.

> If we examine the Bulgarian part of Macedonia, we observe that here too the situation is similar to that in the Serbian and Greek parts. The Macedonian Greeks and the Turks who lived here previously have been driven out. The population that lives in this part of Macedonia, being of Bulgarian ethnicity, enjoys cultural rights. They have schools and churches and so forth. And this is the only difference between the situation of the Macedonians in Bulgaria and that of the Macedonians in Greece and Serbia[37].

Georgi Dimitrov, who wielded considerable influence with IMRO (United), expressed a similar opinion:

> The Bulgarian bourgeoisie keeps the region of Petritch [Bulgarian Macedonia] under a harsh and implacable régime in comparison to the rest of Bulgaria, even though this bourgeoisie regards the Macedonians in this region as a purely Bulgarian population, and treats it both economically and politically as a conquered area. Since the language and the culture are the same here, ethnic oppression chiefly takes the form of economic extortion and the political oppression of the Macedonian population[38].

Until 1934, IMRO (United) denied the existence of a 'Macedonian ethnicity'.

> There has never been any such thing as a Macedonian ethnicity, just as there has never been any such thing as, for instance, a Swiss ethnicity. There have always been discrete ethnic groups lving in

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[37] See Memorandum from IMRO (United) of 10 September 1927 to the chairman of the Conference on Ethnic Minorities in Geneva concerning the situation of the oppressed peoples in the Balkans, *VMRO (Obedineta), Dokumenti i Materiali*, vol. I, National History Institute, Skopje 1991, pp. 129-35 (this quotation is from p. 134).

[38] G. Dimitrov, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, vol. 2, 1921-1935, Berlin (East) 1958, pp. 398-9.

> Macedonia in varying proportions, just as there are French, German, Italian, and Romansch ethnic groups living in Switzerland. And just as these four ethnic groups together form a single geographical, political, and economic unit under the common name of the 'Swiss people', so too the Bulgarians, Greeks, Turks, Vlachs, Albanians, and Serbs who were born and live in Macedonia comprise a multiethnic mosaic that bears the common name of the 'Macedonian people'[39].

In February 1934, for political reasons the International passed a resolution recognising the existence of a '[Slavo-] Macedonian nation'. After Hitler rose to power, and in view of the close contacts between Michajlov's Bulgarian-nationalist IMRO and the Nazis, the USSR was anxious to prevent Nazi Germany from exploiting the Macedonian Question to the advantage of the Bulgarian Fascists, IMRO (United) and the Balkan Communist parties were summoned to embark upon a struggle on the Macedonians' behalf that was not only ideological and political, but clearly by now a national struggle. It is worth noting that the International's resolution to recognise the existence of a Macedonian nation described Macedonia as a theatre of armed conflict in the coming imperialist war and challenged both Bulgaria's right to occupy the Petritch area and its claim to the broader region of Macedonia. In his memoirs, Dimitar Vlahov clearly implied that the decision of the International's Executive Committee to promote the concept of a Macedonian nation was directly connected with the rise of Nazism in Germany. The Committee ordered the leading cadres of the International's Balkan Secretariat — Valetski, a Pole, and Shmeral, a Czech — to draw up the resolution in question. But since they were not familiar with the details of the Macedonian Question, the text of the resolution was chiefly written by Vlachov himself, who was a leading light of IMRO (United). Vlahov also mentions the negative reactions to the Committee's decision to promote the notion of a Macedonian nation both in the Bulgarian Communist party (whose most infuential members were Vasil Koarov, Stanke Dimitrov, and Vulko Tchervenkov) and among those cadres of IMRO (United) who had qualms that the notion might boomerang back on the organisation. The preliminary discussions were also attended by representatives of the Balkan Communist parties who were

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39. *Balkanska Federacija*, No 131, 20 March 1930, pp. 2869-70, in K. Paleshutski, *Makedonskijat vapros v burzhoazna Yugoslavija 1918-1941*, Sofia 1983, p. 197.

studying at the Communist University of Ethnic Minorities in Moscow[40]. IMRO (United) was obliged to toe this new political line until 1936, when it broke up. The International's resolution to recognise the existence of a 'Macedonian nation' chiefly benefited the Yugoslav Communist party, which saw in 'Macedonianism' a chance to make a stand against Bulgarian claims on Serbian Macedonia.

It is obvious why, until 1990, Skopjan historiography took a dim view of both IMRO under Alexandrov and Protogerov and IMRO (United). The former was regarded as a Bulgarian-chauvinist organisation whose aim was to annex Macedonia to Bulgaria; and the latter was considered to be pro-Bulgarian, with weaknesses in its organisation, ideology, and national policy. It is no coincidence that leading cadres of IMRO (United), like Vlahov, who accepted 'Macedonianism' after 1944 and were awarded high positions in the Federal Socialist Republic of 'Macedonia', were soon accused of being pro-Bulgarian and removed from office. In his speech to the First Congress of the Communist Party of 'Macedonia' (19 December 1948), Lazar Kolishevski observed that 'IMRO (United)'s attitude to the national question did not accord with the correct attitude of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia'[41].

The International's resolution about the existence of a 'Macedonian nation' remained a theoretical declaration by the Balkan Communist parties that met with no response at the grass roots level.

> Chapter Thirteen ('The Establishment of the Macedonian State in the Second World War', pp. 91-4) recounts how, in the early days of the Occupation, the Communist Party of Macedonia started to organise the resistance, which in 1943-4 assumed enormous proportions. In accordance with the resolutions of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (on 29 November 1943 in the Bosnian town of Jajce) that Yugoslavia should be federalised, the first session of

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[40] See D. Vlahov, *Memoari*, Skopje 1970, pp. 356-8. The resolution was published in the Greek newspaper *Kathimerini* on 13 December 1992.

[41] L. Kolishevski, *Aspekti na makedonskoto prashanje*, 3rd edition, Skopje 1980, p. 39. In two letters to Kolishevski, written on 5 December 1938 and in 1951, Vlahov expressed his objections to the consolidation of Macedonian ethnicity on an anti-Bulgarian basis. He also refuted Kolishevski's accusation that IMRO (United) was pro-Bulgarian with the argument that during the inter-war years the literary language of the 'Macedonians' had been Bulgarian. See S. Troebst, *Die bulgarisch-jugoslawische Kontroverse um Makedonien 1967-1982*, Munich 1983, p. 49 (n. 12): and idem, 'Mit Ivan Katardziev: Auf den Gipfelpfaden der makedonischen Geschichte', *Südost-Forschungen*, 47 (1988), 255.

the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) announced on 2 August 1944 the establishment of the 'People's Republic of Macedonia'.

However, the facts were rather different. The Bulgarian army of occupation was hailed in the Serbian part of Macedonia as an army of liberation, and during the first stage of the Occupation pro-Bulgarian feeling ran high. Neither the Communist thesis of a separate 'Macedonian nation' nor the notion of a Yugoslav federation met with any particular response from the Slav population. There was no Communist Party of 'Macedonia', because it had not been possible to carry out the Yugoslav Communist Party's 1934 decision to form one. The local Communists, under Metodij Shatorov, broke away from the Yugoslav Communist Party and joined the (Communist) Bulgarian Workers' Party, whose slogan was 'one state, one party'. The subsequent dissatisfaction with the Occupation authorities was due not to national factors so much as social ones (high-handedness, heavy taxation, disregard for local sensitivities). This was why there was little support for Tito's resistance movement in Yugoslav Macedonia. Tito's letter of 16 January 1943 to the Yugoslav Communist Party's Local District Committee of 'Macedonia' is eloquent in this respect.

> Dear Comrades, from the material you have sent us it is apparent that you have not correctly understood the nature and the purpose of the present national liberation struggle, and you have thus made terrible mistakes. It is clear that the party organisation is unable to act and, under the influence of the clique and the anti-party activity of the previous leader [Shatorov], has not yet managed to consolidate itself organically, nor to strengthen itself and become independent politically.
>
> The main features of the Communist organisation in Macedonia are: inadequate and inconsistent promotion of our party's political line; hesitancy in implementing it; organisational mistakes and weaknesses; a lax attitude to the irresolute, foreign, opportunist, and non-party elements within the party; a narrow view of the question of the liberation and independence of the Macedonian people; a lack of affiliation with the masses during action; tolerance of autonomist tendencies of a party organisational nature and also of a national nature...[42].

[42] See S. Vukmanovitch (Tempo), *Revolucija koja tetche*, vol. 2, Zagreb 1982, pp. 271-2.

The Communist Party of 'Macedonia' was formed, with great difficulty, by Tito's envoy to Yugoslav Macedonia, Svetozar Vukmanovitch (known as Tempo), in February 1943, though it did nothing to change the situation. Only after Italy surrendered (in September 1943) and it became obvious that Germany would be defeated was any armed resistance initiated. The Yugoslav Communist Party agitated for the International's earlier notion of a separate 'Macedonian nation' and the formation of a 'united Macedonia' (comprising the Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian parts) within the Yugoslav federation. Both in ASNOM's proclamation and in other texts and public statements by members of the Council, expansionist intentions were blatantly apparent. The unification of all sections of Macedonia was presented as the 'just and constant' desire of this brand new member of the Yugoslavian federation. In order to achieve this, Skopje was called upon to play the part of the 'Macedonian Piedmont'. After Tito's rupture with the Cominform in June 1948, the Yugoslav leadership temporarily abandoned its plans for a 'conclusive resolution' of the Macedonian Question and concentrated on cultivating and consolidating the new national identity of the Slav population of Yugoslav Macedonia and stamping out rival influences. This 'Macedonianisation' did not happen all at once; it was a lengthy process, during which the Yugoslav leaders initially broke up all the Bulgarian organisations that were opposed to the notion of Macedonianism on an anti-Bulgarian basis, seeing it as a new form of Serbian dominance over the region[43]. At the same time, many IMRO veterans were accused of being pro-Bulgarian supporters of Ivan Mihajlov and condemned to death or sent to prison for allegedly having pursued the secession of Yugoslav Macedonia from the Yugoslav federation in order to make it an independent state under the protection of the Great Powers, in the belief that they would thus more easily achieve the union of all parts of Macedonia as a single independent state. The victims included the president of ASNOM and first president of the Federal Socialist Republic of Macedonia, Metodij Tchento[44]. At the same time, the Yugoslav leaders were raising the issue of respect for the rights of the putative 'Macedonian' minorities in the neighbouring countries. Their constant references to the subject clearly show that the régime established by Tito never abandoned its interest in the whole of Macedonia. Official historiographers and social scientists in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were conscripted to bring about the birth of a nation, but the operation inevitably conflicted with the historical tradition and cultural identity of most of the neighbouring peoples. Skopje's newly minted national ideology rested on the hypothesis of the existence of a 'Macedonian people' and on all three sections of the geographical region of the same name, of which the Greek and Bulgarian parts were 'unredeemed' areas.

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[43] See Tsarnushanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 283-329.

[44] For these trials in the latter half of the 1940s and the subsequent developments, a revelatory recent publication is S. Risteski's *Sudeni za Makedonija (1945-1985)*, Vreme, Skopje 1993. In 1943, the present President Kiro Gligorov himself supported the non-inclusion of Yugoslav Macedonia in the future Yugoslav federation; see K. Paleshutski, 'National Problem in the Yugoslav Federation', in *National Problems in the Balkans*, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences/Sofia Institute for Balkan Studies, Sofia 1992, p. 96.

> Chapter Fifteen ('The Macedonian Language in the Balkan Language Environment', pp. 105-11) and Chapter Sixteen ('Macedonian Culture', pp. 113-19) discuss the morphological characteristics of the 'Macedonian language', its recognition by international science, and its literary output since 1944.

There is some confusion surrounding the term 'Macedonian language' used in relation to a Slavonic linguistic idiom. Properly speaking, the 'Macedonian language' is the language spoken by the ancient Macedonians, a Greek Doric dialect. What Skopje calls the 'Macedonian language' shares many morphological and structural features with Bulgarian: the absence of an infinitive, for instance, the absence of cases, the use of the aorist, the postposition of the article, and the perphrastic formation of comparatives. On this basis, the so-called 'Macedonian language' may more accurately be described as a Bulgarian dialect[45]. After 1944 a systematic effort was launched to 'de-Bulgarianise' it. The Serbian alphabet was adopted, the typically Bulgarian phoneme *a* was dropped, many Serbian words (*vlada, uloga, stvarnost, struka, sprat*) were introduced, even though the Bulgarian equivalents already existed, the instrumental case in Serbian was rendered by the preposition *so* plus the relevant word, which is quite an unnatural formation in this dialect (e.g. *upravljavam drzhavom — upravuvam so drzhavata*), the proper noun endings *-ov* and *-ev* were changed to *-ovski* and *-evski*[46]. It should also be noted that the so-called 'Macedonian language' is not uniform, but varies considerably from area to area. The region's central dialects were the basis on which the scholarly 'Macedonian language' was created in the FYROM, because they were thought to have been less influenced by the scholarly Bulgarian language. Despite the cultivation of the 'Macedonian language' on a literary level after 1944 and the introduction of many Serbian words, it is by no means a rich language.

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[45] H. Bräuer, *Slavische Sprachwissenschaft*, Berlin 1961, p. 46; Bulgarian Academy of Sciences/Institute for Bulgarian Studies, *Edinstvoto na balgarski ezik v minaloto i dnes* (offprint from the periodical *Balgarski Ezik*, 1 (1978)), Sofia 1978.

[46] For the influence of Serbian, see N. Reiter, 'Die serbisch-makedonische Symbiose', in *Jugoslawien: Integrationsprobleme in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Beiträge zum V. internationalen Südosteuropa-Kongreß*, Göttingen 1984, pp. 178-95.

Chapter Fourteen ('The Republic of Macedonia — From a Member State of the Yugoslav Federation to a Sovereign and Independent State', pp. 95-104) concerns the modern aspect of the Macedonian Question, from 1944, when the 'Macedonians' supposedly acquired a state of their own, to the present developments, with the FYROM's secession from the Yugoslav federation and its course towards independence and international recognition.

The main points emphasised in this version of the post-war period are:

> In the framework of a unified Yugoslavia, the 'Socialist Republic of Macedonia' was to become known all over the world and the 'Macedonian' people would be recognised by the international community.
>
> Because it was no longer possible for the individual republics to stay in the federal system, their people decided to break free of it. By a peaceful and democratic process, the 'Socialist Republic of Macedonia' initiated the démarches that would eventually bring it independence, in contrast to the other Yugoslav republics that are still struggling to impose the new *status quo* by fighting and force.
>
> Important events in the republic's breakaway from the Yugoslav federation and its journey along the road to parliamentary democratic status were the independence referendum held on 8 September 1991 and the adoption of the constitution on 17 November 1991.
>
> The constitution is the result of the 'Macedonian' people's centuries-long struggle for national liberation and fully accords with the general principles both of international law and of the UN and CSCE resolutions concerning the democratic organisation of society, acceptance of the parliamentary system of government, peaceful co-existence with neighbouring countries, respect for the individual and collective rights of all citizens, including minorities, and protection of the distinctive cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious features of the republic's citizens.
>
> According to the Badinter Arbitration Committee's opinion on the

Yugoslav crisis[47], the FYROM fulfils all the conditions laid down by the European Union on 16 December 1991 for the recognition of the former Yugoslav republics[48].

Special mention is made at the end of the chapter to two resolutions adopted by the parliament of the FYROM. The first (3 July 1992) concerned the EU's decision at Lisbon on 27 June 1992 that, if it is to be recognised by the EU, the new republic must select a name that does not contain the term 'Macedonia'. The second (29 July 1992) was connected with Skopje's decision to apply for membership of the United Nations.

The information given and the events described in this chapter invite the following comments.

The report of the first post-war multi-party elections in November 1990 is somewhat economical with the facts. There is no mention of the results of the elections[49], which were a walkover for the extreme nationalist party IMRO-DRMNU (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity). The party's name and manifesto alike hark back to the late nineteenth-century organisation of the same name. Nor is it fortuitous that a US State Department report of 1991 describes it as a terrorist organisation that patterns its activities on those of the old IMRO[50]. Furthermore, its election poster consisted of a map of the whole of the geographical region of Macedonia accompanied by the slogan: 'Take its fate in your hands'. In its election proclamation, the party explicitly declared:

> IMRO-DPMNU considers that those segments of the Macedonian nation living under a government of occupation in Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania are not an ethnic minority, but constitute the enslaved sections of the Macedonian nation; because a nation that has been

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[47] K. Ioannou, *Το ζήτημα της αναγνώρισης των Σκοπίων* (The question of the recognition of Skopje), Athens and Komotini 1992.

[48] The last paragraph of the Foreign Ministers' joint statement specifically states: The Community and its member states also ask that the Yugoslav republic undertake, before it is recognised, to issue constitutional and civil guarantees that it has no territorial claim against any neighbouring member state of the Community and that it will not engage in hostile propaganda activities against any neighbouring member state of the Community, including the use of a name which implies territorial demands.

[49] B. Timovski and S. Stefanovski, *Izbori '90: Polititchkite Partii vo Makedonija,* Skopje 1991.

[50] *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990,* Washington D.C., April 1991, p. 18.

> living in its own homeland for ten centuries cannot be described as an ethnic minority. IMRO-DPMNU believes there is an urgent need for the spiritual, political, and economic unification of the Macedonian people ... and it has a keen concern for those segments of the Macedonian people who are living in slavery in Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania'[51].

How telling that during the party's First National Conference at Prilep (6-7 April 1991) it was resolved that the next conference would be convened in Thessaloniki and the one after that in Blagoevgrad[52]!

As far as the referendum is concerned, a certain amount of behind-the-scenes activity is not mentioned in Chapter Fourteen. A total of 68.32% of those registered to vote and 95.09% of those who actually voted came out 'in favour of a sovereign and autonomous state of Macedonia, empowered to participate in a union of sovereign states of Yugoslavia'. But, both within the FYROM and abroad, it was the first part of the question that was emphasised in the referendum — i.e. the autonomy of the 'Republic of Macedonia' (which was rendered as 'independence') — and the second part was completely ignored. The Albanian inhabitants of the new mini-state refused to take part in the referendum, and in fact held one of their own, on 11 and 12 January 1992: 99.86% voted for territorial and political autonomy[53].

Despite additions and modifications, the FYROM's constitution is still strongly irredentist in tone. *Macedonia and its Relations with Greece* places particular emphasis on the contentious articles in the 1991 constitution (Nos 3 and 49, with the relevant amendments and additions, 68 and 74) in order to underline the fact that the FYROM is not spreading hostile propaganda or making territorial claims.

The main resultant of the FYROM's expansionist claims is the preamble to the constitution, which explicitly refers to 'the legal and state traditions of the Republic of Krushevo [1903] and the historic decisions of the Antifascist Assemby of the People for the Liberation of Macedonia [1944]'. The decisions gave the green light for the establishment of the 'People's Republic of Macedonia' in the framework of the Yugoslav federation. They also explicitly proclaimed the freedom and unification of all 'brother Macedonians' beyond the artificial borders erected in the Balkans in the twentieth century.

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[51] Timovski and Stefanovski, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

[52] *Makedonski Glas* (Rockdale, Australia), No 29, 23 April 1991.

[53] *Le Monde*, 18 January 1992.

This excerpt from the 'Report of the Organising Committee of the Antifascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia' concerning ASNOM's activity from its foundation until its first conference (2 August 1944), is eloquent:

> At this instan[ce], when all fighting forces in Macedonia are engaged in combat against the Fascist occupiers, appealing to the other two segments of the Macedonian people to join the grand anti-Fascist front, since it is the only way to win the right to self-determination and the only path leading to the unification of the entire Macedonian nation in a free community of emancipated peoples of Yugoslavia. *The fighting Piedmont of Macedonia has fiercely proclaimed that it will not stint on support or sacrifice for the liberation of the other two segments of our nation and for the general unification of the entire Macedonian people.* When we know that the fighting Piedmont of Macedonia is a part of Tito's Yugoslavia, then it is obvious how great our support could be and how firm is our desire for the unification of our entire nation[54].

The manifesto to the people of Macedonia of the first ASNOM Conference (2 August 1944) had this to say:

> In view of the centuries-old ideals of the people of Macedonia, the first Macedonian National Council proclaims to the entire world the just and resolute aspiration *for the unification of the whole Macedonian people* on the principle based on the right to self-determination. This would put an end to the oppresion of the people of Macedonia in all its parts and would provide conditions for genuine solidarity and peace among the Balkan peoples[55].

The additions and amendments made to articles 3 and 49 do nothing to soften this expansionist tone. The addition to article 3 to the effect that the 'Republic of Macedonia' has no territorial claims against neighbouring states is a step in the right direction, certainly; but in essence it is no more than a gesture. because all nations are forbidden by International Law (*jus cogens*) to pursue territorial claims by unlawful means (i.e. using violence or in contravention of international treaties). The rationale behind articles 3, 68, and 74 (which also concern the changing of national borders) concerns the annexing, not the loss, of territory belonging to the FYROM; for, according to the constitution, its territory is 'indivisible' and 'inviolable'. Furthermore, the FYROM has not yet officially recognised its existing border with Greece.

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[54] The University of Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy and History, *Documents on the Struggle of the Macedonian People for Independence and a Nation-State* (hereafter: *Documents*), vol. 2, Skopje 1985, p. 607.

[55] *Documents*, vol. 2, p. 635.

Both the reference to minorities in article 49 ('the Republic cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people who live in neighbouring countries') and the amendment of 6 January 1992 to the effect that 'the Republic will not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states or in their internal affairs' provide the FYROM with a lever for territorial claims against neighbouring countries. The constitution's unilateral, arbitrary reference to the existence of 'Macedonians' in neighbouring countries, when international treaties have never acknowledged any such thing, is in itself a fundamental form of interference in the internal affairs of Skopje's neighbours, on the pretext of protecting the rights of the so-called 'Macedonian minority'. Consequently, the amendment has neither substance nor value.

Special reference is made to the protection of the individual and collective rights of the various ethnic minorities living in the FYROM, chiefly in certain articles in the 1991 constitution. Typically, *Macedonia and its Relations with Greece* refers repeatedly to the role played by various international organisations (the UN, the CSCE, the Council of Europe, etc.), in an obvious attempt to present the FYROM as acting in accordance with international law and punctiliously implementing the provisions arising out of its international obligations, and above all as being in absolute agreement with the latest thinking on the protection of minorities and respect for human rights.

All the same, the minority groups living in the republic are constantly — daily — levelling accusations against Skopje's state officials with regard to the treatment meted out to them. Eloquent in this respect is a letter written by the President of the Albanian Democratic Prosperity Party in the FYROM, Nevzat Halili, to President Kiro Gligorov on 18 June 1993:

> In the Macedonian Parliament decisions are taken undemocratically by majority vote on an ethnic basis, without securing a national consensus on vital national issues. The electoral law creates problems for us. It is very unfavourable to the Albanians, in view of the electoral districts and the ratio of voters to MPs. One Albanian MP represents some 8,000 voters, while one Macedonian represents only 3,500 voters. [...] In all the town and cities of Macedonia the various districts have only Macedonian names, not the names used

> by the inhabitants of those districts, even in towns where Albanians represent 50% or even 80% of the population, such as Tetovo, for instance, or Gostivar, Debar, Kichevo, Struga, and Krushevo, and most parts of the city of Skopje. Not a single town has an Albanian cultural centre with an Albanian name. There is only one Turco-Albanian theatre, in contrast to the eight Macedonian professional theatres. The Albanian presence in middle-level education is at best nominal. No court of law at any level has an Albanian judge, and the same applies to the medical centres'[56].

The Badinter Committee was set up on 28 August 1991, under the terms of the Declaration on Yugoslavia made by the European Union, and its brief was defined on 3 September. It was agreed that the Committee would have five members and be chaired by the President of France's Constitutional Council, Robert Badinter, and that two of the five members would be nominated by the Federal Presidium of Yugoslavia. It eventually comprised the Presiding Judges of the Constitutional Courts of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Some aspects of the Committee's working methods are worth noting.

a) It did not clearly specify the issues covered by its verdict.
b) The parties concerned were not bound to comply with its decisions.
c) The Committee did not follow the standard procedure of conducting on-the-spot investigations and interviewing witnesses.
d) It relied exclusively on the two aforementioned political reports produced by the EU and asked the interested parties only one question about each precondition the reports laid down for recognition of the various Yugoslav republics.
e) Essentially, the Committee did not resolve a single disagreement, but remained strictly within the reports' political context, thus complicating the situation even further.

Specifically, in opinion No 6 of 11 January 1992 relating to the FYROM, the arbitration committee:

i. Considered that constitutional stipulations are internationally binding for a state applying for recognition.
ii. Found unilateral statements made by officials of an unrecognised state entity to be valid in international law (e.g. the letter of 20 December 1991

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[56] *Nova Makedonija*, 19 June 1993.

written by the Foreign Minister of the FYROM, which was followed by a second letter containing supplementary information on 11 January 1992).

iii. Offered no definition of 'hostile propaganda'.

iv. Deemed it sufficient to say that, since the FYROM had abandoned its territorial claims against neighbouring states by means of the relevant amendments to the 1991 constitution, the use of the name 'Macedonia' could not therefore imply any territorial claim against another state.

v. Did not pay the slightest heed to the misgivings and objections of Greece, nor to the views of the various minority groups within the FYROM.

In Lisbon, on 27 June 1992, the EU representatives came out against the FYROM's demands; at which point the republic stepped up its expansionist policy by appropriating the ancient Greek Macedonian emblem, the sixteen-rayed Sun of Vergina, for its new national flag. The parlament in Skopje ratified the flag in August 1992, but *Macedonia and its Relations with Greece* makes no mention of this. When viewed in conjunction with subsequent developments, the move might well be regarded as a tactical manœuvre by the FYROM's leaders. In the course of future negotiations, Skopje might consent to remove the Vergina sun from the flag, and world opinion would regard it as a tremendous concession to Greek demands. But in fact Skopje would be 'giving back' something which no-one in the FYROM has ever identified with the republic's history[57].

A general review of the course of the Macedonian Question since 1950 produces the following picture. In the early fifties, Tito's 'Macedonian' policy revolved around two axes: i) cultivating and consolidating the 'Macedonian' identity of the population of Yugoslav Macedonia in order to counteract the rival influence of Bulgaria; ii) making efforts to defend the rights of supposed 'Macedonian minorities' in neighbouring countries. In fact, laying claim to those minorities was a fundamental aspect of Tito's governance of federal Yugoslavia.

The close interest shown by both Belgrade and Skopje in the 'Macedonian minorities' in neighbouring countries created more friction and tension with Bulgaria than with Greece. In fact relations became much less strained between Belgrade and Athens after the signing (with Turkey) of the tripartite Balkan Pact (1953-4) that aimed to strengthen Yugoslavia's anti-Soviet policy.

In contrast to the central government in Belgrade, the local leaders in the 'People's [later 'Socialist'] Republic of Macedonia' continued to maintain tense relations with Greece. The Macedonian part of Greece had inevitably become the main focus of their expansionist aims. Their tactics consisted in placing inordinate emphasis on the component features of a solid, unified national ideology: historical roots, language, and Church. At the same time, they also had to replenish the arsenal of the 'Macedonian' national ideology with the necessary 'irredentist' ideas. The local historians sought the latter chiefly in the historical tradition and cultural identity of their Balkan neighbours, in an attempt to shore up the notion of the birth of the 'Macedonian nation' within the FYROM. This was achieved both by appropriating any and every suitable foreign element and also by casting doubt on the provenance of these elements. The historical myth of the unification of all the sundered parts of Macedonia was also essential to reinforce 'Macedonianism' abroad, and specifically in the New World, where natives of the whole geographical area of Macedonia maintain a strong presence.

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[57] See *Nova Makedonija*, 1, 2, 3 May 1993 and 19 January 1994.

Not only did the Slavonic-speaking émigrés from Macedonia swallow the notion of 'Macedonian irredentism', but they became its basic prop and mouthpiece all over the world. It was thanks chiefly to the Slavonic-speaking communities abroad that the international community became familiar with Skopje's irredentist visions throughout the period of post-war bipolarity. In the late sixties, these communities began to display strong nationalist tendencies, which usually took a very different line from the official ideology of metropolitan Skopje[58].

A glance at the education the post-war generations have received both in the FYROM and abroad reveals two clear axes along which the doctrine of 'Macedonian' national ideology proceeds. The first consists in the appropriation of the cultural heritage of the whole geographical area of Macedonia and the ancient Macedonians. By a process of constantly casting doubt on the fact that the ancient Macedonians were a Hellenic race and spoke Greek[59], and producing maps which clearly dissociate Macedonia from the rest of the Hellenic world in the course of history[60], the inhabitants of the

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[58] Illustrative of this is the fact that 'Macedonian' nationalist circles in Australia started to exploit the sixteen-rayed Sun of Vergina as early as 1983. See *Macedonia Weekly Herald* (Kilmore, Victoria), 15 September 1983.

[59] See the school textbooks about the ancient period by B. Drashkovitch and I. Makek, *Istorija za V Oddelenie*, Skopje 1987, pp. 71, 74; and S. Mladenovski, *Istorija za I Klac*, Skopje 1992, pp. 129-34, 148, 158.

[60] Drashkovitch and Makek, *op. cit.*, pp. 55, 67, 73, 77, 86, 94, 109, 112, 114; Mladenovski, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

FYROM are insidiously identified with the ancient Macedonians, with the geographical region over which they held sway, and with their achievements. The second consists in imbuing post-war generations with the notion that only part of Macedonia (i.e. the quondam 'Socialist Republic' now 'Republic of Macedonia') has been liberated. The rest, in Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania, is still unredeemed and must be 'rescued' at some future date[61].

Throughout the post-war period, official and unofficial circles in the Republic of Skopje have kept up relentless propaganda activity both at home and abroad. The irredentist policy is conducted either overtly, by means of official statements by political leaders and proclamations by local parties, or indirectly, in the form of maps of a unified Macedonia, propaganda sheets, calendars, and publications generally expressive of a hostile attitude towards Greece, casting doubt on the Greek cultural heritage and Greek symbols.

Throughout this period, the FYROM has utterly abused the name of 'Macedonia'. It has seized every opportunity to turn it from a purely geographical term into a national one applied to a country whose post striking feature is the overwhelming presence of ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities who absolutely do not identify themselves with Slavonic culture and 'Macedonian' irredentist ideology. According to the last population census, which was conducted on 31 March 1991, the Albanians are the largest minority in the FYROM, accounting for 21.1% of the total population (427,313 individuals out of a total of 2,033,964)[62]. However, the Albanians' political and spiritual leaders strongly dispute these official figures and cite numbers closer to 35% or 40% (c. 800,000)[63]. Furthermore, a large number of Albanians refused to take part in the census, in protest against the way it was conducted. The official figures include other minority groups[64]: Turks (4.79% — 97,416), Rom (Gypsies) (2.73% — 55,577), and Serbs (2.17% — 44,159)[65].

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[61] See the school textbook about the Second World War and the Greek Civil War by C. Belichanski, B. Cvetkoski, and A. Kjorveziroski, *Istorija za IV Klac*, Skopje 1986, pp. 134-48, 172-4.

[62] For details of the 1991 census, see *Stanovnistvo*, 3-4/1990, 1-2/1991, Belgrade, pp. 300-1; Statistical Office of Macedonia, *Basic Statistical Data for the Population*, Skopje, December 1991, pp. 14-16.

[63] M. Andrejevitch, 'Resurgent Nationalism in Macedonia', *Report on Eastern Europe*, vol. 2, No 20, 17 May 1991, p. 27.

[64] Though no mention is made of Greeks or Bulgarians.

[65] Although, according to the 1991 census, the Serbs make up the fourth largest minority, the preamble to the 1991 constitution does not mention them by name among the nationalities enjoying the same rights as the 'Macedonians'.

To summarise the main points of this book:

1. Only what is now the Greek part of Macedonia may be considered to be representative of ancient, historical Macedonia.
2. No 'Macedono-Slavonic nation' came into being, either in the Middle Ages, as a result of the mingling of the ancient Macedonians and Slavs and the founding of a 'Macedono-Slavonic state'; or in the nineteenth or twentieth century, as a result of efforts to differentiate the Slavonic-speakers in Macedonia from the Bulgarians, the Greeks, and the Serbs.
3. The so-called 'Macedonian nation' is the brainchild of the Communist International and Tito's Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia used this artificial ethnicity to rebut Bulgarian claims to the Yugoslav section of Macedonia and to foster its own expansionist plans for the rest of Macedonia.
4. Although the afterword to *Macedonia and its Relations with Greece* points out the necessity for Greece to play a leading role in the new European policy for the Balkans and calls for the relations between Athens and Skopje not to be affected by historical stereotypes of the past, the purpose of the book is nonetheless to persuade world opinion, on the basis of the 'Macedonian people's glorious past', of their historical rights, their specific national identity, and their right to national status. In view of this 'historical psychosis' on Skopje's part, it is not unreasonable to suppose that, even if some political solution is found for the discord between Athens and Skopje (a solution the EU and the UN have been seeking for some years now), it will be very difficult for Balkan historians to reach any sort of agreement about the historical aspects of the Macedonian Question.

Annals

REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE IN 1994

I. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

1. Research Programmes

In 1994 the Institute for Balkan Studies organized and took part in a number of research programmes concerning the recent and past history of the Balkans. Some were conducted exclusively by members of our own staff, who acquired the requisite technical knowledge for the purpose. Others were carried out in association with scientific institutions and other government sponsored facilities by occasional associates, experienced university faculty members, and young researchers.

1. The conclusions continued to be published of the three-year research programme concerning Thrace from antiquity to the present day, conducted by university professors from Greece and abroad, and research fellows of the Institute for Balkan Studies and the Academy of Athens. The following independent studies are being published at the moment: i) Kyriaki Mamoni, *Σύλλογοι Θράκης και Ανατολικής Ρωμυλίας (1861-1922): Ιστορία και δράση;* ii) Eleni D. Belia, *Εκπαίδευση και αλυτρωτική πολιτική. Η περίπτωση της Θράκης (1856-1912).* The following studies are being prepared for publication this year: i) Kalliopi Papathanasi-Mousiopoulou, *Το διασυμμαχικό καθεστώς της Δυτικής Θράκης*, ii) Eleonora Skouteri-Didaskalou, *Ανθρωπολογική προσέγγιση στη λαογραφία της Θράκης: το επίπεδο του καθημερινού*, iii) Charalambos Bakirtzis, *Βυζαντινή Θράκη. Πόλεις, χωριά, κάστρα, μονές.*

2. The Institute's associates involved in the programme concerning the Bulgarian occupation of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace during the Second World War also worked hard and productively. The four people concerned,

who are both regular and occasional associates of the Institute for Balkan Studies, have already carried out research in the libraries of Thessaloniki, Athens, and Sofia, and have assembled material from university and national libraries in the United States and Europe. They have also collected and collated archival material from Britain, the USA, and the Greek archives of Thessaloniki and Athens. Some of their conclusions have been presented in artciles and conference papers, namely: i) Xanthippi Kotzageorgi and George A. Kazamias, "The Bulgarian Occupation of the Prefecture of Drama (1941-1944) and its Consequences on the Greek Population", *Balkan Studies* 35 (1994) 81-112; ii) Xanthippi Kotzageorgi, «Έξοδος Ελλήνων και εποικισμός Βουλγάρων στην Ανατολική Μακεδονία και τη Θράκη: οι νομοθετικές 'πρωτοβουλίες' των βουλγαρικών αρχών κατοχής (1941-1944)», paper delivered at the international conference on *Macedonia and Thrace, 1941-1944: Occupation, Resistance, and Liberation,* Thessaloniki (December 9-11, 1994). By the end of 1995, the Institute expects to have published a book about the Bulgarian occupation of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, comprising the fruits of the work carried out by the members of the research programme.

3. With the approval of and in association with the General Secretariat for Expatriate Greeks, associates of the Institute continued the second part of the research programme concerning Greek communities in Bulgaria in the 19th and 20th centuries until the Second World War. The programme is being conducted by five researchers — Xanthippi Kotzageorgi, Giorgos Kazamias, Giorgos Kioutoutskas, Tasos Hadzianastasiou, and Nikos Tapouris — who expect to have their findings ready by the end of 1995. They have already studied and are collating published and unpublished archival material from Greece and Bulgaria and have made an initial compiliation of studies relating to: i) the legal status of the Greek communities in Bulgaria after the foundation of the Bulgarian state (1879); ii) the numerical strength of the communities, the concentration of the Greek population, their language and level of education, and the extent of their urbanisation on the basis of the Bulgarian censuses; iii) the general history of the Greeks of Bulgaria in the period in question; and iv) the manifestations of their intellectual life and culture (education, cultural associations, theatre, the press). They also intend to produce studies relating to: i) the economic life of the Greek communities; ii) ecclesiastical life; iii) local history and community life; and iv) the Greek communities' relations with the Bulgarian government at times of crisis (persecution, restrictive measures, exclusive practices).

4. In the context of the Institute's research programme concerning the Macedonian Question, two associates, Spyridon Sfetas and Kyriakos Kentro-

tis, are working on a special study of the Albanian problem as a destabilising factor in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. They are examining the historical dimensions of the problem in Serbian Macedonia between the Wars (1918-41) and in the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1944-91), devoting particular attention to the deteriorating ethno-political relations between the Albanians and the Slavs since the FYROM declared its independence in 1991. The study should be completed and published by the summer of 1995.

5. Finally, the Institute's programme concerning the Greeks of Albania is continuing, its main purpose being to collect and classify archival material (chiefly from Greek, British, Italian, and French archives) relating to the period from the foundation of the Albanian state onwards. Those involved in the programme have already published a collection of documents about the Greek minority in Albania, titled *The Greek Minority in Albania (1921-1993): A Documentary Record.* Special attention is also being given to the period between the Second World War and the establishment of the Communist régime in Albania, as a turning point for the Greeks living there.

2. *Activities of Board members and research associates*

The President of the Institute, Prof. Anthony-Emil N. Tachiaos

During the Spring Semester of 1994, as a Visiting Professor at New York University, he taught two graduate courses in Byzantine History.

He published the following works:

1. «Η Μακεδονία και το πρόβλημα των Σλάβων», *Η Δυτική Μακεδονία στην ιστορική της συνέχεια,* Πρακτικά 3ου Πανδυτικομακεδονικού Συνεδρίου, Thessaloniki 1994, 89-95.
2. "Le rôle de la Philocalie grecque et slave dans les renouveaux spirituels du XVIIIe siècle", *To Ελληνικόν. Studies in Honor of Speros Vryonis, Jr.*, Volume II. *Byzantinoslavica, Armenica, Islamica, The Balkans and Modern Greece,* Edited by E. Stanojevich Allen, P. Ioannides, J. S. Langdon and S. W. Reinert, New Rochelle, New York 1994, 84-107.
3. "Some Controversial Points Relating to the Life and Activity of Cyril and Methodius", *Cyrillomethodianum,* XVI-XVII (1993-1994) 41-71.
4. "Vozrozhdenie vizantijskogo misticizma Starcem Paisiem Velichkovskim (1722-1794)", *Cyrillomethodianum,* XVI-XVII (1993-1994) 201-226.

The Vice President of the Institute, Prof. I. K. Hassiotis

On January 6-7, he took part in the international congress on "Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society”, organized in Oxford by St Antony’s College, with a communication on “The Armenians in Greece: History, Politics, Ethics”.

On April 23, he gave a lecture in Delphi, organized by the Soroptimist Association of Greece, on “Greece and inter-Balkan Relations: Historical Tradition and Contemporary Aspects”.

On July 21-23, he took part in the international congress on “The Peloponnese and Italy: 15th-18th cc.”, organized in Monembasia by the Monembasiot Association with a communication on “Migration of Peloponnesians to Southern Italy in the 16th and 17th cc.: Problems of Research and Interpretation”.

On November 25, he took part in a special seminar for press attachés of Greece and Cyprus, organized in Thessaloniki by the Ministry of the Press and Mass Media, with a communication on “Greece and the Countries of the Former Soviet Union”.

On November 24-26, he took part in the International Forum for the Cooperation of the Black Sea Countries, organized in Thessaloniki by the Greek Center for European Studies, with a communication on “The Relations between the People of the Black Sea Countries: Heritage and Prospects.

He published the following works:

1. “The Historical Background to the Greek and Armenian National Movements: An Initial Comparison”, *Το Ελληνικόν. Studies in Honor of Speros Vryonis, Jr.*, New Rochelle, N.Y., 1993 (1994), pp. 287-306.

2. “España y los movimientos antiturcos en Macedonia en los siglos XVI y XVII”, *Χάρις διδασκαλίας. Homenaje a Luis Gil,* Madrid, Univ. Complutense 1994, pp. 685-697.

3. «Οι Αλεξιανοί της Μινόρκας. Συμβολή στην ιστορία των ελληνικών αποδημιών κατά τον ΙΗ′ αιώνα», *Ροδωνιά: Τιμή στον καθηγητή Μ. Ι. Μανούσακα,* Athens and Rethymno 1994, pp. 649-660.

The Director of the Institute, Prof. Basil Kondis

On April 25, he gave a lecture at the Open University of the Municipality of Menemeni on: “The Albanian Question”.

On September 26-28, he took part in the 6th Greek-German Symposium on “Beiträge zur Stabilisierung in Südosteuropa aus deutscher und griechischer Sicht”, organized in Berlin by the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, in assocation with the Institute, with a communication on “Greek-Albanian Relalions: A Critical Factor for Balkan Stability”.

On October 14-15, he took part in the conference on “The Balkans

Today", organized in Los Angeles by the Loyola Marymount University, with a communication on "The Greek Minority in Albania".

On November 25, he took part in a special seminar for the press attachés of Greece and Cyprus, organized in Thessaloniki by the Ministry of the Press and Mass Media, with a communication on "Greek-Albanian Relations in the 20th Century".

On December 9-11, he took part in the international conference on "Macedonia and Thrace, 1941-1944: Occupation, Resistance, and Liberation", organized, under the auspices of the Minister for Macedonia and Thrace, Mr Konstantinos Triaridis, in Thessaloniki by the Institute in association with the Department of History and Archaeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, with a communication on "The Policy of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) on the Eve of Liberation".

He published the following works:

1. *Εύθραυστες ισορροπίες: Αλβανία και Ελλάδα στον 20ό αιώνα*, Thessaloniki 1994.

2. *The Greek Minority in Albania. A Documentary Record (1921-1993)*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki 1994, (with E. Manda).

3. «Ελληνισμός της Βορείου Ηπείρου», *Νέα Εστία*, Αφιέρωμα στους λαούς της Χερσονήσου του Αίμου, Athens 1994, pp. 98-104.

The Deputy Director of the Institute and Director of the School of Balkan Languages, Constantine Papoulidis

On June 6-11, he took part in the 4th Greek-Russian Symposium of Historians on "Greek Culture in Russia, 17th-20th cc.", organized in Moscow by the Institute for Balkan Studies in association with the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, with a communication on "Osveščenie dejatel'nosti Grekov, služivših v MID Rossii v XVIII-om, XIV-om i XX-om vv".

He took part in the 7th International Congress of South-East European Studies, held in Thessaloniki (August 29-September 4), with a communication on "Sultan Hamid II's Policy toward Christians, as Seen by French Diplomats (1897)".

He took part in events organized in Odessa by the Foundation for Hellenic Culture to celebrate the town's second centenary and the opening of the Philike Hetairia Museum (September 1-2) with two communications on "The Greeks of Odessa (18th-20th cc.)" and "Grigorios G. Maraslis (1831-1907): His Life and Work".

He was also invited to attend cultural events organized by the Greek community of Toronto under the genersal title of "Macedonian October (October 11-16)" and gave two lectures on: "Heroes of Church during the Macedonian Struggle" and "Germanos Karavangelis: The Ardent Bishop of the Macedonian Struggle".

On October 25, at the invitatation of the Minister for Macedonia and Thrace, Mr. Konstantinos Triaridis, he delivered a speech to the Ministry staff on "The Entry of the Greek Army in Thessaloniki".

On November 20, at the invitation of the Pontic Ladies' Society of Drama, he delivered a talk in the local Chamber of Commerce, on "The Greeks of Russia in the 19th and the Early 20th Century (on the occasion of the 180th anniversary of the founding of *Philike Hetairia*)".

From November 22 to December 4, he accompanied the Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Grigoris Niotis, on his tour of Armenia, Georgia, Russia, and the Ukraine with the purpose of visiting Greek communities and meeting government leaders. The mission went to Erevan and Etsmiatjin, Tbilisi, Anapa and Vitizeno, Krasnodar, Stavropol and Essentuky, Moscow, Kiev, Marioupol and Sartana.

He published the following works:

1. "À propos de l'œuvre des employés grecs du Ministère des affaires étrangères de la Russie impériale aux XVIIIème, XIXème et XXème siècles", *Balkan Studies* 35 (1994) 5-14.

The same article was published in Greek without footnotes as «Το έργο των Ελλήνων διπλωματών στην αυλή των τσάρων της Ρωσίας», *Μακεδονία* (20.11.1994).

2. «Η σημασία των αρχείων της Ρωσίας για την ελληνική ιστορία», *Βαλκανικά Σύμμεικτα* 5-6 (1993-1994) 165-196.

3. «Οι Έλληνες της Ρωσίας το 19ο και στις αρχές του 20ού αιώνα», *Χίλια χϱόνια Ελληνισμού-Ρωσίας*, Athens 1994, pp. 213-249.

4. «Η πολιτική του Σουλτάνου Χαμίτ Β' έναντι των Χριστιανών υπηκόων του», *Μακεδονία* (31.8.1994).

5. "In Memoriam, Père Dimtru Stăniloae (16.11.1903-05.10.1993), *Balkan Studies* 34 (1993) 365-366.

The same article was published in Greek as "Μνήμη π. Στανιλοάε (16.11.1903-05.10.1993)", *Πϱωτάτον* 47 (1994) 322-323.

6. He contributed 367 entries on Greek and Russian Literature to *Balkan Bibliography* (vol. XI, 1984-1986, Thessaloniki 1993).

7. He contributed 201 entries on Greek and Russian Literature to *Balkan Bibliography* (vol. XII, 1987-1990, Thessaloniki 1994).

Book reviews:

1. *Arsenios of Elasson (1550-1626) and Arsenios the Greek (1621-?); Recent Research and Studies, Cyrillomethodianum* 13-14 (1989-1990) 179-184.

2. *Posol'skaja kniga po svjazjam Rossii s Greciej, Cyrillomethodianum* 13-14 (1989-1990) 185-189.

3. I. K. Hassiotis, *Επισκόπηση της Ιστορίας της νεοελληνικής Διασποράς*, Thessaloniki 1993, p. 231, *Balkan Studies* 34 (1993) 373-375.

4. *Les Balkans à l'époque ottoman, Balkan Studies* 34 (1993) 375-376.

5. D. Panzak, *La population de l'Empire ottoman, Balkan Studies* 34 (1993) 377.

Research associate Ms Georgia Ioannidou-Bitsiadou

On May 27-29, she participated in the 15th Panhellenic Historical Congress, organized in Thessaloniki by the Hellenic Historical Society, with a communication on "The Greeks of Southern Russia after 1914".

Between August and 29-September 4, she participated in the 7th International Congress of South-East European Studies, held in Thessaloniki, with a communication on "Serbia and the Port of Thessaloniki from 1926 to 1929".

From November 25 to 27, she participated in the conference on "The Macedonian Question: Aspects and Historical Development", organized in Thessaloniki by the Institute, in association with the Department of History and Archaeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, with a communication on "The Macedonian Struggle in Strumitsa: The Memoirs of Nikolaos Angioplastis".

She contributed entries on Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian literature to *Balkan Bibliography* (vol. XI, 1984-1986, Thessaloniki 1993 and vol. XII, 1987-1990, Thessaloniki 1994).

Research associate Mr Anastasios Iordanoglou

Between August 29 and September 4, he participated in the 7th Inter, national Congress of South-East European Studies, held in Thessaloniki- with a communication on "The Demographic Make up of the Vilayets of Kossovo, Monastir, and Thessaloniki in the 19th and early 20th Century, Based on Published Turkish Sources".

From September 23 to 25, he participated in the congress on "Ethnogenic Processes in the Balkans", organized in Komotini by the Laboratory of Anthropology of the Democritus University of Thrace, in cooperation with the Center for the Study of Greek Minorities, with a communication on "New Thinging on the Origin of the Gagaouzes" (in association with Nikolaos Tapouris).

Between October 31 and November 2, he took part in the international conference on "Greeks and Armenians in South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor in the 19th and 20th Centuries", organized in Thessaloniki by the Institute for Balkan Studies, in association with the Department of History and Archaeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, with a communication on "The Armenian Community of Istanbul after the Treaty of Lausane".

From November 28 to 30, he participated in the 3rd Panhellenic Asia Minor Congress on "The Political History and Cultural Heritage of the Greeks of Asia Minor from Classical Antiquity to the Twentieth Century", organized in Thessaloniki by the Department of Ancient and Medieval History of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, with a communication on "Gelveri Hatiralari = Memories of Karvali: The Unpublished Memoirs of K. Andreadis".

He published the following studies:

1. «Ο Salname (Οθωμανική Επετηρίδα) του Βιλαετίου Κοσόβου του Έτους 1318 Εγείρας (1900)», *Βαλκανικά Σύμμεικτα* 5-6 (1994) 39-73.

2. «Η Ελληνορθόδοξη Κοινότητα της Άγκυρας», *Β' Πανελλήνιο Συνέδριο για τον Ελληνισμό της Μικράς Ασίας, Θεσσαλονίκη 27-29 Νοεμβρίου 1992*, Thessaloniki 1994, pp. 121-137.

3. He contributed entries on Greek and Turkish literature to *Balkan Bibliography* (vol. XI, 1984-1986, Thessaloniki 1993, and vol. XII, 1987-1990, Thessaloniki 1994).

Research associate Mr Kyriakos D. Kentrotis

On April 4, he gave a lecture at the Open University of the Municipality of Florina on "Greek-Albanian Relations and the Question of the Muslim Chams".

From August 2 to 6, he gave a course of lectures at the International Summer School held by the Institute on "The Balkans Today; A Tour of South-Eastern Europe".

Between August 29 and September 4, he took part in the 7th Congress of South-East European Studies held in Thessaloniki, with a communication on "Deutschland und der Balkan".

On October 7-8, he participated in a round-table discussion at the Athens Institute of International Economic Relations with a communication on "Greek-Bulgarian Relations in the Post-Communist Period".

From November 25 to 27, he took part in the conference on "The Macedonian Question: Aspects and Historical Development", organized in Thessaloniki by the Institute, in collaboration with the Department of History and Archaeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, with a communication on "The Macedonian Question in the German Press (1990-1994)".

He published the following studies:

1. S. Sfetas and K. Kentrotis, *Σκόπια. Σε αναζήτηση ταυτότητας και διεθνούς αναγνώρισης. Κριτική προσέγγιση της MANU, "Macedonia and its relations with Greece", Skopje, 1993* (IMXA 257), Thessaloniki 1994, pp. 67.

2. «Βουλγαρία», in *Βαλκάνια: Από το διπολισμό στη νέα εποχή*, edited by T. Veremis, Athens 1994, pp. 219-413.

3. «Η Βουλγαρία στη μετα-κομμουνιστική περίοδο. Τρία χρόνια πειραματισμού υπό καθεστώς κοινοβουλευτικής Δημοκρατίας (1990-1993), *Βαλκανικά Σύμμεικτα* 5-6 (1993-1994) 113-128.

4. "Der Verlauf der griechisch-albanischen Beziehungen nach dem II. Weltkrieg und die Frage der Muslimischen Tschamen", *Balkan Studies* 34 (1993) 271-299.

5. "Echoes from the Past: Greece and the Macedonian Controversy", *Mediterranean Politics*, edited by R. Gillespie, London 1994, Vol. I, pp. 85-103.

6. «Ρομ: Μια ξεχασμένη μειονότητα στη Νοτιοανατολική Ευρώπη», *Τετράδια* 34 (Athens 1994) 53-67.

7. «Η Βουλγαρία στη μετα-κομμουνιστική περίοδο: Πολιτική και ιστοριογραφία», *Νέα Εστία*, Αφιέρωμα στους λαούς της Χερσονήσου του Αίμου, Athens 1994, pp. 171-181.

8. «Η πορεία των ελληνοαλβανικών σχέσεων και το ζήτημα των Τσάμηδων (1990-1993)», *Αριστοτέλης* 223-224 (Florina 1994) 14-25.

9. He contributed a number of entries on Greek, German, Bulgarian and "Macedonian" literature to *Balkan Bibliography* XI, 1984-1986, Thessaloniki 1993 and XII, 1987-1990, Thessaloniki 1994.

10. Book reviews:

a. H. Psomiades and S. B. Thomadakis (eds.), *Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order*, New York 1993, *Balkan Studies* 35 (1994) 71-78.

b. J. Loughlin (ed.), *Southern European Studies Guide*, London-Munich 1993, *Balkan Studies* 35 (1994) 78-82.

Research associate Mr Spyridon Sfetas

On January 11, he gave a lecture at the Open University of Florina on

"The Balkan Aspects of the Macedonian Question Today".

From May 19 to 22 he took part in the 2nd conference on "Drama and the Surrounding Region. History and Culture", organized by the Municipality of Drama with a communication on "The Uprising in Drama in 1941 and the Reaction of the Germans".

From June 6 to 9 he took part in the 4th Greek-Russian Symposium of Historians on "Greek Culture in Russia, 17th-20th cc.", organized in Moscow by the Institute in association with the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, with a communication on "Aspekte der griechisch-russischen Kulturbeziehungen im 17. Jahrhundert".

He took part in the 7th International Congress of South-East European Studies held in Thessaloniki (August 29-September 4), with a communication on "The Serbian National Idea, Yugoslavism and the Present Yugoslav Crisis".

From September 26 to 28, he took part in the 6th Greek-German Symposium on "Beiträge zur Stabilisierung in Südosteuropa aus deutscher und griechischer Sicht", organized in Berlin by the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, in association with the Institute, with a communication on "Die serbische Nationalidee der Jugoslawismus und die heutige jugoslawische Krise".

From November 25 to 27 he took part in the conference on "The Macedonian Question: Aspects and Historical Development", organized in Thessaloniki by the Institute, in association with the Department of History and Archaeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, with a communication on "The Macedonian Question in the Light of the Communist International, 1919-1937".

From December 9 to 11, he took part in the international conference on "Macedonia and Thrace, 1941-1944: Occupation, Resistance, and Liberation", organized in Thessaloniki by the Institute, in association with the Department of History and Archaeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, with a communication on "Autonomist Movements of the Slavophones in 1944 and the Security of the Greek-Yugoslavian Border".

He published the following works:

1. S. Sfetas and K. Kentrotis, *Σκόπια. Σε αναζήτηση ταυτότητας και διεθνούς αναγνώρισης. Κριτική προσέγγιση της MANU, "Macedonia and its relations with Greece", Skopje, 1993* (ΙΜΧΑ 257), Thessaloniki 1994, pp. 67.

2. «Οι ανθελληνικοί διωγμοί στην Ανατολική Ρωμυλία κατά το έτος 1906 στα πλαίσια της βουλγαρικής κρατικής πολιτικής», *Βαλκανικά Σύμμεικτα* 5-6 (1993-1994) 77-91.

3. He contributed a number of entries on Bulgarian, Russian, Serbian,

and "Macedonian" Literature to *Balkan Bibliography,* XI, 1984-1986, Thessaloniki 1993 and XII, 1987-1990, Thessaloniki 1994.

4. Book-reviews:

a. Vlavianos Haris, *Greece 1941-1949: From Resistance to Civil War. The Strategy of the Greek Communist Party,* Oxford 1992, *Balkan Studies* 35 (1994) 166-171.

b. Magossci Paul Tober, *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe,* University of Washington Press 1993, *Balkan Studies* 35 (1994) 186-187.

c. Brandes Detler, *Vom Zaren adoptiert. Die deutschen Kolonisten und Balkansiedler in Neurußland und Bessarbien 1751-1914. Schriften des Bundesinstituts für Ostdeutsche Kultur and Geschichte,* Munich 1993, *Balkan Studies* 35 (1994) 187.

Research associate Ms Xanthippe Kotzageorgi

In February she participated in the 2nd Greek-Bulgarian Conference, "Greeks and Bulgarians. History, Education, and Culture", which was organized by the Educational Department of the Philosophical School of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki and the Educational Department of the University of Sofia. She presented a paper entitled "The Character and Function of Education for Peripheral Hellenism: The Greek Schools in Southern Bulgaria (early 19th cent.-1885)".

From May 19 to 22 she participated in the 2nd Conference on "Drama and the Surrounding region: History and Culture", which was organized by the Municipality of Drama. She presented a paper titled "The Bulgarian Occupation of Drama and the Surrounding Region (1941-1944): The Measures, their Aims and the Effects of their Implementation on the Greek Population" (in association with G. A. Kazamias).

Between 29 August and 4 September she participated in the 7th International Congres of South-East European Studies, which took place in Thessaloniki. She gave a paper entitled "The Profile and Activities of the Greek Women's Associations in Bulgaria (late 19th - early 20th c.): The Case of *Evrydiki* (Philippoupolis, 1870-1906)".

From December 9 to 11 she took part in the International Conference "Macedonia and Thrace, 1941-1944. Occupation, Resistance, and Liberation", organized by the Institute for Balkan Studies in Thessaloniki. She submitted a paper on the subject of "The Exodus of the Greeks and the Colonization of the Bulgarians in Eastern Macedonia and in Thrace: The Legislative 'Initiatives' of the Bulgarian Occupation Authorities (1941-1944)".

She published the following studies:

1. "The Greeks in Eastern Rumelia, Mid 19th c. - Early 20th c.: Corporate Organization and Social Life" (in Greek), *Βαλκανικά Σύμμεικτα* 5-6 (1993-1994) 18-36.

2. "The Bulgarian Occupation of the Prefecture of Drama (1941-1944) and its Consequences on the Greek Population", *Balkan Studies* 35 (1994) 81-112 (in association with G. A. Kazamias).

3. "The Greek Community of Burgas in the 19th Century. Education and Culture", *Etudes Balkaniques* 30/1 (1994) 79-85.

4. "Ioannis A. Papadrianos, *The Greek Immigrants in the Yugoslav Countries, 18th-20th cent.*" (review), *Balkan Studies* 34 (1993) 369-373.

5. "Modern Thrace (1800-1922): Aspects of Intellectual Life and Culture (Education, Corporate Organization, Theater, the Press)" (in Greek). It was published in the periodical *Umbrella: Letters, Art, Civilization,* in the Festschrift: *Thrace, Bastion of Hellenism and Bridge between Cultures,* Nos. 26-27, December 1994, 34-37.

6. She contributed various entries on Greek, Bulgarian and Russian Literature to *Balkan Bibliography* (Volume XI, 1984-1986, Thessaloniki 1993 and Volume XII, 1987-1990, Thessaloniki 1994).

Research associate Ms Eleftheria Madna

She took part in the 7th International Congress of South-East European Studies, held in Thessaloniki (August 29-September 4), with a communication on "The Use of a Greek Character Alphabet for the Albanian Language. A First Approach".

She published the study *The Greek Minority in Albania. A Documentary Record (1921-1993),* edited by B. Kondis and E. Manda, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki 1994.

She published the book review *The Truth on Kosova,* The Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Albania, Institute of History, Tirana 1993, *Balkan Studies,* 35.1 (1994) 182-186.

She contributed entries on Greek, Italian, and Albanian Literature to *Balkan Bibliography,* vol. XI, 1984-1986, Thessaloniki 1993 and vol. XII, 1987-1990, Thessaloniki 1994.

External research associate Mr Veniamin Karakostanoglou

From September 26 to 28, he took part in the 6th Greek-German Symposium on "Beiträge zur Stabilisierung Südosteuropas aus deutscher und griechischer Sicht", organized in Berlin by the Südosteuropa - Gesellschaft, in association with the Institute, with a communication on "The Ethnic Conflict in Kosovo: A Test Case for International Borders?".

From November 25 to 27, he took part in the Conference on "The Macedonian Question: Aspects and Historical Development", organized by the Institute for Balkan Studies, in association with the Department of History and Archaeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, with a communication on "International Supervision of the 1994 Census in the FYROM: Conclusions and Observations".

On December 10, he gave a lecture to 30 Greek journalists in the lecture hall of the Institute on "Consequences of the Yugoslav Crisis on Greece".

External research associate Ms Alexandra Ioannidou

From June 6 to 11, she took part in the 4th Greek-Russian symposium of Historians on "Greek Culture in Russia, 17th-20th cc.", organized in Moscow by the Institute for Balkan Studies, in association with the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, with a communication on "Der poetische Altgriechischunterricht im Russland der Jahrhundertwende: Innokentij Annenskij und Vjačeslav Ivanov" (= The poetic teaching of Ancient Greek in fin de siecle Russia: Innokentij Annenskij and Vjačeslav Ivanov).

Between August 29 and September 4, she took part in the 7th International Congress of South-East European Studies organized in Thessaloniki by the AIESEE, with a communication on "Languages and Ethnic Groups of Macedonia in the Work of P. S. Delta".

From November 25 to 27, she took part in the Conference on "The Macedonian Question: Aspects and Historical Development", organized in Thessaloniki by the Institute, in association with the Department of History and Archaeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, with a communication on "Slavonic Texts in Greek Script: Two Unpublished Letters by the comitadji Apostol Petkof".

She published the article «Η διαβαλκανική μνήμη στις ιστορικές παραδόσεις της Βουλγαρίας», *Νέα Εστία*, Αφιέρωμα στους λαούς της Χερσονήσου του Αίμου, Athens 1994, pp. 181-189.

3. *The Institute for Balkan Studies and the INTERNET*

WHAT IS THE INTERNET?

The Internet is the world's biggest information network, which is actually a global supernetwork made up of many smaller ones, and is already estimated to have thirty million users. The computers of universities and businesses all over the world are linked to the it.

What the Internet has to offer the Institute for Balkan Studies

— *Electronic mail (e-mail):* the most widely used application of the Internet, because of the speed with which messages are transmitted and the possibility of sending sound, images, and computer programs.

— *File Transfer Protocol (FTP):* the Institute can use the FTP to transfer programs and large files from distant computers.

— *Telnet:* this enables the Institute to link up with another computer on the Internet and use it just like one of its own computers.

— *Archie:* a programme-locating tool that can search through all the data bases on the Internet.

— *Usenet:* a collection of bulletin boards covering every imaginable field of interest. The bulletin boards are grouped in general categories, such as science (sci.), society (soc.), etc. The Institute can join a newsgroup and receive and study all sorts of opinions about the topics that interest it. Eighty per cent of the people who take part in Internet discussions are students and faculty members of universities all over the world. The Usenet includes newsgroups that discuss topics connected with Greece, such as *soc.culture.greek,* for instance, or *soc.culture.turkish,* or *soc.culture.classics.*

— *Gopher:* a tool for searching through all the subjects and data on the Internet to locate fields of special interest to the Institute for Balkan Studies.

— *World Wide Web:* a global hypertext environment that enables the user to log in to many data bases simultaneously in search of information.

Why the Internet is useful to the Institute for Balkan Studies

Being a research centre anxious to make the most of the latest advances in information technology and to keep a close eye on developments within its particular sphere of interest and research (the Balkans and south-eastern Europe), the Institute for Balkan Studies has decided to go ahead and link up to the Internet. The following possibilities are already available to us:

— We can collect information about historical and political subjects relating to the Balkans.

— We can also collect and store data relating to Greek national affairs (such as the Macedonian Question, Northern Epirus, Greek-Turkish relations).

— We have access to libraries all over the world that are online (the

Library of Congress, for instance, and other libraries in the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and elsewhere) and can thus locate titles and compile exhaustive bibliographies on Balkan topics.

— We also have access to international data banks and electronic data bases (e.g. DISCUS) that have material of interest to the Institute's researchers and their current research programmes.

In the immediate future, the Institute for Balkan Studies is planning to use the Internet for the following purposes:

— to give scientific institutions and libraries all over the world access to our specialised Balkan library;

— to enable the Institute to develop into an official processing agency for scientific data, which can then be transmitted to the Internet, possibly via some officially sponsored facility or Greek news agencies. The process of transmitting the texts is expected to be carried out via the Internet's home page for Greece.

II. HISTORICAL ARCHIVES

The Institute for Balkan Studies has an important collection of archival material, both originals and copies. In 1994 it was enriched by the acquisition from the United States National Archives of 105 microfilms on the activities of the German army in Greece during the occupation and from the Public Record Office of Great Britain of 66 microfilms dealing with the Macedonian Question in the 1940s.

III. THE LIBRARY

The Library of the Institute for Balkan Studies was equipped in 1994 with an up-to-the-minute computer documentation system (Alexandrie^{TM}), which operates on an internal network available both to the Institute's researchers, who work on it, and to users of the Library. The Library will soon be accessible on the Internet.

First of all we had to make all the basic preparations for the computer system to function smoothly. The standardised forms of the names of all the authors of books in the Library were indexed and entered, together with their variant forms. Then all the thesaurus identifiers, the hierarchy of keywords under which books, periodicals, and articles are listed, were indexed.

The program was installed in May 1994, since when the process of transferring the details of all the books, monographs, periodicals, and articles to the new documentation system has been continuing steadily.

During 1994, all the periodicals in the Library were entered into the computer, and a selection of articles in 40 periodicals issued from 1991 onwards were indexed. The titles of 209 periodicals received by the Library in 1994 were entered; 28 of these were purchased, 109 were received under the exchange system, and 72 were donated. The titles of 525 new monographs, conference proceedings, dictionaries, and pamphlets have also been entered, 171 of them purchased, 105 received under the exchange system, and 249 donated.

The latest volume (XII) of *Balkan Bibliography* is now available, containing an index of articles from 1987-90.

IV. CONFERENCES

The Institute organized a symposium on "The Balkans Today and the Role of Greece. Economy, Politics, and Mass Communication Media". The symposium was held in the hall of the Thessaloniki Chamber of Commerce and Industry on January 12.

The speakers were:

Georgios Romaios, Deputy Minister for National Economy.

Kostas Karamanlis, Member of the Parliament.

Nikos Efthymiadis, President of the Association of Industries of Northern Greece.

Antonis Kourtis, President of the Journalists' Union of Daily Newspapers of Macedonia and Thrace.

The Institute for Balkan Studies and the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences together organized, the 4th Greek-Russian Symposium of Historians in Moscow on June 6-11. The subject of the conference was "Greek Culture in Russia, 17th-20th cc.".

The Institute for Balkan Studies and the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft together organized the 6th German-Greek Symposium in Berlin on September 26-28. The subject of the conference was "Beiträge zur Stabilisierung Südosteuropas aus deutscher und griechischer Sicht".

Between October 31 and November 2, the Institute for Balkan Studies, in association with the Department of History and Archaeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, organized under the auspices of the Minister for Macedonia and Thrace, Mr K. Triaridis, an international conference in Thessaloniki on "Greeks and Armenians in South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor in the 19th and 20th centuries".

From November 25 to 27, the Institute il association with the Department of History and Archaeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, organized, as part of the activities of the Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace for the 90th anniversary of the death of Pavlos Melas, in Thessaloniki a conference on "The Macedonian Question: Aspects and Historical Developement".

From November 25 to 27, as part of the celebrations held by the Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Liberation of Macedonia and Thrace, the Institute and the Department of History and Archaeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki together organized an international conference in Thessaloniki on "Macedonia and Thrace, 1941-1944: Occupation, Resistance, and Liberation".

V. LECTURES

On March 7, Dr Evangelos Kofos gave a lecture on "The Greek Minority School Textbooks during the Enver Hoxha Period".

On March 23, Dr E. Kofos gave a lecture on "The Vision of 'Greater Macedonia': Remarks on the FYROM's New School Textbooks". The lecture was organized jointly by the Institute and the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle.

On March 24, Dr John Lambe, Professor of International Relations and Director of East-European Studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center and former State Department official, gave a lecture on "American Relations with Former Yugoslavia". The lecture was organized in association with the United States Information Service.

On May 11, P. Carl-Brown, Professor of International Relations at the University of Princeton, gave a lecture on "The Ottoman heritage in Today's World". The lecture was organized in association with the Department of Modern and Contemporary History and Ethnology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.

On June 10, Mr Melvin Croan gave a lecture on "The Americans and their Policy in the Balkans".

VI. EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. The School of Balkan Languages

The School of Balkan Languages (founded in 1963) continues its educational activities.

During the academic year 1993-1994 there were 22 classes with 359 regular students and 14 auditors and a teaching staff of 14.

During the academic year 1994-1995 there are 22 classes with 349 regular students and 9 auditors and a teaching staff of 15. Of the 349 regular students, 11 are studying Albanian, 100 Russian, 88 Turkish, 73 Bulgarian, 24 Romanian, and 53 Serbian.

The Society of Macedonian Studies awarded 15 students of the school scholarships for the academic year 1994-1995.

In August 1994, 48 members of the Graduates' and Students' Association visited the Kalas tribe in the Western Himalayas, Northern Pakistan. From September 26 to October 9, the Association mounted an exhibition of photographs on "Pakistan: The Kalas tribe" in the pavilion of the 3rd Army Corps.

2. The International Summer School

From July 31 to August 28, the Institute for Balkan Studies held its 22nd International Summer School on Greek language, history and culture for foreign scholars and students.

The program, which aims to promote Modern Greek Studies at an international level, was attended by 114 people from 26 countries in Europe, North, Central, and South America, and Asia, most of whom had scholarships from the Ministries of Culture and Education.

VII. PUBLICATIONS

In 1994 the following works were published:

1. D.-E. Tsourka-Papastathi, *Ελληνική Κομπανία του Σιμπίου Τρανσυλβανίας, 1636-1848* (IMXA 246), Thessaloniki 1994, pp. 446.
2. E. C. Zeginis, *Οι Μουσουλμάνοι Αθίγγανοι της Θράκης* (IMXA 255), Thessaloniki 1994, pp. 84+22 plates.

3. *Die Balkanländer im Europa der Gegenwart, Fünftes Symposium Organisiert in Thessaloniki (Am 22.-23. Mai 1992) vom Institut für Balkan-Studien und der Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft München* (IMXA 256), Thessaloniki 1994, pp. 170.

4. S. Sfetas and K. Kentrotis, *Σκόπια. Σε αναζήτηση ταυτότητας και διεθνούς αναγνώρισης. Κριτική προσέγγιση της MANU, "Macedonia and its relations with Greece", Skopje, 1993* (IMXA 257), Thessaloniki 1994, pp. 67.

5. *The Greek Minority in Albania; A Documentary Record (1921-1993)*, Edited by B. Kondis, and E. Manda (IMXA 258), Thessaloniki 1994, pp. 130.

6. K. I. Ailianos, *Μια προοπτική συμμαχίας Ελλάδος - Αυστρο-Ουγγαρίας χωρίς επαύριο, 1883-1887* (IMXA 260), Thessaloniki 1994, pp. 154.

Balkan Studies (Editor-in-Chief: Prof. B. Kondis), vol. 34, no 1, Thessaloniki 1993, pp. 1-192; vol. 34, no 2, Thessaloniki 1993, pp. 193-385.

Balkan Studies (Editor-in-Chief: Prof. B. Kondis), vol. 35, no 1, Thessaloniki 1994, pp. 1-191.

Βαλκανικά Σύμμεικτα, edited by K. K. Papoulidis, vols. 5-6, Thessaloniki 1993-1994, pp. 290.

Balkan Bibliography, edited by T. Verrou-Karakosta, and A. E. Karathanasis, vol. XI-1984/1986, Thessaloniki 1993, pp. XX+423.

Balkan Bibliography, edited by T. Verrou-Karakosta, vol. XII-1987/1990, Thessaloniki 1994, p. XXXI+279.

From May 21 to June 6, the Institute for Balkan Studies participated for the 9th year with its own pavilion in the 13th Panhellenic Book Festival, organized by the Association of Publishers of Northern Greece.

In 1994 the Institute sent 21.000 copies of its publications to varioust scientific institutions, libraries, associations, and schools, both in Greece and abroad.

VIII. VISITS

In 1994 the Institute was visited by:

1. Mr Armand Ramière de Fontanier, Inspector-General of the Archives of France, accompanied by Mr Nestor Bamidis, Director of the Historical Archive of Macedonia, on January 10. They had a long discussion on archive-related subjects with the President of the Institute Prof. Antony-Emil N. Tachiaos and the Deputy Director Mr Constantine Papoulidis.

2. The Secretary of the Turkish Consulate Mr Mustafa Imam, accompanied by the journalist Mr Gümet Özdemir and the cameraman Mr Yusuf

Akçura, on March 3. They had a long discussion on various subjects with the Director of the Institute Prof. Basil Kondis.

3. Mr P. J. Carabott, lecturer at King's College London, on March 29. He was informed about the activities of the Institute.

4. The Consul General of Turkey Mr Murat Bilham, on March 30. He met with the Vice President of the Institute, Prof. I. Hassiotis and the Director, Prof. B. Kondis, and was informed about various subjects.

The Director of the British Council, Dr Robin Baker, who met with the Vice President and the Director and was informed about various subjects.

5. The *Le Monde* journalist Mr Christophe Chiclet, on April 8. He had a long discussion with the Director and was informed about Greek current affairs.

6. The *Wall St. Journal Europe* journalist Ms Marcia Kurop, on April 11. She met the Director and was informed about various subjects.

7. Twenty-two pupils from the German Senior High School, on April 12. They were informed on various subjects by the Institute's research associate Mr Spyridon Sfetas.

8. Dr John Allock, Professor, at the University of Bradford, on May 11. He met the Director and was informed about the Institute's activities.

9. Erich Trapp, Professor, of Byzantine Studies at the University of Bonn and Corresponding Member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, on May 16. He met the Director and was informed about the Institute's activities.

Alexis E. Sola, Professor, of Hellenic Studies in Barcelona, who had a long discussion on various national issues with the Deputy Director Mr Constantine Papoulidis.

Ms Svetlana Hristova, associate of the Black Sea Institute of Varna, who discussed the possibility of an association between the two institutes with Mr C. Papoulidis.

10. The United States Ambassador in Athens Mr Thomas Niles and his staff, on May 17. He had a long discussion with the Director and was informed about various national issues.

11. The President of the Hellenic Shipbrokers Association, Mr E. Panas, accompanied by his daughter, on June 21. He presented the President of the Institute with his Association's coat of arms in recognition of the Institute for Balkan Studies' contribution to scholarship and national issues.

12. Johannes Koder, Professor of Byzantine Studies at the University of Vienna and Corresponding Member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, on June 26. He met the Director, Professor B. Kondis and the associate Mr

I. Leontiades and was informed about various subjects.

13. Greek journalists, on June 30. They were informed about the Institute's publications.

14. The German journalist Ms Elke Sturm-Trigonakis, on August 18. She met the Director of the Institute and was informed about various subjects.

15. Mr Isao Hinata and Mr Hiroshi Segawa from the Toho Broadcasting College on August 26. They interviewed the Director and the interview is scheduled to be broadcast on Japanese television.

16. Prof. Marc Maresceau, Director of the European Institute of the University of Ghent, on September 1. He met with the Director, and was informed about the Institute's activities.

Mr Valentin Stamov, Vice President of Balkan Media the Association for Mass Media and Communication Culture of the Balkan Countries. He met with the Director and discussed the possibilities of future co-operation.

17. The Director of the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences Mr V. Volkov, accompanied by the research associate Mr G. Arš, on September 2. They met with the President and the Director and discussed the terms of the co-operation between the two Institutes and the signing of a new agreement.

A delegation of 15 Albanian professors, who met with the Director and were informed about the Institute's activities.

Prof. N. Todorov, who met with the President of the Institute and discussed current affairs.

18. The Consul General of Turkey Mr Murat Bilham, on September 13. He met with the President and the Director and told them he was leaving Thessaloniki.

Mr G. Arš, research associate of the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who discussed matters relating to publishing with the Deputy Director.

19. Dr Kjell Magnusson of the University of Uppsala, on September 14. He met with the Director and was informed about current affairs.

20. Dr Jürgen Renter, associate of the Förderungsgesellschaft Wissenschaftliche Neuvorhaben mbH, on September 22. He met with the Director and was informed about the Institute's activities.

21. The journalist Mr Igal Avidan, on September 26. He met with the research-associates Mr Kyriakos Kentrotis and Mr Veniamin Karakostanoglou and was informed about current affairs.

22. Mr B. L. Fonkič, research associate of the Institute for General

History (Dept. of Byzantine Studies) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, on October 3. He discussed matters relating to publishing with the Deputy Director of the Institute.

23. The new Consul General of Turkey, Mr Tarday Koray, on October 19. He met with the President and was informed about various subjects.

24. The Polish journalist Mr Lech Niekrasz, on October 27. He met with the research associate Mr Spyridon Sfetas and was informed about current affairs. He also met the associate of the Institute Ms Efrossyni Panagiotidou, who told him about the Kalas tribe of Western Pakistan, whose members are believed to be descended from Alexander the Great.

25. Thirty journalists representing Greek-language newspapers published abroad, on December 10. They met with the Director and were informed about various national issues.

SYMPOSIUM

Saint Mark: Historical and Hagiographic Views. International Scientific Symposium in Venice, 25-29 April 1994, for the 900th Anniversary of the Consecration of the Basilica of Saint Mark.

This year marks the 900th anniversary of the official consecration (1094) of the Basilica of Saint Mark in Venice. The city is celebrating its patron saint, recalling the glorious past of its naval and commercial dominance in the Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean in particular. Apart from the other festive events, the supervisory committee of the church (*procuratoria*), with the *procuratore* Professor Mgr. Antonio Niero acting as co-ordinator, organized a scientific symposium from April 25 (the saint's day) to 29, dedicated to historical and hagiographic issues connected with Saint Mark. More than 40 university professors from Italy, Germany, France, Greece, Belgium, the USA, and Canada, as well as experienced researchers and top officials of the Venetian archives were invited to make contributions.

There were four thematic units: a) Origins and formation of the cult of Saint Mark; b) sources and symbols of the cult; c) cult and iconography; d) diffusion of the cult of Saint Mark.

Until the end of the 18th century, Saint Mark's was the church *par excellence* of the Doge, its emblem being the winged lion holding an open Gospel on its right foot. This is why the fortunes of the church were tied to the military and political history of the Venetian Republic. Not until 1807 did it achieve the status of metropolitan church of Venice.

The titles of the reports are indicative of the breadth of scientific interests. It is worth mentioning a few: Saint Mark between Babylon. Rome and Aquileia; new suppositions and investigations (by Giorgio Fedalto, of the University of Padua). — Cult and Symbols of Saint Mark in the Venetian Hinterland (by Silvio Tramontin, of the University of Milan). — Evidence Concerning the Primicerium of Saint Mark's (by Maria Francesca Tiepolo, of the Venice State Archive). — Saint Mark in Representations of the 15th Century (by Augusto Gentili, of the University of Rome). — Inscriptions on the Mosaics of Saint Mark (by Maria Da Villa Urbani, of the Supervisory Committee of Saint Mark's). — The Representations of the Childhood of the Mother of God and of Christ in the Basilica of Saint Mark (by Jaqueline Lafontaine-Dosogne, of the University of Louvain). — The Political Significance of the Baptistery of Saint Mark's and the Role of the Doge Andrea Dandalo (by Debra Pincus, of the University of Vancouver, Canada). — The Icon of the Evangelist and the Mechanisms of Shaping the Urban Myth (by André Jean-Marc Loechel, of the University of Strasbourg). — The Churches of Crete Dedicated to Saint Mark: Architectural Shape, Transformations and State of Preservation (by Alessandro Spiridione Curuni, of the University of Rome). — Venetian Churches in Honour of Saint Mark in the Eastern Mediterranean during the 12th-13th centuries (by Marco Pozza, of the University of Venice). — The Basilica of Saint Mark in Byzantine and post-Byzantine Texts (by Zacharias Tsirpanlis, of the University of Ioannina). — Saint Mark in the Upper Adriatic before Venice (by Sergio Tavano, of the University of Trieste). — The Special Character of some of the Rites of the Basilica of Saint Mark (by Giulio Cattin, of the University of Padua). — One Location, three Authorities: Saint Theodore, Seat of the Holy Inquisition at the Beginning of Modern Times (by Anne Jacobson Schutte, of the University of Virginia, USA). — Demonstrations of Piety by the Doges (by Gino Benzoni, of the University of Venice). — Ecclesiastico-political structure of Saint Mark's immediately after the End of the Venetian Republic (by Giovanni Scarabello, of the University of Venice). — The Sacred and Secular Paths of Venice (by Edward Muir, of Northwestern University, Evanston, USA). — The Clergy of the Dogal Church of Saint Mark and their Jurisdiction (by Paolo Selmi, Director of the Venice State Archive). — The Evangeliarum of Cividale and the Gospel According to Saint Mark (by Uwe Ludwig, of the University of Duisburg). — Archive Sources on Saint Mark in the Historical Archive of the Patriarchate of Venice (by Francesca Cavazzana Romanelli, of the Treviso State Archive). — Concerning the Patristic Explanation of the Gospel Tetramorph (by Pier Franco Beatrice, of the University of Padua). — The Archive Collection of the "Procuratori di S. Marco de Supra" at the Venice State Archive (by Bianca Lafranchi Strina, head of the archive service of the Venetian region). — The cult of Saint Mark in Istria and Dalmatia (by Francesco Semi). — The cult of Saint Mark in Apulia (by Liana Bertoldi Lenoci, of the University of Trieste). — The diffusion of the cult of Saint Mark through Personal Names and Churches in Dalmatia and Crete (by Paola Ratti Vidoli). — The Transfer of the Relics of Saint Mark to Venice and to Reichenau (by Regina Dennig-Zettler and Alfons Zettler, of the University of Freiburg), et al.

The conference was organized with outstanding care right down to the tiniest detail. Its proceedings took place in the Monastery of Saint Apollonia, next to the church of the Apostles Philip and James. The arched peristyle of the courtyard of the monastery (*chiostro*), a marvellous example of the Romance style (12th-13th century), is the only one extant in Venice today. And so the location, too, as well as the *sapientia* of those taking part, contributed to the success of this scientific gathering.

University of Ioannina ZACHARIAS N. TSIRPANLIS

Book Reviews

Digenes Akrites - New Approaches to Byzantine Heroic Poetry edited by Roderick Beaton and David Ricks, Centre for Hellenic Studies, King's Kollege London, Publications 2, Variorum 1993, pp. 196.

Au mois de mai 1992 a eu lieu au King's Collège un symposium intitulé *Byzantine Heroic Poetry: New Approaches to Digenes Akrites*, dont les travaux sont publiés dans ce volume. Cependant, les résumés des rapports concernant ont paru dans la revue *Μαντατοφόρος* vol. 35-36, pp. 363-375. Les professeurs R. Beaton et D. Ricks, qui sont également les éditeurs de ce volume, déclarent que le Symposium a été convoqué en raison de la parution, en 1985, de l'œuvre du Prof. Stylianos Alexiou sur Digenes Akrites. Lors de Symposium de nouveaux éléments et des opinions revisées sur les manuscrits ont été présentés, ainsi que des discussions sur l'histoire, la société, la littérature, la tradition de Digenes Akrites.

Titres des rapports présentés: Paul Magdalino, *Digenes Akrites and Byzantine Literature. The Twelfth-Century Background to the Grottaferrata Version* (pp. 1-14) divise son travail à trois sous-chapitres, *Love, Politics, Religion,* Le prof. Stylianos Alexiou dans *Digens Akrites: Escorial or Grottaferrata? An Overview* (pp. 15-25), après son Introduction cherche l'*Historical and geographical authenticity, l'Authenticity of parallel passages,* la *Language, style and versification* et finalement cite ses conclusions. Elizabeth Jeffreys, *The Grottaferrata Version of Digenes Akrites, A Reassessment* examine *The manuscrit, The first version, Conclusion* (pp. 26-37). Catia Galatariotou, *The Primacy of the Escorial Digenes Akrites: An Open and Shut Case?* (pp. 38-54) cherche sa thématique dans les trois sous-chapitres: *The chronological Primacy, References to Muslim Life, Reference to frontier Life including military terms, proper names, Toponyms, Qualitative primacy and historicity, Conclusions.* Roderick Beaton, *An Epic in the Making? The Early Versions of Digenes Akrites* (pp. 55-72) après son introduction examine les sujets suivants: *Comparison of narrative episodes, Comparison of structural elements, Conclusion, Appendix Core material in the "Lay of the Emir".* David Hook, *Digenes Akrites* *and the Old Spanish Epics* (pp. 73-85) compare Digenes avec les deux poèmes espagnols *La Condesa traidora, Bernaldo del Carpio* et *Siete infates de Lara etc.* Hratch Bartikian, *Armenia and Armenians in the Byzantine Epic* (pp. 86-92) analyse ses opinions dans les sous-chapitres *Geography in the epic, Personal names in the epic,* tandis que Anthony Bryer dans son rapport *The Historian's Digenes Akrites* (pp. 93-102) discute quelques faits historiques dans les sous-chapitres: *The Palace, The Tomb, Politics, Geography, Economy.* Ulrich Moennig dans son *Digenes = Alexander? The Relationship between Digenes Akrites and the Byzantine Alexander Romance in their Different Versions* (pp. 103-115) compare les deux textes. George Kechagioglou, *Digenes Akrites in Prose, The Andros Version in the context of Modern Greek Literature* (pp. 116-130) analyse son thème dans les deux sous-chapitres, *The Writing of the prose Digenes Akrites, Poetics of the prose version, Linguistic character, The literary context.* Il suit le rapport de Theodore Papadopoullos *The Akritic Hero: Socio-Cultural status in the Light of Comparative Data* (pp. 131-138). Guy Saunier, dans son rapport *Is there such a thing ar an "Akritic Song? Problems in the Classification of Modern Greek Narrative Songs* après son introduction passe à l'examen des ses sujets: *Independent songs, The songs of the Digenes-Cycle, Conclusion* (pp. 139-149). Peter Mackridge avait comme rapport le thème *None but the brave deserve the Fair: Abduction, Elopement, Seduction and Marriage in the Escorial Digenes Akrites and Modern Greek Heroic Songs* (pp. 150-161). David Ricks, *Digenes Akrites as Literature* (pp. 162-170) présente son rapport avec les sous-chapitres suivants: *Understatement, Direct speech, Repeated formulas, Special motifs, Conclusion.*

La bibliographie (pp. 171-185) et l'Index (pp. 186-196) clôturent la volume qui donne une image des recherches parues récemment au sujet de Digenes.

Université de Thessaloniki Ath. E. Karathanassis

Danilo L. Massagrande, *I governi dei Paesi balcanici dal secolo XIX al 1944. Volume I,* Milano, Edizioni di Comune di Milano "Amici del Museo del Risorgimento", 1994, pp. 204.

An exceptionally important point of reference and a valuable source of information, the celebrated *Almanach de Gotha* is a well-known work among scholars of history and heraldry. Its importance derives both from a pro-

longed existence and from the breadth and variety of the information it contains.

The *Almanach de Gotha* was first published in 1763 by the Geographical Institute of Justus Perthes in the German city of Gotha; thereafter it was published annually without exception until 1944. Initially a publication of the genealogies of royal houses and other courts in Europe (Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Italy, Spain etc.) and of the independent rulers of Germany, it was later enriched with political, diplomatic and statistical information on other countries as well. The annual political and diplomatic catalogues were also accompanied by the *Cronique,* a record of the year's events, and the *Additions et changements qui ont eu lieu pendant l'impression,* catalogue changes occurring after the *Almanach* had gone to press.

A crucial time for the evolution of the *Almanach,* as well as for this publication's origins, was the year 1824, when what was until then the *Liste des Agens diplomatiques des principales Cours de l'Europe* evolved into the *Annuaire diplomatique contenant une liste des Ministères des Puissances Européennes ainsi que des Agens diplomatiques des diverses Cours.* What this volume with particular success undertakes is a classification and critical edition of this latter segment of the celebrated *Almanach de Gotha.* It is a painstaking task, due to the huge volume and the special difficulties involved; nonetheless, it is an ambitious work and particularly important for historian researchers of Balkan countries.

It was not an easy task for the publisher to restore the complete catalogues of each year's members of each government, as the *Almanach* itself has serious omissions. Because of the fact that the data were recorded on an annual basis, in many cases —and particularly in times of political upheaval— it does not include changes occurring during the time which elapsed between two consecutive publications (a problem that to some extent the publication of the *Additions* is called upon to solve); in other cases, it presents the names of government officials after the list has already undergone certain corrective changes, but without including its original form. In an attempt to deal with this inherent problem and to fill in gaps, the editor takes care to include for each country at least two reliable works from which the reader can draw additional corresponding information or compare it with information presented in the *Almanach* itself.

The present publication includes an analytical list of government officials in five Balkan countries, as it derives from the *Almanach de Gotha,* with a chronology of the rise and fall of each government, the catalogue of Ministers who participated, and the date each Ministry was assumed by the Ministers. The following countries are included:

Bulgaria. From the government of T. Burmov, 4/17.7.1879, until the government of K. Muraviev, 2.9.1944.

Moldavia. From the government of A. Sturdza, 1851, until the government of A. C. Moruzi, 5/17.10.1861.

Wallachia. From the government of G. Baleanu, 1841, until the government of D. Ghica, 19/31.7.1861.

Romania. From the government of B. Catargiu, 22.1/3.2.1862, until the government of 1944.

Serbia. From the government of 1856, until the government of N. Pašić, 3/16.11.1918.

It should be noted that the dates used for each country are those in which each country is presented in *Almanach de Gotha* comprehensively. The publication is also accompanied by a complete index of names, rendering it a useful tool for readers.

Unquestionably, this publication constitutes an important manual for those studying the history of the Balkan region, both because of the richness of the information given and the particular care taken in arranging it, and because of the long period of time it spans. For this reason, the publication of the second volume —which has already been announced— is expected impatiently; it will include the countries Albania, Greece, Montenegro, the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia), and the countries which made a brief appearance on Yugoslav soil during World War II.

Institute for Balkan Studies ELEFTHERIA MANDA

Vlavianos Haris, *Greece, 1941-49: From Resistance to Civil War,* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. pp. XVII+350, ISBN: 0-312-06573-6.

Haris Vlavianos is Professor of Political History at the American College of Greece. He has studied economics and philosophy at the University of Bristol and international relations at Trinity college, Oxford (Dphil). He has published many articles on the Greek Communist Party. He is a research fellow of the Greek Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Athens. Professor Vlavianos's *Greece' 1941-49: From Resistance to Civil War* is an important book. At first glance, it may seem to resemble other one-volume histories of Greece of the 1940s. But Vlavianos's book is even more complete devoting its 350 pages to all aspects of the stormy decade of the 1940s in Greece.

In 1943 Compton Mackenzie in his book *Wind of Freedom* observed that the "full story of the sublime struggle of the Hellenic people against the new Barbarian cannot be told because the material is wanting" (p. ix). Indeed western historians have been struggling for decades to get into the archives of the Stalin period. In the early Eighties, before Gorbachev took office, scholars were granted very limited access. The real transformation came after the defeat of the August 1991 coup. Access to Russian archives and the opening of archival material in England, the United States and other countries have shed new light to our knowledge of events in Greece since the decade of the 1940s. Several scholarly publications including Professor Mark Mazower's *Inside Hitler's Greece* (1993), a scholarly account of the experience of occupation exploring the impact of the Nazi occupation upon the lives and values of ordinary peope in wartime Greece, have already appeared. The previously inaccessible archival material now available have made possible a vast increase in our knowledge of recent Greek history. Indeed the further in time that the second world war and the cold war recedes, the more does evidence accumulate that challenges the accepted certainties — political, diplomatic, economic, social and operational.

In 1940 the Greek public was so engrossed in the war with Italy as to spare little attention to the threatening developments to the north. On April 6, 1941 Germany declared war on both Greece and Yugoslavia. By May 1941, following the German famous airborne invasion of Crete (the first predominantly airborne invasion in history), Greece came under Axis occupation. Soon the Greek resistance forces began to harass the Germans quite effectively. King George II carried on a government in exile, sometimes in London and sometimes in Cairo. The period of German occupation of Greece is a melancholy one with episodes, often cruel, which greatly influenced the political, economic and social institutions of the country. With the German occupation of Greece many Communist leaders, imprisoned by the Metaxas government, were released. They fled to the mountains to establish contacts with the underground forces to fight the enemy. Rival monarchist and communist groups maintained a guerilla war with the Germans from 1942 until the British liberated Athens in October 1944, when the two resistance groups started fighting each other as ardently as they fought the Germans. Bitter civil war lasted from May 1946 until October 1949. The struggle between the

Greek communists, the British and the Greek right, brought Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden to Athens to help bring a settlement to the tragic situation. Between January 1945 and April 1946, no less than eight governments succeeded each other, characteristic of the political instability that was troubling the country.

The election of March 1946 brought to power a monarchist government and the plebiscite of September 1946 recalled King George II to return to Greece. However, the ideological differences between the two ends of the political spectrum —the Right and the Left— were chiasmatic and "irreconcilable". Thus Greeks experienced another face of the civil war and a "bloody exercise in tragic determinism". Alas, the Greek civil war was one of the bloodiest of modern times: it cost the lives of more than 600,000 people out of a population of 7 million. Professor Angelos Angelopoulos, the distinguished economist and member of the Academy of Athens, in his recently published book *Από την Κατοχή στον Εμφύλιο: Η Μεγάλη Ευθύνη των Συμμάχων* (1994), [The Greek Resistance during the Second World War 1940-1945], provides an important account of the Greek civil war and observes that its impact on Greek political, social and economic developments could be traced to the present. The period of the Nazi occupation and the liberation that followed, professor Angelopoulos writes, "is an epoch that was to have a decisive impact on the subsequent course of Greek affairs since its various consequences have been felt right down to the present day". A coalition of Rightists parties formed a new government in January 1947. In April, King George died and was succeeded by his brother Paul. In the meantime, the communist guerrillas, assisted from Yugoslavia, formed a "Provisional Democratic" government up in the mountains and continued their struggle with the government in Athens. The prospects for Greece and the Greeks were not promising. The British, who hoped to continue as a major power in Greece, found themselves unable to continue to carry the economic and military burden after March 1947. At this critical point, the United States entered Greece's world by taking over in the momentous Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine. With massive military and economic assistance from the United States (more than $ 2 billion by 1953), in August 1949 the Greek army launched an all-out offensive which destroyed the guerrilla forces and brought an end to the civil war.

Greece, 1941-49 is a study "of the policies and strategies of the Greek Communist party (KKE) during the period 1941-7, with particular emphasis of the period 1945-7. It examines the policy of the KKE during the Resistance and the immediate post-liberation period" offering a "post-revisionist interpretation of the causes of the Greek Civil War". The book is divided into seven chapters: part I, "The Greek Communist Party: Resistance or Revolution?", part 2, "Varkiza: Capitulation to the British?", part 3, "From Varkiza to the Seventh Congress", part 4, "The Elections of March 1946: Pandora's Box", part 5, "The Second Plenum: Textbook Revolution", part 6, "The Decision to Abstain: 'Tactical Error' or 'Decisive'", and part 7, "From Limited Self-Defence to Civil War".

The book includes a useful conclusion, chronological table, index section and bibliography. "The history of the Greek Civil War, as we have interpreted it in this book" writes Professor Vlavianos, "is the history of errors, of petty malice, of vicious intentions, of high-sounding objectives sometimes masking the lowest of motives". *Greece, 1941-49* is well written and thoroughly researched. It is a most important contribution to our knowledge and understanding of a tragic epoch in recent Greek history. The decade of the 1940 is of great importance to political, social and economic developments in Greece during the following decades. It is a period that deserves more books. Books that bring together the thinking, experiences, plans, and frustrations of all protagonists in the drama of the Greek Civil War. Professor Haris Vlavianos is to be commended for his highly significant book.

Ball State University JOHN A. KOUMOULIDES

Christofis H. Economides, *Demythologizing the History of Cyprus in the Last 50 Years* (in Greek), Nicosia, 1993.

A review of a book on the historical developments in Cyprus is a welcome opportunity for the reader to comment on the Cyprus dilemma and to offer another perspective on the problem afflicting the people of that island Republic. Christofis Economides' book "Demythologizing the History of Cyprus in the Last 50 Years" is an attempt to deal with the historical events in Cyprus. The book includes the following: essays, studies, commentary; the author's correspondence on important developments, especially with leading political leaders and personalities; and a series of documents, speeches, and revelations on the major historical junctures during the anti-colonial struggles and the events surrounding the independence period, up to the present. Much of this historiography is familiar to the student of Cyprus history and politics.

Over the past fifty years quite a few Greek Cypriots have been involved directly or on the periphery of the struggle for emancipation from British colonialism and, in the last twenty years, from the Turkish military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. Entire generations of leaders and ordinary people have been "wounded" or have gone without the satisfaction that their ancestral land is "free at last" from the threat of extinction. The recent experience only shows that this is not possible for the Greek Cypriot people. Nonetheless, there is a growing number of writers / activists from different ideological positions who have broken the culture of silence and are recording their own experiences and interpretations of these historical events. In this vein, the author states (on the cover page) that this is an attempt to set the record straight, for the "Cyprus public and especially the young, who are mostly uninformed or misinformed on the real issues of Cypriot history and the Cyprus problem in the last 50 years"

The book is an excellent source of reference material. It would have made reading easier had it been organized chronologically or thematically in its totality. The author makes an attempt to do so by offering some sixty pages of a "Short Review of Developments of the Cyprus problem in the last 120 years". This extended review preempts the lengthy sections in the main body. It could have been shorter. Otherwise, the book contains useful information and a level-headed analysis—maybe too level-headed.

In the "Review" section author Economides traces the historical record of Cyprus: the origins of British colonialism and its "divide-and-rule" policy, pitting Greek against Turk, as it unfolded in the colonial administrative apparatus; the determination of imperial Britain to maintain hegemony over the island for geopolitical reasons; the two-pronged method used by the British to neutralize the demand for self-determination (enosis/union of Cyprus with Greece): (a) repression (e.g., emergency rule, 1931-1959); and EOKA (1955-1959); or (b) limited self-rule within the colonial system. As it is well-known, these policies failed because the 80 percent Greek majority of Cyprus demanded "enosis and only enosis".

The author does not hesitate to state that the rejection of limited "Self-Government" prior to independence in 1959 was a mistake, a "lost opportunity". The blame is squarely placed on the shoulders of Archbishop Makarios. "Makarios", the author states, "even though he had many attributes, he had a major flaw which overwhelmed his advantages. Makarios believed he had the capability to win if he remained intransigent and engaged in "brinkmanship" (page K). The offer for self-government, had it been accepted, the author suggests, would have been free of the disadvantages contained in the Zurich-

London Agreements in 1959 which gave birth to the Republic of Cyprus, the hardships of the EOKA armed struggle, the executions of EOKA fighters, and the irreversible traumatized relations between the Greek and Turkish communities incurred during the armed struggle.

It is not suggested that the British were innocent bystanders in the unending Greek-Turkish struggle. Britain's policy to avoid becoming an "offshore" island of Europe is well-known (India, Palestine, and Northern Ireland). In Cyprus, their initial strategy was to use Turkey to counteract Greek diplomacy and during the EOKA struggle they used the Turks of Cyprus as the colonial police, interrogators, torturers, and the armed militia with a license to commit acts of violence against Greek Cypriots. By 1958 the British succeeded in converting an anti-colonial struggle into a Greek-Turkish conflict, with themselves playing the "unappreciated" role of keeping the peace so the Greek and Turks will not kill each other. It was the threat of partitioning the island between Greece and Turkey (a policy pursued by Turkey and Great Britain, and supported by the United States) that forced the Greek Cypriots to accept the Zurich and London Agreements in 1959, negotiated by Britain, Turkey, and Greece, for the sake of the NATO Alliance. These Agreements, as Dr. Stanley Kyriakides points out in his classic study, "Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government" (1968), proved to be unworkable from the very beginning because the 18 percent Turkish minority and the Turkish Vice-President had veto powers over the legislative process and the "Guarantor Powers" (Greece, Turkey and Britain) had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Cyprus. In short, the political arrangements worked out for an "independent Republic of Cyprus" reflected more or less the power configuration within NATO, favoring British and Turkish interests. The jockeying for power among the three powers within NATO and the region and the two communities were constitutionalized. "Deadlock politics" was the norm, with both sides arming themselves.

Author Economides suggests that the Zurich and London Agreements collapsed because of Makarios' "brinkmanship" politics and "split personality" — as a religious leader committed to enosis and as political leader sworn to respect the 1960 constitutional arrangements. With hindsight, the author may be right that Makarios' personality may have been part of the problem, but it ought to be seen within the context of a larger picture: the regional and global geopolitical dynamics. This interpretation is, of course, at variance with that claim at the time and to this day by those who continue the EOKA legacy that Makarios was a traitor to the cause of enosis by agreeing for an independent Cyprus (see Photis Papafotis, E Karpasia ston Agona tis EOKA, Limassol, 1993). Obviously, Makarios was in a difficult situation: blamed by the enotists for compromising too much and by the realists for not compromising enough. Despite the warnings from Athens and Ankara against overturning the Zurich and London arrangements, the author states, Makarios unilaterally proceeded to offer the thirteen points to make the Constitution workable and democratic. The author accepts the allegation made by Glafkos Clerides that "Polycarpos Georgadzis [murdered] and the present-day rejectionist leaders Vassos Lyssarides and Tassos Papadopoulos had a part in this effort; they are responsible for the overturn of the Zurich-London arrangements and the consequences" (p. K.θ).

The author's message is clear: the EOKA armed struggle, the 13 points proposed by Makarios, the inter-ethnic violence (1963-64) coupled with the intransigence and unwillingness of President Makarios to solve the ethnic conflict, set the stage for the invasion and partition of the island by Turkey in 1974. These claims no doubt have a great degree of validity. But, the immediate cause of the 1974 invasion was the coup d'etat against Makarios by the Athens military government, nurtured and kept in power by NATO and the CIA. The United States policy at the time towards the "Red Priest" (Makarios) of the Mediterranean is well-known. So are the machinations of the Athens junta and its EOKA-B supporters in Cyprus, and the attacks on Makarios by the three bishops. The warnings to Makarios came from many quarters, including the author himself. His warnings that time was running out and partition was imminent are included in the correspondence. The results are well-known, including the failed diplomacy to deal with the Cyprus problem from 1974 to today. That is all history now.

The above information is contained in the review section. The rest of the book is devoted to elaborating and documenting the author's view of history and involvement. There is a plethora of personal documents, conference reports, correspondence, and analysis. A review of these documents concludes that British policy objectives and Turkish partitionist plans, as it was stated above, began to converge from the very beginning of the enosis struggle. Both agreed that the status of Cyprus could not change without satisfying Anglo-Turkish interests. Hence, every move of the Greeks towards self-determination was counteracted by British and Turkish partitionist plans.

The author includes an extended section (pp. 54-101) dealing with the squabbling between the Makarios government and the British over money. Specifically, the Makarios government demanded 30 million gold pounds (with the author's help in counting it) that Britain plundered from the Cypriot people for fifty years in the form of a "tributary tax". Makarios also demanded compensation for money extracted from the Cypriot people during the emergency rule which began with the uprising in 1931 and lasted until 1959. The author recounts the conflict with the British over the legal status of the British "sovereign bases" in Cyprus and the rights of the military personnel. Other issues dealt with in this section include the relationship between Cyprus and the British Commonwealth.

The period between the inter-communal violence, 1963-64 and 1974 is critical in the history of Cyprus. An extensive section (pp. 104-193) is devoted to this period. According to the author, Makarios missed another opportunity to solve the inter-ethnic conflict. The political crisis which engulfed Greece at the same time was not unrelated to the Cyprus problem. The sell-out of Cyprus was one of the charges against Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis. The defeat of the rightist Karamanlis government in 1963-64 was interpreted by the Greek ruling circles and the United States/NATO as a threat to Western hegemony over Greece. The mobilization of the liberal forces against NATO/CIA meddling in Greek internal affairs, for democratization, and justice for Cyprus resisted by the rightist forces and their Western allies served as catalysts for the military takeover on April 21, 1967. The military junta simply accentuated the contradictions in Greece and Cyprus. The anti-junta forces were no match to the military and police state, which was immediately exported to Cyprus. The anti-junta demonstrations in Nicosia, held during the April anniversary, were met by Greek military personnel dressed in civilian clothes and EOKA-B followers, with clubs. The Cypriot police stood on the sideline. Those involved in the anti-junta struggle had a sense of the impending dangers. The warnings went unheeded. The author includes a 1971 proposal for a "Realistic National Solution of the Cyprus Problem Before It Is Too Late". As it was stated earlier, the author claims it was another "lost opportunity". Even though the Turkish government demanded a federal solution, the author suggests the Turkish Cypriot leadership only demanded local autonomy. Makarios refused; he continued to be intransigent as in the pre-independence period (pp. 192-93). Why? The author refers to Nikos Kranidiotis and his son John N. Kranidiotis for the answer. Makarios simply did not wish to accede to the Treaty of Alliance and Guarantee which gave Turkey the right to intervene in Cyprus nor Article 185 of the Constitution which precluded enosis (and partition). Makarios was assuming that the Turkish Cypriots would eventually acquiesce to his efforts to make the Constitution workable and democratic, and that Turkey would not intervene militarily. These calculations proved to be wrong (Ibid.).

The last section of the book (pp. 194-548) deals with the period between

1974 to the election of President Glafkos Clerides in 1993. All the diplomatic efforts and proposals to solve the Cyprus problem through the United Nations are dealt with. The author's letters to newspapers, the various Presidents of Cyprus (Kyprianou and Vassiliou) are included. The author did not hesitate to support positions coming from the U.N. Secretary General for a solution to the problem—solutions deemed unacceptable by other political leaders in Cyprus. He focuses on the failure of the leadership (meetings between Kyprianou-Denktash and Denktash-Vassiliou) and the missed opportunities. The author's attacks, however, go beyond them. Vassos Lyssarides (EDEK), for example, is branded as a "rejectionist" who perpetuates the "deadlock" and the partition of Cyprus.

Whether one agrees or not with the author's message on solving the Cyprus problem or his claim of a series of "lost opportunities" presented to the Greek Cypriots in the last 59 years is not the issue here. This is history. The author, however, deserves credit airing his views on Cypriot historiography.

Whatever has been said and written over the past fifty years is of little value to the present crisis: the Turkification of 37 percent of Cyprus. Whatever options existed in the past twenty or fifty years, as the author states, are no longer. It seems that the only lesson the Greek Cypriot leadership learned from this history is that it did not learn anything. The problem remains. The survival of the Greek Cypriots in their ancestral land is at stake, especially when all traces of Greek civilization have been eradicated from the occupied zone. Ten, twenty, or fifty years from now, the "Turkish" population of Cyprus will equal if not overwhelm the Greek Cypriots. And the "Hellenic Center" (Athens) is incapable of defending Cyprus. The "war of words" by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou on his (victory) statement in the last election, that a repetition of the "Attila" in Cyprus will mean war, is not enough. We are still dealing with the first Attila of 1974, not the next one. Neither the symbolic military planes flying over Cyprus are reassuring. At the moment, war is not an option. The only individuals who romanticize armed struggle are those left over from the EOKA period or their progeny who gather and sing the Greek national anthem, read poems, listen to a speech by an EOKA leader, and praise General George Grivas. They do more than that: they distribute maps of Greece with Northern Epirus, Eastern Thrace, Smyrna, Constantinople, and Cyprus. Those who disagree are branded "traitors".

One cannot suggest either that the political line followed since 1974 has produced results. If the argument can be made (as Economides does) that the refusal of the Greek Cypriot leadership to make the necessary compromises at opportune moments before (or even after) 1974 was a mistake, can the same claim be made for the last twenty years? Witness how the Greek Cypriot leadership has been making one concession after another at the United Nations. If the Greek Cypriots were missing every opportunity, what opportunities were missed in the last twenty years? The negotiations have been conducted in a way that one side makes concessions, and these concessions become the basis for the next round of negotiations. Since the Greek Cypriots have proved that they are willing to make one concession after another, the pressure is on them. Witness the principle position taken by President Clerides against any meetings with Rauf Denktash unless he agreed to a federal solution, bi-zonal, with political equality between the 18 percent and the 80 percent, one citizenship, and one international personality*. No sooner than he finished making the statement, he agreed to have a series of unofficial meetings in late October 1994 without preconditions. These too accomplished nothing.

The Turkish strategy has been clear all along: a "two-state" solution, with political equality between the two communities. President Clerides' proposal for an acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem cited is music to Denktash' ears. The "facts on the ground" will determine the final solution. The 70-30 percent solution, if it ever materializes, would require minor territorial adjustments. The transferring of the "dead zone" to Greek control would more or less solve the territorial dispute. The United Nations' clerks are busy drawing territorial lines on someone else's ancestral land. The constitutional issues appears to have been settled: political esuality. If what President Clerides is promoting is a bi-zonal, federal, 70-30 percent territorial division of Cyprus, with political equality, and the Turkish side does not agree to such terms, who among us would dare, in the name of realism, suggest to the leadership of Cyprus to agree to worse terms demanded by the Turkish leadership because the alternative is "partition"?

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* Glafkos Clerides' statement/address at the U.N. General Assembly, October 3, 1994, p. 7. See also Clerides' letter to the U.N. Secretary-General Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, dated 7th September 1994.

Anastasios Myrodis Tamis, *The Immigration and Settlement of Macedonian Greeks in Australia,* La Trobe University Press, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, 1994, pp. xii+387+12pp. of plates.

Books in Greek and in other languages about the modern Greek diaspora are of enormous importance, in terms of both quality and quantity. However, they have tended to focus on specific periods and specific places where Greek immigrants have settled and organised themselves, as well as being somewhat restricted in their scientific (chiefly sociological) and methodological approach to the subject. Thus a large proportion of such literature is devoted, for instance, to the Greek immigrant presence in North America, while relatively little has been written about the historical development of the modern Greek diaspora on the other side of the world, in Australia, at least up to the Second World War. At the same time, writers have tended to avoid investigating the phenomenon of modern Greek emigration from the more particular point of view of the immigrants' specific geographical origins — an approach that might have a certain *de facto* legitimacy. It is only recently that, in association with the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, the present writer has launched an effort to reconsider the phenomenon of emigration, from Macedonia at least, in its economic, social, political, and historical context from as narrow a point of view as possible — i.e. that of the immigrants' original community or slightly broader geographical and administrative area.

It is precisely into this gap that one may put Anastasios Tamis' new book, *The Immigration and Settlement of Macedonian Greeks in Australia.* His aim is to follow the paths and the tracks of both the pioneering and the later Macedonian Greek immigrants to Australia; to describe their struggle to get back on their feet economically and socially while becoming assimilated into their new homeland; and to explore the causes of the disputes that arise amongst them and between them and the other Greeks.

A Professor of Sociolinguistics and Dean of the Department of Hellenic Studies at the University of Melbourne, Anastasios Tamis now teaches at La Trobe University. One of the founder members of the Institute for Macedonian Studies, he plays a very active part in the cultural and educational affairs and the ethnic issues of Australia's Greeks in general, and Macedonian Greeks in particular. He has published some important articles, chiefly in the field of sociolinguistics, both in Australia and in Europe, and is also the author and/or editor of a considerable number of works about the Greeks of Australia. These include: 'The State of Modern Greek as Spoken in Victoria' (Univ. of Melbourne Ph. D. thesis, 1986), *Greeks in Australia* (co-edited with

A. Kapardis, Melbourne 1986), *Macedonian Hellenism* (editor, Melbourne 1990), *The Emergence of the Orthodox Church in Australia (1892-1949)* (Melbourne 1992), 'The State of Modern Greek in Australia' in *The Australian People* (edited by J. Jupp, Melbourne 1988, pp. 527-31).

In addition to a foreword, an introduction and the necessary acknowledgements, the book comprises five chapters: 'Macedonia and Macedonians', 'Immigration and Settlement of Greeks in Australia', 'Settlement of Macedonian Greeks in Australia', 'Settlement of Macedoslavs in Australia', and 'Final Remarks, Conclusions, and Implications'.

In Chapter One (pp. 1-11), the author sets out to familiarise his readers with some of the terms ('Macedonia', 'Macedonians', etc.) that are used in the book and also to give an account, from ancient times to the modern day, of the geographical and historical area from which the immigrants in question originated. In this connection he discusses in detail the tradition of emigration from (mainly Western) Macedonia to the northern Balkans, the Danube countries, and Central Europe throughout the period between the early fifteenth century and 1912-13. It was a tradition that increased in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and reached a peak early in the twentieth century with the Ilinden Uprising, at which point Macedonian immigrants began to flood into North America.

The fundamental difference between those who emigrated to Europe and North America and those who went to Australia lay in the whole process of their departure. Most of the first group were escaping from the troubled political and wretched economic situation in their homeland with the intention of returning some day, once they had achieved their real aim of some measure of financial security. The steady flow to Australia, on the other hand, was made up of earlier immigrants who, for various reasons, had every intention of settling there for good. One might call them conscious immigrants.

The migration of Greeks to the Antipodes and their settlement there (Chapter Two, pp. 13-106) took the form of three waves. i) Before the First World War it was sporadic and made up of pioneering immigrants who initially did not intend to settle permanently. ii) Between 1918 and 1951, the Australian immigration authorities erected linguistic, racial, and financial barriers as a means of controlling the numbers and types of foreigners entering the country, in pursuance of the so-called White Australia Policy; but this did not hold back the flood of pre-war Macedonian immigrants and the immigrants-cum-refugees who came surging in after the Greek Civil War. iii) In the final period (1952-74), the situation changed radically as the Australian governments adopted a new policy introducing programmes designed to attract immigrants and turning the country into a multi-ethnic, multicultural mosaic.

These chronological divisions show, amongst other things, that the model of Greek immigration and settlement in Australia was determined as much by the (economic, cultural, and other) developments in their new homeland as by the corresponding changes taking place in Greece, and followed a parallel course to that of the movement of other south European immigrant groups. The earliest Greek immigrants, who were adventurers and gold-diggers for the most part, set forth from the Aegean and the Ionian islands (Kythira, Ithaki, Kastellorizo) and made for Victoria and New South Wales between 1851 and 1880.

Until the arrival of the first Macedonian Greek immigrants, the organised Greek Orthodox communities in Australia were very few in number and very small in size. The most important ones were in New South Wales, Victoria (Melbourne), Brisbane, and Perth.

The first efforts to install Greek consular representatives on the fifth continent were made in the late 1880s and early 1890s. The first official consuls, Australian citizens of British extraction, were quickly succeeded by Greek immigrants, who were outstanding members of their communities, well established financially, and highly respected by their associates in Australia's British community. The first Greek career diplomat to be appointed as Greece's Consul General in Australia was Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, who assumed his post in May 1926 at a time when the then Greek government was anxious to promote trade with Australia. By and large, the Greek consuls, both honorary and career diplomats, played an important part in the whole process of those early immigrants' arrival, settling, and rehabilitation in their new homeland. They opposed the restrictive measures imposed by the Australian authorities, took steps to set up a reception programme for Greek immigrants, chiefly for refugees from Asia Minor, and they managed to support the Greek communities and promote their contacts and exchanges with their Australian surroundings. The only dark clouds in this respect were the active involvement of some of them (mainly the first honorary consuls) in the intracommunal clashes and the rift between the communities and the Church; their occasionally authoritarian attitude; and their tendency to involve the Greek Foreign Ministry in the Australian Greek communities' affairs.

The earliest references to the presence of the Greek Orthodox Church in Australia date from 1895, when priests sent by the Patriarchates of Jerusalem and Alexandria and the Church of Greece were travelling around to serve, occasionally and sporadically, the devotional and ceremonial needs of the still few Greek settlers. There was terrible strife at the level of communal and ecclesiastical organisation and activity between 1924, when the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople established the Greek Orthodox Metropolitanate of Australia and New Zealand, and 1931, when peace was restored. Personal and party rivalries over the right to authority and control in the communities seriously undermined the Greeks' position in Australia, shattered their cohesion, and brought their political and legal status to the brink of disaster.

During the first twenty-five years of Macedonian presence in Australia (1924-49), the Macedonian Greeks were relatively uninvolved in the general affairs of the Greek communities. They were content to concentrate on their personal struggle for survival and their own families' welfare. The very few Macedonian immigrants (Chapter Three, pp. 107-263) who were on the continent of Australia around the beginning of the twentieth century had probably come via Constantinople, France, or America. The first large-scale influx of Macedonians, essentially the first Greeks from mainland Greece, took place in 1924, when some 250 inhabitants of the west Macedonian areas of Florina, Kastoria, and Kozani landed at Perth, Melbourne, and Sydney. The next wave came in 1928. In the process of successive immigration, these first-comers had something of a magnetic effect, attracting new immigrants from their own original localities.

The suspicion and hostility with which the new British-Australian community treated them (almost to the point of mental and physical violence sometimes), the far from open-armed welcome they received from the established, chiefly insular, Greek immigrants, the employment restrictions imposed by the Australian Agricultural Bank to protect the interests of the British labour force, the widespread recession, ignorance of the language, and lack of specialised training forced most of these newcomers to seek employment as a free and mobile agricultural workforce in the outback. As loggers, or as labourers on farms, sugarcane plantations, vegetable and fruit farms, pioneering tobacco plantations, poultry farms, or as miners, they managed to win the recognition and respect of the Australian community through their diligence and resilience in the adverse conditions they endured until they were able to set up the first businesses of their own. Until the early 1950s, the Macedonian immigrants' social and professional rehabilitation and integration were determined chiefly by their ties with 'home', their contact with the Australian outback, whither they went in search of work, and above all their efforts to avoid a clash of interests with the British Australians by opting for occupations approved by the host community.

The influx of Macedonian immigrants to Australia varied little from 1924 to 1974, despite the severely restrictive measures that the immigration authorities introduced from time to time. As before the war, so too after it, the rate remained high as the first immigrants from Eastern and Central Macedonia began to arrive. Taking advantage of the more favourable economic situation and the more tolerant policy of the Australian governments, the post-war Macedonian Greek immigrants joined forces with their pre-war relatives and fellow villagers. They developed a stable model of urban settlement and either engaged in the same trades as Macedonian and other Greek immigrants or, more commonly, worked as labourers on building sites, and in metal works, foundries, and quarries, or else in somewhat lighter occupations. A desire to improve their living conditions and their relations with the British Australian community prompted many of them to adopt an Australian way of life and to take a positive attitude to integration; though they still maintained their cultural differences, their ethnic identity, and their cultural presence.

Until about 1935 the early Greek Macedonian immigrants resolutely withstood urbanisation. But following the economic recovery in Australia and the more tolerant attitude of the Australian authorities, their hitherto simple, patriarchal mode of rural communal life began to change. Particularly after 1946 and the arrival of their families from Greece, there was a marked increase in the number of Macedonian associations and societies with educational, social, cultural, and charitable aims, addressed both to their own members and to the people 'back home'. The associations were a reflex response to their members' serial immigration, and reflected the powerful family ties that bound their members from the time they left Greece; unbreakable ties that determined the economic, religious, social, and political functioning of the communities. They also reflected, in their very names, their members' common geographical origin, the economic situation in their native communities (whether they were mountain or lowland villages, for instance), and also the political and social situation there (whether the inhabitants were refugees or local-born). The native communities were also an arena of personal and political rivalry and conflict, usually at the leadership level, between progressive leftist and conservative members. The strife between Slavonic-speakers and Greek-speakers in the mixed associations resulted in a rift between them, a rift, indeed, which assumed extremely hostile proportions after the War. It was not until the 1970s and '80s that the Australian Macedonians achieved a measure of success in establishing an interstate corporate organisation, the Panmacedonian League of Australia, and corresponding regional organisations, such as the Panmacedonian League of Victoria, the Panmacedonian League of Melbourne, etc. Even these, however, have not entirely escaped ideological and political conflicts and organisational problems.

The Greek Macedonian immigrants involved themselves as little as possible in the discord between the communities and the Church. They tended to regard the Church as a social and communal symbol with a negligible role in the process of their settling down and making good. It is only with respect to the developments connected with the Macedonian Question in Australia that the Greek Orthodox Church of Australia has played an important part in the Macedonians' eyes. Upholding the sacred canons and its own principle of the universality of Orthodox Christianity above and beyond linguistic, cultural, and ethnic differences, the Church has sought to approach the Slavonic-speaking Macedonians along general lines, while nonetheless refusing to recognise the uncanonical 'Macedonian Orthodox Church' and its Australian branch.

The Greek Macedonian press played a major part in the immigrants' efforts to keep in touch with each other and to pass on news from 'back home'. The Greek Macedonian communities' sports associations and clubs also had a socialising function. However, financial and organisational problems, not to mention the ever-present personal and political rivalries, made it all but impossible for them to achieve a meaningful presence within Macedonian Australian society or Australian society in general.

Since 1974, the flow of Greek Macedonian immigrants to Australia has dwindled considerably. This does not necessarily imply, of course, that the Macedonian Greeks in Australia are becoming more and more assimilated. On the contrary, their existing associations and institutions are still very much alive and kicking both in the context of the broader Greek immigrant presence in Australia and with respect to the confrontation between the Greek Macedonians and the Macedonian Slav community.

The first signs of the Macedonian Question appeared in the mid-1930s, mainly in the form of disputes over the leadership and control of the first Macedonian communities between their Slavonic-speaking and Greek-speaking members. After the War, the issue flared up, mainly because the repercussions of the relevant developments in the Balkans reached Australia distorted by the memories and the experiences of the post-war Macedonian immigrants.

Until 1960, the vast majority of Macedonians who had settled in Australia hailed from Greek Macedonia (Chapter Four, pp. 264-335). Yugoslav Macedonians arrived chiefly after 1961. Their initially peaceful and harmonious co-existence in their new socio-economic situation came to an end in the late 1920s, owing to the developments in Europe over the Macedonian Question. From the early '30s until the Second World War, pro-Bulgarian Macedonian settlers and immigrants from Bulgaria proper, having failed to gain control of the existing Macedonian associations (in Perth, Melbourne, and elsewhere), set up pro-Bulgarian Macedonian associations of their own, most of which were heavily influenced by or dependent on similar Bulgarian organisations in North America. Later on, after 1950, the remaining pro-Bulgarian Macedonians rallied round the Australian branch of the Autocephalous Bulgarian Orthodox Church, in an effort to survive the machinations and predatory desires of those who had turned to the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia after the War.

Bulgaria's disappointing stance (as far as the Bulgaro-Macedonian leaders in Australia were concerned) during the Second World War; the birth of the Federal Yugoslav Socialist Republic of Macedonia and the new state-approved policy for consolidating a 'Macedonian national ideology'; the arrival, after 1950, of thousands of Slav Communists from Greek Macedonia who sympathised with the policy of the Yugoslav Socialist Republic of Macedonia; the enervating dissension within traditional Slav Macedonian organisations; personal rivalries and wrangling over power; all these factors conspired to upset the equilibrium that had obtained hitherto. In that multicultural environment, and thanks to the tolerant, liberal official policy towards Australia's various ethnic groups, the confrontation over the Macedonian Question grew increasingly heated.

After 1950, the architects of the 'Macedonian national ideology' in Australia devised four models of propaganda activity, proclaiming: a semi-autonomous Greek Macedonia; a Macedonia that would include both the Greek and the Bulgarian part of the geographical region directly annexed to Yugoslavia; an independent Greek Macedonian state; and a Messianic Macedonia. Though old, the machinery for diffusing the new ideology had long been successful in the past, was completely attuned to what was going on 'back home' in the Balkans, and embraced the struggle for a nation, a language, a Church, and a history. At the same time, the Macedonians were presenting themselves to Australian society as a tiny, oppressed people, but law-abiding, unyielding in the defence of their national ideals, and committed to the protection of human rights.

In the last chapter (pp. 336-360), Dr Tamis draws some final conclusions and offers comments on the mechanisms and pattern of Macedonian immigration to and settling in Australia more or less as outlined above. His basic conclusion in this summing up is that certain abiding factors (their locality of origin and the concomitant mentality, where they chose to settle in Australia, their political and socio-economic behaviour during integration) have always set the Macedonian Greeks apart from the rest of the Greek immigrant community and make it impossible to treat them as a unified group of settlers.

Since the issue of language — i.e. the rift between the Slavonic-speaking and the Greek-speaking members of the Macedonian communities — has assumed immense proportions in Australia, Dr Tamis ventures some linguistic observations on Macedonian Greek as one of the northern Greek dialects. He also investigates the extent to which the Macedonian immigrants use Greek amongst themselves as an indication of how far they have become integrated or preserved their ethnic identity and cultural difference.

The book is supplemented by a lengthy bibliography and a list of the new archival material on which the writer was able to draw (pp. 361-367); as also by three appendixes (pp. 368-374), the first containing extracts from sources relating to Macedonia and the Macedonian Question, the second describing the method and format of his interviews with first-generation immigrants from Macedonia and the rest of Greece, and the third consisting of a point-by-point refutation of the distorted data presented in the Australian writer Peter Hill's recent book *The Macedonians in Australia.*

The author's active involvement on the Greeks' behalf in the developments relating to the Macedonian Question in Australia has prevented him, as he himself admits, from maintaining a rigorously objective stance in his presentation and handling of the subject. This is apparent, for instance, in what he says at the end of the final chapter, about the recent international developments concerning the name and the recognition of the new state that has been created on Greece's northern border since the break-up of Yugoslavia, and also in the first and third appendixes. All the same, the more or less committed stance of the book in no way affects the quality and credibility of the material and the data it contains.

The author's arrangement and presentation of his material in sections based on the geographical areas in which Macedonian immigrants have settled in Australia was no doubt unavoidable, since it was precisely these geographical foci on that massive, unique continent that produced considerable individual variations in the process of settlement and integration. His approach is also justified by the process of serial emigration which brought emigrants from specific areas of Greece to specific areas of Australia. But it must be said that it does make for a repetitive narrative, going over the same ground at close intervals, producing chronological and spatial leaps, lengthy departures from the regular flow of the narrative, and fragmenting the information. The reader is confused and finds it hard to follow the train of events and the sequence of the various stages of Macedonian presence and activity in Australia. The confused effect is no doubt due to the material that was available to the author and used by him: the interviews he recorded over many years of research and the questionnaires he asked a considerable number of immigrants to fill in (cf. appendix 2). Not only does it determine the structure of the book, such material also makes for a lively narrative and abundant and profound data, so important and precious for resolving the mysteries of the past, particularly when isolated individual cases act *de facto* as a mirror for collective experiences in the host country. A lack of consistency in the footnotes is another, minor, drawback.

None of these criticisms, however, in any way reduces the book's intrinsic value. The abundant information, the originality of the material, the critical approach to the various issues, and the writer's need to demonstrate the real relationships underlying the phenomena and events of this particular aspect of the Greek diaspora, all make this book a truly valuable contribution to the study of the history of the Macedonian Question and the Greek diaspora in general, as also the evolution of the Macedonian Question outside the Balkans.

Museum of the Macedonian Struggle CHRISTOS M. MANDATZIS

Abstracts

VICTOR SPINEI

THE ORIGINS OF THE CITIES IN SOUTH-EASTERN MOLDAVIA AND THE TRADE RELATIONS IN THE XIII-XIV CENTURIES

Due to the great migrations the all but few ancient cities in between the Carpathians and the Dniester disappeared altogether and could not be rebuilt for over one thousand years. The overall development of the Romanian society, the intrusion of the Genovese and the Greeks upon the north-western coast of the Black Sea, and the Mongol domination in the regions of the Lower Danube greatly favoured the economic life in the territories east of the Carpathians. The dynamic trade relations were largely responsible for the emergence in the 13th-14th centuries of the urban centres at Cetatea Albă (Asprocastron, Moncastro, Akkerman, Belgorod), Orheiul Vechi and Costeşti.

J. V. IVANOVA

THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS OF LIFE SUBSISTENCE OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE: A GLIMPSE FROM RUSSIA

On the basis of many years' research work on the countries of South-East Europe, using archives and literary sources, the author has come to the conclusion that ethnic culture of the peoples of South-East Europe forms the whole cultural mass, that does not, naturally, exclude the existence of local variants. According to the author's opinion all the region can be defined as a single historico-ethnographic area.

The culture of the peoples of South-East Europe is investigated within the bounds of those theoretical principles, that are followed now by Russian ethnologists (ethnographers, anthropologists). Considering such notions as "historico-ethnographic area", "culture", "traditional culture" and its component elements, special attention has been paid to the combination of the natural-geographic conditions and historical and social factors in the process of forming traditions, to the psychological aspects of the inclusion of innovations into traditional cultural complex. These problems are being solved differently by the Russian scientists of our time, the author expresses here her personal point of view.

I. KYZLASOVA

GREEK ICON OF THE XVIII c. WITH THE VIEW OF THE MONASTERY OF CHRIST PANTOCRATOR ON MOUNT ATHOS

The great collection of the Moscow Historical Museum posseses an unique, never published befor, a greek icon that we refer to the middle of the the XVIII c. There are some historical characters and the trustwortningly drown architectural ensemble of the monastery of Christ Pantocrator on Mount Athos — the type of "loca sancta". For the Greek standards this type of icon is very rare. We can see on the icon two brothers—fonders of the monastery (Stratopedarche Alexis and Great Primikirij John) and St. Callistos I a Patriarch from Constantinople. They lived in XIV c. Among the other bystandings the most important are two Patriarchs: Constantinople's Anfim II (1623) and Pecz's Paisios II (about 1755). History left us nothing about the last character and perhaps it is his "portrait".

ATHANASSIOS CHRISTOU

C. D. SCHINAS AND THE FIRST RECTORSHIP TO THE ATHENS UNIVERSITY (1837-1838)

The Athens University was established by decree "On the Constitution of the University" of April 22nd, 1837. This was the first institution of higher education not only in the newly established Hellenic state, but in the Balkans and the Orient as well. It aimed at the promulgation and cultivation of the letters in "Our Orient".

The subject of this paper is the setting-up of the University and the foundation of its administrative structure, as these appear through the works of C. D. Schinas, its first Rector. At the same time, an effort is made to trace the influence of the European universities in general, and those of Germany in particular, on the first institution of this kind in Greece and the Balkans.